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MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 


MARSHAL 
FERDINAND  FOCH 


HIS   LIFE   AND   HIS  THEORY 
OF  MODERN  WAR 


BY 


A,   HILLIARD  ATTERIDGE 


WITH  BIGHT  MAPS 


NEW  YORK 

DODD,    MEAD   AND  COMPANY 

1919 


CoPYRieHT  1919 
By  DODD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY.  Inc. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 

I  First  Years  and  Education    . 

II  Army  Career  up  to  1905 

III  FocH^s  First  Principles  of  War 

IV  The  Advanced  Guard 
V  The  Battle        .... 

VI  Criticism  of  German  Leadership 

VII  The  Coming  of  the  Great  War 

VIII  FocH^s  Forecast  of  the  War 

IX  The  Battle  of  Morhangb 

X  The  Battle  of  the  Trouee  db  Charmes 

XI  The  Ninth  Army  in  the  Battle  of  the 

Marne 

XII  The  Victorious  Manceuvrb    . 

XIII  FocH  AT  Ypres    .... 

XIV  The  Second  Battle  of  Ypres 
XV  Battle  of  the  Somme 

XVI  Chief  of  the  French  General  Staff 

XVII  "  Co-ordinator  "  of  the  Allied  Oper 

ations 

XVIII  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Allies 

XIX  The  Decisive  Counter-Attack     . 

XX  Personal  Characteristics 


PAGE 

1 

15 

28 

51 

66 

85 

113 

123 

134 

146 

156 
180 
196 
211 
223 
233 

244 
254 
267 

278 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


VACIMO 
FAOB 


Map  No.  1 106 

Map  No.  2     . 136 

Map  No.  3 148 

Map  No.  4 162 

Map  No.  5 182 

Map  No.  6 .184 

Map  No.  7 200 

Map  No.  8 268 


MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 


MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

CHAPTER  I 

FIRST  YEARS   AND   EDUCATION 

Ferdinand  FocH;,  Marshal  of  France  and  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Allied  Armies,  is  one  of  the  sol- 
diers who  have  won  a  lasting  place  in  the  annals  of 
war  in  the  world  wide  conflict  of  our  time.  Few  among 
the  war  leaders  have  achieved  such  eminent  distinction. 
In  this  clash  of  armed  nations,  with  armies  of  millions 
in  the  field,  it  has  been  exceptionally  difficult  for  any 
man  to  win  for  himself  world  wide  recognition  as  a 
master  of  war,  a  recognition  accepted  not  only  by  his 
own  people  but  by  their  Allies,  not  only  by  those  he  has 
led  to  victory  but  by  those  against  whom  he  fought. 

During  the  long  war,  hundreds  of  good  soldiers  have 
found  themselves  in  high  command  as  leaders  of  army 
groups,  armies  and  army  corps  in  the  various  theatres  of 
war.  In  the  stern  test  of  war  under  new  and  peculiarly 
exacting  conditions,  some  have  lost  the  reputation  ac- 
quired in  earlier  days.  A  large  number  of  generals  on 
both  sides  have  shown  themselves  thoroughly  competent 
and  resourceful  leaders  of  men.  They  have — each  in  his 
own  place  in  the  far-flung  battle  line — conducted  oper- 
ations of  importance  and  commanded  in  actions  which 
in  earlier  wars  would  have  been  counted  as  great  bat- 
tles; but  so  far  as  public  recognition  of  their  merit  is 
concerned  they  have  not  emerged  from  the  huge  number 


2  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

of  leaders  engaged  in  the  conflict.  Their  names  are  no 
more  known,  beyond  the  narrow  circle  of  expert  stu- 
dents of  war,  than  the  names  of  the  average  competent 
battalion  commanders  in  the  smaller  wars  of  the  past. 
Not  a  few  have  displayed  powers  of  command  that  would 
have  won  them  a  high  reputation  in  earlier  days.  Some — 
and  their  number  is  not  a  large  one — have  won  a  place 
on  the  roll  of  the  world's  great  war  leaders.  But  even 
among  these  Ferdinand  Foch  stands  out  as  a  leader  of 
supreme  excellence. 

At  the  outset  of  the  war  he  held  a  subordinate  com- 
mand. From  its  first  days  his  rise  to  fame  began.  He 
showed  himself  a  trusty  leader  of  men  alike  in  the  days 
of  trial  and  disaster  and  in  those  of  hard  won  success. 
Indeed  the  highest  tribute  to  his  character  and  his  qual- 
ities as  a  war  leader  is  the  fact  that,  again  and  again,  it 
was  at  moments  when  the  outlook  for  France  seemed 
darkest  that  he  was  called  upon  to  take  control  of  im- 
portant operations  and  that  finally  it  was  when  disaster 
threatened  the  whole  Allied  cause  on  the  Western  Front 
that  all  the  Allied  Nations  joined  in  committing  their 
fortunes  to  his  strong  hands,  and  entrusting  their  fu- 
ture to  his  guidance. 

And  he  has  owed  his  rise  to  this  supreme  position  en- 
tirely to  merit.  It  was  the  result  of  a  life-long  prepara- 
tion for  the  task  thus  entrusted  to  him.  He  had  never 
sought  to  conciliate  the  favour  of  politicians  or  courted 
the  influence  of  men  in  power.  Ou  the  contrary,  in  his 
fidelity  to  the  religious  convictions  that  have  been  the 
inspiration  of  his  life  he  had  taken  a  course  that  was  if 
anything  calculated  to  provoke  their  hostility,  and  which 
certainly  delayed  his  promotion  to  high  rank  and  seemed 
likely  to  be  an  obstacle  to  his  ever  receiving  an  import- 


FIRST  YEARS  AND  EDUCATION  3 

ant  command.  In  an  age  of  self-advertisement,  when  so 
many  hold  that  if  a  man  means  to  succeed  he  must  push 
himself  into  the  limelight  of  press  publicity  Foch  never 
for  a  moment  thought  about  the  easy  ways  of  bringing 
his  name  before  the  public  and  the  political  world,  or 
even  about  acquiring  a  reputation  for  military  insight 
among  the  chiefs  of  the  French  army.  He  never  posed 
as  a  central  figure  at  public  functions;  he  was  never 
interviewed  by  the  press ;  he  made  no  use  of  the  profes- 
sional reviews  to  bring  his  name  before  military  readers. 
He  never  published  a  line  until  his  chiefs  suggested  the 
publication  of  his  lectures  at  the  Staff  College.  From 
the  day  when  he  received  his  first  commission  he  was  a 
hard-working  student  of  war,  patiently  preparing  him- 
self to  do  his  duty  when  the  opportunity  came,  and  mean- 
while content  to  put  all  his  energies  into  the  work  as- 
signed to  him.  Success  in  the  career  of  arms  is  not 
always  associated  with  high  personal  character  or  with 
this  modest  pursuit  of  duty  for  its  own  sake.  In  the 
case  of  Foch,  the  great  soldier  is  also  a  man  whose  whole 
life  has  been  inspired  by  the  highest  ideals. 

In  the  life  story  of  most  successful  soldiers  we  have  a 
long  record  of  war  services  before  they  are  at  last  given 
the  opportunity  of  showing  what  they  can  do  as  generals 
in  high  command.  But  Ferdinand  Foch  saw  active 
service  for  the  first  time  at  the  age  of  sixty-three  in  the 
early  days  of  the  Great  War.  In  the  years  of  peace 
before  the  world-wide  crisis  of  1914  his  name  was  known 
only  to  his  comrades  of  the  French  army  and  to  a  few 
serious  students  of  military  literature  in  other  coun- 
itries.  His  reputation  within  this  limited  circle  de- 
pended on  two  books  in  which  he  had  summed  up  his 
teaching  on  war  in  the  French  Staff  College.     Those 


4  MAKSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

who  knew  these  books  recognized  in  them  the  hand  of 
a  master. 

But  there  is  still  in  many  minds  a  lingering  prejudice 
against  the  soldier  who  without  personal  experience 
of  the  grim  realities  of  war  wins  at  his  desk  and  in  the 
lecture  room  a  reputation  for  military  science.  They 
may  not  go  so  far  as  Shakespeare's  lago  in  his  denun- 
ciation of  Michael  Cassio  as  a  mere  master  of 

"  the  bookish  theoric, 
Wherein  the  togM  consuls  can  propose 
As  masterly  as  he ;  mere  prattle  without  practice." 

But  the  confidence  of  peoples  and  governments  is  more 
readily  given  to  the  soldier  who  has  a  long  record  of 
campaigning  though  he  may  never  have  written  a  line 
of  theoretical  exposition  of  his  methods.  It  is  said  of 
such  a  leader  that  he  has  the  really  useful  knowledge 
that  comes  of  practical  experience,  that  he  is  no  "  theo- 
rist" and  that  after  all  practice  is  worth  more  than 
theory.  But  talk  of  this  kind  leaves  out  of  account  the 
fact  that,  valuable  as  experience  is,  even  the  longest  life 
of  active  service  does  not  by  itself  give  the  wide  and  deep 
knowledge  of  the  possibilities  of  war  that  can  be  gath- 
ered from  scientific  study  based  upon  military  history, 
which  collects  into  one  focus  the  experience  of  the 
world's  greatest  war  leaders.  The  most  marvellous 
soldier  of  them  all — Napoleon — was  himself  throughout 
his  career  a  student  of  the  wars  of  the  past  and  no 
despiser  of  the  "bookish  theoric."  Moltke  before  his 
three  victorious  wars  had  seen  active  service  only  in 
one  unsuccessful  campaign  with  a  Turkish  army,  and 
had  been  under  fire  only  for  a  couple  of  hours  in  the 
defeat  of  Nisib  on  the  Euphrates.  He  prepared  for  his 
years  of  victory  by  the  study  of  the  past.     It  was  Moltke 


FIRST  YEARS  AND  EDUCATION  5 

who  told  the  despisers  of  theory  that  though  it  was  true 
thajt  there  was  a  wide  gap  between  theoretical  knowl- 
edge and  successful  practice,  it  was  no  less  true  that 
there  was  a  vast  abyss  between  ignorance  and  action. 

Ferdinand  Foch  was  one  of  the  new  school  of  French 
soldiers  who  recognized  the  overwhelming  importance  of 
a  sound  theory  of  war  as  the  first  condition  of  military 
success,  and  who  set  themselves  to  popularize  in  the 
French  army  the  knowledge  of  war  to  be  derived  chiefly 
from  two  sources — the  study  of  Napoleon's  campaigns 
and  the  frank  and  fearless  examination  of  the  causes 
that  had  led  to  the  success  of  Germany  and  the  dis- 
asters of  France  in  the  war  of  1870-71. 

Such  study  must  be  based  on  facts ;  and  the  necessary 
materials  were  supplied  by  the  painstaking  work  of  the 
historical  section  of  the  French  General  Staff  during 
the  years  that  saw  the  production  of  detailed  records  of 
the  wars  of  Napoleon  and  the  admirable  French  official 
history  of  the  war  of  1870-71,  a  history  remarkable  for 
the  clear-sighted  impartiality  with  which  it  marshals 
the  facts,  and  the  candour  with  which  the  full  meed  of 
praise  is  given  to  German  leadership  and  the  weakness 
of  the  French  direction  of  the  war  is  exposed.  Making 
full  use  of  these  facts  and  of  the  rich  store  of  material 
provided  by  recent  German  military  literature,  students 
of  war  like  Bonnal,  Langlois  and  Colin,  had  done  good 
work  in  the  development  of  theory.  Foch  broke  new 
ground  and  gave  to  the  French  doctrine  of  war  the 
stamp  of  his  own  mentality.  Clear  in  his  vision  of  the 
facts,  equally  clear  in  his  exposition  and  in  drawing 
sound  practical  conclusions  from  them,  he  was  a  model 
teacher.  Then,  after  having  inspired  so  many  of  his 
comrades  with  his  ideas,  it  was  his  good  fortune  to 


6  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

find  the  opportunity  of  doing  splendid  service  to  his 
country  and  her  allies,  and  to  show  that  he  was  no 
mere  theorist  but  could  apply  in  the  field  the  lessons 
he  had  taught  so  well  in  the  lecture  room  and  in  his 
writings. 

To  know  such  a  man  one  must  not  only  follow  the 
story  of  his  career  and  of  his  exploits  in  the  field,  but 
also  learn  something  of  his  teaching. 

Foch  does  not  sound  like  a  purely  French  name.  In- 
deed, it  rather  suggests  as  its  place  of  origin  that  border- 
land of  the  Vosges  and  the  Rhine  which  has  given  so 
many  good  soldiers  to  France — not  in  the  east  but  in 
the  south,  a  region  that  was  once  an  independent  king- 
dom with  territories  on  both  sides  of  the  Pyrenees,  now 
parcelled  out  into  Spanish  provinces  and  French  depart- 
ments. The  Gascony  of  France  and  the  Vascongadas 
of  Spain  have  produced  many  world-famous  men.  In 
the  fighting  days  of  the  Republic  and  the  First  Empire, 
Gascony  gave  the  French  army  a  Murat,  a  Bessieres  and 
a  Marbot.  Joffre  comes  from  that  southern  land,  as 
also  does  that  other  good  soldier,  De  Castelnau.  The 
home  of  the  Foch*  family  is  among  the  foothills  of 
the  Pyrenees,  on  the  upper  Garonne,  where  the  river 
is  a  mountain  stream  winding  among  wooded  hills. 
Here,  in  1780,  the  grandfather  of  the  general  invested 
part  of  his  profits  as  a  wool  merchant  in  land  and  built 
himself  a  house  at  the  village  of  Valentine  near  the 
town  of  St.  Gaudens.  Possessing  neither  the  wealth 
nor  the  claim  to  nobility  that  might  have  made  the  days 
of  the  Revolution  a  danger  to  him,  the  stormy  time 
brought  no  trouble  to  his  home,  and  under  the  Empire 

*  In  the  south  of  France  the  name  is  pronounced  with  a  hard  guttural 
ending.  In  Paris  and  the  north  it  is  usually  softened  into  "  Fosh."  The 
name  is  said  to  have  in  ths  Basque  landa  the  meaning  of  "  fire." 


FIRST  YEARS  AND  EDUCATION  7 

he  was  a  prosperous  man  devoted  to  the  new  order  of 
things  and  rejoicing  in  the  victories  that  for  awhile 
made  France  under  Napoleon  the  mistress  of  half 
Europe.  To  his  son  born  in  those  days  of  triumph  he 
gave  the  name  of  Napoleon. 

Amongst  his  friends  in  the  days  of  the  Restoration 
was  a  soldier  of  the  Empire,  Colonel  Dupr^,  who  had 
fought  with  distinction  in  the  Spanish  wars  and  on  his 
retirement  from  the  army  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon, 
settled  at  St.  Gaudens.  His  daughter,  Sophie  Dupr^, 
married  Napoleon  Foch.  These  were  the  parents  of 
Ferdinand  Foch. 

Napoleon  Foch  entered  the  French  civil  service,  and 
in  1851  was  stationed  at  Tarbes  in  the  Hautes  Pyrenees 
as  secretary  to  the  prefecture  of  the  department,  when 
on  October  2nd,  his  son  Ferdinand  was  born.  He  was 
the  third  child  of  the  marriage.  The  eldest  was  a 
daughter,  now  living  in  the  old  home  of  the  family  at 
Valentine.  Then  came  a  son,  Gabriel  Foch,  now  a 
lawyer  at  Tarbes.  The  third  son,  Germain,  is  now  a 
priest,  the  Jesuit  Pfere  Foch.* 

Within  a  few  weeks  of  the  birth  of  Ferdinand  Foch 
came  the  news  of  the  coup  d'etat  of  December,  1851, 
and  a  year  later  the  revival  of  the  Empire  under 
Napoleon  III,  bringing  with  it  a  promise  of  peace  and 
internal  order.  Considering  what  were  the  family 
traditions  one  is  not  surprised  at  finding  that  M. 
Napoleon  Foch  of  Tarbes  welcomed  the  change  and 
from  the  first  gave  his  allegiance  to  the  new  govern- 
ment. But  he  seems  never  to  have  been  a  keen  poli- 
tician. He  sought  no  special  favours  from  the  new 
regime,  but  was  content  to  retain  his  employment  under 

*  Germain  Foch,  the  youngest  of  the  three  brothers,  was  born  in  1854; 
and  entered  the  Jesuit  novitiate  in  1872. 


8  MAESHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

it.  Year  after  year  lie  fulfilled  routine  duties,  first  at 
the  Tarbes  prefecture,  later  as  an  official  in  the  revenue 
department.  Promotion  came  slowly,  and  he  never  held 
any  high  office  or  reached  the  centre  of  administration 
at  Paris.  From  time  to  time  he  was  moved  from  one 
part  of  France  to  another,  and  the  result  was  that  his 
son  Ferdinand's  education  was  of  a  rather  exceptional 
character.  He  passed  through  several  schools  in  the 
course  of  a  few  years.  Devoted  to  his  sons,  Napoleon 
Foch  disliked  the  idea  of  sending  them  away  to  a  pen- 
sionnat  or  boarding-school.  At  each  change  of  resi- 
dence he  took  the  boys  with  him.  Their  education  was 
carried  on  in  the  home  circle  as  well  as  in  the  class- 
rooms of  the  local  day  school. 

The  first  of  these  schools  was  the  old  college  of 
Tarbes,  where  Ferdinand  spent  two  years  in  1862 
and  1863.  The  holidays  were  always  passed  at  the 
country  house  at  Valentine.  Here  for  some  weeks  in 
the  summer  the  boys  and  their  sister  lived  an  open-air 
life  in  the  pleasant  hill  country.  A  favourite  excur- 
sion was  to  the  Bout  du  Puig,  a  bold  summit  locally 
famous  for  its  shrine  of  Our  Lady,  from  which  there  is 
a  wide  prospect  northwards  over  the  upper  valley  of 
the  Garonne,  while  southwards  the  view  is  bounded  by 
the  Main  ridges  of  the  Pyrenees. 

The  school  days  at  Tarbes  came  to  an  end  when 
Napoleon  Foch  was  transferred  from  the  prefecture  to 
the  post  of  "Payeur  du  Tresor,"  or  superintendent  of 
public  disbursements  at  Polignac.  Ferdinand  attended 
a  local  day  school,  and  then  came  a  move  to  Rodez  in 
the  AveyroD  and  another  new  school.  He  made  no 
record  of  any  special  intention  in  these  first  years.* 

•  At  TarheB,  though  he  won  no  prizes,  he  obtained  the  "  accesait  " 
or  "  hfiiHMirahli'  mention  "  for  religious  knowledge,  Latin,  history,  and 
geography. 


FIRST  YEARS  AND  EDUCATION  9 

We  only  know  that  he  showed  a  marked  capacity  for 
mathematical  work  and  was  a  great  reader.  Instead 
of  juvenile  fiction  and  tales  of  imaginary  adventure,  he 
plodded  through  solid  military  histories  written  for 
older  readers.  At  twelve  years  of  age  he  had  read 
through  all  the  volumes  of  Thiers'  History  of  the  Con- 
sulate and  the  Empire,  the  last  volume  of  which  had 
appeared  in  1860.  The  book  is  not  very  sound  or  criti- 
cal history,  but  for  the  Frenchmen  of  the  time  it  was 
the  popular  epic  of  Napoleon.  It  celebrates  the  glories 
of  the  great  soldier  and  the  prowess  of  France.  But  it 
is  anything  but  bright  reading,  and  the  boy  who  made 
it  his  favourite  book  so  early  in  life  must  have  been 
of  a  decidedly  studious  disposition.  Probably  it  helped 
to  decide  his  future  career.  We  may  guess  that  he 
passed  lightly  over  the  political  chapters,  but  revelled 
in  the  battle  stories,  from  the  cannonade  by  the  mill  of 
Valmy  to  the  last  charge  of  the  Old  Guard  at  Waterloo. 
If  he  dreamed  of  future  battles  in  which  he  would  some 
day  play  a  part,  his  wildest  imagination  could  not 
suggest  that  he  was  himself  to  command  greater 
armies  than  had  ever  followed  the  eagles  of  his 
hero. 

In  1867  there  came  another  change.  His  father  was 
moved  from  Rodez  to  act  as  percepteur  or  receiver  of 
the  revenue  at  St.  Etienne,  near  Lyons,  and  the  boy 
became  a  pupil  at  the  Jesuit  college  of  St.  Michel.  Here 
he  prepared  for  his  successful  examination  for  the  bac- 
calaureat — the  university  degree  that  marks  the  con- 
clusion of  a  young  Frenchman's  general  education,  after 
which,  if  he  pursues  his  studies  further,  specialization 
begins. 

Foch  had  already  decided  to  enter  the  army,  and  his 


10  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

aptitude  for  scientific  and  mathematical  studies  sug- 
gested that  he  should  make  the  artillery  his  special 
branch  of  the  service.  In  France  the  Ecole  Polytech- 
nique  at  Paris  is  the  usual  centre  of  preliminary  studies 
for  the  artillery  and  the  engineers,  including  those  who 
intend  to  enter  the  civil  service  of  the  State  as  well  as 
the  engineer  officers  of  the  army.  But  though  some  of 
the  students  are  destined  for  civilian  life,  the  organi- 
zation and  discipline  of  the  school  are  essentially  mili- 
tary. One  of  its  proud  traditions  is  that  when  Parfs 
made  its  brief  stand  against  the  Allied  armies  in  1814, 
the  students  of  the  Polytechnique  manned  the  guns  of 
some  of  the  improvised  batteries.  Artillery  and  engi- 
neer officers  are  commissioned  directly  from  the  school. 
Admission  to  it  is  obtained  by  passing  a  stiff  examina- 
tion in  which  higher  mathematics  plays  a  larger  part. 
To  make  ready  for  this  test,  Ferdinand  Foch  was  sent 
to  a  special  class  at  the  Jesuit  college  of  St.  Clement 
at  Metz. 

In  these  later  years  of  the  Second  Empire  the  Jesuit 
colleges  in  France  had  been  remarkably  successful  in 
preparing  candidates  for  the  military  examinations. 
After  the  war  of  1870-71,  the  college  of  the  Rue  de 
Sevres  was  able  to  set  up  in  one  of  its  halls  on  a  series 
of  marble  tablets  its  Roll  of  Honour  inscribed  with  the 
names  of  more  than  six  hundred  of  its  former  pupils 
who  had  fallen  sword  in  hand  as  officers  of  the  imperial 
army  and  of  the  new  levies  raised  by  Gambetta.  St. 
Clement  at  Metz  stood  only  second  to  the  Paris  college 
as  a  training  centre  for  the  army.  It  w'as  a  large 
establishment  with  several  hundred  students.  A  num- 
ber of  these  were  boarders,  but  most  of  them  were  day 
scholars  from  the  city  and  from  many  places  within 


FIRST  YEARS  AND  EDUCATION  11 

easy  reach  by  railway.  Foch  joined  the  internat,  or 
resident  side  of  the  college  early  in  1870,  and  thus  found 
himself  for  the  first  time  living  away  from  home.  His 
professors  in  the  army  class  were  Pere  Saussier  who 
had  been  in  earlier  years  an  officer  of  the  French  navy, 
and  Pere  Lacouture  a  distinguished  mathematician. 
Metz  was  an  interesting  place  for  the  future  soldier — 
a  frontier  fortress  with  a  large  garrison  and  an  army 
of  workmen  busy  on  the  new  defences.  Since  1866  there 
had  been  a  growing  tension  in  the  relations  of  France 
and  Prussia;  rumours  of  the  "inevitable  war"  for  the 
Rhine  frontier  were  in  the  air.  The  students  of  the 
military  class  would  look  forward  to  the  probability 
of  seeing  active  service  as  soon  as  they  had  won  their 
commissions.  In  France  there  was  absolute  faith  in 
the  forecast  that  when  the  w^r  came  it  would  be  fought 
out  on  the  Rhine  and  in  Germany — ^that  it  would  be  a 
victorious  march  on  Berlin.  There  were  a  few  thought- 
ful men  who  had  their  doubts ;  but  such  scepticism  was 
regarded  as  unpatriotic  pessimism.  For  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  Frenchmen  it  was  impossible  to  imagine  that 
the  army  which  had  conquered  at  Sebastopol  and  on 
the  battlefields  of  Italy  could  fall  before  the  "  Prussian 
militia." 

In  the  summer  of  1870,  young  Foch  went  home  to  St. 
Etienne.  He  had  won  the  college  prize  for  good  con- 
duct ;  bestowed  not  by  the  decision  of  the  professors  but 
by  the  votes  of  his  fellow  students.  He  expected  to  re- 
turn to  his  studies  at  St.  Clement  in  August.  But 
July  19th  brought  the  declaration  of  war,  long  expected 
but  nevertheless  coming  as  a  surprise.  For  at  the  be- 
ginning of  this  third  week  of  July  it  seemed  that  the 
crisis  would  receive  a  peaceful  solution,  thanks  to  the 


12  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

withdrawal  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidature  for  the 
Spanish  crown.  But  then  the  political  horizon  dark- 
ened again,  as  the  Emperor's  government  rashly  sought 
to  improve  the  advantage  won,  by  putting  forward  new 
demands  for  the  future.  Then  came  the  story  of  the 
angry  scene  between  King  William  and  the  French 
ambassador — a  fiction  exploited  by  both  sides  to  fan 
the  war  fever — and  then  the  crash  came. 

But  even  so  it  seemed  that  Foch  would  be  able  to 
go  back  to  Metz.  The  French  army  of  the  Rhine  was 
preparing  to  invade  Germany.  The  young  man  had  the 
prospect  of  spending  his  next  half  year  at  college  in 
the  great  fortress  that  would  be  the  starting-point  of 
the  victorious  advance — a  place  where  he  would  see, 
not  war,  but  all  the  stir  and  excitement  of  a  great 
military  centre  close  up  to  the  war  zone.  But  the  first 
days  of  August  brought  news  of  defeat.  Metz  became 
a  centre  of  the  conflict — soon  to  be  besieged.  The 
classes  did  not  reassemble  at  St.  Clement,  and  the  col- 
lege was  transformed  into  a  military  hospital.  Ferdi- 
nand Foch  remained  at  home,  awaiting  events. 

September  brought  the  catastrophe  of  Sedan.  The 
Germans  were  marching  on  Paris,  but  the  flood  of 
invasion  had  passed  far  to  the  north  of  St.  Etienne. 
The  call  for  the  new  levies  came;  and  Foch  presented 
himself  as  a  recruit  at  the  local  depot  of  the  4th  Regi- 
ment of  Infantry. 

He  was  looking  forward  eagerly  to  seeing  active 
service  as  Private  Focji;  but  as  chance  would  have  it, 
he  was  to  take  no  part  in  the  fighting  during  the  four 
months  in  which  the  new  armies  kept  the  field.  After 
some  weeks  at  the  depot,  he  was  sent  with  the  4th 
Battalion  of  tlie  regiment  to  Chillons-sur-Saone.    Here 


FIRST  YEARS  AND  EDUCATION  13 

he  was  not  far  from  the  scenes  of  the  last  episode  of 
the  war  in  eastern  Prance — Bourbaki's  march  to  the 
relief  of  Belfort  ending  in  defeat  and  a  retirement 
across  the  Swiss  frontier.  But  the  battalion  remained 
on  garrison  duty  just  clear  of  this  eastward  eddy  of 
the  tide  of  war. 

In  January,  1871,  came  the  armistice  and  the  peace 
negotiations.  The  battalion  was  at  once  disbanded,  and 
Foch  found  himself  mustered  out  without  having  been 
under  fire.  However  he  had  done  his  duty  and  made 
with  full  intent  the  sacrifice  of  his  life  if  need  be,  and 
it  was  no  fault  of  his  that  he  had  not  undergone  the 
supreme  test  of  battle.  "  They  also  serve  who  only 
stand  and  wait " ;  and  he  had  waited  eagerly  for  the 
chance  that  was  denied  him.  For  him  the  war  had 
come  just  too  soon.  If  he  had  already  reached  the 
Polytechnique,  he  would  have  been  one  of  the  crowd  of 
young  men  who  on  the  news  of  first  defeats  on  the 
frontier  were  at  once  commissioned  to  supply  the  cadres 
of  officers  for  the  batteries  of  the  new  armies  and  the 
defences  of  Paris.  Instead  of  any  such  good  fortune,  he 
had  had  to  spend  four  months  as  an  infantry  private  in 
barracks  and  on  the  drill  ground.  But  all  the  same,  it 
had  been  a  very  useful  experience.  He  had  been  doing 
a  man's  work.  The  infantry  private's  training  under 
the  severe  discipline  of  war  time  was  a  useful  element 
in  his  education.  It  would  be  a  gain  for  the  future 
officer  to  have  shared  the  rough  conditions  of  life  in  a 
barrack  room.  It  would  help  him  to  understand  better 
the  men  in  the  ranks,  when  he  came  to  wear  the 
epaulettes. 

From  Chaions-sur-Sa6ne  he  returned  to  St.  Etienne 
for  a  brief  rest  at  home,  and  then  resumed  his  studies. 


14  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

The  college  of  St.  Clement  at  Metz  had  reopened  in 
January.  He  went  there  in  the  following  month.  Metz 
was  now  a  German  fortress.  The  red-white-and-black 
flag  flew  over  its  forts,  and  a  German  general  had  his 
headquarters  at  the  prefecture.  There  was  a  large  gar- 
rison in  the  city.  Indeed,  so  pressed  for  room  wiere  the 
conquerors,  that  part  of  the  college  had  been  requisi- 
tioned as  a  temporary  barrack.  It  was  in  the  midst  of 
these  reminders  of  the  disasters  that  had  befallen  his 
country,  that  Foch  prepared  for  his  life  work  as  a 
French  officer.  In  the  summer  he  went  to  Nancy, 
where  an  examination  for  admission  to  the  Polytech- 
nique  was  to  be  held. 

The  capital  of  Lorraine  had  not  been  included  in  the 
territory  annexed  by  Germany ;  but  a  German  garrison 
still  held  the  city.  General  Manteuffel,  commanding 
the  army  of  occupation  in  eastern  France,  had  made 
Nancy  his  headquarters.  German  troops  were  in  bar- 
racks and  billets  in  the  city,  their  patrols  passed  along 
the  streets  every  day,  and  one  of  their  military  bands 
played  in  the  Place  Stanislas.  For  the  time  being  the 
German  conquest  was  as  much  in  evidence  at  Nancy  as 
at  Metz.  Like  other  young  men  Foch  must  have  had  his 
day-dreams.  But  even  the  most  ambitious  dream  could 
not  suggest  to  him  that  in  the  coming  years  he  would 
be  the  general  in  command  at  Nancy  and  would  march 
from  it  to  his  first  battle.  Probably  he  thought  mostly 
of  his  chances  in  the  examination.  He  came  out  in  the 
list  of  successful  candidates,  and  went  home  for  a  well- 
earned  holiday  with  the  notification  that  he  was  to  join 
the  Polytechnique  at  Paris  on  November  1st. 


CHAPTER  II 

ARMY  CAREER  UP  TO  1905 

Southern  Paris — the  old  Quartier  de  rUniversit^ — is 
the  region  of  the  schools.  There  it  was  that  in  1794, 
under  the  government  of  the  Directory,  Gaspard  Monge 
founded  a  new  kind  of  college  for  which  he  invented  a 
new  name,  a  name  that  in  its  English  form  has  come 
to  be  applied  to  more  peaceful  institutions.  Gaspard 
Monge's  Polytechnique  was  to  be  a  college  where  young 
men  would  receive  a  scientific  education  to  prepare 
them  for  "  technical "  work  of  various  kinds  in  the 
service  of  the  State  either  in  a  military  or  civil  capacity. 
Monge  was  a  world-famous  mathematician ;  so  mathe- 
matics held  a  high  place  in  the  programme  of  his  school. 
As  the  school  was  to  supply  the  army  with  gunner 
officers  and  engineers  it  had  from  the  outset  a  distinctly 
military  character  with  a  barrack  element  in  its  organi- 
zation and  a  uniform  for  its  students.  But  a  large 
number  of  them  would  never  be  soldiers.  They  were  to 
be  builders  and  inspectors  of  roads  and  bridges.  Later 
on,  the  course  included  preparation  for  the  telegraph 
service  and  the  tobacco  monopoly  offices.  But  even 
these  future  civil  engineers  and  controllers  of  tobacco 
and  matches  lived  under  military  discipline,  drilled  in 
the  quadrangles  of  the  barrack-like  college,  and  were 
boy  soldiers  for  the  time  being.  Therefore  when  Foch, 
destined  for  the  French  artillery,  put  on  his  new  uni- 

15 


16  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

form,  on  November  1st,  1871,  and  reported  for  duty 
and  study  at  the  Polytechnique,  he  felt  that  at  last  he 
had  made  a  real  start  in  his  chosen  career. 

Here  too,  as  at  Metz  and  Nancy,  there  were  reminders 
of  the  recent  troubles  of  France.  During  the  German 
siege  the  year  before,  the  Polytechnique  had  been  a 
hospital.  In  the  second  siege  of  the  Commune  the 
Federalists  had  held  the  school,  and  it  had  been  stormed 
on  May  24:th,  by  a  battalion  of  Chasseurs.  The  build- 
ings bore  traces  of  the  fighting.  Shells  had  burst  on 
the  roofs.  There  were  bullet  holes  in  the  walls.  After 
the  capture  of  the  Polytechnique,  drum  head  court- 
martials  had  been  held  in  one  of  the  class  rooms,  and 
the  condemned  communists  had  been  shot  on  the  play- 
ground, the  dead  being  collected  afterwards  in  the 
large  billiard-room.  These  recent  memories  of  civil 
war  were  sadder  even  than  the  earlier  record  of  defeat 
at  the  hands  of  the  invader.  It  was  under  the  im- 
pression of  such  memories  that  the  directors  of  the 
Polytechnique  suppressed  the  traditional  school  f^tes 
during  this  first  year  of  resumed  work. 

Among  Foch's  fellow  students  there  were  two  other 
future  leaders  of  the  Great  War.  One  was  a  southerner 
like  himself,  and  a  year  younger  than  Foch,  but  he  had 
already  commanded  guns  in  action  in  the  batteries  of 
Paris  during  the  first  siege,  for  he  was  one  of  the 
students  taken  from  the  Polytechnique  as  an  improvised 
artillery  officer  in  the  early  days  of  the  war.  He  was 
Joffre,  the  future  chief  of  the  French  Staff  and  com- 
mander of  the  armies  of  France.  The  other  was  Ruffey 
— who  was  to  be  a  member  of  the  Conseil  Sup(5rieur  de 
Guerre  in  1914  and  commander  of  the  Third  Army  in 
the  earlier  operations. 


ARMY  CAREER  UP  TO  1905  17 

In  February,  1873,  during  the  second  year  of  studies, 
it  was  announced  that,  as  officers  were  badly  needed  for 
the  reorganized  army,  those  who  had  done  well  in  the 
annual  examinations  would  have  their  course  shortened 
in  order  to  receive  their  commissions  as  soon  as  possible. 
Among  those  who  were  given  this  accelerated  promotion 
were  Joffre  and  Foch.  Joffre  had  selected  the  engineers 
as  his  branch  of  the  service ;  Foch  was  destined  for  the 
artillery.  Before  completing  the  full  course  at  the 
Polytechnique  he  joined  as  a  cadet  the  artillery  school 
(Ecole  d' Application  d'Artillerie)  at  Fontainebleau. 

Paris  had  never  had  any  attractions  for  him.  He 
has  all  his  life  been  a  lover  of  the  country,  and  the 
change  to  Fontainebleau  was  a  welcome  one.  He  was 
at  last  working  at  his  profession  amid  ideal  surround- 
ings. He  had  learned  to  be  at  home  in  the  saddle  when 
he  was  a  boy  at  Valentine.  The  great  forest  of  Fon- 
tainebleau gave  opportunities  for  many  excursions.  The 
little  town  itself  was  a  place  of  historic  memories, 
centering  around  episodes  in  the  career  of  his  hero,  the 
great  Emperor.  He  was  in  vigorous  health,  and  his 
studious  habits  made  the  work  of  the  classes  easy.  At 
the  end  of  the  course,  he  came  out  third  in  the  examina- 
tion list,  a  proof  that  he  had  made  exceptionally  good 
use  of  his  time.  He  then  received  his  commission  as 
Sous-lieutenant  in  the  artillery,  and  was  told  that  he 
might  choose  the  garrison  to  which  he  was  to  be  at- 
tached. He  selected  his  birthplace — Tarbes.  There  he 
would  be  among  the  old  and  loved  Pyrenean  scenes  of 
his  boyhood  and  within  easy  reach  of  the  home  of  his 
people  at  Valentine. 

Two  years  were  spent  at  Tarbes  in  the  round  of 
regimental  duties,  with  a  first  experience  of  the  mild 


18  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

imitation  of  campaigning  supplied  by  the  autumn 
manoeuvres.  The  young  soldier  was  still  a  student, 
busy  with  military  history  and  technical  works  on  his 
own  special  branch  of  the  service.  With  a  view  to 
qualifying  himself  for  future  staff  work,  he  applied  for 
admission  to  the  cavalry  school  at  Saumur.  In  his  four 
months  of  service  during  the  Franco-German  War  he 
had  learned  something  of  infantry  work.  He  had  since 
then  made  himself  an  exceptionally  capable  artillery 
officer.  He  was  now  to  learn  the  methods  of  the  third 
arm  of  the  service,  the  cavalry.  He  had  been  promoted 
to  the  full  rank  of  Lieutenant  at  Tarbes.  After  a  twelve 
months'  course  with  the  cavalry  at  Saumur,  he  was 
promoted  in  the  summer  of  1878  to  the  rank  of  Captain, 
and  when  he  rejoined  the  artillery  he  was  given  com- 
mand of  a  field  battery  in  the  10th  Regiment  of  Artillery 
at  Rennes,  in  Brittany. 

This  Celtic  province  of  far  western  France  was  to 
become  the  land  of  his  adoption.  In  after  years  he 
was  to  speak  of  its  soldiers  as  "my  Bretons".  No  dis- 
trict in  France  has  been  more  devoted  to  the  nation, 
because,  yet  more  than  any  other  province,  it  keeps  its 
local  individuality,  its  own  special  nationalism.  The 
old  Celtic  language  is  still  spoken,  the  old  literature 
of  ballad  and  legend  cultivated  even  among  peasants 
and  fishermen.  The  people  are  devoted  to  the  old  faith 
of  France.  For  them  the  unseen  world  is  a  reality,  and 
as  sailors  and  soldiers  they  face  death  with  the  tranquil 
courage  of  men  for  whom  it  is  only  a  passage  to  the 
other  life  that  has  been  the  background  of  their  thought 
since  childhood.  The  land  itself  jutting  out  into  the 
Atlantic,  broken  with  wild  stretches  of  rocky  upland 
and  desolate  moors,  has  for  its  monuments  the  dolmens 


ARMY  CAREER  UP  TO  1905  19 

and  menhirs  of  the  vanished  pagan  days,  with  the 
village  calvaries  proclaiming  the  triumph  of  the  cross. 
For  Foch,  a  zealous  and  devoted  Catholic,  this  Celtic 
land  had  a  special  glory  of  its  own. 

Here  he  made  his  new  home ;  for  it  was  while  he  was 
doing  garrison  duty  at  Rennes,  that  he  met  the  lady 
whom  he  married  in  the  same  year — Mademoiselle  Julie 
Bienvenue  of  St.  Brieuc.  After  his  marriage,  he  bought 
the  estate  and  the  old  manor  house  of  Trefeunteuniou, 
near  Morlaix,  in  Finisterre,  the  far  west  of  Brittany 
between  the  Montagne  d'Arr^e  and  the  Atlantic  coast. 
The  estate  was  well  wooded,  when  Foch  bought  it,  and 
he  has  made  extensive  additions  to  the  plantations  in 
the  years  before  the  war.  Forestry  was  one  of  his 
recreations.  The  long  grey  front  of  the  house — with 
two  rows  of  sunny  windows  and  little  dormer  windows 
in  the  high-pitched  roof — looks  out  between  bowers  of 
trees,  across  a  broad  stretch  of  meadow;  and  though 
the  church  of  Ploujean  is  not  far  off,  there  is  a  domestic 
chapel  in  the  garden  near  one  end  of  the  house. 

During  his  stay  at  Rennes,  he  began  his  studies  in 
immediate  preparation  for  admission  to  the  Ecole  de 
Guerre,  the  French  Staff  College  founded  during  the 
reorganization  of  the  army  after  the  war  of  1870-71.  A 
course  at  the  Staff  College  is  the  normal  way,  first  to 
staff  employment,  and  then  to  high  command.  Foch 
knew  that  success  in  his  career  must  depend  entirely 
on  his  own  efforts.  He  had  no  influential  friends  in 
high  places,  and  he  had  always  held  studiously  aloof 
from  politics.  Considering  the  drift  of  French  politi- 
cal affairs  in  these  days  he  was  seriously  handicapped 
by  a  fact  that  is  entirely  to  his  credit.  Anti-cleri- 
calism— to   use  a   stupid   but   popular   term — was   in 


20  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

fashion  in  Government  circles  in  France.  An  officer 
was  likely  to  find  his  professional  merit  and  zeal 
disregarded  and  his  promotion  delayed  if  he  openly 
professed  and  practised  the  religion  that  was  associated 
with  so  much  of  the  historic  glories  of  France.  The 
faith  of  St.  Lonis  and  Duguesclin,  of  Jeanne  d'Arc  and 
Bayard,  of  Champlain  and  Montcalm,  was  a  barrier 
to  a  good  soldier's  success  in  his  career.  There  even 
came  a  time  when  the  Ministry  of  War  at  Paris  had  its 
secret  dossiers  noting  as  a  black  mark  against  an  officer's 
name,  that  he  went  to  Mass  on  Sundays.  No  doubt  the 
names  of  men  like  De  Castelnau  and  Foch  were  to  be 
found  in  this  list — which,  happily  for  the  future  of  the 
French  army  was  before  long  denounced  in  the  French 
Parliament  and  consigned  to  the  waste  paper  basket. 

The  son  of  pious  Catholic  parents,  a  student  in  the 
Jesuit  colleges,  Ferdinand  Foch  has  been  all  through 
his  life  an  earnestly  religious  man,  practising  and  pro- 
fessing his  religion  without  either  ostentation  or  con- 
cealment, and  paying  no  attention  to  what  those  who 
were  hostile  to  it  might  think  or  say  of  him.  He  made 
it  the  guide  of  his  life,  the  inspiration  of  his  high  ideals 
of  duty  and  self  sacrifice.  He  knew  that  this  might 
well  be  an  obstacle  to  him  in  his  professional  career, 
but  that  made  no  difference.  "  Fais  ce  que  tu  dois, 
advienne  qui  pourra  " — "  Do  what  you  ought,  come  what 
may" — was  the  rule  of  his  life.  He  was  conscious  of 
mental  power  and  capacity,  and  worked  steadily  to  fit 
himself  for  command  should  the  opportunity  come.  The 
way  he  chose  was  continual  application  to  the  serious 
scientific  study  of  his  profession.  Others  took  a  more 
adventurous,  and  what  they  hoped  would  be  a  more 
rai)id,  way  to  promotion,  by  volunteering  for  one  or 


ARMY  CAREER  UP  TO  1905  21 

other  of  the  many  little  wars  of  France's  growing 
colonial  empire.  They  fought,  and  won  distinction,  in 
Algeria,  Tunis,  Morocco,  the  Senegal  and  Niger  regions. 
Tonkin  and  Madagascar.  Foch  remained  in  France, 
doing  the  daily  round  of  duty,  giving  his  leisure  hours 
to  study,  and  waiting  to  take  his  part  in  the  defence  of 
his  country  in  the  Great  War  in  Europe — the  war  that 
was  often  predicted  but  deferred  year  after  year  until 
those  who  spoke  of  it  were  at  last  in  danger  of  being 
regarded  as  hopeless  pessimists.  Yet  it  was  coming 
slowly  but  surely.  For,  as  Bismarck  put  it  in  his  later 
years,  "All  the  Great  Powers  were  busy  piling  up  ex- 
plosives, and  some  day  a  spark  would  bring  the  ex- 
plosion." 

From  Rennes  Foch  was  called  to  Paris  to  act  for 
some  months  as  one  of  the  experts  of  the  technical 
department  of  artillery  at  the  War  Office — ^a  first  official 
recognition  of  his  scientific  ability.  In  1885,  he  secured 
admission  to  the  Staff  College,  the  Ecole  de  Guerre. 
Years  after,  when  he  was  himself  a  teacher  there,  he 
noted  that  though  the  Staff  College  of  France  was 
founded  in  1876,  it  was  not  till  1882  that  a  reasonable 
and  practical  teaching  of  the  science  of  war  was  given 
there.*  He  began  his  course  of  studies  in  the  School 
when  the  new  method  of  teaching  had  made  some  prog- 
ress— a  method  that,  instead  of  abstract  theory,  made 
the  detailed  account  of  recent  military  history  the  basis 
of  the  teaching,  and  presented  the  theory  of  war  as  a 
series  of  practical  deductions  from  well-ascertained 
facts. 

•  II  faut  arriver  a  1882-83  en  France  pour  trouver  de  la  guerre  un 
enseignement  rational  et  pratique,  et  cela,  bien  que  notre  ficole  datat 
de  1876.  II  n'avait  pas  done  sufR  de  porter  I'inseription  sur  les  mur3 
pour  cr^er  I'^ficole  de  Guerre." — Principes  de  la  Ouerre,  p.  2. 


22  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  POCH 

The  course  lasted  for  two  years.  At  the  final  ex- 
amination, in  the  summer  of  1887,  he  came  out  fourth 
on  the  list.  But  besides  winning  this  high  place,  he  had 
made  his  mark  there  in  other  ways.  His  soldier  pro- 
fessors— men  who  would  soon  themselves  hold  high 
command  and  act  as  the  advisers  of  the  Government  in 
questions  of  promotion — recognized  in  the  Captain  of 
Artillery  a  man  with  a  wide  knowledge  of  all  the  arms 
of  the  service  and  a  student  of  war  who  could  think 
for  himself  and  had  his  own  way  of  facing  every  prob- 
lem, a  power  of  stating  its  conditions  clearly  and  sug- 
gesting a  solution  that  took  into  account  the  realities 
of  war.  His  years  of  earlier  study  had  borne  good 
fruit. 

After  passing  successfully  through  the  Ecole  de 
Guerre,  an  officer  is  usually  given  the  opportunity  of 
further  training  by  actual  experience  of  staff  work. 
Foch  was  sent  to  the  south  of  France,  to  the  coast 
region  of  the  Mediterranean,  to  serve  for  awhile  on  the 
staff  of  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  which  had  its  head- 
quarters at  Montpellier.  He  was  then  for  awhile  at- 
tached as  a  staff  officer  to  one  of  the  divisions  of  the 
same  Army  Corps.  In  February,  1891,  he  was  pro- 
moted to  the  rank  of  Chef  d'Escadron  (Major  of 
Artillery),  and  recalled  to  Paris,  where  he  was  attached 
to  the  Third  Section  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army, 
which  has  to  deal  with  the  planning  of  military  opera- 
tions, and  among  other  duties  works  out  the  schemes 
for  the  annual  training  manoeuvres. 

He  had  now  had  some  years  of  useful  experience  in 
stuff  work,  })ut  it  was  his  good  fortune  not  to  have  to 
setth^  down  to  the  routine  of  an  office,  but  again  to 
receive  an  active  command.    His  knowledge  of  cavalry 


ARMY  CAREER  UP  TO  1905  23 

tactics  and  his  fine  horsemanship  led  to  his  appoint- 
ment to  the  command  of  the  group  of  artillery  batteries 
attached  to  the  13th  Regiment  of  Artillery,  with  head- 
quarters at  Vincennes.  In  1894,  he  was  again  serving 
on  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army,  and  in  the  following 
year  he  was  appointed  Assistant  Professor  of  Military 
History  and  Strategy  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre. 

He  remained  there  six  years.  In  1900  came  his 
promotion  to  the  rank  of  Lieutenant  Colonel,  and  at 
the  same  time  he  was  appointed  to  the  full  professor- 
ship, becoming  the  chief  and  not  mere  assistant  teacher 
of  History  and  Strategy.  It  was  during  these  years 
that  he  made  his  mark  in  the  French  army  and  deeply 
influenced  its  coming  leaders.  Eighty  picked  officers 
joined  the  school  each  year,  so  that  during  the  time  of 
his  professorship  nearly  five  hundred  were  his  pupils — 
men  who  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events  would  rise 
in  the  following  years  to  the  command  of  regiments, 
brigades,  divisions  and  army  corps.  Among  them  were 
many  of  the  generals  who  have  done  good  service  for 
France  and  her  Allies  in  the  Great  War. 

A  professor  addressing  such  an  audience  and  rising 
to  the  possibilities  of  his  position  might  well  feel  that 
he  was  laying  the  foundations  of  future  victories  for 
his  country.  He  had  before  him  an  extremely  critical 
audience,  no  mere  beginners  but  men  who  had  already 
studied  the  science  he  was  teaching,  and  many  of 
whom  had  commanded  troops  in  active  service.  It  was 
only  an  exceptional  man  who  could  impress  them  as  he 
did  from  the  outset  with  the  feeling  that  they  were 
listening  "  to  the  most  gifted  and  original  of  the  pro- 
fessors in  the  Ecole  de  Guerre". 

He  spoke  in  a  calm,  measured,  sometimes  almost 


24  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

monotonous  voice,  using  no  gestures,  having  indeed 
rather  the  air  of  an  exponent  of  some  rigid  science  than 
of  a  lecturer  on  the  clash  of  armies,  the  march  and  the 
battle,  with  all  their  vivid  incidents  of  human  effort. 

He  did  not  neglect  the  human  element  in  war,  nor 
attempt  to  reduce  it  to  a  mere  mechanical  problem; 
but  he  would  analyse  the  course  of  events  with  the 
impartiality  of  a  judge,  betraying  no  feeling  for  either 
side,  as  map  in  hand  he  traced  the  development  of  a 
campaign,  fixing  the  situation  at  each  moment,  asking 
the  questions.  What  was  to  be  done?  What  was  known 
to  the  leaders?  What  course  did  they  take?  How  did 
they  reason  it  out?  What  better  line  could  they  have 
chosen?  What  was  the  result  actually  obtained?  And 
what  were  the  consequences,  how  could  success  have 
been  improved  or  defeat  averted?  He  made  his  hearers 
realize  the  conditions  under  which  armies  fight  and  are 
led,  the  difficulties  of  leadership,  the  inevitable  failure 
at  times  to  rise  to  the  possibly  ideal  solution  of  the 
problem  when  it  is  set  not  by  the  teacher  in  the  class 
room  but  by  the  swift  development  of  events  amidst 
the  stress  and  "fog"  of  war.  He  was  a  realist  in  his 
teaching.  Every  statement  as  to  the  guiding  principles 
of  leadership  was  based  on  a  wealth  of  examples  from 
military  history.  There  were  times  when,  as  one  of 
his  pupils  notes,  the  very  abundance  of  knowledge  that 
he  poured  forth  required  a  strong  effort  of  attention  to 
follow  his  line  of  thought.  But  those  who  heard  him 
were  ready  for  the  effort,  and  they  were  delighted  and 
inspired  by  their  teacher.  He  was  able  to  accomplish 
with  them  what  he  had  in  view — to  give  the  French 
army  through  its  future  chiefs  a  practical  doctrine  of 
.war,  and  a  widely  accepted  doctrine  that  would  secure, 


ARMY  CAREER  UP  TO  1905  25 

when  the  day  of  trial  came,  mutual  understanding  and 
intelligent  co-operation  for  the  common  end. 

What  the  characteristics  of  his  doctrine  of  war  were, 
we  shall  see  later,  when  we  come  to  analyse  his  writings. 
These  are  contained  in  the  two  volumes  in  which  he 
summed  up  his  lectures  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre,  after 
he  had  left  it  for  awhile  to  take  up  other  duties. 

In  1901,  Foch  returned  for  a  time  to  service  with 
the  artillery,  being  given  command  of  the  29th  Regi- 
ment at  Laon,  an  appointment  which  gave  him  the 
opportunity  of  becoming  intimately  acquainted  with  a 
district  that  was  to  be  of  considerable  importance  in 
the  Great  War.  It  was  at  Laon  that  he  prepared  for 
publication  his  Principes  de  la  Guerre.  The  book  in- 
cluded the  lectures  given,  in  1900,  at  the  Ecole  de 
Guerre.  It  was  at  once  recognized  by  military  critics 
in  all  countries  as  the  work  of  a  master  hand.*  In  1903, 
he  was  promoted  to  the  full  rank  of  Colonel,  and  given 
command  of  the  35th  Regiment  of  Artillery  with  head- 
quarters at  Vannes,  in  Brittany,  an  appointment  all  the 
more  welcome  because  it  brought  him  back  to  his 
"adopted  land",  and  to  the  neighbourhood  of  his  home 
in  Finisterre.  During  this  stay  in  Brittany,  he  prepared 
for  the  press  and  published  his  second  book,  De  la 
Conduite  de  la  Guerre,'t  based  on  work  he  had  done 
for  his  class  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre.  It  is  a  treatise  on 
leadership  in  war,  founded  on  a  painstaking  analysis 
of  the  German  staff  work  and  operations  in  the  first 
stage  of  the  Franco-German  War. 

*  Des  Principes  de  la  Guerre,  Conferences  faites  A  I'Ecole  8up6rieure 
de  Ouerre  (Paris,  Berger-le-Vrault,  1901).  2nd  edition,  1903;  3rd  edi- 
tion, 1911;  reprinted,  1917. 

t  De  la  Conduite  de  la  Guerre.  La  Manoeuvre  pour  la  Bataille  (Paris, 
1904).    2nd  edition,  1906;  3rd  edition,  1915. 


26  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

In  1905,  he  was  given  an  important  staff  appoint- 
ment, the  command  of  the  artillery  of  the  Fifth  Army 
Corps  at  Orleans.  It  was  a  command  usually  given  to 
a  general,  and  many  of  his  old  comrades  of  the  Ecole 
Polytechnique  had  already  reached  that  rank.  But  his 
promotion  was  delayed  until  June  20th,  1907.  It  was 
only  then  that  Ferdinand  Foch,  now  nearly  fifty-six 
years  of  age,  received  the  well-merited  rank  of  Briga- 
dier General  (General  de  Brigade).  With  the  promo- 
tion came  an  appointment  to  the  General  Staff  of  the 
Army  at  Paris. 

He  was  not  to  hold  his  new  post  for  more  than  a 
few  weeks.  General  Bonnal,  who  had  been  his  chief 
during  the  latter  part  of  his  professorship  at  the  Ecole 
de  Guerre,  had  just  resigned  his  position  as  Director  of 
the  School.  Several  distinguished  generals  had  their 
names  at  once  put  forward  as  candidates  for  the  vacant 
appointment.  Foch  was  not  among  them,  perhaps  be- 
cause he  thought  he  could  hardly  be  an  acceptable 
candidate  in  the  eyes  of  the  fiercely  "  anti-clerical " 
M.  Clemenceau,  then  the  Prime  Minister.  But  one  day 
he  was  surprised  by  receiving  an  invitation  to  lunch 
with  the  Premier.  When  he  arrived  at  the  house,  he 
found  that  he  was  the  only  guest.  During  the  de- 
jeuner there  was  general  conversation  on  various  sub- 
jects, but  not  a  word  was  said  of  the  vacancy  at  the 
Ecole  de  Guerre.  It  was  only  when  the  coffee  and  cigars 
stage  had  been  reached,  that  Clemenceau  said,  without 
a  word  of  introduction : — 

"  I  have  some  news  for  you,  General.  You  are  ap- 
pointed Director  of  the  Ecole  de  Guerre." 

"  But  I  am  not  a  candidate,"  said  Foch,  who  was 
completely  surprised  by  the  announcement. 


ARMY  CAREER  UP  TO  1905  27 

"Possibly,"  replied  Clemenceau;  "but  you  are  ap- 
pointed all  the  same,  and  I  am  sure  you  will  do  good 
work  there." 

The  General  thanked  him,  but  suggested  a  difficulty. 

"  Probably,  you  are  not  aware,"  he  said,  "  that  one  of 
my  brothers  is  a  Jesuit." 

Clemenceau  laughed.  "  I  know  all  about  it,  and  I 
don't  care  a  rap.  Mon  general,  or  rather  Monsieur  le 
Directeur,  you  are  appointed,  and  all  the  Jesuits  cannot 
after  it.  You  will  make  good  officers  for  us,  and  that 
is  the  only  thing  that  matters." 

Of  course,  Foch  accepted  the  promotion  thus  frankly 
offered  to  him  by  the  politician  whom  he  had  believed 
to  be  anything  but  his  friend.  He  had  spoken  of  his 
Jesuit  brother  out  of  a  delicate  sense  of  honour.  He 
could  not  believe,  until  he  was  assured  to  the  contrary, 
that  Clemenceau  knew  the  facts,  and  he  felt  that  the 
Premier's  colleagues  might  resent  his  action  in  making 
such  an  appointment,  and  that  some  of  his  opponents 
might  protest  against  the  soldier  brother  of  P^re  Foch 
being  given  such  a  position.  But  with  frankness  on 
both  sides,  the  way  was  now  clear.  Clemenceau,  like 
a  sensible  man  did  not  think  of  allowing  his  anti- 
clericalism  to  prevent  the  best  possible  appointment 
being  made  for  the  Ecole.  And  no  work  could  have 
been  more  welcome  to  Foch.  He  was  returning  to  what 
he  held  to  be  the  most  useful  centre  of  activity  for 
himself  in  the  French  army. 


CHAPTER  III 

FOCH^S  FIRST  PEINCIPLES  OF  WAR 

FocH  was  in  command  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre  for  the 
four  years  from  1907  to  1911.  Once  more  some  hundreds 
of  officers — who  were  to  be  among  the  leaders  of  the 
French  army  in  the  Great  War  that  was  now  so  near 
at  hand — came  under  his  inspiring  influence.  The  pro- 
fessors, who  formed  his  staff,  had  been  his  pupils.  His 
two  published  works  were  used  as  authoritative  text 
books. 

We  may  proceed  to  an  examination  of  these  masterly 
treatises,  which  have  a  twofold  interest.  For  they  not 
only  set  forth  those  principles  of  the  art  of  war,  which 
he  was  before  long  to  illustrate  by  his  own  brilliant 
leadership  in  the  field,  but  they  also  in  many  ways  re- 
veal the  character  of  their  author. 

Ilis  Principes  de  la  Guerre  appeared,  as  we  have 
already  noted,  in  1903;  his  second  work,  De  la  Con- 
duite  de  la  Guerre,  in  1905. 

At  the  very  outset,  Foch  warns  the  reader  of  his 
Principes  that  the  book  is  not  meant  to  be  a  complete 
treatise  on  war,  but  a  discussion  of  some  of  its  principles 
from  a  practical  point  of  view.  The  author  of  a  very 
remarkable  essay  on  the  same  subject,  published  in  the 
"  Journal  of  the  Royal  United  Service  Institution  "  dur- 
ing the  war,  notices  that  on  the  first  page  of  the  "  Field 

28 


FOCH'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  29 

Service  Regulations  of  the  British  Army  "  we  are  told 
that:— 

"  The  fundamental  principles  of  war  are  neither  very 
numerous  nor  in  themselves  very  abstruse,  but  the  appli- 
cation of  them  is  difficult  and  cannot  be  made  subject  to 
rules.  The  correct  application  of  principles  to  circum- 
stances is  the  outcome  of  sound  military  knowledge, 
built  up  by  study  and  practice  until  it  has  become  an 
instinct." 

And  he  then  remarks  that  throughout  the  rest  of  the 
book  no  further  reference  is  made  to  those  principles, 
and  there  is  no  attempt  even  to  enumerate  them.  Foch 
in  the  same  way  tells  us,  that,  when  a  young  ofBcer 
joins  his  regiment,  he  hears  of  the  "  principles  of  war " 
as  the  guide  in  military  operations,  but  is  not  told 
much  more  about  them,  nor  does  he  find  much  light 
thrown  upon  them  in  the  average  military  books.  They 
seem  to  be  taken  for  granted.  He  is  told  that  "these 
principles  are  matter  of  common  sense  and  judgment: 
their  application  varies  with  the  circumstances:  they 
are  not  written  down  to  be  learned." 

Foch  therefore  tries  to  give  a  clear  explanation  of 
some  of  these  dominant  principles  and  to  show  their 
application  to  various  situations  taken  from  recent 
military  history,  discussing  their  probable  application 
in  a  future  war  under  modern  conditions.  The  prin- 
ciples are  eternal ;  the  circumstances  continually  chang- 
ing. The  principles  themselves  are  determined  by  the 
study  of  military  history;  in  other  words,  they  have 
been  fixed  by  practical  experience  of  successful  war  as 
conducted  by  its  great  leaders. 

To  teach  a  doctrine  of  war  is,  therefore,  something 


30  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

different  from  laying  down  the  principles  of  some 
abstract  science.  Foch,  indeed,  hesitates  to  speak  of 
a  "science  of  war".  War  is  rather  an  art,  an  affair  of 
action  directed  by  right  knowledge  and  clear  thinking. 
To  prepare  oneself  for  such  action  one  must  keep  in 
mind  realities  not  abstractions,  and  deduce  all  theory 
from  ascertained  fact,  keeping  in  view  all  the  time  its 
practical  application  under  existing  conditions. 

Foch  does  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  the  teaching 
of  war  in  France  was  very  defective,  not  only  before 
the  disastrous  war  of  1870,  but  long  after  it.  The 
human  element  in  war  was  left  out  of  account.  There 
was  the  constant  tendency  to  reduce  the  theory  to  a 
mere  affair  of  numbers,  time  and  space.  And  the  result 
of  these  attempts  to  develop  a  kind  of  exact  and  mathe- 
matical theory  of  war,  was  a  theory  that,  as  Foch  puts 
it,  "  had  the  drawback  of  being  radically  false  because 
it  left  out  of  account  the  most  important  factor  in  the 
problem — man,  with  his  moral,  intellectual  and  physical 
faculties,  and  in  trying  to  make  of  war  an  exact  science 
disregarded  its  essential  character  as  a  terrible  and 
impassioned  drama."'  One  human  element  was  indeed 
taken  into  account — the  influence  of  the  great  leaders. 
But  the  whole  point  of  view  being  astray,  this  was 
neither  understood  nor  explained.  History  was  treated 
only  in  bold  outline;  it  was  history  after  the  manner 
of  M.  Alexander  Dumas,  a  series  of  marvellous  exploits, 
"  unexplained  and  inexplicable  unless  indeed  one  ad- 
mitted the  existence  of  mysterious  causes  of  the  nature 
of  the  miraculous  or  the  fatalistic,  such  as  the  incompre- 
hensible genius  of  a  Napoleon,  or  even  *  his  star '." 

The  natural  result  of  such  teaching  was  the  idea  that 
after  all  any  serious  study  of  war  was  not  important. 


FOCH'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  31 

One  had  the  gift  of  leadership,  or  one  had  not;  and  it 
was  on  the  field  of  battle  one  would  find  out.  It  used 
to  be  said  that  war  could  only  be  learned  in  war.  But 
as  Foch  points  out,  there  came  a  rude  awakening  in 
1870,  when  the  French  army  found  itself  opposed  to 
"  adversaries  whose  minds  were  formed  by  the  teaching 
of  history  and  the  study  of  concrete  cases;  for  since 
the  beginning  of  the  century  it  was  thus  that  Scharn- 
horst,  Willisen  and  Clausewitz,  had  formed  the  men  who 
were  to  command  the  Prussian  army." 

Foch  never  hesitates  to  recognize  the  merits  of  even 
the  enemy  of  the  past,  the  probable  opponent  of  the 
future.  Thus,  again,  we  find  him  prefacing  his  long 
examination  of  the  Battle  of  Nachod  (1866),  by  the 
remark  that  the  Prussian  regiments  engaged  had  not 
fired  a  shot  since  the  campaign  of  Waterloo,  while  the 
Austrians  had  been  at  war  as  recently  as  1859 ;  yet  the 
conduct  of  the  battle  demonstrated  that  the  Prussian 
officers  without  having  made  war  had  learned  to  under- 
stand it,  while  the  Austrians  had  made  war  without 
understanding  it  or  learning  anything  from  it. 

Military  history  must,  therefore,  be  the  basis  of  all 
useful  study  of  war.  It  is  quite  true  that  no  mere 
study  can  of  itself  make  the  successful  leader,  but  it 
gives  to  the  student  a  familiarity  with  principles  de- 
duced from  practice,  the  habit  of  grasping  the  essential 
points  of  a  military  problem  and  applying  those  prin- 
ciples to  it,  and  as  Foch  puts  it  "  the  bent  of  mind  that 
suggests  a  rational  method  of  manoeuvring." 

He  dwells  upon  the  importance  for  an  army  of  having 
the  same  way  of  thinking  on  such  matters — a  generally 
accepted  doctrine  of  war.  Hence  will  come  the  same 
way  of  regarding  a  situation,  the  same  way  of  acting, 


32  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

and  this  will  facilitate  both  command  and  co-operation. 
Again  and  again  he  insists  that  practical  realities  must 
be  kept  in  view;  war  is  not  a  chess  game;  men  are  the 
actors  in  it.  Its  climax  is  the  battle,  and  the  result  of 
the  battle  depends  on  moral  or  mental  even  more  than 
upon  material  force.  With  a  frank  realism,  in  almost 
the  opening  words  of  his  first  lecture  he  describes  war 
as  "waged  on  the  battlefield  in  the  midst  of  the  un- 
foreseen, under  the  stress  of  danger,  making  use  of 
surprise  and  all  the  qualities  of  force,  violence,  brutal 
strength,  to  create  terror."  The  battle  is  the  effort 
ultimately  to  break  down  not  merely  the  opponent's 
fighting  power,  but  his  courage,  his  hope,  "  his  will  to 
conquer."  With  Foch,  the  "  will  to  conquer "  is  the 
most  essential  thing  in  war.  As  long  as  it  is  not  lost, 
there  will  be  no  disaster.  And  this  is  why  he  puts 
aside  as  misleading  the  old-fashioned  mathematical 
theories  of  war,  which  used  to  leave  out  of  account  the 
human  or,  as  he  would  put  it,  the  moral  and  spiritual 
element. 

Goethe — sitting  by  a  camp  fire  with  some  Saxe 
Weimar  officers,  on  the  night  of  September  20th,  1792, 
after  the  Battle  of  Valmy — said  to  them : — "  I  tell  you 
that  from  this  place  there  dates  a  new  era  in  the  world's 
history."  It  was  at  least  a  new  date  in  the  history 
of  war,  is  Foch's  comment.  The  wars  of  kings  were 
ending,  the  wars  of  peoples  beginning. 

The  wars  of  the  eighteenth  century  had  been  carried 
on  by  comparatively  small  armies  of  professional  sol- 
diers. The  nineteenth  century  was  to  see  the  develop- 
ment of  wars  by  "  nations  in  arms  " ;  and  the  evolution 
had  begun  with  the  conscript  levies  of  the  Revolution. 
In  the  former  period  grave  teachers  of  the  art  of  war 


FOCH'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  33 

had  insisted  on  the  merit  of  avoiding  a  battle  and  forc- 
ing the  enemy  to  retire  by  dexterous  manoeuvres.  They 
had  regarded  the  reduction  of  fortresses,  the  occupation 
of  territory,  as  sufficient  objects  of  a  campaign.  Sur- 
vivors of  the  old  school  acted  on  the  same  ideas  even  in 
the  Napoleonic  wars.  In  1814,  we  find  Schwartzenberg 
crossing  the  Rhine  at  Basel  and  directing  his  march 
on  Langres,  because  the  plateau  of  Langres  was  sup- 
posed to  be  the  "  key  of  France." 

For  Napoleon  there  was  only  one  objective.  It  was 
not  geographical  but  military — the  enemy's  main  army. 
To  manoeuvre  for  a  decisive  battle  under  favourable 
conditions  was  what  he  sought.  As  for  fortresses,  he 
said  they  were  captured  on  the  battlefield.  The  enemy's 
fighting  strength  in  the  field  once  broken,  the  fortresses 
must  fall  to  the  victor.  Strange  to  say,  it  was  not  in 
France,  but  in  Germany,  that  the  lessons  of  the  great 
soldier's  campaigns  were  first  understood.  It  was 
Clausewitz  who  summed  them  up  in  his  famous 
unfinished  book  On  War.  Scharnhorst  had  laid  the 
foundation  of  the  Prussian  system  of  the  "nation  in 
arms  " — the  regular  army  as  the  training  school  for 
huge  reserves.  Clausewitz  summed  up  the  lessons  of 
the  wars  of  the  Revolution  and  the  Empire.  He  popu- 
larized the  central  idea  of  the  decisive  battle  with  an 
enemy's  main  army  as  the  objective  to  be  kept  in  view 
in  war. 

Foch  fully  recognizes  the  services  of  the  German 
writers  to  the  development  of  a  theory  of  modern  war, 
and  his  works  are  full  of  quotations  from  them — from 
Clausewitz  to  Von  der  Goltz,  But  he  continually  goes 
back  to  the  source  of  their  inspiration — to  the  records 
of  Napoleon's  campaigns,   the   Emperor's   despatches, 


34  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

letters  and  notes  on  war.  To  his  mind  the  Germans 
are  the  pupils  of  Napoleon,  and  not  always  apt  pupils. 
He  makes  abundant  use  of  the  studies  of  Napoleon's 
campaigns  produced  by  the  Section  Historique  of  the 
French  Staff.  He  had  studied  the  works  of  General 
Bonnal,  his  predecessor  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre.  He 
accepts  the  broad  outlines  of  Bonnal's  theory  of  Na- 
poleonic strategy;  but  his  thoroughly  practical  view  of 
war  prevents  him  from  seeking  like  Bonnal  to  reduce 
a  series  of  campaigns  to  the  same  almost  mathematical 
formulas. 

Napoleon's  campaigns  represent  the  beginnings  of 
modern  war.  These  are  to  be  studied.  Next  in  value 
to  them  for  the  student  are  the  campaigns  directed  by 
the  elder  Von  Moltke.  For  the  study  of  any  event  in 
the  wars  of  1866  and  1870  fully  detailed  narratives  are 
available,  and  detail  is  essential  in  the  study  of  military 
history.  So  we  find  Foch  making  use  of  many  examples 
from  these  wars  to  build  up  and  illustrate  his  theory. 

He  sums  up  the  lesson  to  be  derived  from  Napoleon's 
campaigns,  the  basis  of  all  his  teaching,  in  a  quotation 
from  Clausewitz : — 

"  Modern  war  is  the  outcome  of  the  ideas  of  Napoleon, 
who  was  the  first  to  set  in  a  clear  light  the  importance 
of  preparation,  and  the  overwhelming  power  of  mass 
multiplied  by  impulse  to  break  down  the  moral  and 
material  forces  of  the  enemy  in  a  battle  sought  for  from 
the  very  outset  of  the  war."  * 

In  the  national  wars  of  our  time,  the  preparation 
begins  years  beforehand.  It  is  part  of  the  systematic 
permanent  army  organization,  directed  to  securing  as 
complete  and  rapid  mobilization  as  possible,  followed 

•  Principea  de  la  Ouerre,  p.  42. 


FOCH'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  35 

by  the  ordered  concentration  of  the  armies  at  their 
starting  point  on  the  frontier.  The  mass  to  be  launched 
into  the  struggle  now  involves  all  the  resources  of  the 
belligerent.  "Impulse",  the  driving  force  that  brings 
the  mass  to  bear  on  the  striking  point,  implies  move- 
ment; and  Foch  insists  that,  whether  in  attack  or  in 
defence,  movement  is  the  soul  of  the  battle.  "  Movement 
is  the  law  of  strategy.  .  .  .  The  tactics  of  the 
battlefield  must  be  tactics  of  movement."  To  obtain 
the  decisive  result,  there  must  be  the  shock  of  the 
greatest  possible  force  hurled  upon  the  enemy. 

The  battle  must  be  sought  for,  not  merely  awaited, 
far  less  avoided  as  in  the  old-fashioned  eighteenth  cen- 
tury campaigns  of  manoeuvre. 

But  the  enemy  also  is  in  movement.  He  must  be 
discovered,  and  held  so  that  the  stroke  can  be  delivered 
against  him.  Hence  the  need  of  detachments  manoeu- 
vring to  fulfil  this  special  mission.  Here  we  have 
Napoleon's  strategical  advanced  guard  and  "mass  of 
manoeuvre."  Bonnal  had  developed  the  idea  already 
very  fully  in  his  teaching  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre  and 
in  his  studies  of  various  Napoleonic  campaigns.  He 
and  his  followers,  however,  exaggerate  the  uniformity 
of  Napoleon's  application  of  the  principle.  They  try 
to  trace  a  rigid  reproduction  of  the  "  pivotting  square," 
the  advance  en  bataillon  carre  of  the  Jena  campaign,  in 
every  subsequent  war  conducted  by  the  great  soldier. 
The  mere  formula  dominates  their  teaching.  Foch,  with 
a  clearer  vision  of  the  facts  and  a  more  practical  ap- 
plication of  their  lessons,  gives  a  freer  interpretation 
of  the  Emperor's  war  methods,  an  interpretation  that  is 
a  better  guide  to  the  application  of  the  idea  to  modern 
war.    Obviously,  the  movements  of  the  vast  armies  of 


36  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

to-day  cannot  be  crushed  into  the  Procrustean  limits 
that  sufficed  for  the  relatively  small  armies  of  Na- 
poleon. But  it  is  the  spirit  of  his  leadership,  not  the 
mere  form,  that  matters;  and  Foch  fixes  the  minds 
of  his  hearers  and  readers  on  the  practical  essen- 
tials. 

The  preparation  must  include  a  plan  based  on  a 
profound  study  of  the  task  to  be  accomplished,  and 
a  detailed  examination  of  the  ground.  It  must  not  be 
a  rigid  scheme,  but  should  be  capable  of  modification. 
The  essential  point  is  to  bring  the  largest  possible  mass 
up  to  the  striking  point,  and  launch  it  "all  together 
against  the  same  objective." 

The  problem  is  not  an  easy  one  with  the  huge  armies 
of  to-day.  It  was  comparatively  simple  for  a  Turenne 
or  a  Frederick  the  Great,  with  his  army  camped  under 
canvas  in  one  body,  with  its  magazines  of  supplies, 
near  at  hand.  In  those  days  men  talked  of  the  "  maxi- 
mum army",  the  number  that  could  not  be  exceeded 
without  making  the  weapon  unmanageable.  This  may 
have  been  correct  enough,  considering  the  resources 
supplied  by  the  organization  of  those  past  times.  But 
to-day  there  is  no  maximum.  The  army  is  the  armed 
nation. 

Foch  now  puts  the  question — How  is  this  concentrated 
attack  on  the  vital  point  by  the  main  mass,  this  union 
of  all  available  forces  in  the  movement,  to  be  realized, 
while  at  the  same  time  providing  the  necessary  de- 
tachments which  are  to  gain  touch  with  and  hold  the 
enemy  and  generally  safeguard  the  operation?  Here, 
he  tells  us,  there  must  come  into  play  the  principle  of 
the  econoiriy  of  force. 

The  word  "economy"  is  not  used  here  in  its  popular 


FOCH'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  37 

sense  of  sparing  and  saving,  but  rather  in  its  old  Greek 
sense  of  management.  There  must,  it  is  true,  be  a 
cutting  down  of  all  useless  expenditure;  but  this  is 
done,  not  to  save,  but  to  have  as  much  as  possible  to 
expend  in  the  vital  essential  effort. 

The  principle,  he  tells  us,  is  easier  to  describe  than 
to  define.  He  dates  its  appearance  in  war  from  the 
time  when  Carnot  was  directing  the  operations  of  the 
Revolutionary  armies.  But  one  may  perhaps  suggest 
that  it  was  a  revival,  a  re-discovery,  of  an  older 
method,  not  a  complete  innovation  in  the  ways  of  war. 
But  Foch  is  quite  justified  in  regarding  Carnot's  orders 
to  the  Republican  generals  as  a  new  departure,  so  far 
as  regarded  the  adopted  methods  of  eighteenth  century 
war.  It  seems  obvious  enough  to  obtain  a  local  pre- 
ponderance by  neglecting  minor  objectives,  reducing  all 
detachments  to  a  minimum,  and  pushing  the  striking 
force  thus  accumulated  against  a  single  decisive  point. 
This  is,  in  familiar  language,  the  "  economy  of  force" ; 
but,  obvious  as  it  seems,  it  was  not  the  method  of  the 
average  general  of  the  pre-Revolutionary  period. 

In  those  days  it  was  the  established  tradition  to 
fritter  away  a  huge  force  in  providing  garrisons  and 
guards  for  every  mile  of  a  frontier:  to  organize  the 
field  army  on  a  set  pattern,  of  centre,  right  wing,  left 
wing  and  reserve :  to  put  several  of  these  armies  in  the 
field  on  various  fronts  without  any  unity  of  command. 
Even  the  initiative  of  Carnot — soon  abandoned  to  be 
resumed  and  developed  by  Napoleon  did  not  break  the 
tradition  completely.  It  was  revived  again  in  France 
during  the  Restoration.  It  appeared  again  in  the 
French  official  manual  of  the  Service  en  Campagne 
of  1883,  which  was  the  accepted  guide  for  leadership 


38  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

in  war  until  after  1895,  which  set  forth  that  "  Armies 
are  organized  with  a  centre,  wings  and  reserve." 

Foch  points  out  that  armies  are  crippled  by  such 
fixed  formulas  of  organization,  for  operations  in  the 
field.  The  mass  of  living  force  must  be  in  the  hands 
of  the  commander  with  full  freedom  to  group  and 
regroup  its  units  as  the  necessities  of  the  day  demand, 
and  his  guiding  principle  will  be  the  fixed  purpose 
to  aim  at  one  great  objective,  disregarding  mere  local 
loss  or  gain  so  long  as  that  vital  decisive  end  is  gained, 
directing  upon  the  chosen  point  the  mass  of  his  force, 
protected  and  guided  by  the  vanguard  that  gains  touch 
with  and  holds  the  enemy,  and  avoiding  all  dissipation 
of  force  to  subsidiary  objects.  It  was  Frederick  the 
Great  who  said  wisely  that  one  might  well  lose  a  whole 
province  for  awhile,  if  one  could  thereby  help  to  win 
the  war. 

So  for  the  army  of  operations  we  have  the  logical 
division  into  (1)  advanced  guards  using  the  capacity 
of  resistance:  (2)  the  main  battle  force,  using  the 
capacity  for  the  shock  or  impact  upon  the  enemy  at  the 
vital  point. 

As  for  the  detachments  from  the  main  battle  force, 
which  Foch  classes  under  the  name  of  advanced  guards, 
he  illustrates  their  mission  and  practical  working  by 
taking  an  outpost  line  and  showing  how  its  sentries  or 
sentry  groups  keep  touch  with  and  watch  the  enemy, 
and  if  he  advances  are  supported  by  the  larger  units 
of  the  second  line,  which  hold  the  enemy  until  the 
main  force  can  come  into  action.  The  outpost  line 
of  a  halted  force  and  the  advanced  guard  of  a  force 
on  the  move  nre  essentially  the  same  thing.  The  flank 
guard  is  a  similar  organization  to  protect  the  flank  of 


FOCH'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  39 

a  line  of  march.  Then  we  have  a  detailed  examination 
of  Napoleon's  campaign  in  Italy,  in  1796,  to  show  how 
he  used  detachments,  now  here  now  there,  to  hold  one 
part  of  the  Allied  forces  while  he  employed  his  main 
fighting  force  to  strike  a  series  of  deadly  blows.  He 
thus  secured  the  "economy  of  forces"  that  enabled 
him  to  be  always  the  stronger  at  the  striking  point, 
though  the  aggregate  numbers  opposed  to  him  were 
superior  to  his  own. 

Viewed  in  comparison  with  the  wars  of  to-day,  the 
campaign  was  a  small  affair.  Foch  only  analyses  its 
opening  phase,  the  advance  of  the  French  army  from 
the  Riviera  across  the  Alps  into  Piedmont — some  32,000 
ragged  Republican  troops  against  70,000  Austrians  and 
Piedmontese,  divided  up  into  the  old  organization  of 
centre,  left  and  right  wings  to  hold  the  mountains  in 
fixed  positions.  The  operations  of  this  first  stage  of 
the  campaign  only  cover  part  of  the  month  of  April. 
Foch  uses  this  little  campaign  to  illustrate  the  great 
principles  that  apply  even  with  armies  of  millions.  He 
shows  us  how  Bonaparte  used  the  new  working  organiza- 
tion of  advanced  guards,  attacking  to  reconnoitre  and 
hold  the  enemy  for  the  advantage  of  the  main  body,  or 
meeting  an  attack  of  the  enemy  to  cover  its  operations, 
and  the  main  body  manoeuvring  to  strike  at  the  se- 
lected objective.  The  advanced  guards  were  the  de- 
tachments under  Laharpe,  Serurier,  Cervoni  and 
Rampon;  the  main  battle  force  was  made  up  of  the 
divisions  of  Massena  and  Augereau  and  the  cavalry. 
It  was  a  small  army ;  its  divisions  were  often  weaker  in 
numbers  than  a  modern  brigade.  And  it  was  out- 
numbered two  to  one  by  the  enemy.  But  victory  was 
secured  by  the  tactics  that  gave  local  superiority  at  the 


40  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

decisive  point.  We  have  Napoleon's  own  account  of  the 
method  that  won  this  success,  in  his  conversation  with 
Moreau,  when  they  discussed  the  Italian  campaign. 

"When  I  found  myself/'  he  said,  "with  a  weaker 
army  in  presence  of  a  large  army,  I  rapidly  grouped 
mine  so  as  to  be  able  to  fall  like  a  thunderbolt  on  one 
of  the  enemy's  wings  and  overwhelm  it.  I  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  confusion  that  this  manoeuvre  could  not 
fail  to  produce  in  the  enemy's  army  to  attack  it  at 
another  point,  always  with  the  mass  of  my  forces.  I 
thus  beat  him  in  detail,  and  the  victory  thus  gained 
was,  as  you  see,  the  triumph  of  the  greater  number  over 
the  less." 

Foch  adds  the  comment,  that  it  was  the  art  of  con- 
triving to  secure  numerical  superiority  at  the  point 
of  contact — the  "  economy  of  force  "  in  operation — and 
throwing  disorder  into  the  enemy's  ranks  by  these  suc- 
cessive blows,  at  the  same  time  raising  the  moral  su- 
periority of  his  own  army  by  success.  This  was  war  as 
Napoleon  conducted  it. 

Now  still  taking  this  little  campaign  as  his  text,  he 
raises  another  question.  The  title  of  the  lecture  that 
deals  with  it  sounds  somewhat  paradoxical.  It  is 
characteristic  of  Foch's  originality  of  treatment,  that 
he  boldly  invents  new  formulas,  and  gives  a  new  and 
wider  meaning  to  old  ones.  His  title  is — "  Intellectual 
discipline — Freedom  of  action  in  order  to  obey " — 
{Discipline  intellectuellc — lAberte  d'action  pour  oheir.) 
He  has  just  examined  the  mechanism  of  the  campaign 
of  1790.  He  now  points  out  that  tlie  link  between  the 
Commander-in-Chief  and  his  subordinates  is  this,  for 
in  any  combined  operation  there  must  be  discipline, 
obedience. 


FOCH'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  41 

For  the  subordinate  officers,  it  must  be  (he  tells  us) 
in  the  first  place  "intellectual  discipline,"  bringing 
home  to  them  a  clear  idea  of  the  result  that  their  Com- 
mander-in-Chief has  in  view,  and  seicondly  "  intelligent 
and  active  discipline,  or  rather,  initiative,"  with  the 
result  that  they  act  in  accordance  with  his  will.  He 
adopts  Von  der  Goltz's  description  of  initiative  as  "  the 
manifestation  of  personal  will  seconded  by  judgment 
and  acting  in  the  sense  of  the  plans  of  the  higher  com- 
mand." With  the  great  armies  of  to-day,  the  subordi- 
nate leaders  must  exercise  an  intelligent  obedience. 
There  must  be  activity  of  mind.  A  mere  unthinking 
passive  obedience  like  that  of  a  machine  was  perhaps 
sufficient  in  the  small  armies  of  the  past,  where  it  was 
easier  for  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  define  the  task  of 
his  subordinates;  but  something  more  is  wanted  with 
armies  of  millions,  in  which  the  subordinates  them- 
selves command  perhaps  hundreds  of  thousands.  In 
such  a  case  an  order  from  the  higher  command  will 
at  most  outline  the  movement  and  define  clearly  the 
object  to  be  attained.  The  general  who  receives  it  has 
to  decide  on  the  way  in  which  it  is  to  be  carried  out 
and  adapted  to  the  special  circumstances  of  the  mo- 
ment on  his  own  front.  Initiative  is  therefore  a  neces- 
sity. 

Foch  remarks  that  to  obey  in  war  is  not  an  easy 
thing ;  for  one  has  to  carry  out  one's  orders  "  in  presence 
of  the  enemy,  and  despite  the  enemy's  efforts;  amid 
varying  conditions — the  unseen,  the  unknown  with  all 
its  menace  of  peril,  and  notwithstanding  the  fatigue 
which  results  from  many  causes." 

Moltke  put  the  same  idea  in  another  way,  when  he 
said  that  in  time  of  peace  a  decision  once  taken  could 


42  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

always  be  carried  out ;  but  in  war  our  will  soon  clashes 
with  the  independent  will  of  the  enemy. 

So  the  clear  grasp  of  the  intention  conveyed  by  an 
order,  with  the  ready  determination  to  carry  it  out,  is 
not  enough ;  the  order  will  have  to  be  carried  out  under 
the  menace  of  hostile  action  tending  to  prevent  or  at 
least  delay  its  execution.  So  the  subordinate,  who  re- 
ceives it,  must  preserve  what  Foch  describes  as  his  free- 
dom of  action  in  order  to  obey.  He  notes  that  the  whole 
object  of  war  is  to  maintain  one's  freedom  of  action  and 
take  it  away  from  the  enemy.  This  freedom  of  action — 
freedom,  that  is,  from  interference  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy — is  to  be  obtained  by  what  Foch  calls  surete. 

The  word,  as  he  uses  it,  can  hardly  be  translated  by  a 
single  equivalent  word  in  English.  And  with  him  it  is 
a  favourite  word,  conveying  ideas  that  play  a  large  part 
in  his  teaching  and  in  his  attitude  of  mind.  It  implies 
not  only  "safety"  or  "security"  and  the  measures  that 
ensure  it,  but  something  more.  It  means  also  "  sure- 
ness" — all  that  goes  to  give  the  commander,  whether 
of  an  army  or  of  a  small  group  operating  in  the  presence 
of  an  enemy,  a  clear  view  of  the  situation  and  the  power 
of  acting  with  a  grasp  of  realities. 

As  usual,  he  makes  his  meaning  clear  to  his  class  and 
his  readers,  by  taking  examples  from  military  history, 
examining  them  in  detail,  and  showing  the  influence  of 
this  sfirete  or  of  its  absence.  In  a  mere  review  of  his 
writings  like  this,  one  cannot  follow  the  full  exposition 
that  he  gives  of  even  one  such  example.  But  one  may 
fry  to  summarize  some  point  in  his  examination  of  an 
incident  in  the  Franco-German  War,  that  is  referred  to 
in  even  the  least  technical  of  the  popular  histories  of 
the  time  as  one  of  those  failures  of  effective  co-operation 


FOCH'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  43 

between  the  French  commanders  that  had  most  dis- 
astrous consequences. 

On  August  4th,  1870,  the  French  detachment  under 
General  Abel  Douay,  stationed  at  Wissemburg  near  the 
German  frontier,  was  overwhelmed  after  a  brave  resist- 
ance by  the  advance  of  the  Crown  Prince  Frederick's 
army.  That  day  Marshal  MacMahon  was  in  position 
on  the  hills  above  Woerth  with  the  First  Army  Corps, 
formed  of  the  veteran  regiments  he  had  commanded  in 
Algeria.  He  intended  to  offer  battle  on  this  position 
in  the  hope  of  stopping  the  Crown  Prince's  advance. 
He  was  heavily  outnumbered  by  the  Crown  Prince's 
army,  which  would  be  in  position  to  attack  him  in  the 
next  forty-eight  hours,  and  he  badly  needed  reinforce- 
ments. The  nearest  available  force  for  this  purpose 
was  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  under  De  Failly,  about 
thirty  miles  away  to  the  northwest,  at  Sarreguemines. 

On  the  afternoon  of  August  4th,  De  Failly  received 
orders  by  telegraph  to  move  his  army  corps  to  the  sup- 
port of  MacMahon.  He  had  two  of  his  divisions  near 
Sarreguemines,  and  the  other  at  the  hill  fortress  of 
Bitsche  about  halfway  to  Woerth.  The  order  wired  to 
him  ran :  "  Concentrate  your  Army  Corps  immediately 
about  Bitsche."  But  the  object  of  the  order  was  clear 
enough.  If  he  could  have  all  his  troops  at  Bitsche  on 
the  5th,  he  would  be  within  a  few  hours'  march  of  Mac- 
Mahon's  position,  and  ready  to  support  him  on  the  6th. 

With  his  habitual  painstaking  thoroughness,  Foch 
gives  us  a  reproduction  of  the  French  staff-map  of  the 
ground,  on  which  to  follow  his  narrative  of  the  way  in 
which  De  Failly  acted  on  this  order.  He  discusses  his 
action,  and  he  shows  how  he  ought  to  have  executed  the 
order,  working  out  all  the  arguments  on  which  this 


44  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

better  plan  of  action  is  based,  and  marking  the  map 
to  show  what  would  have  been  the  result.  And  the 
whole  forms  a  clear  illustration  of  what  he  means  by 
"  intellectual  discipline "  and  "  freedom  or  action  in 
order  to  obey."  He  insists  on  these  two  points,  because 
in  all  his  teaching  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre  his  object  was 
not  merely  to  give  his  soldier-pupils  information  and 
rules  for  their  guidance,  but  to  inspire  them  with  the 
true  military  spirit  and  form  the  character  that  makes 
a  self-reliant  commander.  In  his  own  mind  there  was 
no  idea  of  setting  himself  up  as  a  model,  for  there  is  no 
egotism  about  Foch.  But  we  may  say  that,  without 
any  self-conscious  realization  of  the  fact,  he  was  try- 
ing to  make  them  into  men  of  his  own  high  ideals,  sol- 
diers of  his  own  stamp. 

Following  the  movement  hour  by  hour,  he  shows  us 
how  De  Failly  acted,  and  how  grievously  he  blundered 
and  failed.  The  3rd  Division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  was  at 
Bitsche:  the  1st  and  2nd  Divisions  at  Sarreguemines. 
He  was  to  move  these  two  divisions  to  Bitsche  over 
about  fifteen  miles  of  good  road.  The  weather  was  fine. 
There  are  long  bright  summer  evenings  in  the  first  week 
of  August.  The  two  divisions  might  have  started  on 
the  4th  and  made  good  progress  towards  Bitsche  reach- 
ing the  place  by  a  short  march  early  next  day.  But 
De  Failly  sent  off  the  1st  Division  only,  and  it  marched 
less  than  five  miles  before  bivouacking.  He  kept  the 
2nd  at  Sarreguemines, — Why? 

Sarreguemines  and  Bitsche  and  the  road  between 
thera  were  only  a  few  miles  from  the  frontier.  The 
Germans  had  shown  no  force  of  any  importance  on  that 
part  of  it;  but  tliey  had  cavalry  patrols,  which  occasion- 
ally showed  themselves  and  excliaugcd  a  few  shots  with 


FOCH'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  45 

the  French  horsemen  watching  the  border  line.  De 
Failly  thought  he  must  guard  Sarreguemines  as  long 
as  possible,  and  kept  his  2nd  Division  there.  Even  the 
division  that  moved  out  was  warned  that  it  might  be 
attacked  on  the  road,  and  marched  with  elaborate  and 
badly  arranged  precautions,  halting  at  each  cross  road 
till  the  country  towards  the  border  had  been  explored 
by  patrols.  "Instead  of  going  to  Bitsche,"  remarks 
Foch,  "there  was  the  idea  of  guarding  everything;  in- 
stead of  obeying  his  orders,  he  is  guided  by  his  own 
personal  views.  Here  we  have  the  lack  of  intellectual 
discipline." 

On  August  5th,  De  Failly  is  still  holding  on  to  Sarre- 
guemines. He  keeps  half  of  his  2nd  Division  there  all 
day.  He  sends  off  the  other  half  towards  Bitsche.  At 
noon,  it  had  only  reached  the  village  of  Rohrbach,  about 
halfway.  From  Rohrbach,  a  valley  opened  eastward 
through  the  hills  towards  the  German  frontier.  Some 
enemy  had  shown  themselves  in  the  valley.  They  re- 
tired before  an  advance  of  French  cavalry.  But  De 
Maussion,  who  commanded  the  brigade  that  reached 
Rohrbach,  was  so  alarmed  that  he  decided  to  go  no 
further  but  to  halt  there  and  watch  the  "Rohrbach 
gap."  Cavalry  and  infantry,  reported  to  be  Germans, 
were  said  to  be  near  at  hand  in  front.  De  Maussion 
threw  out  a  skirmishing  line  which  opened  fire  on  them, 
and  then  discovered  that  they  were  French  troops  of 
the  division  that  had  started  for  Bitsche  the  day  before. 
Marching  without  either  advanced  guard  or  flank  guard 
to  protect  it,  this  division  had  been  moving  slowly, 
halting  continually,  sending  out  patrols  in  all  direc- 
tions. By  evening  it  halted,  not  at  Bitsche,  but  nearly 
two  miles  from  it,  with  the  men  tired  out  by  the  slow 


46  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

marcH  and  the  endless  halts  and  patrol  work  under  a 
blazing  sun.  Result — on  the  evening  of  the  5th,  when 
the  two  divisions  should  have  been  at  Bitsche,  one  was 
near  it;  of  the  other,  one  brigade  was  halfway,  and 
the  remaining  brigade  had  not  even  started  from  Sarre- 
guemines.  Instead  of  being  concentrated  early  on  the 
5th  at  Bitsche,  the  Fifth  Corps  was  strung  out  over 
twenty  miles  of  road.  Here,  Foch  tells  us,  we  see  the 
results  of  false  theories,  lack  of  military  spirit  and  intel- 
lectual discipline,  ignorance  of  surete,  dominance  of 
mere  personal  views  in  the  subordinate  commander. 

On  August  5th,  the  headquarters  of  the  army  at  Metz 
placed  De  Failly's  Corps  under  the  direct  command  of 
MacMahon,  and  the  Marshal  wired  to  its  commander 
at  8  P.M. — 

"Come  to  Reichshoffen  (the  Woerth  position)  with 
all  your  Army  Corps  as  soon  as  possible.  I  expect  you 
to  join  me  to-morrow." 

At  3  A.M.  on  August  6th,  De  Failly  telegraphed  that 
it  was  impossible.  He  could  only  send  one  division,  the 
3rd  under  General  Lapasset  ( which  had  been  at  Bitsche 
for  days).  The  1st,  worn  out  by  the  blundering  of  the 
day  before,  could  not  start  in  time.  The  2nd  Division 
was  still  far  from  Bitsche,  most  of  it  at  Sarreguemines. 
Next  morning,  though  Lapasset's  division  was  to  start 
at  6  A.M.,  it  did  not  move  till  7 :  30  on  account  of 
rumours  brought  in  by  the  peasants,  about  large  hostile 
forces  close  at  hand.  Lapasset  had  been  for  some  time 
at  Bitsche,  but  there  was  no  surete,  no  organized  infor- 
mation service.  He  was  at  the  mercy  of  every  story 
brought  in  by  a  tramp  or  a  pedlar.  When  he  could  dis- 
cover no  enemy  near  him,  he  marched — but  marched 


BLOCK'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  47 

under  the  impression  of  these  rumours  which  delayed 
and  deluded  him  all  day.  There  was  again  no  flank 
guard,  no  advance  guard,  the  same  endless  halts  while 
patrols  searched  the  cross-roads  and  peasants  were  in- 
terrogated. In  front,  a  few  miles  away,  the  cannon 
thunder  told  of  a  great  battle.  But  the  division  crawled 
slowly  along,  to  arrive  only  late  in  the  afternoon,  when 
MacMahon  was  in  full  retreat  and  the  battle  was  lost. 

In  the  French  press,  De  Failly  was  denounced  as  a 
traitor.  He  was  nothing  of  the  kind.  He  was  only, 
like  so  many  of  the  French  generals  of  the  day,  utterly 
ignorant  of  the  first  principles  of  war,  utterly  devoid 
of  "intellectual  discipline."  The  same  defects  led,  a 
few  weeks  later,  to  the  swift  destruction  of  his  corps  in 
the  surprise  at  Beaumont  on  the  march  to  Sedan. 

If  De  Failly  had  obeyed  his  orders,  and  obeyed  them 
with  intelligence  and  initiative,  his  three  divisions 
would  have  been  able  to  reinforce  MacMahon  by  noon 
on  the  day  of  the  battle.  At  that  hour  the  French 
were  still  holding  their  own,  and  the  intervention  of  a 
whole  army  corps  might  well  have  had  a  decisive  result. 
Woerth,  instead  of  being  a  disaster,  might  thus  have 
been  a  victory  for  France. 

But  De  Failly  did  not  obey,  because  he  had  not  kept 
what  Foch  calls  the  "freedom  of  action"  that  would 
make  obedience  not  only  possible  but  obvious  and  easy. 
And  this  freedom  of  action  was  wanting  because  he  had 
not  its  necessary  basis — what  Foch  calls  surete.  In 
fact,  neither  he  nor  his  divisional  commanders  had  any 
clear  idea  of  how  to  obtain  what  the  word  implies — 
security  from  surprise  and  the  sure  grip  of  the  situation 
that  would  enable  them  to  act  resolutely  and  swiftly. 
De  Failly  was  haunted  by  the  old  military  superstition, 


48  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

that  the  only  way  to  be  safe  was  to  disperse  his  force  so 
as  to  guard  every  point.  He  was  the  easy  victim  of 
every  vague  report.  So  were  his  subordinates,  like  De 
Maussion  and  De  Lapasset.  Dominated  by  vague  fears 
of  the  unknown,  ignorant  of  how  to  guard  themselves 
they  were  helpless  to  give  efficient  obedience.  They  had 
lost  their  freedom  of  action,  though  they  had  not  had 
to  face  the  conflict  of  their  own  wills  with  that  of  the 
enemy. 

De  Maussion,  instead  of  marching  on  to  Bitsche, 
halts  his  brigade  for  the  rest  of  the  day  to  watch  the 
imagined  dangers  of  the  Troupe  de  Rohrbach,  the  valley 
or  gap  opening  towards  the  enemy's  country.  But  as 
Foch  points  out,  a  gap  in  the  hills  is  not  a  danger  in 
itself.  One  does  not  abandon  one's  orders,  to  form  in 
battle  array  against  it,  like  De  Maussion  who  kept  his 
men  under  arms  part  of  the  night.  One  does  not  fight 
against  geographical  features  of  the  country,  but  against 
men.  There  may  be  danger  of  the  enemy's  advancing 
through  a  gap  in  force,  though,  by  the  way,  there  are 
roads  over  hills  as  well  as  through  gaps.  De  Maussion 
had  only  to  adopt  ordinary  precautions  to  ascertain 
that  there  was  no  serious  force  of  the  enemy  in  this 
direction,  and  leave  a  flank  guard  to  watch  the  gap 
during  the  time — a  short  one — that  it  would  take  his 
brigade  to  march  past  it.  It  was  a  fairly  simple  prob- 
lem of  surete.  But  his  blundering  methods  led  to  the 
sacrifice  of  his  "  freedom  of  action,"  and  he  failed  to 
obey  liis  orders  and  push  on. 

Foch  proceeds  to  show  how  the  movement  should  have 
been  executed.  There  is  no  need  to  enter  into  details 
here,  and  williout  an  elaborate  map  such  details  would 
be  unintelligible.     But  the  broad  outline  of  the  opera- 


FOCH'S  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  49 

tion,  as  he  describes  it,  is  simple  enough — like  all  sound 
military  plans.  De  Failly  on  receiving  the  order  should 
have  acted  at  once,  and  started  off  the  1st  and  2nd 
Divisions  on  the  road  to  Bitsche.  The  long  summer 
evening  would  allow  good  progress  to  be  made  before 
halting.  The  cavalry  would  send  out  patrols  to  the 
border  line.  A  flank  guard  would  give  ample  protection, 
moving  forward  from  time  to  time  as  the  column  pro- 
gressed, halting  when  need  be,  to  be  ready  to  meet  any 
attempt  to  interrupt  the  movement,  of  which  the  cavalry 
would  give  warning.  The  two  divisions  would  reach 
Bitsche  early  on  the  5th.  They  would  have  a  rest  there 
that  day.  MacMahon's  telegram  in  the  evening  would 
find  the  whole  Fifth  Corps  concentrated  and  in  good  con- 
dition for  a  further  march.  Starting  at  4  a.m.  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th  (when  it  would  be  daylight,  and  the 
cool  morning  hours  available  for  the  march),  the  corps 
would  reach  the  battlefield  about  9  a.m.  The  battle  had 
been  begun  by  the  individual  action  of  one  of  the  Ger- 
man commanders,  and  attempts  had  at  first  been  made 
to  break  it  off,  for  the  Crown  Prince  did  not  intend  to 
fight  till  the  7th,  and  half  his  army  was  still  far  from 
the  field  at  9  a.m.  If  MacMahon  had  had  De  Failly's 
corps  at  his  command  at  that  hour,  or  even  some  hours 
later,  victory  would  have  been  within  his  grasp. 

So  the  battle  was  lost  by  De  Failly's  failure  to  obey 
and  to  obey  with  intelligent  initiative.  He  had  been 
given  a  clear  order  and  an  easy  task.  The  enemy  had 
not  opposed  his  movement.  "  The  Fifth  Corps,"  says 
Foch,  "  found  no  enemy  in  its  way.  But  everything 
was  done  as  if  the  enemy  had  been  everywhere.  It 
should  have  marched  even  in  spite  of  his  opposition.  It 
failed  to  march  even  in  his  absence.     The  march  was 


50  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

regulated  by  false  information,  which  was  never  veri- 
fied. There  was  no  reconnaissance,  no  proper  protec- 
tion. It  was  indeed  through  ignorance  that  the  Fifth 
Corps  disobeyed." 

What  a  difference,  he  suggests,  there  was  between  this 
blundering  operation  and  the  methods  of  the  little 
"Army  of  Italy"  in  1796!  One  may  now  add,  "what 
a  difference  between  the  blunders  of  1870  and  the  clear- 
sighted action  of  the  French  generals  of  1918!"  And 
the  difference  is  due  to  Foch's  teaching  as  well  as  to  his 
supreme  direction. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  ADVANCED  GUARD 

Concentrated  action  against  the  enemy's  main  army 
by  "  economy  of  force,"  enabling  the  striking  mass  to  be 
collected  for  this  vital  operation;  the  advanced  guard, 
in  the  general  sense  of  all  covering  detachments,  not 
only  getting  in  touch  with  and  reconnoitring  the  enemy, 
but  "holding"  him,  so  as  to  make  the  blow  possible, — 
intelligent  discipline  and  intelligent  obedience  and  ini- 
tiative on  the  part  of  subordinate  commanders  each  in 
his  own  sphere,  so  as  to  make  it  possible  for  one  mind  to 
control  and  direct  the  whole;  "freedom  of  action" 
secured  by  due  measures  of  protection  and  reconnais- 
sance ;  a  clear  grasp  of  the  facts  of  the  situation ;  in  a 
word,  all  that  security  and  sureness  that  Foch  sums  up 
under  the  term  of  surete: — these  are  the  foundations  of 
his  whole  theory  of  modern  war. 

The  example  of  De  Failly's  unfortunate  action  in 
1870  throws  much  light  upon  Foch's  view  of  surete  and 
the  freedom  of  action  it  ensures.  Many,  who  have  dis- 
cussed Foch's  teaching,  have  dwelt  rather  upon  the  idea 
of  concentrated  action  and  the  determined  will  to  con- 
quer, as  its  chief  characteristic.  At  least  as  important 
is  the  idea  of  surete. 

The  word  and  the  idea  recur  again  and  again  in  his 
writings.  He  uses  it  to  include  in  one  generalization, 
one  application  of  a  principle,  matters   which   most 

61 


52  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

writers  on  war  treat  under  various  separate  heads: — 
with  French  writers  the  service  of  exploration,  the  serv- 
ice of  security :  with  writers  of  all  countries,  such  topics 
as  outposts,  advanced  flank  and  rear  guards,  and  the 
tactics  of  a  fighting  retreat.  The  basis  of  the  tactical 
working  out  of  the  idea  is  the  delaying  power  of  a 
relatively  small  force,  this  delay  being  intended  to  en- 
able the  main  body  either  to  effect  a  movement  under 
its  cover,  or  to  come  to  its  help,  or  to  organize  its  own 
action.  Examining  still  further  the  problem  of  De 
Failly's  march,  he  works  out  in  detail  the  action  of  the 
flank  guards,  supposing  that  there  had  been  a  German 
attack  from  the  frontier  against  the  flank  of  the  line  of 
march.  One  cannot  here  follow  the  details  of  this  inter- 
esting discussion.  We  may  note  only  some  points  that 
he  brings  into  relief. 

The  flank  guard  is  warned  by  its  advanced  patrols  of 
cavalry,  that  the  enemy  is  approaching.  What  is  to  be 
done?  It  must  delay  the  attack,  or  hold  it  until  the 
column  has  passed  the  danger  point.  How  is  it  to  do 
this?  He  quotes  Carnot :  "  If  the  enemy  is  not  in  force, 
the  question  is  easy  to  settle ;  if  the  enemy  is  in  superior 
force,  by  taking  up  an  impregnable  position."  But 
Foch,  always  eminently  practical,  notes  that  there  are 
no  impregnable  positions,  and  any  position  held  by 
merely  relying  on  its  strength  and  making  a  passive 
defence  will  be  lost  by  the  enemy  manoeuvring  to  turn 
it.  Passive  defence  is  like  fencing  when  one  only  par- 
ries and  makes  no  riposte,  no  counter-thrust.  Sooner 
or  later,  the  fencer  is  hit.  But  though  a  flank  guard 
or  similar  detachment  cannot  find  any  "  impregnable  " 
position,  there  are  "  strong  "  positions,  that  lend  them- 
selyes  to  the  far-reaching  efCect  of  modern  arms.    Long 


THE  ADVANCED  GUARD  53 

range  will  compel  the  enemy  to  deploy  at  a  distance; 
rapidity  of  fire  will  make  the  results,  even  with  a  rela- 
tively small  force,  serious  for  the  attack.  So  the  prob- 
lem of  delaying  the  enemy  is  simplified.  The  enemy  is 
forced  to  lose  time,  and  further  delay  can  be  imposed 
upon  him  by  falling  back  to  make  a  stand  on  a  second 
position. 

To  show  what  could  be  done  by  a  small  force  well 
handled  by  a  commander  who  both  obeyed  his  orders 
to  the  letter,  and  took  every  precaution  to  act  with 
security  and  sureness — with  sureU — he  examines  the 
operations  not  of  a  French  commander,  but  of  a  German 
leader  in  the  same  war.  Foch  never  allows  national 
feeling  to  influence  him  in  his  appreciation  of  facts, 
and  acts  frequently  on  the  old  maxim,  that  one  can 
rightly  learn  from  an  enemy — Fas  est  ah  hoste  doceri. 
He  takes  his  example  for  study  from  General  von 
Kettler's  operations  against  Garibaldi  at  Dijon,  in 
January,  1871.  Von  Kettler  had  under  his  command 
a  brigade  and  two  batteries,  four  thousand  rifles  and 
twelve  guns.  Garibaldi's  force,  known  as  the  "  Army 
of  the  Vosges  "  is  variously  estimated  at  from  thirty 
to  fifty  thousand  men.  Dijon  had  been  surrounded  by 
entrenchments  armed  with  heavy  guns,  and  a  division 
under  General  Pelissier  had  been  assigned  to  the  city 
in  order  to  set  Garibaldi  and  the  army  of  the  Vosges 
free  for  operations  in  the  field.  A  definite  object  was 
indicated  to  him.  It  was  a  critical  time.  Bourbakfs 
army  was  endeavouring  to  reach  Alsace  and  raise  the 
siege  of  Belfort.  Manteuffel,  with  the  German  army  of 
the  South,  was  hurrying  to  head  him  off.  It  was  all- 
important  to  delay  ManteuffeFs  movement  eastwards. 
All  that  Garibaldi  did  was  to  move  out  less  than  five 


54  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

miles  to  a  point  from  which,  without  attacking  it,  he 
could  see  Manteuffel's  flank  guard  moving  across  his 
front.  Next  day,  he  allowed  the  German  army's  convoy 
to  pass  him.  He  abandoned  the  bridges  of  the  Saone 
with  hardly  a  show  of  resistance.  It  was  a  moment 
when  an  attack,  even  followed  by  a  lost  battle,  would 
have  helped  Bourbaki  and  France  by  delaying  Man- 
teufeel's  march.  But  after  doing  nothing.  Garibaldi 
retired  to  the  works  of  Dijon. 

Manteuffel's  objective  was  the  army  of  Bourbaki. 
Against  that  he  directed  his  own  army.  But  he  could 
not  entirely  neglect  the  possible  menace  of  a  move  from 
Dijon.  He  understood  the  need  of  surete,  and  he  pro- 
vided for  it  on  his  side  with  the  most  rigid  care  not  to 
weaken  his  main  striking  force  by  detaching  a  man  or 
a  gun  beyond  what  was  strictly  necessary.  He  gave 
Von  Kettler  only  an  infantry  brigade  and  twelve  guns. 
Foch  shows  how  thoroughly  the  latter  understood  his 
mission,  and  how  efficiently  he  executed  it. 

He  was  not  content  merely  to  "  remain  in  observa- 
tion "  with  his  small  force  and  watch  Garibaldi.  He 
got  in  close  touch  with  Dijon,  and  made  annoying  at- 
tacks on  the  French  outposts.  Outnumbered  ten  to  one, 
it  was  a  risky  game  to  play;  but  the  German  general 
had  taken  the  measure  of  his  opponent,  and  even  when 
he  was  facing  big  risks,  he  did  not  forget  the  measures 
of  surete  that  he  could  adopt.  One  of  his  attacks  ended 
in  serious  loss,  and  was  proclaimed  as  a  great  victory  by 
Garibaldi ;  but  the  final  result  was  that  the  Dijon  force 
was  kept  occupied,  and  all  the  time  that  Manteuffel  was 
operating  against  Bourbaki  he  had  the  certainty  that 
Garibaldi  would  not  move,  or  that  if  he  moved  Von 
Kettler  would  be  able  to  send  back  ample  warning.    In 


THE  ADVANCED  GUARD  55 

the  end,  Bourbaki  was  driven  into  Switzerland,  without 
having  received  the  remotest  aid  from  the  army  of  the 
Vosges  at  Dijon.  There  is  a  further  lesson  in  the  epi- 
sode— a  detached  force,  sent  out  to  hamper  and  delay 
an  enemy's  operations,  may  at  times  obtain  its  object 
by  incurring  a  local  defeat.  It  may  attack  only  to 
obtain  delay,  and  the  defeat  of  the  detachment  helps 
effectually  to  secure  the  victory  of  the  main  body — 
the  only  victory  that  has  any  decisive  result. 

Continuing  his  study  of  the  problem  of  sureU,  Foch 
takes  up  again  the  example  of  De  Failly's  march.  He 
has  pointed  out  that  a  properly  organized  and  well- 
handled  flank  guard  would  have  ensured  the  necessary 
surete^  and  he  proceeds  with  his  analysis  of  the  idea. 
What  would  the  flank  guard  provide?  First,  it  would 
secure  for  the  main  body,  whether  halted  or  on  the 
move,  safety  from  coming  under  hostile  fire.  This  he 
calls  surete  materielle — "  material  security."  And,  sec- 
ondly, if  the  enemy  made  his  appearance,  it  would  hold 
him  back  and  delay  him  until  the  main  body  had  passed 
the  danger  point,  thus  permitting  it  to  continue  its  move- 
ment and  execute  the  order  received.  This  is  surete 
tactique — "  tactical  security." 

"  Material  security  "  enables  a  force  to  live  in  safety 
in  the  midst  of  danger ;  "  tactical  security  "  enables  a 
commander  to  execute  his  programme,  to  carry  out  his 
orders  despite  the  difficulties  of  war,  the  unknown,  the 
action  of  the  enemy — to  act  surely  and  with  certainty, 
whatever  the  enemy  may  do,  by  preserving  for  himself 
his  freedom  of  action.  The  organization  that  safe- 
guards this  "  tactical  security  "  is  the  advanced  guard ; 
and  Foch  gives  the  widest  meaning  to  the  term.  He 
includes  in  it  what  most  writers  divide  up  into  the 


56  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

subjects  of  advanced  guards,  flank  guards,  rear  guards, 
outposts.  It  is  for  his  purpose  simply  any  detachment 
or  group  of  detachments,  that  has  to  exert  its  power  of 
resistance  for  the  sake  of  the  main  body,  in  order  to 
enable  that  main  body  to  execute  the  operation  en- 
trusted to  it.  Its  action  is  not  merely  defensive  how^ 
ever.  Every  operation  of  war  finally  tends  to  the 
battle  as  the  decisive  act.  And  here  comes  in  the  func- 
tion of  the  advanced  guard,  not  as  a  mere  protecting 
force,  but  as  a  means  of  preparing  the  attack.  It  gains 
touch  with  the  enemy,  holds  him,  reconnoitres  his  dis- 
positions, so  that  the  commander  of  the  main  body  may 
be  able  to  bring  it  into  action  and  direct  its  stroke  with 
that  sureness  and  security  that  are  summed  up  in  the 
term  surete,  or  to  put  it  in  other  words,  so  that  he  may 
be  able  to  exercise  his  freedom  of  action  with  a  full 
knowledge  of  what  is  before  him.  The  leader  must 
neither  be  forced  to  conform  to  the  enemy's  action,  nor 
fling  himself  blindly  into  the  fight.  An  example  illus- 
trates this  point. 

Had  De  Failly  brought  up  his  army  corps  in  the  early 
hours  of  the  battle  of  Woerth,  and  had  he  understood  his 
business,  how  would  he  have  had  to  act?  He  could  not 
merely  dribble  his  battalions  and  batteries  into  the  fight 
piecemeal  and  haphazard,  without  much  result.  The 
principle  of  economy  of  force  must  come  in.  "  One  can- 
not be  victorious  everywhere,"  says  Foch ;  "  but  it  is 
enough  to  be  victorious  at  one  point.  One  must  fight 
everywhere  else  with  a  minimum  of  forces,  in  order  to 
have  a  crushing  force  at  this  point.  There  will  be 
economy  everywhere  else,  in  order  to  be  able  to  spend 
freely  at  the  point  where  one  means  to  secure  the  de- 
cision."    So  the  Fifth  Corps  would  be  massed  and  de- 


THE  ADVANCED  GUARD  57 

ployed  facing  the  selected  point,  and  during  this  prep- 
aration it  must  be  covered  by  the  advanced  guard,  which 
had  already  come  into  touch  with  the  enemy  and  besides 
this  protection  was  doing  the  work  of  reconnaissance. 
But  leaving  special  instances  aside,  one  may  general- 
ize and  say  that  it  is  the  organization  and  efficient 
handling  of  the  advanced  guard  that  enables  the  com- 
mander to  act  with  security  and  certainty  despite  the 
difficulties  inherent  in  a  state  of  war,  despite  the  un- 
known, the  free  action  of  the  enemy,  the  dispersion  of 
his  own  units.  Foch  makes  what  looks  at  first  sight  a 
startling  statement  in  the  midst  of  his  long  discussion 
of  surete.  "  The  unknown — Vinconnu  is  the  rule  in 
wartime."  In  every  war,  armies  have  lived  and  moved 
in  the  midst  of  the  unknown.  In  England  a  descrip- 
tion of  it  has  become  generally  accepted,  since  Lonsdale 
Hale  invented  the  happily  chosen  term  in  a  lecture  at 
the  Royal  United  Service  Institution,  and  spoke  of  the 
"  fog  of  war  " — not  gunpowder  smoke,  but  the  fog  of 
the  mental  vision  produced  by  the  conditions  of  the  con- 
flict. Foch  as  usual  makes  his  idea  clear  by  referring 
to  definite  historical  instances,  such  as  MacMahon  in 
Alsace  in  August  not  knowing  anytliing  of  the  numbers, 
place  of  concentration,  and  degree  of  readiness  of  the 
Germans,  nor  even  of  their  advance,  until  a  civilian,  the 
sub-prefect  of  Wissemburg,  brought  him  news  that  the 
Crown  Prince  was  approaching:  and,  again,  the  igno- 
rance of  the  actual  situation  that  prevailed  at  the  Ger- 
man headquarters  in  the  days  before  the  battle  of  Grave- 
lotte:  or,  to  take  an  earlier  instance,  the  days  before 
Jena  at  Napoleon's  headquarters.  But  the  unknown 
ceases  to  be  a  danger,  if  a  well-commanded  advanced 
guard  is  there  to  deal  with  its  perils.    Thus,  in  those 


58  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

days  of  1806,  Lannes  with  Napoleon's  advanced  guard 
comes  upon  the  army  of  Hohenlohe,  and  within  twenty- 
four  hours  Napoleon  has  his  army  concentrated  for  a 
victorious  battle.  Foch  uses  a  familiar  example : — one 
is  walking  in  a  dark  room,  but  one  stretches  out  hands 
and  arms  in  front  to  guard  against  a  dangerous  col- 
lision; the  outstretched  arms  are  the  advanced  guard. 
In  dealing  with  this  question  of  the  "  fog  of  war,"  he 
refers  to  the  new  difficulties  of  reconnaissance  created 
by  the  introduction  of  long-range  weapons,  smokeless 
powder  and  the  use  of  cover. 

Foch  wrote  in  1901,  and  has  not  since  revised  his 
book.  A  great  and  marvellously  rapid  revolution  in  the 
art  and  the  means  of  reconnaissance  has  come  since 
then.  In  1901  there  was  talk  of  the  flying  machine  of 
the  future  among  a  few  enthusiasts,  who  ran  the  risk 
that  friends  would  become  doubtful  of  their  sanity. 
Lilienthal  had  been  carrying  out  his  flights  on  gliders 
two  years  before;  but  scientific  opinion  was  doubtful 
about  any  really  valuable  result.  The  brothers  Wright 
were  secretly  experimenting  in  America.  In  1907,  came 
Santos  Dumont's  staggering  flight  of  a  few  yards  near 
the  ground  on  a  clumsy  aeroplane.  It  was  a  great  event 
when  Farman  flew  a  kilometre  in  1908.  Next  year, 
Bl(^riot  flew  across  the  Channel.  Before  1914,  the  aero- 
plane had  ceased  to  be  a  novelty  or  a  scientific  toy.  It 
was  a  recognized  equipment  for  armies ;  and  throughout 
the  war  it  has  become  more  and  more  their  chief  means 
of  reconnaissance.  The  vanguard  is  now  in  great  part 
aerial,  tiurctc  depends  largely  on  the  airmen.  But 
even  with  this  wonderful  aid  to  surctc,  the  unknown  has 
not  been  entirely  abolished.  The  "  fog  of  war  "  still 
exists,  as  gigantic  surprise  operations  on  both  sides  have 


THE  ADVANCED  GUARD  59 

proved.  It  will  be  interesting,  when  new  editions  of 
Foch's  writings  appear,  to  see  how  he  deals  with  this 
new  element  in  the  great  problem.  This  much,  however, 
is  certain.  Even  the  help  of  the  new  "  cavalry  of  the 
air"  does  not  make  obsolete  or  unnecessary  the  older 
methods  of  ensuring  security  and  the  power  to  act  surely 
with  the  help  of  the  advanced  guard  upon  the  ground. 

Again,  Foch  shows  how  the  advanced  guard  solves 
the  difl&culty  that  arises  from  "  dispersion."  He  uses 
the  word  here,  not  to  signify  the  lack  of  concentration, 
but  the  inevitable  fact  that  any  large  force  in  movement 
must  be  spread  out  over  a  considerable  space.  An  army 
corps  on  the  march  will  cover,  say  fifteen  miles  of  road, 
and  it  will  be  five  or  six  hours  before  the  rearmost  units 
can  possibly  be  in  line  if  they  form  up  for  action  on  the 
front  reached  by  the  leading  battalion.  It  cannot  be 
sent  into  action  par  petits  paquets — ^in  a  succession  of 
small  detachments.  It  must  concentrate  and  be  in  hand. 
So  for  some  time  there  must  be  a  covering  force  out  in 
front  to  protect  the  deployment  and  hold  the  enemy. 
Here  again  is  the  work  of  the  advanced  guard.  It  is 
no  merely  passive  resistance  that  will  suffice.  It  is 
part  of  the  work  of  the  advanced  guard  to  occupy,  at 
the  cost  of  hard  fighting,  points  of  vantage  that  will  help 
in  the  subsequent  development  of  the  main  attack  and  at 
the  same  time  force  the  enemy  to  deploy  and  show  his 
strength  and  dispositions.  A  relatively  small  force  in 
this  position  can  afford  to  act  boldly  and  cover  a  wide 
front,  for  every  moment  help  is  nearer  and  nearer  at 
hand.  The  advanced  guard  attacks,  not  to  obtain  a  de- 
cisive result,  but  to  facilitate  the  subsequent  effort  for 
that  result  by  the  main  body. 

More  than  one  military  critic  of  note  has  blamed  the 


60  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

action  of  the  German  advanced  guards,  wlio,  on  the 
morning  of  August  6th,  1870,  opened  the  attack  on  Mac- 
Mahon  and  brought  on  the  battle  of  Woerth,  which  the 
headquarters'  staff  had  planned  for  next  day,  the  7th. 
Foch  praises  them.  In  the  Prussian  lines  it  was  thought 
that  there  were  signs  of  the  French  preparing  to  retreat. 
Trains  were  heard  moving  out  of  the  station  at  Nieder- 
bronn,  behind  their  position,  and  the  advanced  guard 
was  sent  into  action.  "  Rightly,"  says  Foch ;  "  for  it  is  of 
the  highest  importance  that  at  the  moment  when  a  battle 
is  being  prepared  the  enemy  should  not  be  free  to  do  as 
he  pleases  and  avoid  the  shock."  So  too  at  Spicheren 
(Forbach),  on  the  same  day,  Steinmetz  attacked  with- 
out orders  from  headquarters,  because  he  thought  that 
the  French  under  Frossard  were  about  to  retreat.  He 
was  right,  says  Foch ;  and  he  makes  some  of  his  familiar 
comparisons : — "  One  does  not  strike  out  with  the  fist 
at  an  enemy  who  is  running  away.  One  first  seizes  him 
by  the  collar  to  force  him  to  receive  the  blow.  The  hand 
on  the  collar  is  the  action  of  the  advanced  guard." 

So  we  have  the  advanced  guard  fulfilling  a  triple 
office,  to  solve  a  threefold  difficulty:  feeling  its  way 
into  the  unknown,  gaining  touch,  clearing  up  the  situa- 
tion; at  the  same  time  covering  the  concentration  and 
deployment  of  the  main  body,  and  holding  the  enemy. 
It  must  attack  to  secure  the  ground  necessary  for  the 
deployment  of  the  main  body ;  it  passes  to  the  defensive 
when  these  ends  have  been  gained.  It  must  attack  also 
to  hold  the  enemy.  With  Foch,  attack  means  success, 
and  war  is  movement  against  the  enemy,  not  waiting 
to  parry  the  enemy's  thrusts  and  leaving  him  full  free- 
dom of  action. 

The  advanced  guard  must  be  a  force  of  all  three  arms* 


THE  ADVANCED  GUARD  61 

In  modern  war  it  may  well  have  to  be  itself  an  army 
of  considerable  strength,  and  its  preliminary  operations 
may  be  on  a  scale  that  in  earlier  days  would  be  that  of 
a  great  battle.  Contact. — it  may  be  prolonged  contact 
with  the  enemy  and  serious  fighting — will  take  place 
before  the  moment  comes  to  launch  the  decisive  attack ; 
and  all  the  while  the  enemy  must  not  only  be  held  but 
watched  and  carefully  reconnoitred.  As  Napoleon  put 
it,  a  commander  can  adopt  a  sound  plan  of  attack,  only 
if  he  has  "  certain  and  true  reports  up  to  the  moment 
of  action."  And  for  these  he  depends  on  his  advanced 
guard. 

Foch  works  out  in  detail  the  method  of  handling  an 
advanced  guard  by  making  an  elaborate  study  of  one 
of  the  engagements  in  the  war  of  1866.  He  follows  from 
hour  to  hour  and  illustrates  with  a  series  of  elaborate 
maps  the  operations  of  a  small  force  (seven  battalions, 
two  batteries,  five  squadrons) — the  advanced  guard  of 
Steinmetz's  army,  as  it  marched  into  Austrian  territory. 
Von  Loewenstein,  who  commanded  this  detachment,  had 
to  seize  the  defile  of  Nachod  in  the  hills  that  form  the 
Bohemian  frontier,  and  pushing  out  beyond  it,  cover 
the  march  of  Steinmetz's  army  through  the  pass.  He 
was  attacked  by  a  superior  Austrian  force,  and  held  his 
own.  His  troops,  by  the  way,  belonged  to  a  Polish 
corps  of  the  Prussian  army.  They  were  good  fighting 
men,  and  they  had  good  leaders  and  a  thoroughly  com- 
petent commander.  The  Austrians  blundered  badly. 
The  record  of  both  success  and  blundering  in  war  is  full 
of  useful  lessons,  when  analysed  by  a  master  hand ;  and 
Foch  not  only  works  out  the  theory  of  how  an  advanced 
guard  should  be  handled,  but  also  incidentally  conveys 
a  number  of  most  useful  lessons  as  to  the  leading  of 


62  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

troops  in  action,  the  use  of  ground,  the  defence  of  woods 
and  villages,  the  combination  of  the  three  arms.  This 
is  characteristic  of  his  teaching.  He  keeps  the  main 
object  of  his  lecture,  its  special  topic  clearly  in  view, 
but  as  occasion  offers  he  does  not  hesitate  to  point 
out  other  lessons;  and  he  does  this  so  skilfully  that  the 
hearer  or  reader  does  not  lose  sight  of  the  chief  subject 
on  account  of  these  digressions.  One  cannot  even  at- 
tempt to  summarize  this  study  of  the  fight  at  Nachod. 
Its  value  depends  on  the  mass  of  detailed  facts  that 
he  skilfully  marshals  and  makes  the  text  of  his  com- 
ments. The  chapter  occupies  just  one-fifth  of  the  whole 
volume  of  which  it  forms  a  part.  That  so  much  space 
is  devoted  to  it  shows  the  importance  Foch  attaches  to 
this  question  of  the  advanced  guard — the  organization 
that  ensures  the  essential  condition  of  sureU  in  the  con- 
duct of  military  operations  whether  on  a  large  or  on  a 
small  scale. 

We  may  note  two  examples  of  what  we  have  called  his 
incidental  teaching,  points  which  have  a  direct  bearing 
on  all  battle  leading,  but  here  are  insisted  on  as  spe- 
cially concerning  the  fighting  of  an  advanced  guard. 

First,  as  to  the  consumption  of  cartridges.  The  2nd 
Battalion  of  the  Thirty-seventh  Prussian  Infantry,  who 
had  to  meet  the  most  serious  Austrian  attack,  twice 
during  the  morning  stopped  the  enemy  by  its  fire. 
But  its  average  consumption  of  ammunition  was  only 
twenty- three  cartridges  for  each  man  in  the  ranks — a 
striking  proof  of  wjiat  can  be  accomplished  by  con- 
trolled and  well-directed  fire. 

There  is  a  still  more  important  lesson  as  to  losses  in 
action.  Foch's  own  words  are  worth  quoting :  "  With 
modern  weapons,  which  revealed  their  full  power  on  the 


THE  ADVANCED  GUARD  63 

battlefield  of  Nachod,  we  see  that  the  Austrians  suffered 
the  most  serious  losses  when  they  were  retiring  after  the 
failure  of  their  attacks,  or  when  they  were  abandon- 
ing a  lost  position.  It  cost  them  less  to  advance  to  the 
attack  or  to  hold  their  ground  on  the  defensive.  Hence 
we  have  the  two  principles  that  should  hold  the  first 
place  in  modern  tactics :  An  attack^  once  begun,  must  he 
pushed  on  to  the  end:  the  defence  must  he  maintained 
to  the  very  last  effort.  These  are  the  methods  that  are 
the  most  economic.  They  must  be  the  guide  of  those 
who  carry  out  the  operations,  and  also  of  those  who 
direct  them  and  command  them.  They  imply  the  strict- 
est obligation  to  recognize,  to  foresee,  and  to  prepare 
for,  the  difficulties  involved  in  the  attack,  and  not  to 
attempt  it  unless  it  can  be  pushed  to  the  end;  and  in 
order  to  make  this  possible  it  must  be  organized  and 
pushed  forward  under  due  protection,  and  prepared, 
supported,  guarded,  up  to  the  last  moment." 

The  study  of  the  battle  of  Nachod  has  been  used 
chiefly  to  show  how  surete  is  obtained  by  the  use  of  the 
advanced  guard  covering  the  operations  of  a  single  line 
of  march.  This  is  an  instance  of  tactical  surete.  Foch 
goes  on  to  apply  the  same  idea  to  the  covering  of  opera- 
tions in  a  wide  theatre  of  war,  where  it  is  a  question 
of  obtaining  the  freedom  of  operation  and  the  clear- 
sighted direction  of  armies  and  groups  of  armies. 
Here  we  have  to  obtain  surete  strategique — "  strategic 
security."  The  lack  of  it  involves  all  the  perils  of 
"strategical  surprise,"  Foch  takes  as  the  historical 
examples  on  which  he  bases  his  teaching  first,  the 
German  operations  of  August  16th,  1870,*   resulting 

*  These  operations  are  more  fully  dealt  with  by  Foch  in  his  Con- 
4uite  de  la  Ouerre. 


64  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

in  the  battle  of  Rezonville  (known  in  France  as  the 
Battle  of  Gravelotte  and  in  some  German  histories  as 
the  Battle  of  Mars-la-Tour) — a  case  where  the  German 
headquarters  was  seriously  involved  in  a  dangerous 
fog  of  war,  that  might  have  led  to  disaster  but  for  the 
hopelessly  bad  leadership  on  the  French  side.  Then, 
as  an  example  of  "  strategic  security  "  obtained  in  diffi- 
cult circumstances,  he  takes  Napoleon's  direction  of 
Eugene's  operations  with  the  Army  of  Italy  in  the 
Hungarian  campaign  of  1809,  an  episode  little  known 
to  most  students  of  military  history  because  it  was  a 
"  side-show "  while  greater  events  were  in  progress. 
Finally,  he  takes  a  campaign  that  will  always  be  of 
interest  to  English  readers — the  campaign  of  Waterloo 
— and  studies  the  operations  of  Ziethen's  Army  Corps, 
on  the  line  of  the  Sambre  about  Charleroi,  on  the  day 
when  Napoleon  crossed  the  frontier.  Ziethen  had  to 
gain  time  for  the  concentration  of  both  the  army  of 
Blflcher  and  that  of  Wellington.  Every  hour  was  im- 
portant. Foch  describes  his  leadership  on  that  anx- 
ious day  as  "  an  example  of  dispositions  that  ensured 
strategic  security."  The  Prussians  had  to  make  a 
fighting  retreat  in  a  confined  space  against  the  advance 
of  a  vastly  superior  force  directed  by  the  greatest 
master  of  war.  Ziethen's  operations  are  a  splendid 
example  of  rearguard  work.  He  made  Waterloo  pos- 
sible, and  foiled  the  great  Emperor's  well-conceived  plan. 
And  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  here  we  have  Foch  tak- 
ing rearguard  fighting  as  his  final  instance  of  how  the 
"avant-garde"  ensures  suretc,  for  the  main  fighting 
force.  With  Foch,  as  we  have  already  noted,  the  ad- 
vanced guard  is  any  detachment  engaged  in  this  mission 
of  s'kreti,  whatever  be  the  direction  in  which  it  may  be 


THE  ADVANCED  GUARD  65 

facing  or  moving.  The  accidental  position  is  nothing. 
The  principle,  the  central  idea,  is  what  is  important — 
namely  that  the  smallest  or  the  largest  body  of  troops — 
everything  from  a  company  on  the  march  to  a  group  of 
armies — runs  the  continual  risk  of  blundering,  failure 
and  destruction,  unless  it  is  covered  by  some  kind  of 
living  screen  that  will  provide  it  with  the  all-important 
surete.  That  is  the  first  condition  not  merely  of  success 
but  of  continued  existence  as  an  organized  force. 


CHAPTER  y 

THE  BATTLE 

Every  operation  of  war  is  intended  to  lead  up  to  the 
decisive  test  of  battle.  The  last  three  chapters  of 
Foch's  Principes  de  la  Guerre  are  devoted  to  the  sub- 
ject. He  treats  it  in  less  detail  than  the  question  of 
surete.  He  makes  no  attempt,  indeed,  to  handle  it 
exhaustively.  He  dwells  chiefly  on  one  point. — the 
decisive  attack. 

In  his  preface  to  the  first  edition  of  the  book  he  had 
been  careful  to  state  explicitly  that  it  was  not  meant 
to  be  anything  like  a  complete  treatise  on  war,  but  only 
a  discussion  of  certain  of  its  aspects.  In  these  closing 
chapters  he  insists  only  on  the  application  of  some  of 
the  principles  he  has  already  examined  to  the  decisive 
effort  on  the  battlefield.  He  has  already,  in  the  opening 
pages  of  his  book,  insisted  on  the  all  importance  of  the 
decisive  battle,  and  in  the  course  of  his  work  he  has 
repeatedly  to  touch  upon  battle  tactics.  He  now  sums 
up  the  guiding  principles  of  command  in  the  prelim- 
inary stages  of  a  great  battle  and  in  its  final  act. 

As  one  reads  the  pages,  it  is  obvious  that  if  they  were 
now  to  be  rewritten,  they  would  be  modified  and  supple- 
mented in  more  than  one  point  of  detail.  The  principles 
would  remain.  There  would  be  a  fuller  discussion  of 
their  api>lication  under  the  latest  conditions  of  war. 
One  chapter  deals  with  "  The  Modern  Battle."  Written 
more  than  ten  years  before  the  Great  War,  and  some 

66 


THE  BATTLE  67 

years  before  the  prolonged  Russo-Japanese  battles  of 
the  Manchurian  campaign,  it  does  not  anticipate  battles 
prolonged  over  days  and  weeks,  nor,  again,  the  battles 
of  the  Western  Front,  fought  upon  one  portion  of  a 
line  that  stretched  from  the  sea  to  Switzerland,  Foch 
foresaw,  of  course,  that  the  battles  of  forthcoming  wars 
would  be  fought  on  far  extended  fronts  by  enormous 
masses  of  troops  and  that  they  might  well  be  prolonged 
day  after  day — as,  for  instance.  Napoleon's  battle  of 
Leipzig  had  been.  But  various  chapters  indicate  that 
he  had  still  in  mind  the  battle  decided  between  sunrise 
and  sunset,  like  most  of  the  conflicts  of  the  past. 

In  telling  the  story  of  his  own  leadership  in  the  battles 
of  the  Great  War,  we  shall  be  able  to  show  how  he 
demonstrated  the  application  of  his  theory  under  the 
new  conditions,  not  by  words  but  by  deeds,  no  longer 
in  the  lecture  room  but  on  the  battlefield.  Here  we 
need  only  deal  with  the  salient  points  of  his  theory  as 
based  upon  the  lessons  of  all  military  history,  viewed 
under  existing  conditions  when  he  was  teaching  at  the 
Ecole  de  Guerre  and  writing  his  first  treatise  on  war. 

He  begins  by  sweeping  aside  what  he  describes  as 
false  ideas  of  what  a  decisive  battle  really  is.  It  is 
not  simply  a  great  tragic  drama  of  moving  incidents, 
with  a  denouement  depending  on  some  unforeseen  event. 
It  is  not  like  the  battles  of  peace  manoeuvres  dependent 
on  some  scheme  that  regularly  develops  into  an  illus- 
tration of  the  employment  of  the  three  arms ;  nor  is  it 
made  up  of  a  number  of  local  conflicts  and  efforts  with 
a  result  depending  on  success  being  won  in  the  whole 
or  in  the  majority  of  these.  To  use  a  term  taken  from 
mechanics,  victory  in  a  decisive  battle  is  not  the  sum 
total  but  the  resultmit  of  a  number  of  combined  efforts. 


\ 


68  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

some  of  which  may  appear  to  those  engaged  in  them  to 
be  failures.  All  nevertheless  converge  to  produce  the 
result;  and  this  combination  is  the  work  of  the  com- 
mander who  plans  and  directs  the  battle. 

The  battle,  which  Foch  is  analysing,  is  not  one  of  the 
subsidiary  engagements  of  a  war.  He  refers  to  those 
with  which  he  has  already  dealt  more  or  less  fully  as 
examples  to  be  studied  in  connection  with  the  important 
problem  of  siireU,  and  the  operations  of  the  advanced 
guard.  All  these  had  a  restricted  local  object  in  view. 
Thus,  for  instance,  at  Nachod,  the  object  of  the  ad- 
vanced guard  of  Steinmetz's  army,  and  the  5th  Prussian 
Corps,  was  simply  to  obtain  control  of  the  exit  from 
the  defile  for  the  long  column  that  followed  it — to  open 
the  gate  into  Bohemia.  The  object  of  the  Austrians 
was  to  prevent  this.  Before  Dijon,  Von  Kettler  had 
simply  to  keep  Garibaldi's  army  of  the  Vosges  occupied, 
and  observe,  and  hamper  any  attempt  to  move  to  the 
help  of  Bourbaki.  On  the  Sambre  about  Charleroi,  in 
1815,  Ziethen  had  simply  to  delay  Napoleon's  advance 
into  Belgium,  in  order  to  gain  time  for  the  concentration 
of  Bliicher's  and  Wellington's  armies.  These  were 
all  preliminary  operations,  not  the  decisive  trial  of 
strength,  the  battle  that  marks  an  epoch  in  a  campaign 
or  settles  what  its  final  result  shall  be.  None  of  these 
battles  belong  to  the  class  of  decisive  events — like  a 
Waterloo  or  a  Sadowa  or  a  Gravelotte.  Foch  is  deal- 
ing with  battles  of  this  kind — days  on  which  the  com- 
mander seeks  to  obtain  a  decision  by  defeating  and 
destroying  the  main  battle  force  of  the  enemy,  breaking 
down  its  will  to  conquer,  imposing  on  it  the  sense  of 
hopeless  failure. 

Such  a  battle,  if  it  is  to  obtain  this  great  result, 


THE  BATTLE  69 

cannot  be  purely  defensive.  Speaking  of  the  merely 
defensive, — "  Such  a  battle,"  says  Foch,  "  gives  us 
neither  a  victorious  nor  a  beaten  side.  It  is  simply  a 
case  of  having  to  renew  the  conflict  again." 

So  we  must  have  the  offensive,  either  from  the  outset 
or  as  the  second  stage  of  the  fight  after  a  preliminary 
defensive. 

Every  defensive  battle,  if  it  is  to  achieve  a  decisive 
result,  must  develop  into  a  counter-attack. 

This  seems  an  obvious  truth,  but  it  has  often  been 
forgotten  or  disregarded,  with  fatal  results  for  those 
who  thus  leave  out  of  their  calculations  an  elementary 
idea  of  war.  This  mistake  vitiated  the  whole  of  the 
battle  leading  of  the  Imperial  army  of  France,  in  1870. 
There  was  a  notable  instance  of  it  on  August  16th,  1870, 
the  day  of  the  battle  of  Rezonville,  when  the  German 
headquarters  staff  had  blundered  badly,  and  the  French 
had  a  victory  within  their  grasp.  To  make  the  matter 
clear,  I  may  perhaps  quote  what  I  wrote  in  a  popular 
work  on  the  evolution  of  battle  tactics  since  Crimean 
days  up  to  the  Balkan  War  of  1912 : — 

"  German  leadership  in  the  Franco-German  War  was 
by  no  means  perfect.  It  seemed  to  be  so  admirable,  be- 
cause on  the  whole  it  was  good,  and  because  that  of  the 
generals  of  the  French  army  was  abominably  bad,  ex- 
cept sometimes  on  the  actual  battlefield  where  their 
soldier  courage  and  the  quality  of  their  men  enabled 
them  to  make  a  good  fight.  But  even  there  an  unfor- 
tunate theory  of  the  best  tactics  for  the  quick-firing 
breechloading  rifle  handicapped  them  throughout.  The 
sound  theory  of  Napoleon's  days,  which  held  its  own  still 
in  the  campaign  of  Magenta  and  Solferino,  was  that  at- 
tack  is  the  best  form  of  defence,  and  the  impetuous  char- 
acter of  the  French  makes  their  attack  formidable.  Be- 
sides it  is  only  by  attacking  that  an  enemy  can  be  really 


70  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

beaten.  But  with  the  coming  of  the  breechloading  rifle 
there  had  come  also  a  new  doctrine  that  the  way  to  win 
battles  was  to  '  sit  tight '  on  a  good  position,  preferably 
a  line  of  high  ground,  and  use  the  rapid  fire  to  destroy 
the  enemy  as  he  attacked.  *  The  defensive  is  now 
superior '  was  the  teaching  of  the  French  military 
schools.  The  Germans  held  by  the  sounder  doctrine, — 
*  Only  the  attack  can  give  real  results.  It  may  be  more 
costly  than  formerly,  but  the  cost  must  be  paid.  To 
attack  is  to  assert  from  the  outset  the  sense  of  power 
and  the  determination  to  win.'  For  hours  on  this  day 
of  Rezonville,  the  French  had  in  their  hands  the  oppor- 
tunity of  gaining  a  great  victory — if  only  they  would 
attack.  But  this  wretched  theory  of  the  superiority  of 
the  defence  made  it  the  ruling  idea  that  all  they  had  to 
do  was  to  cling  to  the  edge  of  the  high  ground  near  the 
Mars-la-Tour-Gravelotte  road  and  repel  the  Prussian 
attack.  A  single  German  corps  and  some  cavalry  were 
opposed  to  all  the  army  of  the  Rhine.  But  the  French 
did  not  attack."  * 

Foch  remarks  that,  if  a  sound  theory  of  war  had  pre- 
vailed in  France,  in  1870,  the  engagements  of  August 
14th  and  16th  would  not  have  been  claimed  as  vic- 
tories. Like  other  battles  of  the  time,  they  were  simply 
engagements  that  might  have  been  victories.  The  very 
phrase  in  fashion  in  those  days  in  the  official  commu- 
nique's t  and  in  the  French  press  showed  the  influence 
of  false  theory.  It  used  to  be  said  that  a  victory  had 
been  won,  because  the  troops  had  "  maintained  their 
positions."  This,  though  the  mere  defensive,  prepares 
the  way  for  defeat,  and  a  real  victory  can  only  be  won  by 
passing  from  defence  to  attack. 

*  Famoua  Modem  Battles,  p.  154. 

t  Foch  is  here  facing  and  analysing  the  realities  of  war.  Of  course, 
in  all  countries  during  war  there  is  a  tendency  in  communiques  issued 
to  the  public  to  describe  even  indecisive  actions  as  victories. 


THE  BATTLE  TX 

In  one  of  those  characteristic  phrases  where  his  own 
energetic  spirit  dictates  the  words,  he  remarks  that 
"action  is  the  first  law  of  war.  ...  Of  all  mistakes 
only  one  is  disgraceful — inaction.  We  must  seek  to 
create  the  course  of  events,  not  merely  be  passively  sub- 
ject to  them ;  and  above  all  we  must  organize  the  attack, 
everything  else  becoming  subordinate  to  it,  and  having 
no  claim  for  consideration  except  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  advantage  that  may  result  from  it  for  the  attack." 

Here  speaks  the  vigorous  mind,  that  in  the  darkest 
days  of  the  Great  War,  the  most  critical  moments, 
thought  only  of  striking  back.  These  were  the  ideas 
with  which,  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre,  he  inspired  the 
future  leaders  of  the  French  army;  and  this  teaching 
contributed  in  no  small  degree  to  make  the  armies  of 
France  in  the  war  that  began  in  1914  so  different  from 
the  armies  of  1870. 

How  is  this  decisive  battle,  this  attack  that  is  to  break 
down  the  enemy's  fighting  spirit,  to  be  organized?  Foch 
divides  up  his  ideal  battle  into  three  stages — the  pre- 
paratory action,  the  decisive  attack,  the  pursuit  that 
enlarges  and  secures  the  result. 

The  battle  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  series  of  indi- 
vidual contests,  battalion  against  battalion,  brigade 
against  brigade.  It  is  a  combination  of  these  efforts  by 
the  commander.  Its  decisive  result  does  not  depend  on 
one  side  or  the  other  suffering  greater  material  losses. 
It  depends  on  the  defeated  side — even  though  it  may 
have  suffered  less  material  damage — being  in  the  mili- 
tary sense  of  the  word  "  demoralized."  It  has  lost  the 
spirit  and  hope  that  make  further  successful  resistance 
possible;  hence  the  saying  Foch  quotes  with  approval 
from  Joseph  de  Maistre :  "  A  lost  battle  is  a  battle  that 


72  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

one  believes  to  be  lost,  for  a  battle  is  not  lost  from  the 
mere  material  standpoint."  Hence,  too,  Foch's  maxim : 
"  A  battle  won  is  a  battle  in  which  one  refuses  to  admit 
that  one  is  beaten,"  and  Frederick  the  Great's  saying : 
"  The  most  obstinate  wins — that  is  the  true  source  of 
success." 

So  Foch  insists  upon  what  he  describes  as  the  moral 
element  in  victory.  Material  force  is  used  directly  to 
inflict  loss  and  destruction  on  the  enemy,  but  the  ulti- 
mate object  is  to  break  down  his  fighting  spirit — to  pro- 
duce a  moral  not  a  material  effect.  So  he  quotes  from 
Von  der  Goltz :  "  The  object  in  view  is  not  so  much  to 
destroy  the  enemy's  fighting  men,  as  to  destroy  their 
courage.  Victory  is  on  your  side  as  soon  as  you  have 
given  the  enemy  the  conviction  that  the  cause  is  lost. 
.  .  .  One's  opponent  is  defeated,  not  by  complete  and 
individual  annihilation,  but  by  destroying  his  hope  of 
victory." 

Hence  the  idea  so  frequently  recurred  to  by  Foch  of 
the  "  will  to  conquer  " — a  necessity  for  every  soldier, 
but  above  all  for  him  who  commands. 

In  discussing  the  task  of  the  commander-in-chief,  and 
the  qualities  that  fit  him  for  it,  Foch  puts  in  the  first 
place  his  confident  determination  to  succeed  and  the 
power  of  inspiring  others  with  it.  He  takes  as  a  typical 
example  a  soldier  that  one  would  hardly  expect  a 
French  writer  would  choose  for  the  purpose.  It  is  one 
more  instance  of  the  impartial  scientific  spirit  with 
which  he  regards  the  facts  of  military  history.  He 
points  to  Bliicher,  and  describes  Scharnhorst's  choice 
of  him  to  command  the  Prussian  army,  in  1813,  as  a 
stroke  of  genius.  In  Court  circles  in  Prussia  the  choice 
met  with  opposition.     Bliicher  was  described  as  a  stupid 


THE  BATTLE  73 

old  maD,  broken  with  illness  and  only  half-educated. 
But  his  name  was  popular  with  the  soldiers;  he  could 
make  any  demands  upon  them  with  the  certainty  that 
they  would  give  him  their  utmost  effort.  "  Whatever 
he  may  have  lacked  on  the  intellectual  side,"  says  Foch, 
"  he  had  a  will,  impassioned  energy  of  mind  that  never 
tired,  never  was  at  rest,  and  with  which  he  drew  the 
nations  into  the  war,  and  their  armies  on  to  victory,  as 
he  drew  on  to  Paris  the  sovereigns  in  spite  of  them- 
selves, in  spite  at  least  of  one  of  them,  the  Austrian 
Emperor,  who  certainly  was  not  bent  on  dethroning  his 
son-in-law  or  making  his  daughter  a  widow — and  a 
crownless  widow.  Have  we  not  here  enough  of  deter- 
mined will,  energy  and  power  of  command,  to  justify 
Scharnhorst  in  his  choice?  " 

Without  giving  any  indication  of  the  examples  that 
he  has  in  mind,  Foch  goes  on  to  say  that  one  sees  the 
influence  of  the  commander's  will  on  whole  multitudes 
of  men  at  those  wonderful  moments  "  when  without 
knowing  why,  an  army  on  the  battlefield  feels  itself 
carried  forward  as  if  it  were  gliding  down  an  inclined 
plane." 

He  becomes  enthusiastic  in  his  description  of  the  ideal 
commander  and  his  influence  on  the  events  of  war.  The 
first  condition  of  success  is  to  have  such  a  man  in  com- 
mand ;  everything  depends  on  this.  "  No  victory  is 
possible  without  a  vigorous  commander,  ready  for  re- 
sponsibility, eager  for  daring  enterprises,  himself  pos- 
sessing and  inspiring  in  others  the  determination  and 
energy  that  will  go  through  to  the  end — nothing  will 
be  won  without  his  personal  action,  based  on  will,  judg- 
ment, freedom  of  mind  in  the  midst  of  danger.  These 
are  the  natural  qualities  of  the  gifted  man,  the  born 


74  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

general,  but  advantages  that  can  be  acquired  by  effort 
and  by  thought  in  the  case  of  the  average  man." 

History  is  full  of  instances  of  the  failure  of  armies 
through  the  lack  of  even  average  qualities  for  command 
in  their  chiefs.  In  the  battles  round  Metz,  in  August, 
1870,  officers  and  men  fought  bravely,  but  never  had  a 
chance  of  victory,  because  they  had  a  commander  who 
had  not  the  "  will  to  conquer,"  who  thought  only  of 
defence  not  attack.  Disasters  like  these,  remarks  Foch, 
are  not  accidents,  but  the  inevitable  result  of  the  lack 
of  moral  qualities  in  the  command. 

The  effort  on  which  the  commander  depends  for  giv- 
ing effect  to  his  ^'  will  to  conquer  "  is  the  decisive  attack. 
What  is  the  special  character  he  will  seek  to  give  to  it? 
Terror  is  the  force  that  breaks  down  the  opponent's 
power  of  resistance,  and  the  most  potent  agency  in  pro- 
ducing terror  is  surprise.  How  is  this  to  find  a  place 
in  the  great  operations  of  war?  Ambuscades  and  the 
other  devices  of  war  on  a  small  scale  are  clearly  out  of 
the  question.  But  what  is  possible,  what  the  great 
leaders  from  Napoleon  downwards  have  again  and  again 
accomplished  on  the  battlefield  is  the  sudden  interven- 
tion of  a  superior  striking  force  at  a  chosen  point  in  the 
opposing  line,  the  attack  being  driven  home  so  rapidly 
and  effectually  that  the  enemy  has  not  the  time  to  col- 
lect a  reserve  with  which  to  parry  the  blow.  This  was 
the  central  idea  of  Napoleon's  battle  leading.  We  find 
him  explaining  it  to  one  of  his  marshals,  Gouvion 
St.-Cyr,  and  reducing  it  almost  to  a  set  formula.  One 
engages  the  enemy  all  along  the  front.  It  is  best  not 
to  be  anxious  about  the  good  or  bad  fortune  of  the 
units  tlius  in  action,  or  to  yield  too  readily  to  requests 
for  help  sent  by  their  chiefs.     As  the  days  go  on  and  the 


THE  BATTLE  75 

enemy  is  becoming  wearied  with  the  struggle,  and  has 
engaged  most  of  his  reserves,  a  mass  of  infantry,  cavalry 
and  artillery  is  got  together  suddenly  and  hurled  against 
one  point  in  his  front,  so  as  to  make  what  Napoleon 
called  the  great  event  of  the  battle;  and  speaking  to 
St.-Cyr,  he  added  that  thus  he  had  almost  always  been 
successful.  Foch  takes  as  a  typical  instance  of  suc- 
cess thus  obtained  the  advance  of  Macdonald's  column 
at  the  battle  of  Wagram,  the  huge  mass  of  fifty  bat- 
talions (twenty-two  thousand,  five  hundred  men),  sud- 
denly bearing  down  on  the  Austrian  line,  its  attack  pre- 
pared by  the  fire  of  a  hundred  guns,  and  heralded  and 
partly  screened  by  a  charge  of  forty  squadrons  of  cav- 
alry. What  did  the  infantry  do?  It  had  hardly  any 
fire  effect  on  account  of  the  column  formation.  As  for 
its  twenty  thousand  bayonets,  not  one  of  them  inflicted 
the  loss  of  a  man  upon  the  enemy.  The  column  itself 
suffered  heavy  loss  from  hostile  fire  as  it  advanced.  But 
before  the  steady  advance  of  the  column,  the  Austrian 
line  broke,  without  waiting  to  cross  bayonets  with  the 
attack.  Moral  not  material  collapse  gave  the  French 
the  victory.  Before  the  sudden  appearance  of  Mac- 
donald  and  the  onward  march  of  his  mass  of  bayonets 
the  Austrians  were  seized  with  the  feeling  that  they 
were  in  the  presence  of  a  force  they  could  not  resist — 
that  resistance  would  end  in  their  destruction.  Nothing 
else  on  the  battlefield  mattered.  Napoleon  had  struck 
the  decisive  blow. 

Here  we  have  the  typical  manoeuvre  battle  with  the 
result  depending  on  the  decided  and  decisive  action  of 
the  chief  command.  It  differs  essentially  from  what 
Foch  calls  the  parallel  battle — the  clash  between  two 
lines,  in  which  the  various  units  on  each  side — bat- 


76  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

talions,  brigades,  divisions — are  all  striving,  each  on 
its  part  of  the  field,  to  obtain  a  local  success  without 
any  central  directing  mind  organizing  the  supreme 
effort.  There  are  local  attacks,  while  the  reserves  are 
employed  piecemeal  to  reinforce  those  parts  of  the  line 
that  need  help.  It  is  quite  true  that  in  such  battles  vic- 
tories have  been  won  that  gave  great  results.  But  this 
depends  on  the  chapter  of  accidents,  the  inspiration  of 
some  local  leader,  the  energetic  attack  of  this  or  that 
unit.  The  essential  weakness  of  the  attack  in  such  a 
battle  is  that  it  tends  to  become  a  uniform  pressure  all 
along  the  line,  that  is  nowhere  a  pressure  sufficient  to 
reach  the  crushing  point  of  stress.  It  meets  with  an 
equally  uniform  resistance,  probably  a  superior  resist- 
ance because  the  defence  can  fortify  its  ground  and  in 
other  ways  improve  its  position.  So  we  may  easily  find 
the  attack  becoming  like  a  rising  tide  washing  harm- 
lessly against  a  solid  breakwater. 

But  Foch  points  out  that  if  we  can  find  a  fissure  in 
the  solid  obstacle  opposed  to  us,  a  "  point  of  insufftcient 
resistance,"  and  push  into  it  the  organized  attack  on 
this  selected  spot,  or  if  we  can  make  the  fissure  and 
break  the  resistance  by  substituting  at  one  point,  in- 
stead of  the  regular  pressure  of  the  rising  tide,  a  blow 
like  that  of  a  battering-ram,  a  breach  is  made  and  the 
hostile  line  can  be  swept  away.  Here  we  have  the 
essential  feature  of  the  manoeuvre  battle. 

We  shall  see  how  Foch,  a  few  years  later,  reduced 
this  theory  to  practice,  how  he  found  the  fissure  in  the 
German  line  at  the  battle  of  the  Marne  and  drove  his 
attack  into  it,  and  how  in  operations  on  a  far  larger 
scale  he  marked  down  the  weak  point  in  the  hostile 
front,  when  the  Germans  were  again  pouring  towards 


THE  BATTLE  77 

the  Marne,  and  launched  his  battering-ram  blow  against 
it,  on  July  18th,  1918. 

The  manoeuvre  battle  is,  then,  the  battle  that  is  under 
the  commander's  control,  in  which  he  has  a  definite 
plan,  and  carries  it  out  with  definite  purpose  in  view, 
determined  to  control  events  not  merely  wait  upon  them. 
The  "  keystone  "  of  the  battle  is  the  decisive  attack.  All 
else  is  subsidiary  to  it.  To  have  in  hand  the  necessary 
force  for  this  decisive  event,  the  economy  of  force  must 
be  kept  in  view  in  all  the  other  operations  of  the  battle- 
field. 

In  the  parallel,  the  reserves  are  a  kind  of  magazine, 
from  which  to  draw  fresh  supplies  of  men  and  guns, 
now  for  this,  now  for  that  part  of  the  line.  In  the 
manoeuvre  battle,  they  are  the  force  organized  to  pro- 
duce the  decision.  Foch  notes  that,  in  the  war  of  1870, 
the  French  army  fought  only  parallel  battles.  The 
French  Staff  apparently  had  forgotten  the  very  idea  of 
the  manoeuvre  battle  of  Napoleonic  days  and  did  not 
realize  that  the  Germans  were  employing  the  principle 
against  them.  The  French  official  communiques  used 
to  tell  of  the  arrival  of  German  reinforcements,  which 
decided  the  battle  against  them.  They  did  not  under- 
stand that  the  appearance  of  these  new  forces  was 
nothing  but  the  launching  of  the  organized  decisive 
attack. 

In  the  battle  there  will  usually  be  a  considerable 
amount  of  fighting,  before  the  attack  can  be  delivered 
or  the  moment  is  ripe  for  it.  First,  touch  is  gained  with 
the  enemy's  positions  and  he  is  held  and  kept  occupied 
all  along  the  front.  This  requires  a  considerable  aggre- 
gate force,  and,  it  may  be,  a  long  time.  In  fact,  this 
subsidiary  and  preparatory  engagement  will  probably 


78  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

take  up  the  greater  part  of  the  time  that  the  battle  lasts, 
and  the  greater  part  of  the  force  available  for  it.  Hence 
what  Foch  calls  the  "  optical  delusion  "  of  regarding 
this  as  the  principal  part  of  the  battle  and  the  whole 
affair  as  a  parallel  battle.  While  all  this  is  in  progress, 
the  real  event  of  the  day  is  being  prepared,  the  act  that 
really  counts  and  on  which  the  whole  depends,  though 
its  execution  may  take  up  a  shorter  time  and  only  a 
minor  part  of  the  army  that  is  in  action. 

Foch  illustrates  this  by  a  detailed  study  of  a 
manoeuvre  battle  of  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Instead  of 
taking  as  the  subject  for  his  careful  study  one  of  the 
Emperor's  great  manoeuvre  battles,  he  selects  the  vic- 
tory of  Lannes  at  Saalfeld  in  the  opening  days  of  the 
Jena  campaign  (1806).  He  chose  it,  perhaps,  because 
it  was  easier  to  make  clear  to  his  audience  all  the  de- 
tailed mechanism  of  the  preparation  and  the  decisive 
attack  carried  out  on  this  small  scale,  than  to  trace  the 
whole  course  of  one  of  the  more  famous  battles  that 
decided  the  fate  of  nations.  Saalfeld  itself  could  not 
count  as  a  decisive  victory  in  the  sense  of  settling  the 
fortunes  of  a  campaign ;  but  it  was  locally  decisive,  for 
it  ended  in  the  destruction  of  the  Prussian  force  that 
was  engaged.  And  Lannes  was  a  leader  whose  methods 
are  worth  studying.  Napoleon  himself  spoke  of  him  as 
the  ablest  of  all  his  marshals.  Foch  remarks  that,  if 
the  same  battle  had  to  be  fought  to-day  on  the  same 
ground,  it  would  be  difficult  to  improve  upon  the  plan 
adopted  by  Lannes. 

After  having  thus  explained  the  conditions  of  success 
in  battle  and  the  theory  of  the  preparatory  or  "  hold- 
ing "  engagement  all  along  the  front,  the  decisive  attack 
at   the  selected   pQint — the  theory   of  the   manoeuvre 


THE  BATTLE  79 

battle,  Foch  outlineig  the  application  of  the  theory  on 
the  modern  battlefield. 

He  returns  to  the  idea  of  the  advanced  guard  gaining 
touch,  reconnoitring,  feeling,  holding  the  enemy,  until 
the  main  striking  mass  can  be  hurled  upon  his  line.  But 
there  is  no  rigid  pseudo-mathematical  formula  of 
"  pivotting  squares  "  and  the  like,  no  attempt  to  reduce 
the  vast  conflicts  of  the  armies  of  our  time  to  the  pattern 
of  Napoleon's  comparatively  small  army  in  the  cam- 
paign of  Jena.  The  forces  first  engaged  against  the 
hostile  front  have  a  task  analogous  to  that  of  the  ad- 
vanced guard,  but  a  more  onerous  and  difficult  task  than 
that  of  the  vanguards  of  earlier  wars.  They  will  have 
to  obtain  more  precise  and  more  abundant  information, 
resist  the  enemy's  efforts  for  a  longer  time,  put  forth 
more  serious  exertions  to  hold  him  to  the  ground.  While 
preparing  the  attack  that  he  hopes  to  make  decisive,  the 
commander-in-chief  will  have  to  oppose  the  enemy  wher- 
ever he  shows  himself,  and  do  this  with  forces  that  keep 
him  occupied  and  hold  him  in  check  as  long  as  the  stage 
of  preparation  lasts.  He  must  provide  all  that  is  needed 
for  this  purpose,  while  endeavouring  to  keep  in  hand  the 
largest  possible  force  for  the  supreme  effort.  There  is 
and  must  be  a  still  earlier  stage  of  preparation,  before 
the  actual  battle  begins — the  grouping  of  the  larger 
units,  the  direction  of  their  lines  of  march,  with  a  view 
to  the  intended  battle.  Thus,  in  1870,  we  see  Von 
Moltke  planning  a  great  battle  against  the  French  army 
on  the  line  of  the  Sarre  for  August  9th,  a  battle  which 
the  course  of  events  rendered  impossible.  Three  armies 
were  to  combine  their  operations.  Two  were  to  attack 
in  front  and  hold  the  French  army;  the  third,  that  of 
the  Crown  Prince,  coming  up  from  the  Vosges,  was  to 


80  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

make  the  flank  attack,  the  decisive  blow.  It  was  to  be 
another  Sadowa,  on  the  same  plan  but  on  a  vaster  scale. 
The  preparation  began  with  the  first  advance  to  the 
frontier,  days  before. 

Once  the  actual  engagement  begins,  the  troops  put 
into  the  fighting  line  must  "  immobilize  "  the  enemy ; 
they  must  act  on  the  offensive,  ready  to  act,  if  he  tries 
to  press  forward  or  develop  a  serious  attack,  but 
endeavouring  to  keep  him  so  well  occupied  that  it 
will  not  be  easy  for  him  to  dispose  freely  of  his  own 
units. 

The  special  objects  of  attack  will  be  the  seizure  of 
strong  points  and  their  consolidation,  and  this  either 
with  a  view  to  making  it  easier  to  hold  the  enemy  or 
directly  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  main  attack.  The 
preparatory  battle  thus  becomes  a  series  of  local  engage- 
ments ;  all  have  one  general  purpose,  but  the  commander 
must  necessarily  leave  the  immediate  direction  of  them 
to  his  subordinates.  He  assigns  to  each  his  sphere 
of  action  and  his  special  task;  and  within  these  limits 
the  local  engagement  might  again  be  analysed  into  the 
preparation  and  the  local  decisive  attack. 

This  preparatory  engagement  may  last  a  long  time 
and  assume  the  aspect  of  a  series  of  conflicts  that  in 
the  wars  of  the  past  would  have  ranked  as  great  battles. 
Foch  goes  into  some  detail  as  to  the  part  to  be  played 
by  the  three  arms,  and  their  mutual  support.  He  dwells 
on  the  importance — the  ever  increasing  importance — of 
cover,  and  suggests  that  even  the  supports,  the  reserves 
of  the  fighting  line,  should  entrench  their  ground,  so 
as  to  prepare  positions  for  a  rally  and  a  stand  in  case 
of  things  going  badly  in  front.  There  is  a  hint  of  the 
modern  developments  of  artillery  barrage  fire  in  the 


THE  BATTLE  81 

remark  that  the  guns  will  seek  to  produce  a  danger 
zone  all  round  the  objective  of  the  attack. 

There  is  a  warning  against  making  the  preparatory 
action  or  series  of  actions  mere  "  demonstrations."  It 
must  be  pressed  with  energy  and  with  an  ever  increasing 
energy.  To  talk  to  soldiers  of  a  "  demonstration  "  is 
only  to  slacken  their  efforts  and  depress  their  morale. 
Troops  once  under  fire  must  exert  their  utmost  efforts. 
An  attack  once  begun  must  be  driven  home;  a  defence 
maintained  to  the  last. 

So  we  have  the  battle  in  progress.  If  all  goes  well, 
the  enemy  is  being  held,  his  first  lines  are  being  driven 
in,  advanced  posts  captured.  There  is  a  watch  for  any 
sign  of  a  coming  attempt  on  his  part  to  make  a  serious 
counter-attack,  and  the  means  are  at  hand  to  oppose  it 
and  at  least  delay  the  development.  If  on  the  whole 
things  are  going  well,  the  preparation  is  satisfactory. 
As  Napoleon  said  to  Gouvion  St.-Cyr,  one  need  not 
worry  much  about  local  failures.  There  need  not  be 
success  everywhere.  We  shall  see  later  how  calmly 
Foch  himself  faced  a  series  of  local  failures  in  the 
battle  of  the  Marne.  It  was  enough  for  him  that  his 
line  held  together,  though  losing  ground.  It  delayed 
the  enemy  long  enough  to  enable  him  to  organize  and 
find  the  opening  for  his  decisive  attack. 

This  is  the  really  important  element  in  the  battle.  If 
it  succeeds  all  is  won  and  local  losses  count  for  nothing. 

Foch  has  in  his  mind  attacks  modelled  on  those  of  the 
Napoleonic  wars  and  the  war  of  1870,  in  his  outline  of 
the  tactics  to  employ  in  this  attack.  But  though  some 
details  of  execution  may  be  modified  in  applying  the 
scheme  to  the  battles  of  to-day,  the  principle  and  the 
general  direction  remain  the  same.     There  is  the  bring- 


82  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

ing  up  of  tlie  troops  to  be  engaged,  so  that  they  may 
suffer  as  little  as  possible  in  the  distant  zone,  where  they 
can  inflict  no  loss  in  return  but  must  simply  endure  the 
enemy's  fire — the  concentration  under  cover,  and,  as  far 
as  may  be,  veiled  from  the  enemy's  observation.  This 
last  point  is  now  secured  by  movement  by  night,  quar- 
tering in  wooded  districts  and  in  buildings,  and  above 
all  by  the  aircraft  securing  supremacy  above  the  front, 
and  depriving  the  enemy  of  the  help  of  aerial  reconnais- 
sance. This  is  one  instance  of  the  way  in  which  the 
general  rules  and  principles  set  forth  by  Foch,  in  1901, 
hold  good,  subject  to  modification  of  detail  arising  out 
of  more  recent  conditions. 

The  attack  is  prepared  by  an  intense  artillery  fire 
from  as  many  guns  as  can  be  brought  into  action. 
"  There  cannot  be  too  many ;  there  never  are  enough," 
remarks  Foch,  himself  an  artillery  oflflcer. 

The  attack  is  started  on  its  advance  as  near  as  pos- 
sible to  the  enemy's  positions.  The  troops  already  en- 
gaged here  have  prepared  the  way  and  done  the  work 
of  the  advanced  guard.  A  second  line  is  ready  to  carry 
it  forward,  if  the  advance  of  the  first  is  checked.  Guns 
are  pushed  on  in  immediate  support  of  the  infantry. 
The  flanks  of  the  advance  are  watched  and  guarded.  A 
reserve  is  kept  in  hand  to  deal  with  any  counter-attack, 
especially  when  the  enemy's  front  is  broken  through 
and  the  confusion  of  victory  has  arisen.  Meanwhile 
everywhere  the  troops  in  line  are  pressing  the  enemy 
with  their  utmost  effort — to  keep  him  fully  occupied 
and  paralyse  his  efforts  to  handle  his  reserves. 

The  advance  of  the  attack  depends  on  a  steady  for- 
ward movement,  a  rapid  movement  using  fire  effect,  but 
aiming  at  coming  finally  and  as  soon  as  possible  to  hand 


THE  BATTLE  83 

grips  with  the  enemy.  Success  depends  on  this  reso- 
lution to  get  to  close  quarters.  It  is  the  menace  of  the 
actual  shock  that  will  make  the  opponent  give  way. 
Once  there  is  a  breach  in  the  hostile  lines,  it  must  be 
maintained  and  enlarged  against  the  enemy's  efforts  to 
close  it.  As  his  line  gives  way,  the  pursuit  begins,  with 
the  cavalry  and  everything  else  that  is  still  available. 

Such,  in  brief  outline,  is  the  ideal  attack.  The  choice 
of  the  point,  against  which  it  is  to  be  directed,  will  be 
determined  by  a  variety  of  considerations.  A  weak 
point  in  the  enemy's  line,  the  existence  of  ground  that 
offers  for  the  advance  freedom  from  obstacles  and  pres- 
ence of  cover:  the  fact  that  on  this  front  there  is  the 
best  region  for  the  preparation  of  the  attack  and  the 
concentration  of  the  attacking  force :  the  strategic  gain 
of  being  able  to  move  against  a  flank  and  menace  a  line 
of  communication  and  retreat.  Sometimes  there  will  be 
little  or  no  choice  of  alternatives.  The  existing  situa- 
tion, the  nature  of  the  ground,  the  available  lines  of 
concentration  and  advance  may  make  it  impossible  to 
attack  anywhere  else  but  on  one  given  point. 

We  have  in  the  operations  of  1918  a  perfect  example 
of  the  decisive  battle  and  the  decisive  attack,  such  as 
Foch  imagined  and  described  it — an  example  all  the 
more  interesting  because  we  can  see  so  clearly  the  modi- 
fications of  tactical  detail  arising  from  new  weapons 
while  the  principles  applied  remain  the  same.  General 
Allenby's  victory  in  central  Palestine,  that  destroyed  a 
whole  hostile  army  and  opened  the  way  to  Damascus, 
was  this  perfectly  organized  battle.  It  was  won  in  a 
"  side-show  "  of  the  Great  War,  and  there  were  greater 
battles  on  both  the  Western  and  Eastern  Fronts;  but 
none  had  such  strikingly  complete  and  far-reaching 


84  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

results.  We  have  the  preparation.  Touch  is  gained 
with  the  long  Turkish  line  stretching  from  the  sea  far 
into  the  Samarian  hills,  and  away  to  the  Jordan  valley. 
The  advanced  guard,  here  including  an  aerial  vanguard 
of  flying  men  that  has  won  the  local  supremacy  of  the 
air,  provides  sureU  in  the  double  sense  of  safety  from 
surprise  and  sure  knowledge  of  the  situation.  The  de- 
cisive attack  is  prepared  on  the  seaward  flank.  Here 
there  are  good  communications  for  bringing  up  and 
supplying  the  troops  to  be  engaged,  good  cover,  sufficient 
to  conceal  the  presence  of  the  mass  from  any  reconnais- 
sance on  the  ground,  while  the  airmen  prevent  its  being 
reconnoitred  from  above.  It  smashes  through  the 
Turkish  right  like  a  battering-ram.  The  cavalry  pour 
through  the  breach  thus  opened.  The  wiiole  enemy  line 
collapses  in  the  effort  to  effect  a  retreat  with  the  pur- 
suer's mounted  troops  already  well  to  its  rear.  The 
beaten  army,  utterly  disorganized,  surrenders  here  and 
there  by  tens  of  thousands  and  all  the  ways  northward 
into  Syria  are  open  to  the  victor. 


CHAPTER  VI 

CRITICISM  OP  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP 

Foch's  second  book,  De  la  Conduite  de  la  Guerre,  pub- 
lished in  1905,  deals  specially  with  the  direction  of  a 
campaign  by  the  general  headquarters  of  an  army ;  and 
he  takes  as  the  subject  of  his  study  the  operations  of 
the  German  armies  in  1870,  up  to  August  18th.  This 
was  the  day  of  the  battle  of  Gravelotte  (St.  Privat), 
which  closed  the  first  phase  of  the  campaign  and  was 
one  of  the  decisive  events  of  the  war,  for  it  resulted 
in  Bazaine's  army  being  shut  up  in  Metz. 

Apart  from  its  interest  as  a  study  of  the  work  of  the 
headquarters  staff  in  directing  the  combined  operations 
of  three  large  armies,  the  book  had  a  special  value  of 
its  own  for  the  readers  for  whom  it  was  primarily 
written.  It  was  based  on  lectures  already  given  at 
the  Ecole  de  Guerre,  and  intended  to  make  the  teaching 
they  conveyed  accessible  to  a  still  larger  audience  in  the 
French  army.  It  was  exceedingly  useful  that  French 
officers  should  realize  that  the  German  victories  in  1870 
were  not  due  to  any  supremely  wise  and  perfect  direc- 
tion of  their  armies. 

After  the  war  of  1870,  there  had  arisen,  not  only  in 
Germany  but  also  in  other  countries  a  kind  of  legend  of 
the  efficiency  of  Moltke's  leadership  in  the  war.  Ac- 
cording to  this  widely  accepted  version  of  the  course  of 
events,  Moltke  worked  upon  a  plan  of  campaign  that 
had  all  the  deadly  efficiency  of  the  opening  and  the 

85 


86  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

series  of  moves  made  by  a  master  player  at  the  chess 
board.  The  German  cavalry  were  everywhere  out  in 
front  of  the  advance,  keeping  the  headquarters  informed 
of  every  movement  of  the  French.  Their  reports  were 
made  the  basis  of  orders  that  directed  overwhelming 
masses  with  the  certainty  of  fate  against  the  weak 
points  of  the  enemy.  The  whole  campaign  went  like 
clockwork. 

This  popular  legend  of  the  German  leadership  was  to 
a  great  extent  fostered  in  the  early  years  after  the  war 
by  the  official  history  issued  by  the  General  Staff  at 
Berlin,  under  Von  Moltke's  editorship,  and  translated 
into  all  the  chief  European  languages.  It  admitted 
few  failures.  It  found  a  plausible  reason  for  the  action 
taken  by  the  Staff  on  every  occasion.  It  glossed  over 
or  concealed  any  weakness  on  the  part  of  subordinate 
leaders.  Most  of  the  story  it  told  was  true  enough,  for 
the  Germans  had  generally  scored  heavily  in  the  war. 
National  pride,  the  desire  to  make  the  most  of  success, 
the  reluctance  to  censure  the  leaders  who  had  shared 
the  success,  was  the  reason  for  reticence  here,  exaggera- 
tion there,  and  for  special  pleading  in  many  places. 
While  Von  Moltke  remained  chief  of  the  Staff,  there  was 
no  inclination  for  any  German  officer  to  criticize  the 
history  very  closely. 

The  French  official  history,  prepared  by  the  Section 
Historique  of  the  General  Staff  at  Paris,  was  not  begun 
until  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  after  the  war. 
By  that  time,  serious  criticism  of  the  German  official 
story  and  the  tradition  based  on  it  had  begun,  and  made 
considerable  progress  in  Germany  itself. 

The  pioneer  of  the  new  group  of  military  writers  in 
Germany,  who  laid  the  foundation  of  a  truer  view,  was 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP     87 

Captain  Hoenig,  who  had  himself  served  on  the  Staff 
during  the  war.  After  retiring  from  the  army,  he  de- 
voted himself  to  military  journalism  and  literature. 
Regimental  histories,  dealing  with  the  operations  of 
1870,  were  appearing;  and  Hoenig,  comparing  their 
evidence  with  the  official  narrative,  began  to  point  out 
that  the  latter  was  not  always  reliable.  Then  he  ven- 
tured on  more  daring  criticism,  and  his  pamphlet, 
Ticenty-four  Hours  of  Moltke's  Strategy,  dealing  with 
the  battles  before  Metz,  caused  a  sensation.  It  was  a 
frankly  realistic  narrative  of  defective  leadership  that 
nearly  ended  in  disaster.  After  this  other  writers  came 
into  the  field,  dealing  in  the  same  candid  fashion  with 
the  facts;  and  the  General  Staff  itself  published  new 
documents,  supplementary  memoirs  that  threw  much 
light  on  the  operations  of  1870.  Much  of  this  new  ma- 
terial was  translated  into  French,  and  military  writers 
in  France  and  other  countries  dealt  with  it. 

Foch  was  not,  therefore,  announcing  or  assuming  to 
denounce  any  new  discovery,  when  at  the  Ecole  de 
Guerre  and  in  his  work  De  la  Conduite  de  la  Guerre 
he  examined  the  leadership  of  the  German  General  Staff 
in  1870,  and  pointed  out  its  failings. 

But  he  did  this  in  no  narrow  carping  spirit.  The 
same  work  on  page  after  page  bears  testimony  to  the 
efficiency  of  the  German  command.  Foch  shows,  in- 
deed, how  the  soundness  of  Moltke's  original  plan  for 
the  opening  of  the  campaign,  the  high  average  of 
military  spirit  and  knowledge  among  the  subordinate 
leaders,  their  readiness  to  take  responsibility  and  act 
on  their  own  initiative  in  the  general  direction  indicated 
by  headquarters,  secured  for  the  German  army  far- 
reaching  successes.     No  French  writer  has  given  more 


88  MAESHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

generous  praise  to  the  soldierly  qualities  of  the  German 
leaders  of  1870-71  than  this  French  teacher  of  the  art 
of  war.  There  is  in  Foch  none  of  the  narrow-minded 
bitterness  that  blinds  its  victim  to  the  good  qualities  of 
a  successful  antagonist. 

But  at  the  same  time — not  to  depreciate  the  genius 
of  Moltke,  but  to  guard  the  future  soldiers  of  France 
against  a  like  failing — he  puts  his  hand  upon  and 
analyses  the  weak  point  of  Moltke's  system.  He  shows 
too  how  the  French  army  of  the  Ehine,  in  August,  1870, 
outnumbered  as  it  was  and  heavily  handicapped  by 
defective  organization  and  a  slow  and  inefficient  mobili- 
zation, had  nevertheless  the  chance  of  victory,  if  its 
chiefs  had  known  how  to  profit  by  the  mistakes  of  their 
opponents  and  had  seized  the  opportunities  of  success 
thus  offered  to  them.  France  was  defeated  in  the 
battles  of  August,  1870,  not  on  account  of  inferior 
numbers  or  a  less  powerful  artillery,  but  through  the 
lack  of  military  knowledge  and  a  sound  theory  of  war 
among  the  leaders  of  the  Imperial  army. 

This  was  a  valuable  lesson  to  teach  to  the  future 
chiefs  of  the  French  army.  It  served  to  destroy  the  last 
vestige  of  the  old  tradition  of  an  almost  superhuman 
efficiency  and  invincible  battle  power  on  the  side  of 
Germany.  It  brought  out  in  a  brilliant  light  the  su- 
preme importance  of  the  knowledge  of  war.  It  showed 
that  even  in  the  darkest  hours  of  a  campaign  there  was 
no  need  to  despair  of  success.  One  could  still  wait  and 
watcli  for  the  opportunities  that  even  an  adversary  equal 
to  Von  Moltke  might  give  for  deadly  counter-attack  in 
order  to  turn  back  the  tide  of  war. 

Foch  in  liis  book  is  studying  the  higher  mechanism  of 
a  campaign,  the  work  of  the  Staff  in  directing  the  com- 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP     89 

bined  operations  of  great  armies.  There  is  abundant 
documentary  material  for  such  a  study  of  what  went 
on  at  the  German  General  Headquarters,  in  1870.  Such, 
a  study  can  only  be  attempted  when  the  lapse  of  years 
has  made  the  full  evidence  available.  But  besides  the 
voluminous  records  of  what  went  on  day  by  day  and 
even  hour  by  hour  at  headquarters  in  the  eventful  days 
of  August,  1870,  there  is  probably  the  fullest  and  most 
accurate  evidence  as  to  what  was  passing  hour  by  hour 
in  both  the  French  and  the  German  armies.  The  Ger- 
man Staff  history,  the  supplementary  memoirs,  the  great 
library  of  individual  narratives  of  officers  who  took  part 
in  the  operations,  the  regimental  histories  and  reports 
and  finally  the  elaborate  studies  of  operations  and 
battles  published  by  highly  competent  military  writers 
both  in  France  and  Germany,  provide  a  mass  of  detailed 
evidence  which,  coupled  with  the  possession  of  elaborate 
maps  of  the  ground,  enable  the  military  student  to  re- 
constitute the  whole  situation,  or  any  part  of  it  as  it 
actually  was  at  any  given  moment.  There  is  no  war 
for  which  so  much  historical  material  is  available,  ex- 
cept perhaps  the  campaign  of  Waterloo.  It  will  be 
many  years  before  it  will  be  possible  to  have  such  com- 
plete material  for  the  study  of  the  Great  War  that 
began  in  1914. 

There  are  two  ways  of  studying  and  setting  forth  the 
history  of  a  campaign  or  a  battle. 

One  may  reckon  up  the  forces  on  both  sides,  note  their 
organization,  their  positions  at  the  outset  of  the  opera- 
tion or  the  battle,  follow  the  course  of  events  step  by 
step,  marshalling  the  facts  referring  to  both  the  oppos- 
ing armies.  The  student  or  the  reader  has  thus  through- 
out a  complete  knowledge  of  the  general   course  of 


90  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

events ;  he  sees  more  and  knows  more  than  anyone  who 
was  actually  engaged  in  the  operations — even  more  than 
the  opposing  commanders. 

The  other  method  is  to  follow  the  course  of  the  opera- 
tions from  the  standpoint  of  one  side  in  the  conflict, 
usuall}^  from  that  of  the  commander;  to  try  to  show 
what  information  he  possessed  as  to  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion, movements  and  plans;  how  he  obtained  this  in- 
formation and  sought  to  verify  or  supplement  it ;  what 
orders  he  gave,  based  on  this  knowledge;  how  these 
orders  were  carried  out. 

This  is  at  once  a  more  realistic  and  more  scientific 
method.  It  also  conveys  the  most  valuable  practical 
lessons.  It  shows  what  are  the  conditions  under  which 
armies  operate  in  the  field,  how  their  chiefs  have- to 
direct  them  in  spite  of  the  "  fog  of  war." 

This  is  the  method  which  Foch  adopts  in  his  masterly 
work,  De  la  Conduite  de  la  Guerre.  Of  course,  he  also 
gives  his  readers  the  actual  facts  as  to  the  position  from 
day  to  day,  in  order  to  show  how  far  the  idea  of  it  on 
which  Moltke's  plans  were  based  corresponded  with  or 
dcAdated  from  the  reality,  and  to  suggest  also  how  the 
opportunities — given  even  by  such  an  opponent  as  the 
German  chief  of  the  Staff — could  have  been  used  by 
more  efficient  leaders  on  the  French  side. 

In  the  introductory  chapters,  Foch  describes  and  dis- 
cusses the  German  plan  of  campaign.  He  makes  a  very 
important  addition  to  the  doctrine  set  forth  in  a  maxim 
by  Clausewitz,  that  the  objective  of  a  commander  will 
be  the  enemy's  main  fighting  force.  It  is  quite  true 
that  the  destruction  of  this  main  army  will  be  the  pri- 
mary object  of  the  operations,  but  there  will  usually  be 
another  objective  to  be  taken  into  account,  namely,  the 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP     91 

occupation  of  territory,  or  of  some  important  point  such 
as  the  enemy's  capital.  This  is  not  a  return  to  the 
eighteenth  century  idea  of  making  mere  geographical 
gains — the  capture  of  cities,  the  occupation  of  posi- 
tions— the  chief  objects  in  view,  the  decisive  gains  of 
a  campaign.  The  capital  may  be  chosen  as  the  point 
to  be  aimed  at,  where — as,  for  instance,  in  a  centrally 
organized  country  like  France — its  seizure,  after  the 
defeat  of  the  main  field  army,  would  tend  to  paralyse 
further  organized  resistance.  The  loss  of  Paris  meant 
the  downfall  of  Napoleon,  in  1814.  But  not  all  capi- 
tals have,  or  have  at  all  times  this  dominant  import- 
ance. Napoleon's  seizure  of  Madrid  was  the  beginning 
of  the  Spanish  national  resistance  to  his  aggression. 
His  capture  of  Moscow,  in  1812,  with  the  Russian  army 
still  keeping  the  field,  was  no  real  advantage  to  him. 
There  may  be  another  kind  of  local  objective,  such  as 
the  occupation  of  districts  from  which  the  enemy's  army 
would  draw  its  resources  for  reorganization,  such  as 
manufacturing  regions  or  the  ports  on  which  he  depends 
for  oversea  help.  All  this  is  very  different  from  the 
mere  seizure  of  territory  for  its  own  sake.  In  1870,  the 
German  plan  included  besides  the  defeat  of  the  French 
army  of  operations,  the  investment  and  capture  of  Paris 
as  a  means  of  disorganizing  the  French  power  of  re- 
sistance, and  the  driving  of  what  might  be  left  of  armed 
forces  beyond  the  Loire,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  north  of 
France,  the  rich  industrial  region  on  which  so  much 
of  the  resources  of  the  country  depends. 

The  plan  of  campaign  must,  and  can  only,  include 
the  general  idea  of  the  objectives  to  be  aimed  at,  and  the 
placing  of  the  armies  in  presence  of  each  other  for  the 
first  trial  of  strength.     Future  developments  must  be 


92  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

planned  according  to  the  results  of  this  opening  of  the 
gigantic  game.  These  first  operations  are  all-important. 
The  whole  course  of  the  war  may  depend  upon  them. 
They  may  indeed  be  decisive. 

Von  Moltke's  plan,  based  on  the  general  lines  marked 
out  in  a  plan  drawn  up  for  the  Prussian  Staff  by  Clause- 
witz,  many  years  earlier,  took  its  final  shape  in  the 
winter  of  1869  and  the  spring  of  1870.  Foch  gives  it 
the  highest  praise  so  far  as  its  broad  principles  are 
concerned,  and  only  criticizes  certain  details  of  their 
application.  It  is  not  mere  retrospective  criticism,  but 
is  made  the  basis  of  practical  lessons  for  the  future. 

It  is  not  possible  to  condense  into  a  few  pages  these 
criticisms  of  the  plan  and  its  working  out  in  the  cam- 
paign that  followed.  Nor  is  there  here  any  need  to 
attempt  such  a  summary  of  Foch's  teaching.  All  that 
is  sought  in  this  examination  of  his  writings  is  to  give 
a  general  idea  of  his  theory  of  war,  of  his  method  of 
presenting  it,  and  of  his  own  characteristics  as  a  teacher 
and  a  leader,  revealed  by  his  treatment  of  the  subject. 
Certain  points  in  his  criticisms  are  specially  worthy 
of  note,  inasmuch  as  they  make  clearer  the  teaching  of 
his  earlier  work,  Des  Principes  de  la  Guerre,  and  throw 
light  on  his  generalship  in  the  Great  War. 

Much  of  his  criticism  of  Moltke's  staff  work  in  1870 
has  a  character  of  its  own,  and  represents  a  scientific 
advance  beyond  what  had  been  insisted  upon  by  earlier 
writers  on  the  same  subject.  We  have  seen  how  all- 
important  in  Foch's  system  is  the  idea  of  sureU  in  its 
double  sense  of  provision  for  security  and  sureness  as 
to  the  situation  that  has  to  be  dealt  with.  This  is  the 
double  condition  that  ensures  freedom  of  action  for  the 
commander,  enabling  him  to  direct  his  operations  witbr_ 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP     93 

out  being  dominated  by  the  action  of  the  enem}-,  so  that 
he  preserves  his  initiative.  It  is  also  the  guide  to 
rightly  directed  action  on  his  own  part. 

Now  his  main  criticism  of  the  German  leadership  of 
August,  1870,  is  that  the  measures  taken  by  Von  Moltke 
were  deficient  in  this  first  requirement  of  making  an 
adequate  provision  for  sfirete. 

Von  Moltke's  plan  was  based  upon  a  concentration  of 
three  armies  west  of  the  Rhine,  in  the  Bavarian  Pala- 
tinate, between  the  river  and  the  French  frontier.  This 
huge  fighting  force,  concentrated  in  one  great  mass, 
would  directly  protect  Germany  from  any  French  ad- 
vance from  Lorraine  and  the  region  of  Metz.  The  Rhine 
frontier,  facing  Strasburg  and  Alsace  was  left  almost 
open.  It  was  watched  only  by  small  detachments.  But 
it  was  indirectly  guarded  by  the  concentration  further 
north.  For  if — as  was  actually  the  first  idea  at  the 
headquarters  of  Napoleon  III — the  French  attempted 
to  invade  south  Germany  by  crossing  the  Rhine  from 
Alsace,  they  w  ould  lay  themselves  open  to  a  deadly  blow 
against  their  flank  and  line  of  communications,  a  blow 
to  be  delivered  by  the  concentrated  mass  in  the  Palatin- 
ate. So  far  Foch  gives  the  scheme  his  highest  praise. 
It  was  simple  and  practical,  and  provided  for  the  union 
of  all  available  forces  for  the  main  operations,  reducing 
detachments  for  other  purposes  to  the  minimum.  It 
was  a  fine  example  of  the  economy  of  force,  the  concen- 
tration of  battle  power  upon  one  point  to  decide  the 
issue. 

But  now  we  come  to  the  weak  points  in  the  detailed 
elaboration  of  the  plan  and  its  execution.  Von  Moltke 
could  count  upon  a  marked  superiority  of  numbers  once 
his  concentration  was  completed.     It  T^'ould  take  eight 


94  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

clays,  before  the  mobilization  was  complete;  the  trans- 
portation of  troops  by  rail  to  the  point  of  concentration 
would  then  begin.  What  would  happen  during  the 
time — about  a  fortnight — of  mobilization  plus  concen- 
tration? What  would  the  French  be  doing?  Foch 
gives  us  the  text  of  Moltke's  memorandum  on  the 
various  plans  of  action  that  w^ere  open  to  them. 

To  put  the  matter  in  popular  language,  what  most 
concerned  him  was  that  the  Imperial  army  of  France 
had  a  very  large  force  actually  under  arms  when  war 
was  declared.  The  French  army  system  of  the  time  de- 
pended on  a  large  standing  army  in  camps  and  barracks 
with  a  very  insufficient  reserve  to  be  called  out  on  the 
declaration  of  war,  and  second  line  of  the  Garde  Mobile, 
wikich  as  yet  existed  chiefly  on  paper.  The  German 
system  meant  a  relatively  small  force  under  arms  in 
peace  time,  to  be  expanded  into  the  war  army  by  calling 
up  large  reserves.  Further,  it  was  a  fixed  principle  that 
army  corps  must  not  move  to  the  concentration  front 
until  the  reserves  had  joined  and  received  their  equip- 
ment and  the  field  transport  had  been  completed  on  a 
war  footing.  Now,  Napoleon  III  had  large  garrisons 
in  Metz  and  Strasburg,  an  army  at  Chalons  in  the  per- 
manent training  camp — the  Aldershot  of  France — a 
strong  garrison,  including  the  Imperial  Guard,  in  and 
about  Paris,  besides  considerable  garrisons  at  Lyons 
and  other  important  centres.  If  the  troops  already  in 
the  east  of  France,  the  Chtllons  and  Paris  troops  and 
forces  from  other  large  centres,  were  rushed  up  by  rail 
to  the  frontier,  there  would  be,  even  before  the  reserves 
joined,  an  army  about  Metz  and  Strasburg,  stronger 
than  any  force  that  would  liave  been  available  on  the 
German  side  while  the  mobilization  was  in  progress  or 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP     95 

in  the  first  days  of  the  concentration.  The  French 
might  attempt  to  secure  a  first  success,  and  dis- 
organize the  German  concentration  by  a  dash  into  the 
Palatinate. 

Von  Moltke  provided  for  this  contingency  by  direct- 
ing that  the  front  on  which  the  three  armies  were  to 
concentrate  was  not  to  be  the  frontier  but  a  line  a  con- 
siderable distance  to  the  rear  of  it.  The  border  would 
be  watched  by  a  mere  outpost  line  of  small  detach- 
ments, which  would  give  timely  alarm  of  a  French 
irruption.  This  might  take  place  at  any  time  after 
the  first  week  or  eight  days.  The  troops  already  on 
the  concentration  line  would  retire.  The  points  where 
the  rest  of  the  army  would  detrain  wtjuld  be  moved  back 
to  the  Rhine.  As  the  French  advanced,  they  would  have 
a  continually  growing  force  in  front  of  them.  At  latest, 
on  the  fourteenth  day  of  the  war,  the  German  concen- 
tration would  be  complete,  and  battle  would  be  offered 
to  the  French  invader  on  German  ground  with  over- 
whelmingly superior  forces. 

And  now  we  have  an  interesting  glimpse  of  the  inner 
working  of  the  German  Intelligence  Department.*  A 
Staff  officer.  Major  Krause,  had  been  sent  to  Berne,  in 
Switzerland,  to  collect  information  as  to  what  was  hap- 
pening in  France,  from  travellers,  secret  service  agents, 
and  the  newspapers.  It  was  a  perfectly  legitimate  pro- 
ceeding. Every  belligerent  collects  information  with  the 
help  of  the  facilities  afforded  by  neutral  countries.  On 
July  22nd — when  the  war  had  not  yet  lasted  a  week — 
Krause  was  able  to  telegraph  to  the  Headquarters  Staff, 
still  at  Berlin,  that  the  French  were  concentrating  about 
Metz  and  Strasburg,  and  transporting  their  troops  to 

*  Conduite  de  la  Guerre,  p.  93. 


96  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

these  centres  without  waiting  for  the  reservists  to  join. 

Von  Moltke  at  once  made  up  his  mind  as  to  the  signifi- 
cance of  this  news.  "  It  was  not  to  be  supposed,"  he 
writes,  "  that  the  enemy  would  thus  give  up  the  advan- 
tage of  regular  mobilization  and  the  preliminary  organi- 
zation of  his  forces,  if  he  had  not  in  view  some  great 
result  to  be  thus  secured.  One  had  therefore  good 
reason  to  suppose  that  the  French  were  rapidly  col- 
lecting all  their  available  forces  with  a  view  to  crossing 
the  frontiers  of  Rhenish  Prussia  and  the  Palatinate  to 
oppose  the  concentration  of  the  German  armies  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  Whatever  might  be  the  ultimate 
result  of  such  tactics,  this  constituted  a  danger  that 
must  be  provided  against." 

Foch  makes  a  remark  on  this,  that  is  worth  remem- 
bering: "People,  who  themselves  reason  soundly,  often 
make  the  mistake  of  supposing  that  others  also  act  in 
the  same  way.  So  we  find  Moltke  drawing  an  inexact 
conclusion  from  a  sound  line  of  argument." 

The  mobilization  was  still  in  progress;  the  transport 
of  troops  by  rail  had  not  begun.  Moltke  at  once 
ordered  the  detraining  points  and  the  line  of  concen- 
tration to  be  moved  back  to  the  Rhine. 

But  the  French  were  not  moving  forward.  They  were 
incapable  of  any  movement  on  a  grand  scale;  for  the 
masses  of  troops  they  were  assembling  in  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  were  as  yet  only  partly  equipped,  badly  sup- 
plied and  short  of  field  transport.  All  was  confusion 
on  the  French  side  of  the  frontier.  The  news  from 
Berne  and  Von  Moltke's  deduction  from  it  made  up  a 
false  alarm,  the  result  of  which  was  to  delay  the  first 
move  of  the  campaign. 

Foch  points  out  that  all  this  was  the  result  of  the  lack 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP     97 

of  any  efficiently  organized  system  of  surete.  The  weak 
detachments — mere  handfuls  placed  here  and  there  to 
watch  the  frontier,  with  no  support  behind  them — were 
no  real  protection.  If  the  French  had  sent  even  a 
comparatively  small  cavalry  force  across  the  border, 
these  detachments  could  neither  hold  it,  nor  put  up 
such  a  resistance  as  would  compel  the  invader  to  show 
whether  there  was  anything  behind  the  cavalry.  It 
might  be  a  reconnaissance,  a  raid  or  the  first  wave  of 
an  invasion.  Small  detachments,  retiring  before  the 
French  horsemen,  could  not  clear  up  the  question.  But 
a  force  of  all  arms,  an  advanced  guard  of  cavalry,  artil- 
lery and  infantry,  covering  the  concentration  region 
could  force  the  adversary  to  show  his  hand  and  reveal 
his  intentions. 

As  matters  stood,  the  German  operations  could  have 
been  adversely  influenced  and  delayed  by  mere  demon- 
stration of  French  cavalry.  They  were  thus  influenced, 
although  the  French  never  made  a  move  during  the 
first  fortnight  of  the  war — influenced  and  hampered 
by  a  mere  report  and  a  theory  built  upon  it.  Foch 
points  to  this,  as  one  more  instance  of  what  may  happen, 
when  there  is  no  due  provision  to  ensure  surete,  and  the 
freedom  of  action  that  depends  upon  it. 

At  the  time  when  he  wrote,  a  new  system  had  been 
adopted  by  all  the  great  military  powers  of  the  Conti^ 
nent — the  system  of  maintaining  even  in  peace  time, 
on  frontiers  that  might  become  the  scene  of  warlike 
operations,  army  corps  and  specially  organized  divi- 
sions kept  nearly  at  war  strength.  These  troupes  de 
couverture  would,  on  a  declaration  of  war,  play  the 
part  of  a  strategic  advanced  guard,  covering  the  mobili- 
zation and  concentration. 


98  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

Continuing  his  survey  of  tlie  German  operations  of 
1870,  Focli  gives  us  a  singularly  clear  and  interesting 
study  of  the  general  scheme  for  detraining  corps  and 
divisions  brought  up  to  a  war  frontier.  He  shows  how 
well  Von  Moltke  combined  the  forward  movement  of 
troops  already  detrained  with  a  gradual  advance  of  the 
points,  at  which  those  still  arriving  would  be  trans- 
ferred from  the  troop  trains  to  the  roads.  The  loss  of 
time  caused  by  the  sudden  withdrawal  of  the  concen- 
tration to  the  Rhine,  was  thus  partly  made  good.  The 
weak  point  was  still  that  the  operation  was  not  suffi- 
ciently protected.  It  owed  its  smooth  execution  to  the 
disorganization  of  the  French  concentration  and  the 
consequent  inaction  of  the  Imperial  army. 

This  inaction  continued  up  to  the  beginning  .of 
August.  Then,  at  last,  the  French  did  something. 
August  2nd  saw  the  action  at  Sarrebruck,  a  little  battle, 
fought  apparently  with  very  vague  ideas  of  what  it  was 
to  lead  up  to,  and  chiefly  with  the  object  of  impressing 
and  satisfying  public  opinion  in  France.  It  was  the 
Prince  Imperial's  "  baptism  of  fire '' ;  it  was  the  first 
trial  in  action  of  the  new  mitrailleuses,  which  had 
been  described  in  advance  as  fearful  engines  of  destruc- 
tion, talismans  of  victory.  Imaginative  correspondents 
of  the  Paris  newspapers  told  how  the  new  guns  had 
torn  deep  lanes  of  slaughter  in  the  Prussian  masses; 
as  a  plain  matter  of  fact,  there  were  no  masses  in  action 
on  the  German  side,  only  a  thin  line  of  skirmishers, 
and  the  mitrailleuses  fired  off  a  tremendous  quantity 
of  ammunition  with  trifling  effect  against  such  a  target. 
The  small  detachment,  watching  the  frontier  line,  fell 
back  fighting,  and  Sarrebruck  was  occupied.  The  affair 
was  celebrated  in  France  as  a  great  victory. 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP     99 

No  writer,  French,  German  or  neutral,  has  ever  de- 
scribed this  "  Battle  of  Sarrebruck  "  in  more  scathing 
terms  than  those  employed  by  Foch.  A  French  army 
corps  (the  Second  under  Frossard)  was  deployed  for 
battle.  "  These  masses,"  says  Foch,  "  encountered  two 
companies  and  then  a  battalion  (Second  Battalion  of 
the  Forty-sixth  Infantry)  and  these  were  soon  in  re- 
treat, after  losing  four  officers  and  seventy-nine  men. 
Such  was  the  affair  of  Sarrebruck,  which  has  been 
ironically  but  justly  described  as  a  battle  of  three  divi- 
sions against  three  companies,  or  a  manoeuvre  against 
a  skeleton  or  marked  enemy." 

Such  as  it  was,  the  affair  caused  some  anxiety  to  the 
German  headquarters.  Von  Moltke's  orders  show  that 
he  regarded  it  as  possibly  heralding  an  invasion  of 
Germany.  He  had  no  organized  force  that  could  at  once 
maintain  touch  with  the  French,  Once  more  the  want 
of  an  advanced  guard  introduced  some  trouble  into  his 
arrangements. 

On  August  4th,  he  was  at  last  ready  to  act.  After 
Sarrebruck,  the  French  had  relapsed  into  their  former 
inactivity.  They  too  had  taken  no  precautions  to  secure 
their  still  incomplete  concentration.  The  result  was 
a  surprise  and  a  series  of  defeats. 

Once  more,  Foch  points  out  that  the  German  march 
into  France  had  no  general  advanced  guard  to  cover 
it — to  gain  touch  with  the  enemy,  hold  him,  and  enable 
whatever  blow  was  struck  against  him  to  be  directed 
with  security  from  interruption  and  sure  knowledge 
of  his  dispositions.  There  was  no  adequate  provision 
for  the  all-important  surete. 

Each  of  the  German  columns  had  its  own  local 
advanced  guard — but  the  general  movement  of  the  whole 


100  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

force  of  three  great  armies  was  covered  only  by  a 
cavalry  screen.  Cavalry  patrols,  supported  by  formed 
bodies  of  mounted  men,  are  a  first  line  of  protection, 
and  essential  for  tlie  purpose  of  "  exploration  "  and 
reconnaissance,  but  they  are  only  one  element  in  a  prop- 
erly organized  advanced  guard.  There  must  be  a  force 
of  infantry  and  artillery  behind  them  and  working  with 
them.  Otherwise  against  an  active  enemy  they  are 
insufficient.  They  can  be  held  up  or  driven  in.  Organ- 
ized resistance  of  even  a  small  force  of  all  arms  can 
paralyse  their  action  and  make  it  impossible  for  them 
to  obtain  the  information  that  is  demanded  of  them.  If 
the  enemy  advances,  they  cannot  bring  him  seriously 
to  action,  and  so  are  unable  to  distinguish  between  a 
mere  local  counter-attack  and  the  beginning  of  -  an 
advance  in  force. 

Contrast  with  the  unsupported  cavalry  screen,  feeling 
its  way  amid  the  "  fog  of  war  ",  Napoleon's  method,  as 
for  instance  in  the  campaign  of  Jena,  where,  although 
Murat's  huge  force  of  cavalry  was  covering  the  advance 
across  the  Thuringian  hills,  there  was  also  the  advanced 
guard  formed  by  the  Army  Corps  of  Lannes.  For  the 
want  of  such  an  advanced  guard,  the  German  Head- 
quarters Staff,  relying  entirely  on  the  imperfect  infor- 
mation supplied  by  even  the  most  enterprising  of  the 
cavalry  patrols,  was  again  and  again  unable  to  see 
clearly  through  the  war  fog.  Foch  shows  how  Von 
Moltke,  instead  of  being  able  to  act  upon  a  sure  knowl- 
edge of  what  the  French  positions  and  movements  really 
were  based  his  plans  and  orders  on  suppositions. 

He  adopted,  in  fact,  a  system  that  at  first  sight  seems 
sound  enough.  He  took  it  for  granted  that  the  French 
generals  w<juld  take  the  course  that  a  sound  knowledge 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP   101 

of  the  situation  seemed  to  indicate,  the  line  he  himself 
would  choose  if  he  were  in  their  position.  Of  course 
there  is  something  to  be  said  for  this  method.  In  war, 
as  in  every  other  conflict  of  two  wills,  it  is  well  to  keep 
in  mind  the  fact  that  the  opponent  is  not  unlikely  to 
take  the  way  which  one  sees  to  be  most  dangerous  for 
oneself.  But  it  does  not  certainly  follow  that  he  will. 
The  assumption  that  he  will  do  the  best  that  is  possible 
is  not  always  verified  in  fact.  In  the  fencing  school 
one  sometimes  sees  a  good  swordsman  thrown  off  his 
guard  by  even  an  inferior  opponent  making  an  irregular 
and  irrational  attack,  because  it  is  so  utterly  outside 
of  his  expectations. 

Von  der  Goltz,  who  was  described  as  the  best  of  Von 
Moltke's  pupils,  and  who  certainly  is  one  of  the  best 
German  writers  on  war,  erects  the  theory  of  his  master 
almost  into  a  self-evident  axiom,  when  he  asks : — "  Are 
not  the  reasonable  dispositions  of  the  enemy  the  most 
solid  foundation  that  we  can  find  for  our  own  combina- 
tions? "  Foch  points  to  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon,  and 
asks  if  we  have  not  a  reply  to  the  methods  of  this  great 
war  leader,  who,  with  all  his  marvellous  power  of 
judging  the  enemy  and  divining  his  probable  course  of 
action  yet  left  nothing  to  mere  supposition  but  always 
took  the  most  ample  precautions  to  protect  his  own 
movements  and  keep  touch  with  his  opponent,  in  order 
to  be  sure  of  where  the  enemy  was  and  what  he  was 
doing,  not  merely  trusting  to  reasoning  out  what  he 
must  be  doing. 

"  Von  Moltke's  deductions,"  remarks  Foch,  "  are 
always  obviously  logical  and  reasonable.  Such  or  such 
must  be  the  probable  conduct  of  the  enemy;  but  it  is 
not  the  actual  line  he  is  taking.     Here  we  have  the 


102  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

special  characteristic  of  the  '  homme  du  cabinet ',  the 
raan  who  works  at  the  desk  as  Chief  of  the  German 
Staff.  There  is  a  constant  appeal  to  reasoning,  and 
then  he  bases  his  plans  on  the  conjectures  and  hypoth- 
eses he  has  reasoned  out.  Unfortunately  for  his  method, 
they  do  not  always  co-incide  with  the  reality  of  things, 
wfhich  is  often  the  improbable,  something  arising  from 
causes  that  one  cannot  take  hold  of  and  explain.  If  he 
were  a  man  of  action  in  a  higher  degree.  Von  Moltke 
would  have  taken  account  more  largely  of  the  human 
factors  with  their  widely  varying  results.  He  would 
have  sought  to  base  his  plans  on  the  actual  truth,  first 
sought  for  and  then  ascertained." 

He  is  not  trying  to  depreciate  Von  Moltke.  He  recog- 
nizes most  fully  and  generously  the  genius  and  the  high 
soldierly  capacity  of  the  man  who  organized  victory 
for  Germany,  disaster  for  France  in  the  "  terrible  year." 
But  he  is  pointing  out  the  weak  spot  in  Von  Moltke's 
leadership,  in  order  to  warn  his  French  audience  against 
like  mistakes  and  to  confirm  his  own  teaching  of  the 
importance  of  surete  as  the  basis  of  success  in  the 
conduct  of  war.  He  is  insisting  that  action  must  be 
based  on  certified  facts — not  on  even  the  most  logically 
reasoned  out  suppositions. 

The  moment  of  supreme  peril  for  the  German  arms, 
the  great  opportunity  for  France,  if  there  had  been  a 
real  leader  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine, 
came  in  the  middle  of  August.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
month.  Von  Moltke's  plans  were  based  on  the  supposi- 
tion that  the  French  would  make  a  stand  near  the 
frontier,  on  the  line  of  the  river  Sarre.  He  planned  his 
decisive  battle  on  this  basis.  Two  armies  were  to  attack 
the  enemy's  front;  the  third,  moving  up  from  Alsace, 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP   103 

was  to  strike  the  decisive  blow  against  his  right  flank, 
and  threaten  his  line  of  retreat.  It  was  a  well-devised 
battle  plan; — the  very  date  was  fixed  for  it — August 
9th.  But  by  that  time,  other  events  had  intervened — the 
unexpected,  that  plays  so  large  a  part  in  war — and 
the  French  were  in  retreat.  MacMahon,  defeated  at 
Woerth,  was  retiring  beyond  the  Vosges,  Bazaine  with 
the  main  army  in  Lorraine  was  falling  back  towards 
Metz,  en  route  for  Verdun. 

There  had  been  fighting  on  Sunday,  August  14th, 
east  of  Metz,  the  Battle  of  Borny,  an  indecisive  action, 
the  chief  result  of  which  had  been  to  delay  the  French 
retirement.  On  the  15th,  as  the  French  made  no 
attempt  to  renew  the  action  but  continued  their  retire- 
ment through  Metz,  and  had  abandoned  the  crossings 
of  the  Moselle  above  the  fortress.  Von  Moltke  began 
the  crossing  of  the  river  with  his  main  fighting  force 
(the  Second  Army,  commanded  by  Prince  Frederick 
Charles),  while  the  First  Army,  under  Steinmetz,  cov- 
ered the  movement  by  watching  Metz  on  the  right  bank. 

Von  Moltke  had  now  to  decide  on  his  further  opera- 
tions. He  had  very  imperfect  information  as  to  the 
actual  movements  of  the  French  army  under  Bazaine — 
five  Army  Corps.  So,  according  to  his  system,  he  set 
to  work  to  reason  out  what  his  opponent  must  inevitably 
do ;  and  he  felt  so  certain  of  the  result  of  his  reasoning, 
that  he  proceeded  to  take  a  risky  and  adventurous 
course  of  action  himself. 

We  have  in  the  German  Staff  history  of  the  war  his 
own  record  of  how  he  formed  his  judgment  of  the 
situation.  We  are  told  that  at  the  German  headquarters 
there  was  a  conviction  that  the  French  could  not  have 
any  idea  of  accepting  battle  behind  the  Moselle  and 


104  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

near  Metz,  and  it  seemed  equally  unlikely  that  they 
would  make  a  stand  between  the  Moselle  and  the  Meuse, 
that  region  being  hardly  favourable  for  an  action  against 
superior  numbers. 

"  It  was  rather  to  be  supposed,"  says  the  official 
narrative,  "  that  the  enemy's  commander  would  adopt 
the  solution  which  at  the  moment  seemed  to  be  the  best 
— namely  to  withdraw  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  intact 
behind  the  Meuse  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Once  arrived 
there,  it  would  have  at  its  disposal  enough  routes  by 
which  to  reach  in  safety  the  west  of  France,  and  effect 
its  junction  with  the  other  military  forces  of  the  Empire. 
This  was  what  must  be  prevented.  The  Army  of  the 
Rhine  must  not  be  allowed  to  reach  the  Argon ne.  On 
the  contrary,  it  must  be  forced  to  incline  to  the  north- 
wards, and  thus  be  separated  from  the  other  portions 
of  the  army,  which  had  retired  directly  westward.  The 
best  means  for  the  Second  Army  to  counteract  the  plans, 
thus  attributed  to  the  enemy,  seemed  to  be  to  seize  the 
crossings  of  the  Meuse  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  force 
the  enemy  by  a  march  towards  that  river  parallel  to 
his  own  to  continue  his  movement  without  any  respite." 

Von  Moltke  felt  so  certain  of  his  conclusion,  that 
he  took  immediate  action  upon  it.  Some  of  the  reports, 
brought  in  by  his  advanced  cavalry  in  the  course  of  the 
day,  might  well  have  made  him  suspect  that  he  had 
not  grasped  the  real  situation ;  but  he  was  so  dominated 
by  the  theory  he  had  formed,  that  they  were  either 
treated  as  unimportant  or  interpreted  so  as  to  fit  in 
with  the  pre-conceived  idea.  The  cavalry  work  was  not 
well  done.  A  bold  push  to  the  northward  and  north- 
eastward would  have  revealed,  on  the  15th,  that  the 
French  was  massed  close  to  Metz,  crowded  on  the  roads 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP   105 

to  the  westwards,  with  the  heads  of  its  columns  just 
reaching  the  slopes  of  the  plateau  on  the  west  bank.  It 
was  moving  so  slowly, — that  instead  of  trying  to  follow 
it  on  a  parallel  line  of  march,  seize  the  Meuse  bridges 
south  of  Verdun,  and  force  it  on  to  a  line  of  retreat 
towards  Belgium  iu  order  to  separate  it  from  the  French 
forces  about  Chalons — its  line  of  retreat  could  have 
been  cut,  and  a  battle  against  superior  numbers  forced 
upon  it.  For  Frederick  Charles  had  seven  army  corps 
at  his  disposal,  and  the  five  under  Bazaine's  com- 
mand. 

This  battle  eventually  took  place,  and  very  soon ;  but 
it  happened,  not  as  the  result  of  Von  Moltke's  judg- 
ment of  the  situation  and  the  plans  he  adopted,  but 
because  the  French  command  was  hopelessly  inefficient, 
and  the  subordinate  German  leaders — notably  Prince 
Frederick  Charles — were  good  soldiers,  who  were  ready 
to  take  responsibility  and  act  on  their  own  initiative 
as  the  course  of  events  revealed  that  the  orders  issued 
from  headquarters  did  not  fit  the  situation. 

Meanwhile  there  was  a  dangerous  crisis.  Von  Moltke's 
orders  issued  on  August  15th,  and  the  orders  based  on 
them  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  directed  the  march 
of  the  seven  army  corps  of  the  Second  army  in  such  a 
way,  that  on  August  16th,  there  would  be  wide  disper- 
sion, instead  of  concentration,  division  of  aims  instead 
of  unity  of  purpose.  The  army  was  to  be  used  partly 
to  push  on  and  seize  the  bridges  of  the  Meuse,  partly 
to  move  on  a  line  parallel  to  the  assumed  French  move- 
ment. There  was  no  touch  with  the  enemy,  but  only 
occasional  contact  by  the  cavalry ;  there  was  no  advanced 
guard  to  cover  the  whole  march  and  hold  the  enemy. 
The  Third  Corps  (Alvensleben)  was  to  march  to  Mars- 


106  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

la-Tour  ( about  fifteen  miles  west  of  Metz  on  the  nearest 
road  to  Verdun) ;  the  Tenth  Corps  (Voigts-Rhetz) 
would  be  moving  about  ten  miles  further  west.  The 
Prussian  Guard  and  the  Fourth  Corps,  ten  miles  apart 
and  on  different  lines  of  march,  would  be  pushing  to- 
wards the  crossings  of  the  Meuse  and  both  nearly  twenty 
miles  away  from  the  two  corps  already  named.  Of  the 
three  other  corps  assigned  to  Prince  Frederick  Charles's 
command,  the  Ninth  was  crossing  the  Moselle  some 
miles  above  Metz,  and  the  Third  and  Twelfth  were 
marching  to  the  crossings  of  the  same  river.  There 
was  a  widespread  dispersion.  All  the  five  French  corps 
were  concentrated.  There  was  a  chance  of  beating  the 
Germans  in  detail,  if  the  French  had  had  a  leader  who 
knew  anything  about  the  real  situation  and  could  rise 
to  the  opportunity  it  offered. 

August  16th  saw  a  hard-fought  battle,  variously 
known  as  the  battle  of  Mars-la-Tour  or  of  Gravelotte 
in  French  accounts,  and  known  in  Germany  as  the  battle 
of  Rezonville.  Alvensleben,  marching  northwards  with 
the  Third  Corps,  came  upon  the  flank  of  the  whole 
French  army.  With  the  idea  that  he  had  no  such  serious 
force  in  his  front,  but  that  the  French  must  have  made 
considerable  progress  with  their  retreat  so  that  he  had 
to  deal  only  with  a  detachment,  he  attacked.  Single- 
handed  lie  had  to  hold  out  for  hours  agaiust  overwhelm- 
ing numbers.  He  would  have  been  crushed,  only  that 
the  French  fought  a  purely  defensive  battle,  made  no 
serious  attack,  and  thought  all  was  won  if  they  could 
"  maintain  their  positions,"  while  their  incompetent 
chief,  Bazaine,  had  a  theory  that  the  Germans  wanted 
to  cut  him  off  from  Metz,  and  kept  some  of  his  best 
tro()i)s  idle  all  day  to  guard  a  flauk  that  was  never  in 


^ket'ch  map  stiowint^   Hig    si^uttjon   ian  Rua.l(».l>7J, ''e.'S"-th>m  ^i-otvi.  Voii  MoTtkg's 

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CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP   lOT 

danger.  Alvensleben  held  on  doggedly,  until  Voigts- 
Rhetz,  marching  to  the  sound  of  the  cannon,  came  to 
his  help.  Even  then,  the  French  had  victory  in  their 
hands,  if  they  would  only  attack.  No  further  reinforce- 
ment could  reach  the  Germans  that  day,  thanks  to  the 
dispersion  of  their  army.  They  were  saved  by  the  lack 
of  elementary  battle-leading  on  the  French  side. 

Once  more  we  have  the  lack  of  sureU  bringing  dis- 
aster menacingly  near. 

Next  day,  the  French  disappeared  from  the  positions 
they  had  held  during  the  hard-fought  battle.  No  touch 
was  kept  with  them.  The  German  Corps,  that  had 
fought  on  the  16th,  were  exhausted  by  their  efforts. 
There  were  no  fresh  troops  on  the  ground.  Moltke, 
warned  by  the  battle  that  he  had  failed  to  grasp  the 
facts  of  the  situation  was  hastily  concentrating  his 
far-scattered  army  corps.  But  once  more  he  was 
building  up  a  scheme  based  on  what  it  was  most  reason- 
able to  suppose  the  French  would  do.  It  so  happened 
that  Bazaine  just  then  was  acting  most  unreasonably. 
Like  a  timid  amateur  yachtsman,  who  on  a  rough  day 
feels  that  he  is  only  safe  if  he  keeps  a  port  under  his 
lee,  Bazaine  was  haunted  by  the  idea  that  the  salvation 
of  his  army  depended  on  keeping  in  touch  Vith  the 
fortress  of  Metz,  and  that  the  Germans  must  be  anxious 
to  cut  him  off  from  it — to  drive  him  away  from  it.  They 
had  no  such  idea.  At  the  German  headquarters,  Von 
Moltke  had  decided  that  the  French  must  be  marching 
away  to  the  north-westwards.  His  next  manoeuvre, 
based  on  this  assumption,  resulted  in  orders  for  a  march 
in  that  direction,  partly  following  up  the  French,  partly 
trying  to  get  on  their  flank  and  head  them  off.  Then  it 
was  discovered  that  Bazaine,  instead  of  breaking  away 


108  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

to  the  nortli-west,  had  fallen  back  on  the  heights  west 
of  Metz.  Partly  by  the  headquarters,  partly  by  the 
action  of  the  subordinate  commanders,  the  mistakes 
made  were  rectified  and  the  victory  of  Gravelotte- 
St.  Privat  was  won.  But  even  in  its  winning  there  were 
delays,  local  failures  and  needless  losses,  on  account  of 
defective  reconnaissance  and  consequent  errors  in 
battle-leading.  Thus,  to  take  the  most  notable  instance, 
the  German  headquarters  placed  the  right  of  the  French 
line  some  miles  south  of  the  position  which  it  really 
occupied,  and  as  the  decisive  attack  was  planned  to  be 
directed  against  this  flank,  what  was  to  have  been  a 
flank  attack  became  frontal,  and  the  whole  arrangement 
had  to  be  modified.  Once  more  the  German  leader- 
ship gave  the  French  opportunities  of  which  they  took 
no  advantage. 

Operations,  here  only  briefly  outlined,  are  fully 
detailed  by  Foch,  maps  and  documents  in  hand.  Day 
after  day  we  follow  the  debates  of  the  staff,  the  framing 
of  orders  and  their  execution.  At  each  step,  he  draws 
practical  lessons  from  the  story,  not  only  on  his  main 
theme,  but  on  many  other  topics  of  military  interest. 
He  works  out  from  time  to  time  a  scheme  of  what  might 
have  been  done.  He  contracts  the  Napoleonic  method 
of  action  under  the  protection  of  an  advanced  guard, 
with  the  defective  method  of  incomplete  protection  and 
information,  supplemented  by  reasoned  out  suppositions 
as  to  what  must  he,  though  this  again  and  again  proves 
to  be  the  thing  that  is  not.  The  great  lesson  is  the 
necessity  of  action  based  on  ascertained  facts,  the  value 
of  surcte. 

At  the  same  time,  no  praise  is  spared  for  the  good 
points  in  German  war  organization^  strategy  and  battle 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP   109 

tactics.  There  is  no  tendency  to  underrate  the  enemy. 
The  very  last  words  of  the  book  are  a  tribute  of  praise 
to  King  William  of  Prussia,  afterwards  the  first  Kaiser 
of  the  new  Empire.*  In  another  remarkable  passage, 
he  sets  forth  the  services  of  German  students  to  the 
development  of  the  science  of  strategy.  But  he  notes 
that  they  were  the  pupils  of  Napoleon.  They  learned 
from  him  in  the  day  of  their  defeats;  they  applied  the 
knowledge  in  the  uprising  which  Germany  remembers 
as  the  "  War  of  Liberation  ".  Foch  wishes  his  own 
countrymen  to  read  the  lessons  of  1870 ;  but  he  does  not 
make  even  the  greatest  of  German  leaders  a  model  to 
be  imitated;  he  points  out  how  far  his  leadership  falls 
short  of  the  genius  of  Napoleon,  If  he  criticises  Von 
Moltke,  he  is  equally  frank  in  his  exposure  of  the  weak- 
nesses and  blunders  of  the  French  generals  who  opposed 
him.  He  is  dealing  with  these  records  of  1870  in  order 
to  make  it  unlikely  that  such  disasters  should  again  be 
incurred  by  the  leaders  of  France  in  war.  In  the  pre- 
face to  his  book  he  takes  as  its  motto  "  In  memoriam, 
in  spem  " — "  In  memory  of  the  past,  in  order  to  build 
up  the  hope  of  victory  in  the  future." 

His  work,  De  la  Conduite  de  la  Guerre,  is  a  practical 
application  of  the  principles  laid  down  in  his  first  book 
— their  application  to  the  criticism  of  a  great  campaign. 
He  makes  them  still  clearer,  and  enforces  and  enlarges 
upon  their  practical  lessons.    But  besides  this  scientific 

*  "  As  for  the  King,  brought  up  in  the  hard  school  of  the  Wars  of 
Independence,  he  regards  victory  only  as  a  recompense  to  be  gained  by 
the  devotion  of  all  to  the  common  cause.  Far  from  seeking  to  incarnate 
the  State  in  himself,  he  makes  himself  the  first  of  its  servants.  Often 
he  abandons  his  own  views  and  resigns  the  most  precious  prerogatives 
of  his  royal  power  into  the  hands  of  capable  counsellors.  As  the  price 
of  his  self-abnegation  he  brings  back  from  the  campaign  of  France  the 
Imperial  crown  of  Germany,  and  will  perhaps  receive  from  history  the 
title  of  the  Great." — De  la  Conduite  de  la  Ouerre,  pp.  483,  484. 


110  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

teaching,  the  book  conveys  another  lesson — the  truth 
that  in  the  darkest  hour  success  is  still  possible  to  the 
vigilant  leader  who  is  ready  to  seize  the  opportunities 
offered  by  his  opponent.  One  feels,  as  one  reads  it,  that 
success  in  war  depends,  not  on  mere  numbers,  not  on 
the  merely  material  conditions  but  on  the  military  spirit, 
the  disciplined  knowledge,  the  strong-willed  enterprise 
of  the  chiefs  who  command. 

So  we  come  back  to  Napoleon's  saying,  that  in  war  the 
moral  is  to  the  material  as  three  to  one,  and  to  Foch's 
doctrine  of  the  supremacy  of  the  moral  factor.  As  to 
the  leading  principles,  his  whole  theory  of  the  conduct 
of  war  depends  upon  two  vital  points.  First,  there  is 
the  principle  of  surete  in  its  twofold  sense  of  security 
from  the  interference  of  the  enemy,  preserving  thus 
"  freedom  of  action," — and  sureness,  the  result  of  due 
steps  being  taken  to  ascertain  the  facts,  to  grasp  the 
real  situation,  to  base  one's  plans  and  orders  not  on 
mere  suppositions  but  on  realities.  Secondly,  there  is 
the  principle  of  the  economy  of  force,  the  grouping  of 
every  available  man  and  gun  for  the  decisive  effort :  the 
rigid  economy  of  detachments,  so  as  not  to  fritter  away 
the  force  to  be  used  at  the  decisive  point.  On  this  is 
built  the  whole  theory  of  securing  victory  by  being  the 
stronger  at  this  vital  point.  It  applies  both  in  the 
strategy  of  the  campaign  and  in  the  tactics  of  the  battle- 
field. 

Neither  principle  is  new.  But  Foch  gives  a  new 
development  to  these  old  doctrines.  He  takes  care  that 
they  shall  not  be  obscured  by  side  issues  or  minor  details. 
He  views  everything  in  their  light,  and  shows  how  they 
can  be  made  in  every  operation  the  safe  guide  of  con- 
duct and  command.    And  he  enforces  his  teaching  with 


CRITICISM  OF  GERMAN  LEADERSHIP   111 

characteristic  plirases,  and  comparisons  that  reveal  his 
own  energetic  spirit. 

The  later  editions  of  both  his  books  have  been  only 
reprints  of  their  first  issue.  After  the  Japanese  war 
with  Russia,  in  the  preface  to  a  new  edition  of  his  work, 
De  la  Conduite  de  la  Guerre^  he  made  some  remarks  on 
the  strategy  of  the  war,  showing  how  the  conduct  of  the 
Japanese  operations  presented  new  illustrations  of  the 
principles  he  had  laid  down.  In  referring  to  the  pro- 
longed battle  of  Mukden,  he  notes  the  evolution  of  the 
vast  battlefields  of  modern  war,  their  characteristics, 
the  entrenched  front,  and  the  strategic  direction  of  the 
decisive  attack.  In  the  great  battles  in  Manchuria, 
"  the  attack  is  constantly  accompained  by  a  manoeuvre 
strategically  aiming  at  the  opponent's  line  of  communi- 
cations, and  tactically  directed  against  one  wing  of  the 
enemy,  to  destroy  it  or  to  reach  the  line  of  communica- 
tions. At  Mukden,  Nogi's  army  seeks,  not  so  much  to 
crush  the  Russian  right  by  a  flank  attack,  as  to  reach 
its  rear,  in  order  thus  to  compel  the  retirement  of  all 
the  enemy's  forces.  Thus  the  manwuvre  tattle  of  the 
Napoleonic  epoch  and  of  1870  is  transformed  into  the 
operation  battle  lasting  several  days,  the  decision  on 
the  battlefield  becomes  a  strategic  fact,  and  the  union 
becomes  closer  between  strategy  and  tactics. 

Both  sides  are  entrenched  in  these  Manchurian 
battles.  Under  the  influence  of  this  double  necessity 
of  a  prolonged  frontal  engagement  and  wide-sweeping 
flank  attack,  the  assailant  has  to  go  beyond  the  limits 
so  far  recognized  as  needful.  To  strengthen  these 
extended  lines,  he  has  to  use  all  the  resources  of 
armament  and  field-fortification.  Only  telegraphy 
makes  possible  the  command  of  such  vast  fronts. 


112  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

But  thougli  the  details  of  their  application  change, 
the  principles  of  the  art  of  war  remain  the  same.  We 
have  here,  outlined,  some  characteristics  not  only  of  the 
Manchurian  battles,  but  of  the  still  vaster  conflicts  on 
the  battlefields  of  the  coming  Great  War.  There  too 
Foch  was  to  illustrate  once  more  the  unchanging  charac- 
ter of  the  dominant  principles  of  war,  amid  the  changes 
of  armament  and  mechanism,  introduced  by  the  progress 
of  industrial  science  and  invention. 

Foch's  teaching  has  been  thus  dealt  with,  because, 
without  a  survey  of  it  and  some  grasp  of  its  general 
purport  and  method,  one  cannot  understand  either  the 
great  soldier's  services  to  France  or  the  full  import  of 
his  exploits  in  the  war,  in  which  he  was  to  take  so  pre- 
eminent a  part. 

We  now  return  to  the  record  of  his  career  after  the 
close  of  his  directorship  of  the  Ecole  de  Guerre. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  CX)MING  OP  THE  GREAT  WAR 

1911  was  a  critical  year.  There  was  a  long  period  of 
tension  in  the  summer,  caused  by  the  Agadir  crisis  in 
Morocco.  War  with  Germany  seemed  not  unlikely. 
England  and  France  had  become  good  friends,  linked 
together  not  yet  by  an  alliance  but  by  a  "  friendly 
understanding,"  the  Entente  Cordiale.  In  both  coun- 
tries the  preliminary  steps  were  taken  for  a  possible 
mobilization  in  case  they  might  have  to  stand  together 
against  Germany. 

Foch  had  left  the  Ecole  de  Guerre  at  the  close  of  the 
annual  course,  in  the  early  summer.  He  was  then  pro- 
moted to  the  rank  of  General  of  Division,  and  given  the 
command  of  the  13th  Division  of  the  Seventh  Army 
Corps,  with  headquarters  at  Chaumont  on  the  upper 
Marne.  The  Seventh  was  one  of  the  corps  in  the  second 
line  from  the  eastern  frontier,  and  he  found  himself  busy 
with  preparations  for  rapidly  placing  his  division  on  a 
war  footing  if  need  be.  But  the  tension  over  Morocco 
diminished,  an  agreement  was  arrived  at,  and  Europe 
settled  down  again  to  a  hopeful  mood  as  to  preservation 
of  peace. 

The  crisis  had  drawn  England  and  France  more 
closely  together.  There  was  as  yet  no  alliance,  no 
definite  pledge  obliging  Britain  to  take  up  arms  in 
defence  of  France  and  accept  a  challenge  to  her  as  a 
challenge  to  herself.    But  events  were  shaping  towards 

X13 


114  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

the  future  alliance.  The  French  fleet  had  been  perma- 
nently concentrated  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  England 
had  undertaken  that  in  the  event  of  an  unprovoked  at- 
tack on  France  the  British  fleet  would  if  necessary 
intervene  to  prevent  hostile  action  of  the  German  navy 
against  the  northern  Atlantic  French  coasts.  Further, 
British  and  French  staff  officers  met  and  exchanged 
views  as  to  the  form  British  military  co-operation  was 
to  take  should  joint  action  on  land  become  necessary. 

As  a  further  step  towards  securing  useful  co-opera- 
tion should  the  course  of  events  compel  the  two  armies 
to  stand  together,  British  officers  of  rank  attended  the 
great  manoeuvres  of  the  French  army,  and,  in  the  autumn 
of  1912,  a  mission  militaire,  a  group  of  French  officers, 
was  sent  to  watch  the  British  army  manoeuvres  in  East 
Anglia. 

General  Foch  was  selected  to  be  the  chief  of  this 
"  military  mission,"  and  he  and  his  staff  were  the  guests 
of  the  British  Government  during  the  manoeuvres  near 
Cambridge — the  first  British  manoeuvres,  by  the  way, 
in  which  aircraft  took  a  part.  Foch  does  not  speak 
English.  German  he  knows  well,  for  the  study  of  the 
language  became  popular  among  the  more  studious 
French  officers  after  the  war  of  1870-71,  and  it  was  the 
foreign  language  usually  taken  in  the  higher  military 
examinations.  Foch's  writings  show  an  intimate  knowl- 
edge of  recent  German  military  literature — not  merely 
of  those  books  that  have  been  translated  into  French. 
In  East  Anglia,  his  lack  of  English  was  compensated 
by  the  fact  that  a  good  many  British  officers  have  a 
working  knowledge  of  French.  He  made  many  friends 
among  them — friendships  that  were  to  be  useful  a 
couj)le  of  years  later. 


THE  COMING  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR       115 

As  to  his  impressions  of  the  British  army,  of  course 
nothing  was  published  of  the  official  report  he  made  to 
his  Government;  but  in  more  than  one  conversation 
with  Sir  John  French  and  his  staff,  he  expressed  his 
admiration  of  the  men,  their  physique,  their  bearing, 
their  endurance  and  steadiness,  and  their  endless  cheer- 
fulness. Certain  it  is  that  those  East  Anglian  days  led 
him  to  abandon  the  idea  expressed  at  the  time  when 
England  and  France  were  still  divided  by  thorny  ques- 
tions of  African  policy  and  when  dangerous  incidents 
on  the  Nile  and  the  Niger  had  brought  the  two  countries 
perilously  near  a  rupture — the  opinion  that  the  English 
"  mercenaires "  were  hardly  fit  for  Continental  war- 
fare. *  When  he  expressed  this  opinion  in  his  lectures 
at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre,  it  was  an  echo  of  views  very 
widely  held  in  France  at  the  time,  and  even  more 
strongly  expressed  by  other  French  writers  of  recognized 
authority.  The  use  of  the  word  "  mercenaries ''  meant, 
however,  nothing  more  than  that  the  British  army  was 
not  levied  under  a  law  of  universal  liability  to  military 
service,  but  depended  on  recruits  enlisted  in  competi- 
tion with  the  labour  market.  Few  Frenchmen  realized 
that,  though  the  British  soldier  received  better  pay 
than  that  of  a  Continental  conscript,  recruits  were  not 
attracted  by  wages  lower  than  that  of  any  other  occupa- 
tion, but  by  the  adventurous  fighting  spirit,  and  it  was 
really  a  volunteer  army.  In  all  Continental  countries 
there  was  the  fixed  belief  that  the  true  national  spirit 
of  an  army  depended  upon  its  being  raised  by  a  law  of 
obligatory  service  and  realizing  the  ideal  of  "  the  nation 

*  "  II  est  douteux  qu'on  voie  r^ussir  une  armee  de  mercenaires  ou  de 
soldats  ages,  comme  Tarmee  anglaise,  qui  fait  forcement  appel  a  la 
solidit6  et  a  la  discipline  du  rang  pour  supplier  aux  qualites  morales 
de  riiomme  et  Jl  I'initiative  individuelle." — Principes  de  la  Guerre,  p.  39. 


116  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

in  arms."  It  was  further  difficult  for  a  Continental 
soldier  to  understand  the  special  conditions  that  under- 
lay the  organization  of  the  British  army  and  the 
dominant  fact  that  it  was  primarily  intended  to  do  what 
no  other  nation  even  attempted,  namely  to  keep  year 
after  year  a  force  of  some  75,000  men  practically  on  a 
war  footing  in  a  tropical  country  thousands  of  miles 
away,  and  secondly  an  expeditionary  force  ready  for 
mobilization,  to  act  essentially  as  the  landing  force 
of  an  all-powerful  navy.  The  large  reserve  supplied 
by  the  Territorial  army  was  left  out  of  account.  A 
section  of  the  British  press — opposed  to  the  Haldane 
reforms,  and  carrying  on  a  campaign  for  conscription — 
had  helped  to  spread  abroad  the  idea  that  the  regular 
army  was  hopelessly  weak  and  the  Territorial  force 
worthless.  Then  there  was  a  tendency — especially  in 
France — to  set  very  little  value  on  the  war  experience 
that  British  officers  had  obtained  in  fairly  easy  victories 
over  semi-civilized  enemies  in  the  border  wars  of  the 
Empire.  It  used  to  be  said  that  such  experiences  were 
no  training  for  European  war,  and  that  the  French  army 
of  1870  owed  some  of  its  defects  to  habits  acquired  in 
Algerian  warfare. 

That  such  ideas  prevailed  abroad  made  it  especially 
important  that  a  soldier  like  Foch  should  have  the 
opportunity  of  obtaining  personal  experience  of  the 
British  army  and  its  methods.  His  visit  to  East  Anglia 
was  therefore  a  very  important  event  in  his  preparation 
for  his  future  task. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  year — on  December  17th, 
1912, — Foch  received  further  promotion,  leaving  his 
divisional  command  at  Chaumont  to  take  command  of 
the  Eighth  Army  Corps  at  Bourges.     In  the  following 


THE  COMING  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR      117 

summer — on  August  23rd,  1913 — he  was  transferred  to 
perhaps  the  most  important  corps  command  in  France — 
that  of  the  Twentieth  Army  Corps,  with  headquarters 
at  Nancy. 

Foch  had  last  been  at  Nancy  as  a  young  student  from 
the  College  of  St.  Clement,  spending  a  few  days  there 
to  pass  an  examination.  The  Germans  held  the  city, 
and  Manteuffel  had  his  headquarters  at  the  old  Palais 
du  Gouvernement  with  sentries  in  spiked  helmets  at 
the  doors.  That  was  forty-two  years  before  the  summer 
day  when  General  Foch  made  his  entry  into  the  capital 
of  Lorraine  to  take  up  his  residence  in  the  same  palace 
as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Twentieth  Corps.  Nancy 
was  en  fete,  with  the  tricolour  flying  from  roofs  and 
windows,  and  the  evening  ended  with  bands  of  the  six 
regiments  of  the  garrison  parading  the  street  and  square 
to  the  music  of  the  Sambre  and  Meuse  March,  by  the 
light  of  hundreds  of  torches. 

The  Nancy  Army  Corps  was  then  regarded  as  the 
crack  corps  of  the  French  army.  It  was  regularly  kept 
above  the  ordinary  peace  strength  and  almost  on  a 
war  footing,  for  it  held  the  sharply  advanced  salient 
of  the  French  frontier  towards  Metz  and  Germany. 
It  formed  a  most  important  part  of  the  "  covering  force  " 
under  the  protection  of  which  the  whole  French  army 
would  be  mobilized  in  the  event  of  war. 

Foch  and  the  Twentieth  Corps  were  therefore  on  the 
outpost  line.  More  than  once  in  his  lectures  at  the  Ecole 
de  Guerre  he  had  referred  to  Nancy  as  the  point  of  the 
eastern  frontier  most  exposed  to  a  German  invasion. 
*'  Chateau  Salins  is  only  twenty-seven  kilometres  from 
Nancy  "  is  a  phrase  that  he  repeats,*  pointing  to  the 

*  Principes  de  la  Ouerre,  p.  43. — Conduite  de  la  Querre,  p.  49. 


118  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

nearest  place  of  importance  beyond  the  German  fron- 
tier— Chateau  Salins,  French  before  1871,  but  then  the 
German  frontier  town  of  "  Salzburg." 

But  the  frontier  was  actually  nearer  to  Nancy,  for 
it  ran  well  to  the  west  of  Chateau  Salins  and  at  the 
nearest  point  was  only  sixteen  kilometres,  or  about  ten 
miles  from  Foch's  headquarters  at  Nancy.  A  declara- 
tion of  war  might  bring  a  raid  on  the  city  even  before 
the  enemy's  mobilization  was  complete,  for  the  border 
held  by  the  German  "  covering  troops  "  was  not  four 
hours'  march  from  Nancy.  The  city  lies  in  a  hollow 
among  the  vine-clad  hills  where  the  Meurthe  flows 
between  the  heights  of  the  Grand  Couronn^  and  the 
forest  plateau  of  Haye.  When  after  the  Franco-German 
War  and  the  loss  of  Metz  and  Strasburg,  General  S6r^ 
de  Rivieres  was  reorganizing  the  eastern  defences  of 
France  there  was  for  awhile  some  idea  of  crowning  these 
hills  w^th  a  circle  of  forts.  But  rightly  or  wrongly  it 
was  decided  that  to  fortify  Nancy  would  be  to  create  a 
somewhat  isolated  advanced  post  in  front  of  the  eastern 
fortress  screen  formed  by  the  four  entrenched  camps  of 
Verdun,  Toul,  Epinal  and  Belfort,  and  the  lines  of 
forts  along  the  heights  of  the  Meuse  and  the  upper 
Moselle. 

Military  opinion  was  divided  as  to  what  would  be 
the  fate  of  Nancy.  There  were  many  high  authorities 
who  held  that  it  might  have  to  be  abandoned  at  the  out- 
set of  a  war,  in  order  to  concentrate  the  defence  on  the 
line  of  the  fortress  barrier  from  Verdun  to  Belfort. 
But  Foch,  with  his  ideas  of  the  offensive  as  the  only 
possi})le  way  to  success  in  war,  was  not  the  man  to 
accept  such  a  view  and  to  consent  to  tlie  sacrifice  of  the 
great  city  of  some  hundred  thousand  inhabitants  in  the 


fTHE  COMING  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR      119 

first  days  of  a  conflict  with  Germany.  Nancy  had 
surrendered  to  a  squadron  of  uhlans  in  1870,  after  the 
defeats  of  Wissemburg  and  Woerth.  There  would  be 
no  surrender  next  time.  It  would  have  a  bad  moral 
effect,  if  in  a  new  war  the  Germans  could  announce 
in  the  opening  days  of  the  campaign  the  occupation  of 
the  historic  city  as  a  first  prize  won  on  French  territory. 
So,  from  the  day  of  his  arrival,  the  new  commander  of 
the  Twentieth  Corps  studied  the  defence  of  Nancy  and 
the  possibilities  of  a  march  on  Chateau  Salins,  with 
what  the  opening  moves  of  the  Great  War  were  to  show 
before  many  months  were  over. 

In  the  summer  of  1914,  Foch  arranged  and  directed 
the  first  manoeuvres  of  his  army  corps,  division  against 
division  in  a  week  of  mimic  warfare  that  ended  on  July 
5th.  It  was  a  useful  rehearsal  for  the  reality.  Some 
of  the  blank-cartridge  fighting  took  place  on  the  very 
ground  that  in  a  few  weeks  was  to  echo  to  the  roar  of 
shotted  guns  and  the  reports  of  exploding  shells.  He 
had  with  him  during  these  manoeuvres  a  soldier  of  his 
own  type,  General  de  Curieres  de  Castelnau,  a  member 
of  the  Conseil  sup^rieur  de  Guerre,  who  was  making  a 
tour  of  inspection  in  eastern  France  and  took  this  oppor- 
tunity of  seeing  the  Twentieth  Corps  at  work  under  its 
new  chief.  De  Castelnau  was  of  the  same  age  as  Foch. 
(He  was  born  on  Christmas  Day,  1851.)  He  came  from 
the  same  mountain  land  of  Gascony,  and  like  Foch  was 
a  keen  soldier  of  exceptional  ability  and  a  deeply 
religious  man.  He  had  served  in  the  Army  of  the  Loire 
during  the  Franco-German  War,  and  had  been  a  captain 
at  the  age  of  nineteen.  The  two  generals  were  soon  to 
be  comrades  in  the  great  events  that  were  so  near  at 
hand. 


120  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

On  the  eve  of  tlie  manoeuvres  there  had  come  dis- 
quieting news — the  telegram  that  told  of  the  murder 
of  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  and  his  wife  at 
Serajevo  on  Sunday,  June  28th.  But  after  the  first 
shock  of  horror  produced  by  the  tidings,  there  was  a 
general  acceptance  of  the  optimist  view,  that  even  if 
war  resulted  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia,  it 
would  be  "localized"  by  the  efforts  of  European 
diplomacy,  as  had  been  the  case  with  so  many  recent 
wars  in  the  troubled  Balkan  region. 

For  nearly  three  weeks  there  was  no  really  serious 
alarm  as  to  the  general  maintenance  of  peace.  We  have 
clear  proof  of  the  fact  that  in  military  circles  in  France 
the  outlook  was  regarded  as  favourable  for  on  July  18th, 
we  find  Foch  leaving  Nancy  for  a  fortnight's  leave  and 
a  holiday  at  his  home,  the  old  manor-house  of  Trefeun- 
teuniou  in  Brittany.  His  son  remained  with  his  regi- 
ment, but  his  two  daughters  and  their  children  came 
to  Brittany  at  the  same  time,  with  his  sons-in-law,  their 
husbands.  Captain  Fournier  of  the  General  Staff  and 
Captain  B^court  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Chasseurs,  whose 
post  was  on  the  frontier  at  Pont-il-Mousson.  Leave 
would  certainly  not  have  been  asked  for  by  the  three 
officers,  and  above  all  by  Foch,  if  there  was  any  idea 
that  war  on  the  eastern  frontier  was  close  at  hand. 

The  family  party  had  hardly  gathered  at  Trefeun- 
teuniou,  when  the  international  horizon  began  suddenly 
to  darken.  July  23rd  brought  the  first  note  from  Vienna 
to  the  Serbian  Government,  followed  swiftly  by  the 
announcement  that  Russia  would  stand  by  her  "  little 
Slav  brother."  The  danger  of  a  European  war  was 
evident.  If  Russia  moved,  Germany  would  stand  by 
Austria,  and  France  would  be  involved  as  Russia's  ally. 


THE  COMING  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR       121 

The  party  at  the  manor-house  broke  up,  and  Foch 
hurried  back  to  Nancy. 

On  July  28th,  Austria-Hungary  declared  war  against 
Serbia,  and  the  bombardment  of  Belgrade  began  next 
day.  The  same  afternoon  the  Czar  issued  his  orders  for 
a  general  mobilization.  On  August  1st  Germany  and 
Russia  were  at  war,  and  the  order  for  the  mobilization 
of  the  French  army  was  published.  All  was  ready  at 
Nancy.  By  that  evening  Foch  had  his  army  corps,  not 
indeed  completely  mobilized,  but  ready  for  instant 
action,  with  an  outpost  line  watching  the  border. 

The  Twentieth  Army  Corps  was  made  up  of  the  11th 
Division  (headquarters,  Nancy),  and  the  39th  Di- 
vision (headquarters,  Toul).  There  was  a  healthy 
rivalry  between  the  two  divisions.  The  11th  had  been 
called  the  Division  de  fer  (the  "iron  division").  The 
39th  promised  that  they  would  prove  themselves  to 
be  the  Division  d'acier  (the  "steel  division").  Both 
were  already  near  war  strength.  Elsewhere  in  France 
there  were  difficulties  and  delays  in  the  mobilization. 
Reserve  stores  of  arms  and  equipment  had  been  neglected 
by  the  politicians  for  the  sake  of  dangerous  economies, 
and  at  the  outset  tens  of  thousands  of  men  had  to  be 
turned  away  from  the  depots  when  they  presented 
themselves  for  embodiment.  But  at  Nancy  all  worked 
swiftly  and  smoothly.  There  was  even  a  surplus  of 
reservists  armed  and  equipped  and  turned  over  to  a  new 
corps  known  for  awhile  as  the  "  2nd  Reserve  Group  of 
Divisions."  But  the  plan  adopted  by  Joffre,  the  chief 
of  the  General  Staff  and  now  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  French  armies,  was  to  take  the  offensive  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment. 

Several    armies    were    being    formed    by    grouping 


122  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

together  the  army  corps  as  they  completed  their  mobili- 
zation. Meanwhile  the  Twentieth  Corps  was  guarding 
the  frontier.  It  was  to  form  part  of  the  Second  Army, 
otherwise  known  as  the  Army  of  Lorraine.  This  group 
was  to  be  made  up  as  follows : — 

Army  Corps    Peace  Headquarters         Commander 

Fifteenth  Corps        Marseilles  General  Espinasse. 

Sixteenth      "  Montpellier        General  Taverna. 

Twentieth     "  Nancy  General  Foch. 

2nd  Group  of  Reserve 
Divisions. 

These  four  corps  would  give  a  total  fighting  force  of 
about  140,000  men,  with  some  400  guns.  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Army  thus  organized  with 
headquarters  at  Nancy  was  Foch's  friend.  General  de 
Castelnau.  On  its  right  in  the  Vosges  was  the  First 
Army  under  General  Dubail — (Eighth,  Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth,  and  Twenty-first  Corps  with  General  Con- 
neau's  Cavalry  Division).  On  its  left,  based  on  Verdun, 
was  the  Third  Army  under  Foch's  old  comrade  of  the 
Polytechnique,  General  Ruffey. 

The  mobilization  and  concentration  was  complete  by 
the  beginning  of  August.  The  end  of  that  week  saw 
the  first  great  clash  of  the  armies  along  the  whole  front 
from  Mons  to  the  Vosges. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

foch's  forecast  of  the  war 

In  Foch's  second  book,  De  la  Conduite  de  la  Guerre, 
published  ten  years  before  the  Great  War,  there  is  an 
interesting  forecast  of  the  probable  course  of  events  in 
a  war  between  France  and  Germany.  The  General  has 
left  it  unaltered  in  the  latest  edition  of  the  book, 
published  in  1915,  although  events  did  not  fulfil  his 
anticipations.  We  may  take  it  that  he  allowed  it  to 
stand  unaltered  and  without  note  or  comment,  because 
it  expresses  the  view  that,  quite  apart  from  moral  and 
legal  considerations,  Germany  judged  from  the  purely 
military  standpoint  made  a  mistake  in  including  in 
her  plan  of  campaign  in  1914  the  march  through  Belgium 
and  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

He  discusses  the  question  in  connection  with  his  study 
of  the  first  phase  of  the  campaign  of  1870-*  He  examines 
Von  Moltke's  plans  for  the  war,  as  set  forth  in  a 
memorandum  prepared  for  King  William  of  Prussia  in 
the  winter  of  1868-69  and  the  instructions  issued  to  the 
General  Staff  at  Berlin  in  the  spring  of  1870. 

Von  Moltke  adopted  as  the  basis  of  his  plan  the  ideas 
put  forward  by  Clausewitz  nearly  forty  years  earlier. 
When  there  was  danger  of  war  between  France  and 
Prussia,  in  1830,  Clausewitz  prepared  a  memoir  of  the 
plan  of  campaign  to  be  adopted  in  the  event  of  hostilities. 
It  was  an  official  document  drawn  up  at  the  request  of 

*  Conduite  de  la  Querre,  chapter  iii,  p.  25. 

123 


124  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

Von  Krauseneck,  then  Chief  of  the  Prussian  General 
Staff.  Clausewitz  laid  it  down  that  the  Prussian  army 
should  act  on  the  offensive,  and  that  the  objects  to  be 
kept  in  view  should  be  (1)  to  defeat  the  French  army 
in  one  or  more  battles:  (2)  to  take  Paris;  (3)  to 
force  what  was  left  of  the  beaten  army  across  the  Loire. 
Contact  with  the  main  French  army  would  be  assured 
by  a  march  across  the  frontier,  directed  on  Paris. 

Von  Moltke  embodied  this  general  outline  in  his  plan 
of  1868-69.  He  calculated  that  on  mobilization  the  Ger- 
man armies  would  have  the  advantage  of  superior 
numbers.  The  army  would  concentrate  in  the  Bavarian 
Palatinate  for  the  Invasion  of  France.  No  large  force 
would  be  detached  to  guard  the  upper  Rhine  facing 
towards  Strasburg  and  Alsace.  Such  a  detachment 
would  uselessly  weaken  the  main  striking  force.  Con- 
centrated in  the  Palatinate  facing  towards  Metz,  this 
main  army  would  directly  cover  the  middle  Rhine  region 
and  indirectly  protect  south  Germany.  The  menace  to 
Lorraine  would  protect  south  Germany. 

If  the  French  attempted  a  disembarkation  on  the 
North  German  Coast,  they  would  only  increase  their 
inferiority  in  the  main  theatre  of  operations.  If  they 
violated  either  Swiss  or  Belgian  neutrality,  they  would 
encounter  serious  opposition  from  local  troops,  and  a 
march  through  Belgium  would  give  them  a  long  line  of 
operations  on  which  once  more  the  army  in  the  Palati- 
nate would  be  well  placed  for  delivering  a  deadly  blow. 

Foch  describes  the  whole  plan  as  a  masterly  one,  clear 
an?!  sim})le  and  based  upon  the  most  secure  principles 
of  war.  Its  basis  was  the  idea  of  tlie  offensive  with  all 
available  forces  concentrated  in  one  central  region. 
Foch   believed   that  in   future  war  the  German   Staff 


FOOH'S  FORECAST  OF  THE  WAR         125 

would  recognize  that  the  same  reasons  still  held  good. 
There  would  not  be  two  German  offensives,  one  in 
Alsace,  the  other  starting  from  the  lower  Rhine. 

But  might  not  the  enemy  be  attracted  by  the  idea  of 
an  advance  from  the  lower  Rhine  through  Belgium, 
avoiding  or  turning  the  eastern  defence  barrier  of 
France,  the  line  of  entrenched  camps  and  forts  extend- 
ing from  Belfort  to  Verdun?  Foch  did  not  think  so. 
He  pointed  out  that  the  object  of  the  German  Staff  must 
be  to  concentrate  the  largest  possible  force  in  the  short- 
est time.  That  would  require  the  use  of  a  highly 
developed  railway  system  with  plenty  of  long  detrain- 
ing platforms.  The  place  was  marked  on  the  maps  of 
the  German  railways.  It  would  be  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
front.  But  there  were  further  reasons.  Besides  encoun- 
tering opposition  on  the  way,  the  Germans  would  have 
to  weaken  their  striking  force  by  detachments  left  at 
Brussels  and  before  Antwerp.  And  they  would  be 
exposed  to  a  flank  attack  by  the  French  army,  provided 
that  its  chiefs  held  firmly  to  the  three  principles : — 

(1)  the  concentration  of  its  forces  in  a  single  mass, 
without  detachments;  (2)  concentration  of  this  mass  in 
a  region  well  provided  with  railways  and  detraining 
platforms;  (3)  concentration  in  depth,  so  that  at  need 
the  blow  might  be  delivered  north,  east  or  south. 

In  a  remarkable  passage  *  he  further  discusses  the 
question  of  the  region  to  be  chosen  for  the  French  con- 
centration of  this  "  mass  of  manoeuvre  "  or  main  strik- 
ing force.  It  must  be  where  the  railway  system  not 
only  favoured  rapidity  of  concentration  but  also  would 
be  thoroughly  well  adapted  for  the  supply  service  of 
the  army  as  the  operations  developed  "  either  in  an  of- 

*  Conduite  de  la  Ouerre,  pp.  36-37. 


126  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

fensive  or  in  a  retreat  following  a  check."  Such  a 
retreat  would  have  to  be  in  the  direction  of  the  most 
important  part  of  the  national  territory,  and  the  zone 
of  concentration  should  therefore  be  in  advance  of  and 
covering  it.  The  actual  centre  of  concentration  is  not 
precisely  indicated,  beyond  stating  that  "  it  ought  to  be 
a  point  on  the  line,  Chitteau  Salins,  Clermont  Ferrand. 
Questions  of  time  will  enter  into  the  selection  of  the 
precise  point." 

When  we  turn  to  the  map,  we  find  that  this  is  a  line 
from  the  German  frontier  in  front  of  Nancy,  running 
southeastwards  into  the  heart  of  France — a  line  passing 
through  the  Troupe  de  Charmes  ( the  gap  in  the  fortress 
barrier  between  Toul  and  Epinal)  and  over  the  plateau 
of  Langres.  We  have  here  an  instance  of  the  way  in 
which  the  thought  of  Nancy  and  Chateau  Salins  re- 
curred to  him  in  the  days  of  his  professorship  as  the 
critical  point  in  the  eastern  frontier  zone.  The  men- 
tion of  Clermont  Ferrand  seems  to  carry  the  region  of 
possible  concentration  strangely  far  back  into  the  in- 
terior of  the  country.  But  it  seems  fairly  evident  that 
this  point  is  named  only  to  indicate  the  general  direc- 
tion of  the  depth  of  concentration  already  insisted  upon. 
Foch  is  suggesting  the  concentration  along  a  railway 
system  for  a  huge  army  that  may  have  to  be  used  in 
one  of  three  different  directions — there  may  be  a  vic- 
torious advance  across  the  frontier  directed  on  Mayence 
the  nodal  point  of  the  Rhine  front:  or  there  may  be  a 
move  to  the  right  through  Alsace  against  the  upper 
Rhine :  or  to  the  left,  to  strike  against  the  flank  of  an 
invasion  across  the  upper  Meuse.  In  any  case,  it  must 
be  the  crushing  impact  of  one  concentrated  force  at  the 
moment  of  decisive  contact. 


FOCH'S  FORECAST  OF  THE  WAR         127 

From  what  follows  it  is  clear  that  he  expects  the 
centre  of  concentration  to  be  much  nearer  Chateau 
Salins  than  Clermont  Ferrand.  For  he  adds  that  it 
must  cover  the  frontier  provinces.  Public  opinion  has 
now  too  much  influence  on  a  government  for  it  to  be 
possible  to  leave  them  undefended.  And  besides,  the 
resources  of  the  occupied  district  would  be  a  gain  to 
the  enemy  if  he  were  allowed  to  take  possession  of  it. 

Foch  goes  on  to  point  out  that  protection  does  not 
necessarily  mean  occupation  in  force.  The  protection 
of  the  frontier  districts  must  however  be  arranged  so 
as  to  accord  with  "  the  absolute  concurrence  of  all 
forces  in  the  decisive  operations."  The  required  pro- 
tection may  be  given  indirectly — as  Moltke  protected 
south  Germany  in  1870 — and  directly  by  the  troupes  de 
couverture,  the  frontier  guard  nowadays  kept  on  foot 
by  every  Continental  army  even  in  peace  time,  and  by  the 
troupes  de  surete  or  advanced  guard  of  the  main  army. 
He  foresees  minor  operations  by  these  troops  before  the 
operations  on  a  large  scale  begin. 

But  he  has  little  doubt — as  is  shown  by  another 
passage  * — that  in  case  of  war  with  Germany  the  first 
serious  advance  of  the  enemy  would  be  against  the 
eastern  fortress  line.  He  argues  that  the  equipment 
of  the  German  armies  with  batteries  of  heavy  howitzers 
firing  high  explosive  shells  points  to  preparation  for 
dealing  at  the  very  outset  with  the  forts  of  the  en- 
trenched camps  and  the  barrier  line.  Ten  years  before 
the  war,  he  had  in  his  mind  as  the  most  likely  opening 
for  such  a  conflict,  not  a  German  invasion  of  Belgium, 
but  an  attempt  to  smash  a  way  through  the  eastern 
fortress  barrier  with  the  help  of  the  shattering  fire  of 

*  Conduite  de  la  Gnerre,  pp.  44?-48, 


128  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

high  explosives,  in  case  that  the  enemy  mobilized  and 
concentrated  quickly  enough  to  get  in  the  first  blow. 
The  French  army  would  have  its  vanguard,  the  troupes 
de  couverture  and  troupes  de  suretc  beyond  the  fortress 
line  at  the  outset,  and  its  main  mass  ready  either  to 
strike  at  the  German  advance  while  endeavouring  to 
force  its  way  through,  or  to  deal  with  a  break  through 
on  the  right  or  left.  But  he  makes  no  attempt  to  fore- 
east  in  detail  any  scheme  of  operations.  As  he  more 
than  once  insists  there  can  be  no  forecast  of  a  war 
beyond  the  concentration  and  the  first  move. 

It  is  remarkable  that  although  German  military  liter- 
ature, the  discussions  in  the  Belgian  press  and  other  in- 
dications, pointed  so  strongly  to  an  invasion  of  Belgium 
forming  part  of  the  German  plan  in  case  of  war,  Foch 
put  it  aside  as  highly  improbable.  He  never  says  it  is 
impossible ;  but  he  decides  against  it  on  the  ground  that 
the  invader  would  be  adopting  a  less  practical  plan  than 
that  of  a  direct  attack  through  French  territory.  The 
neglect  of  the  northern  defences  of  France,  the  policy 
under  which  Lille  became  an  open  town  instead  of  a 
huge  entrenched  camp,  suggests  that  the  French  Staff 
shared  this  view\  But  the  possibility  of  the  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  was  provided  for  in  an  alternative 
scheme,  besides  the  first  plan  of  concentration  for  the 
French  armies  which  contemplated  an  offensive  at  an 
early  date  in  Alsace-Lorraine, 

Heavily  outnumbered,  and  with  unexpected  difficulties 
in  tlio  mobilization,  General  Joffre  adopted  in  August, 
1914,  plans  very  different  from  Foch's  ideal  of  the  great 
"  mass  of  manoeuvre  "  concentrated  in  one  region.  But 
the  plan  of  Foch  might  perhaps  have  been  adapted  to 
the  emergency  with  good  results.    As  it  was,  the  French 


FOCH'S  FORECAST  OF  THE  WAR         129 

armies  were  strung  out  on  a  long  line  from  Belfort  on 
the  Swiss  frontier  to  beyond  Maubeuge  on  the  Flemish 
border.  But  by  a  strange  turn  of  events,  Foch  found 
himself  in  the  army  that  faced  the  German  frontier  at 
the  very  point  on  which  his  thoughts  had  so  often  been 
fixed  in  the  days  of  peace,  and  his  first  march  into 
hostile  territory  was  from  Nancy  by  way  of  Chateau 
Salins. 

To  make  quite  clear  the  bearing  on  the  general  course 
of  events  of  the  operations  in  which  he  was  now  to  take 
part,  we  must  briefly  summarize  the  opening  moves  of 
the  Great  War.  The  strict  censorship  of  the  press, 
enforced  in  the  allied  countries  in  the  first  weeks  of  the 
conflict,  necessarily  veiled  all  that  was  passing  in  a 
cloud  of  mystery.  Nothing  better  than  fragmentary 
scraps  of  disconnected  information  reached  the  public, 
and  the  events  in  front  of  Nancy  were  mentioned  only 
in  brief  and  unsatisfactory  official  communiques  to 
which  little  attention  was  paid  in  England,  because 
they  were  hardly  issued  when  public  attention  was 
rivetted  on  the  fighting  about  Mons  and  Charleroi,  the 
retreat  from  the  Belgian  frontier  and  the  successful 
stand  on  the  Marne. 

It  was  not  until  1917  that  anything  like  an  intel- 
ligible account  of  the  fighting  on  the  Lorraine  frontier 
in  August,  1914,  was  allowed  to  be  published  in  France. 
The  result  has  been  that  the  importance  of  these  events 
has  been  underrated  and  misunderstood.  Indeed,  com- 
paratively few  people  in  England  or  in  the  United  States 
have  ever  heard  of  the  first  great  battle  of  the  war — the 
fighting  on  a  front  of  some  forty  miles,  which  is  known 
in  France  as  the  battle  of  Morhange,  in  Germany  as 
the  battle  of  Metz — or  of  the  battle  which  followed  on 


130  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

the  French  fortress  line,  an  engagement  of  several  days' 
duration,  known  in  France  as  the  battle  of  the  Troupe 
de  Charmes. 

Years  hence,  when  the  various  belligerent  nations 
have  published  their  staff  histories  of  the  war,  the 
documents  and  orders  in  which  their  plans  of  cam- 
paign were  embodied  will  be  available.  Meanwhile  we 
can  only  judge  what  the  German  plan  in  the  west  was, 
from  the  opening  events  of  the  campaign.  The  mobili- 
zation in  Germany  had  worked  smoothly  and  had  been 
very  rapid;  but  the  first  blow  was  struck  by  frontier 
troops,  normally  almost  on  a  war  footing  even  in  peace 
time,  and  set  in  movement  while  the  mobilization  was 
still  in  progress.  The  immediate  doubling  of  the  avail- 
able units,  by  the  formation  of  reserve  corps  made  a 
main  striking  force  available  that  was  much  stronger 
than  the  Allies  had  anticipated — or  at  least  had  ex- 
pected to  take  the  field  at  the  outset.  By  the  evening 
of  the  fourth  day,  the  German  guns  were  shattering 
the  forts  of  Li^ge.  In  the  third  week  the  Germans 
were  in  Brussels,  the  Belgian  army  was  retiring  on 
Antwerp,  and  Namur  was  besieged. 

Two  armies — those  of  Von  Kluck  and  Von  Billow — 
had  pushed  into  Belgium  west  of  the  Meuse.  These 
formed  the  right  of  the  German  strategic  deployment. 
They  now  wheeled  southward  towards  the  French  fron- 
tier, Von  Kluck  on  the  extreme  riglit  flinging  a  large 
force  of  cavalry  and  armed  motor-cars  out  towards  the 
Belgian  coast  and  towards  Lille,  and  directing  his  main 
advance  on  the  Maubeuge  region.  Von  Btilow  marched 
on  Charleroi  and  the  crossings  of  the  Sambre.  In  Eng- 
lish speaking  lands,  from  the  fact  that  the  Britisli  army 
was  on  this  flank  of  the  long  French  line,  public  atten- 


FOCH'S  FORECAST  OF  THE  WAR         131 

tion  was  rivetted  on  western  Belgium,  and  the  move- 
ment of  the  German  right  was  regarded  as  the  main 
advance  of  the  enemy.  But  his  chief  striking  force  was 
concentrated  east  of  the  Meuse,  in  the  wooded  country 
of  the  Ardennes  and  in  Luxemburg.  Here  there  were 
no  less  than  three  great  armies;  and  the  fact  that  one 
of  them  was  commanded  by  the  German  Crown  Prince 
was  a  sufficient  indication  that  they  were  intended  to 
play  a  chief  part  in  the  invasion  of  France.  These 
formed  the  enemy's  centre.  His  left,  like  his  right, 
was  made  up  of  two  armies — that  of  Prince  Rupert  of 
Bavaria  in  German  Lorraine  with  headquarters  at  Metz, 
and  that  of  General  Von  Heeringen  in  Alsace  with  head- 
quarters at  Strasburg,  At  the  outset  they  were  acting 
on  the  defensive,  covering  Germany  against  a  possible 
French  enterprise  towards  the  Rhine.  It  is  believed 
that  the  original  French  plan  of  operations  aimed  at 
the  immediate  conquest  of  the  lost  provinces  by  an  ad- 
vance into  Alsace,  followed  by  a  march  into  German 
Lorraine  and  the  Palatinate,  which  would  be  supported 
by  the  army  of  Alsace  moving  north  with  its  right  on 
the  Rhine  and  its  left  on  the  Vosges  after  it  had  masked 
Strasburg. 

The  French  armies  on  this  side  were  a  force  under 
General  Pau  based  on  Belfort,  the  First  Army  under 
General  Dubail  and  the  Second  Army  under  General 
De  Castelnau.  Pau  had  made  a  premature  raid  on 
Mulhouse  on  August  7th — one  of  those  "  minor  enter- 
prises before  the  great  operations  "  which  Foch  had  pre- 
dicted. The  French  had  to  retire  before  superior  num- 
bers; but  by  the  middle  of  the  month  they  had  seized 
the  passes  of  the  Vosges  and  pushed  a  strong  detach- 
ment towards   Mulhouse.      The  Germans   under   Von 


132  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

Heeringen  stood  on  the  defensive.  They  were  holding 
the  outlets  of  the  passes  into  the  plain  between  the 
hills  and  the  Rhine.  Rupert  of  Bavaria  showed  no  sign 
of  activity  in  Lorraine.  Further  north,  the  German 
Crown  Prince  was  besieging  Longwy.  The  invasion  of 
Belgium  pointed  to  the  enemy's  main  advance  being 
against  the  northern  frontier  of  France. 

In  the  third  week  of  August,  General  Joffre  felt  him- 
self ready  for  serious  operations  on  a  large  scale,  and 
decided  to  meet  the  German  menace  of  invasion  by  a 
counter-stroke.  But  it  was  not  designed  on  the  lines 
that  Foch  had  been  advocating  for  so  many  years. 
There  was  no  concentration  of  a  "  mass  of  manoeuvre  " 
in  a  single  region  covered  by  an  advanced  guard.  The 
numbers  and  fighting  efficiency  of  the  enemy  were  sadly 
underrated,  and  Joffre  attempted  an  advance  at  several 
points — a  linear  offensive — instead  of  a  heavy  blow  at 
one  point  with  every  man,  horse  and  gun,  that  could  be 
brought  into  action. 

There  was  to  be  a  move  of  two  armies,  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  under  Sir  John  French,  and  the 
Fifth  French  Army  under  General  Lanrezac,  across  the 
Belgian  frontier  by  Mons  and  Charleroi.  They  were 
to  drive  back  Von  Kluck  and  Von  Biilow,  join  hands 
with  the  Belgian  army  issuing  from  Antwerp,  and  then 
wheeling  eastward  recover  Brussels.  Tlie  Fourth  Army 
under  De  Langle  de  Gary  was  to  march  into  the 
Ardennes  and  join  with  Lanrezac  in  raising  the  siege 
of  Namur.  The  Third  Army  under  De  Ruffey  was  to 
push  towards  the  Ardennes,  the  Luxemburg  border,  rais- 
ing the  siege  of  Longwy.  The  move  through  the 
Ardennes  and  on  TiUxemburg  would  be  a  threat  to  the 
German  line  of  communications. 


FOCH'S  FORECAST  OF  THE  WAR         133 

To  assist  in  this  general  move  against  the  northern 
enemy  by  a  menace  to  German  territory,  De  Castelnau, 
with  the  Second  Army  supported  on  the  right  by  Dubail 
with  the  First  Army,  was  to  invade  German  Lorraine; 
the  general  direction  of  the  movement  was  to  be  east 
of  Metz,  towards  Saarbruck,  so  as  to  act  as  an  addi- 
tional threat  against  the  German  communications. 

It  was  a  plan  that,  against  superior  forces  and  with 
the  main  German  striking  force  massed  in  the  centre, 
had  only  the  remotest  chance  of  success.  Let  us  now 
follow  the  fortunes  of  De  Castelnau's  army,  of  which 
Foch's  splendid  Twentieth  Corps  formed  the  best  fight- 
ing unit. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MORHANGE 

In  the  general  offensive  against  the  enemy,  De  Castel- 
nau's  army  was  the  first  to  move,  and  Foch  commanded 
its  vanguard,  the  Nancy  Corps. 

Composed  largely  of  the  men  of  Lorraine  and  about 
to  march  to  the  long  hoped  for  liberation  of  that  part 
of  their  province  which  had  for  more  than  forty  years 
been  annexed  to  Germany,  it  is  no  wonder  that  the 
officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  were  full  of 
enthusiasm.  As  a  frontier  corps  they  had  been  kept 
almost  on  a  war  footing  so  that  there  were  few  reserv- 
ists in  their  ranks ;  and  as  the  conscripts  did  not  come  in 
till  September,  there  were  no  new  recruits  among  them. 
The  youngest  of  them  had  had  nearly  a  year  of  hard 
training.  Most  of  them  had  two  or  three  years'  service. 
They  had  just  had  the  useful  experience  of  the  divisional 
manoeuvres.  The  ranks  were  filled  with  thoroughly  fit 
men,  ranging  in  age  from  twenty  to  twenty-three.  It 
was  an  ideal  fighting  force;  and  it  had  Foch  in  com- 
mand. 

On  the  left,  about  Nomeny,  and  holding  the  new  en- 
trenchments of  the  Grand  Couronnc^  was  the  Corps  of 
Reservists  (2nd  Group  of  Reserve  Divisions)  ;  on  the 
right,  towards  Lun(^villp,  Espinasse's  Fifteenth  Corps 
and  Taverna's  Sixteenth  Corps,  men  of  Provence  and 
Languedoc,  with  all  the  fire  of  the  South  but  not  so 
reliable  in  a  difficult  moment  as  the  men  of  Lorraine. 

184 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MORHANGE  135 

Beyond  the  right  of  De  Castelnau's  concentration, 
Dubail's  army  held  the  heights  of  the  Vosges  towering 
up  to  the  pineclad  mass  of  the  Donon  summit  above  the 
Saales  Pass. 

For  defence,  the  position  in  which  the  Second  Army 
had  concentrated  was  admirable.  The  Vosges  made  a 
strong  support  for  the  right,  the  Grand  Couronn^  for 
the  left.  Behind  the  line  were  the  fortresses  of  Toul 
and  Epinal,  with  between  them  the  gap  of  the  Charmes 
leading  to  the  hill  country  of  the  Faucilles. 

But  what  of  the  offensive?  The  German  frontier  was 
only  a  few  miles  away.  On  the  left  front,  below  the 
slopes  of  the  Grand  Couronn^,  it  was  marked  by  the 
windings  of  the  little  river  Seille.  Beyond  the  border 
line  was  a  hilly  country  with  a  region  of  lakes  between 
Chateau  Salins  and  Saarburg,  lakes  which  are  the 
sources  of  the  Seille  running  towards  the  Moselle  at 
Metz,  and  of  the  Saar  flowing  northward  towards  Sar- 
reguemines  and  Saarbruck.  Beyond  the  lake  region  is 
the  main  railway  line  from  Metz  to  Strasburg.  At 
Saarburg  there  is  an  important  junction  where  the  rail- 
way from  France  through  Luneville  joins  the  German 
system.  Roughly  parallel  to  this  line  runs  the  Marne 
and  Rhine  Canal.  South  of  the  canal  and  railway,  the 
ground  rises  rapidly  to  the  heights  of  the  Vosges  about 
the  Donon. 

The  first  objective  of  the  French  advance  would  be 
the  Metz-Strasburg  railway.  The  seizure  of  the  junc- 
tion at  Saarburg  would  cut  the  direct  communication 
between  the  armies  of  Prince  Rupert  and  Von  Heerin- 
gen.  Of  these  the  latter  was  engaged  in  defending 
Alsace  against  Pau  and  Dubail.  The  probability  was 
that  the  first  fight  would  be  against  Rupert's  army  based 


136  MAESHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

on  the  fortress  of  Metz.  This  made  the  left  of  the 
advance  the  probable  point  of  first  contact  with  serious 
opposition,  so  Foch  was  placed  there  with  his  Lorrainers. 

Little  was  known  of  the  defensive  preparations  of 
the  enemy.  The  wooded  character  of  the  hilly  country 
beyond  the  border  made  aerial  observation  difficult, 
and  not  much  could  be  learned  until  the  outposts  on  the 
frontier  were  driven  in  and  some  progress  was  made 
on  German  (once  French)  ground.  The  enemy's  force 
on  the  actual  frontier  line  was  a  mere  screen  of  troops; 
and  it  was  evident  that  he  would  not  attempt  a  serious 
stand  until  the  French  advance  had  made  some  progress. 

So  the  first  days  of  the  campaign  were  marked  by 
easy  successes.  The  Reserve  Divisions  on  the  left  stood 
fast,  forming  a  flank  guard  on  the  frontier  about  Nomeny 
and  looking  out  towards  Metz,  a  little  more  than  ten 
miles  away.  Even  with  this  protection,  it  was  a  daring 
manoeuvre  to  advance  thus  with  a  great  entrenched  camp 
so  near  at  hand,  which  might  easily  be  made  the  start- 
ing point  for  a  stroke  against  the  left  flank  and  rear 
of  the  Second  Army.  But  the  Grand  Couronn^  was 
being  rapidly  converted  into  a  strongly  fortified  position 
which  would  help  to  secure  the  exposed  flank. 

Foch  left  Nancy  on  August  15th.  Next  day  he  was 
with  the  advanced  guard  of  his  corps,  as  it  marched 
across  the  frontier  in  two  columns,  the  left  on  Delme, 
the  right  on  Chateau  Salins.  There  was  no  serious 
fighting.  There  were  some  skirmishes  with  the  German 
outposts  of  the  frontier  guard  as  they  fell  back  before 
the  tide  of  invasion.  There  was  a  joyful  moment  as  the 
border  line  was  passed,  and  the  pioneers  threw  down  the 
red-white-and-black  posts  that  marked  the  frontier,  and 
the  men  of  Nancy  singing  the  "  Marseillaise  "  trod  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MORHANGE  137 

ground  of  German  Lorraine.  Bridges  had  been  thrown 
across  the  Seille,  the  enemy  making  no  attempt  to  hold 
the  crossings  which  were  commanded  by  the  heavy 
artillery  placed  on  the  heights  of  the  Couronne.  That 
evening  Foch's  corps  was  concentrated  on  the  German 
side  of  the  little  river.  Further  to  the  right,  the  men  of 
Provence  were  moving  towards  the  lake  region,  and  the 
Languedoc  corps  towards  Saarburg,  with  General 
Conneau's  cavalry  division  guarding  its  right  flank  and 
exploring  the  hilly  country  towards  its  front.  On  the 
extreme  right  a  division  of  Dubail's  army  (16th  Divi- 
sion, Eighth  Corps)  was  co-operating  in  the  move  on 
Saarburg. 

A  bulletin  of  General  Joffre,  published  in  Paris  by 
the  War  Office  on  Tuesday,  August  18th,  reported 
further  progress  on  the  Monday.  "  During  the  w^hole 
of  yesterday,  the  17th,"  it  said,  "  we  continued  to  make 
further  progress  in  Upper  Alsace.  *  The  enemy  retired 
in  disorder,  abandoning  everywhere  wounded  and 
materiel.  To  the  south  of  Strasburg,  where  the  enemy 
had  prepared  a  strong  position,  the  Germans  retreated 
precipitately  in  the  afternoon.  Our  cavalry  is  now  in 
pursuit.  We  have  moreover  occupied  the  whole  of  the 
region  of  the  lakes  up  to  the  west  of  Fenestrange.  Our 
troops  are  debouching  from  the  Seille,  where  the  pas- 
sages over  the  river  have  been  abandoned  by  the  enemy. 
Our  cavalry  is  at  Chateau  Salins." 

It  was  the  first  news  of  the  Lorraine  offensive,  and 
seemed  a  presage  of  victory.  But  in  such  a  movement 
the  first  operations  were  only  the  prelude  of  more 
serious  engagements.  Naturally,  the  official  bulletins 
would  make  the  most  of  what  were  really  mere  affairs 

*  General  Pau's  command. 


138  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

of  outposts.  What  had  happened  on  Monday,  the  17th 
was  that  the  German  frontier  detachments  had  fallen 
back  slowly,  fighting  delayed  actions  mostly  on  a  very 
large  scale.  No  guns  or  prisoners  were  left  in  the  hands 
of  the  French.  The  fact  that  on  the  left  front  of  the 
advance  the  Germans  had  abandoned  Chateau  Salins 
and  that  Foch's  divisional  cavalry  had  entered  the  place 
showed  that  there  was  to  be  no  battle  for  the  actual 
frontier.  The  Fifteenth  Corps  was  in  the  lake  region; 
the  Sixteenth  Corps  was  advancing  on  Sarrebourg  junc- 
tion from  the  west ;  while  the  Eighth  Corps  of  Dubail's 
army  was  pushing  up  to  it  from  the  south.  Here  there 
was  some  more  serious  fighting. 

On  Tuesday,  the  18th,  Foch  occupied  Chateau  Salins 
with  his  right  column,  and  established  his  headquarters 
there.  He  thus  held  the  junction  of  the  Nancy-Morhange 
railway  with  the  frontier  line  to  Metz.  On  this  line 
his  left  occupied  Delme.  Cavalry  reconnaissances  from 
Delmy  and  Nomeny  gave  no  tidings  of  a  German  move 
from  Metz.  The  French  centre,  advancing  through  the 
lake  region,  was  approaching  the  main  Metz-Strasburg 
railway,  and  there  was  some  evidence  that  the  enemy 
would  soon  make  a  stand,  for  the  resistance  offered  by 
his  retreating  detachments  was  becoming  more  serious. 
On  the  right,  Sarrebourg  junction  was  occupied. 

That  afternoon  a  discovery  was  made  which  revealed 
the  plans  of  the  enemy.  French  advanced  parties  came 
under  heavy  artillery  and  machine  gun  fire,  and  care- 
ful reconnaissance  revealed  the  fact  that  the  Germans 
were  holding  a  prepared  battle  position  of  consider- 
able extent,  entrenched  along  the  front,  not  indeed 
on  the  elaborate  system  that  developed  during  the  war, 
but  with  well-placed  field  trenches,  and  gun  pits  for  the 


ITHE  BATTLE  OF  MORHANGE  139 

artillery.  The  entrenched  line  began  on  the  right  near 
Morville,  and  ran  thence  eastward  by  Morhange  along 
a  rise  of  ground  south  of  the  main  railway  line.  It 
crossed  the  line  near  Bensdorf  junction  and  then  fol- 
lowed the  upper  slopes  of  a  ridge  north  of  the  railway 
to  Fenestrange  on  the  Saar.  Beyond  the  river  it  was 
continued  up  the  wooded  declivity  of  the  northern 
Vosges  to  where  Phalsbourg  lay  circled  by  its  old  ram- 
parts. The  left  of  the  line  thus  rested  on  the  Vosges, 
while  the  right  had  Metz  a  few  miles  to  its  rear — a 
safe  protection  against  a  turning  movement. 

De  Castelnau  decided  to  attack,  and  there  was  serious 
fighting  for  the  ground  in  front  of  the  position,  on 
Wednesday,  the  19th.  Thus  began  the  battle  of 
Morhange,  the  first  great  battle  of  General  Foch's 
career. 

August  19th  was  a  day  of  preliminary  operations  in 
front  of  the  enemy's  position.  Some  progress  was  made. 
On  the  right,  the  division  detached  by  Dubail  from  his 
army  was  held  north  of  Sarrebourg;  but  the  Sixteenth 
Corps  pushed  forward  west  of  the  town  in  the  direction 
of  Fenestrange.  In  the  centre,  the  Fifteenth  Corps  ad- 
vancing from  Dieuze,  captured  the  village  of  Vergaville, 
and  gained  a  few  hundred  yards  of  ground  further  to- 
wards Bensdorf  junction.  Foch  stormed  the  village  of 
Conthil  on  his  right  front,  and  along  the  rest  of  his  line 
towards  Delme  secured  all  the  northern  margin  of  the 
Forest  of  Chateau  Salins.  The  main  position  was  still 
intact,  and  it  was  only  late  in  the  day  that  its  full 
strength  was  revealed.  Well  placed  in  the  hilly  ground, 
and  largely  masked  by  clumps  and  belts  of  wood,  it  re- 
vealed itself  only  when  the  advance  came  fairly  close 
up  to  its  front.    It  was  evidently  strongly  held.    In  the 


140  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

afternoon  the  fire  of  the  German  batteries  all  along 
the  line  became  intense,  and  every  open  space  in  which 
the  French  advance  showed  itself  was  swept  by  a  hail 
of  machine  gun  fire. 

The  attempt  to  storm  this  formidable  line  was  made 
on  the  20th.  For  the  task  De  Castelnau  had  his  three 
army  corps  and  the  16th  Division  sent  to  his  help 
from  the  First  Army.  Dubail  could  not  afford  him  any 
further  support  for  the  time  being,  for  he  had  to  hold 
the  Vosges  positions  from  the  Donon  southwards 
against  Von  Heeringen's  army,  and  protect  the  left  of 
the  advance  which  General  Foch  with  the  army  of 
Alsace  was  attempting  into  the  Alsatian  plain. 

At  the  time,  the  French  had  not  discovered  the 
superiority  in  numbers  possessed  by  the  enemy.  But 
we  now  know  that  on  the  morning  of  August  20th 
Prince  Rupert  of  Bavaria  was  holding  his  entrenched 
position  in  the  wooded  hills  with  the  three  Army  Corps 
of  the  Bavarian  army,  the  Nineteenth  (2nd  Saxon) 
Army  Corps,  and  the  1st  Reserve  Corps.  Further,  Von 
Heeringen  had  detached  a  corps  from  his  right  to  attacK 
the  16th  Division  near  Sarrebourg.  Thus  on  the  Ger- 
man side  six  corps  wpuld  be  in  action  against  three 
and  a  half  corps  of  the  French.  It  must  further  be 
noted  that  at  the  outset  of  the  war  a  German  corps 
was  usually  stronger  in  numbers  than  a  French  corps. 
It  is  quite  clear  therefore  tliat  Prince  Rupert's  army 
very  heavily  outnumbered  that  of  De  Castelnau.  The 
Bavarian  Prince  had  the  further  advantage  that  his 
entrenched  line  fairly  bristled  with  artillery,  and 
machine  guns,  and  howitzers,  partly  fortress  guns 
brought  from  the  arsenal  of  Metz.  The  artillery  of  the 
defence  was  much  more  powerful  than  that  of  the  attack. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MORHANGE  141 

The  battle  was  fought  on  a  front  of  nearly  forty 
miles,  from  near  Delme  on  the  left  to  beyond  Sarrebourg 
on  the  right.  In  the  early  morning  the  positions  of  De 
Castelnau's  three  army  corps  were : — 

16th  Corps  (Taverna)  on  the  right  about  Bisping: 
15th  Corps  (Espinasse)  in  the  centre,  right  and  left 
of  Vergaville. 
20th  Corps  (Foch)  from  Conthil  to  Delme. 

The  chief  part  in  the  attack  was  assigned  to  Foch's 
two  divisions.  The  11th  Division  was  launched  against 
Rodalbe,  the  39th  against  Marthil.  They  were  met  by 
a  storm  of  high  explosive  shells  and  a  hurricane  of 
machine  gun  fire.  Losing  heavily,  the  11th  Division 
made  some  progress.  Its  leading  regiment,  the  26th 
of  the  line  was  for  some  time  in  the  German  entrench- 
ments, and  sent  back  115  prisoners  of  the  Saxon  Corps, 
The  regiment,  heavily  counter-attacked,  clung  doggedly 
to  the  ground  it  had  won,  but  got  no  farther  forward. 
Along  the  centre  and  right  of  the  line,  the  German  front 
was  nowhere  broken  into.  The  attack  came  to  a  dead 
stop  under  the  tempest  of  the  enemy's  fire.  Whole 
batteries  were  put  out  of  action  by  the  howitzer  shells, 
and  there  were  no  heavy  guns  with  which  to  beat  down 
this  hostile  fire.  The  infantry  was  suffering  serious  and 
continuous  loss  in  its  fruitless  efforts  to  push  forward 
through  the  woods,  and  found  its  progress  barred  by 
wire  beyond  which  the  enemy's  machine  guns  were  in 
action  wherever  the  French  tried  to  break  through  the 
obstacles. 

It  was  a  blazing  summer  day,  and  by  noon  the  men 
W'ere    exhausted    with    their    fruitless    efforts.      The 


142  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

Provengal  corps  was  badly  shaken  by  its  serious  losses. 
The  enemy,  fighting  under  cover,  had  suffered  little,  and 
his  men  were  comparatively  fresh.  It  was  now  that 
Prince  Rupert  made  his  great  counter-attack.  It  began 
in  the  centre,  heralded  by  a  tremendous  burst  of  shell 
fire.  The  Provencals  gave  way  before  the  waves  of  grey- 
clad  infantry  that  poured  forward  on  both  sides  of  the 
Bensdorf  railway.  Guns  were  abandoned,  and  there 
was  something  approaching  a  rout.  The  centre  was 
broken.  Foch,  in  his  advanced  position,  was  in  serious 
peril.  The  Nancy  men  were  forced  out  of  the  trenches 
they  had  won,  by  an  attack  in  front,  combined  with 
another  from  the  right  flank.  It  seemed  that,  with  the 
centre  broken,  there  would  not  be  merely  a  defeat  but 
a  terrible  disaster. 

It  was  in  this  crisis  of  the  battle  that  Foch  lost  two 
of  his  best  young  officers,  both  bearing  famous  names, 
Guy  de  Cassagnac  and  Lieutenant  Xavier  de  Castelnau, 
a  son  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  De  Castelnau  was 
told  of  his  son's  death,  while  he  was  busy  with  his  staff 
arranging  for  the  general  retreat  that  was  to  save  the 
broken  line  from  destruction.  He  paused  in  silence  for 
just  a  moment  with  down-bent  head,  and  then  said, 
"  Gentlemen,  we  must  get  on  with  our  work ;"  and  con- 
tinued his  orders  in  imperturbable  calm. 

Foch  had  already  recognized  that  the  battle  was  lost, 
and  with  his  steadfast  Lorrainers — the  men  of  "  steel  " 
and  "  iron  " — was  preparing  for  a  fighting  withdrawal. 
A  heavy  outburst  of  artillery  away  to  the  north-west- 
ward of  Delme  told  him  that  the  battle  was  suddenly 
extending  in  this  new  direction.  A  Bavarian  Reserve 
Corps  from  the  Metz  garrison  was  being  pushed  out 
towards  the  flank  of  the  French  line.    But  the  possibility 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MORHANGE  143 

of  this  stroke  had  been  foreseen  and  provided  for.  It 
was  parried  by  the  French  Reserve  Divisions,  which  had 
entrenched  the  ground  between  Nomeny  and  Delme,  and 
not  only  stood  fast  against  the  Bavarians,  but  made  a 
successful  counter-attack. 

Trusting  to  this  defence  holding  good,  Foch  dealt 
with  the  more  serious  and  pressing  danger  in  the  centre. 
He  was  able  to  save  the  Provencal  corps  from  complete 
destruction,  and  cover  its  retreat  by  counter-attacking 
with  the  11th  Division  on  the  flank  of  the  advancing 
enemy.  Then  he  fought  a  series  of  rearguard  actions 
with  the  troops  of  the  German  right,  as  they  pressed  for- 
ward towards  Chateau  Salins.  The  broken  forest-clad 
ground  north  of  the  town  was  skilfully  used  in  his 
fighting  retreat  through  the  long  hours  of  the  afternoon. 
On  the  other  flank  Dubail  hurried  up  reinforcements  to 
cover  the  retreat  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps. 

In  the  evening  the  enemy's  efforts  gradually  slack- 
ened, and  the  army  was  able  to  halt  on  the  line 
Jalancourt-Chateau  Salins-Marshal-Maizieres.  The  en- 
trenched heights  of  the  Grand  Couronn^  secured  the  left 
rear  and  formed  a  pivot  for  a  further  retirement. 

As  usual  with  ofiicial  announcements  when  things  are 
not  going  well  in  war,  the  French  bulletins  told  only 
part  of  what  had  happened.  The  communique,  issued 
by  the  Paris  War  Office,  on  August  20th,  reported  that 
after  reaching  Morhange,  Delme  and  Dieuze,  the  advance 
in  Lorraine  had  been  checked  "  before  fortified  organ- 
izations strongly  held."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Morhange 
had  not  been  reached.  It  was  in  the  German  entrenched 
line  or  slightly  to  the  rear  of  it.  The  communique 
published  on  the  21st — the  day  after  the  lost  battle — 
told  only  of  a  counter-attack  having  driven  in  the 


144  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

advanced  guards  upon  the  main  body.  This  was  a  piece 
of  very  daring  official  camouflage. 

The  German  bulletin  described  the  result  of  the 
battle  as  a  brilliant  victory,  with  the  capture  of  eighty 
guns  and  several  thousand  prisoners,  adding  that  the 
French  army  of  Lorraine  was  in  full  retreat.  It  was 
certainly  an  inspiring  success  for  the  enemy.  It  was  the 
first  serious  encounter  with  the  French  army,  and  the 
only  great  battle  fought  within  the  German  frontier 
on  the  Western  Front  during  the  w^ar. 

In  his  forecast  of  a  war  with  Germany  written  years 
before,  Foch  had  taken  into  account  the  possibility  of  a 
check  at  the  outset  followed  by  a  retreat.  He  was  not 
the  man  to  be  discouraged  by  the  adverse  chance  of  war. 
He  had  again  and  again  laid  it  down,  that  defeat  is  only 
serious  when  it  is  accepted  as  defeat  that  breaks  the 
"  will  to  conquer  "  and  the  determination  to  fight  on. 
Hence  his  saying, — "  A  battle  gained  is  a  battle  in  which 
one  is  determined  not  to  admit  that  one  is  beaten." 

So  on  the  lost  battle  of  Morhange  he  was  neither 
disheartened  nor  over-anxious.  The  fight  was  only  a 
first  episode  in  a  long  struggle,  as  to  the  ultimate  result 
of  which  he  had  no  fear.  Meanwhile  he  had  at  last 
had  the  experience  of  actual  battle.  He  had  led  an  army 
corps  in  action  under  the  most  trying  conditions;  he 
had  met  a  terribly  dangerous  crisis  in  the  fight  with 
swift  resolution,  and  helped  to  save  the  whole  army 
from  destruction.  His  own  splendid  corps  had  done 
well,  and  he  felt  it  was  thoroughly  in  his  hands  and 
ready  for  further  efforts.  Meanwhile  he  busied  liimself 
with  preparations  for  the  fighting  retirement  across  the 
Seille  and  tlie  Meurthe. 

His  chief,  De  Castclnau  had  already  decided  on  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MORHANGE  145 

main  lines  of  the  movement.  The  Second  Army  was  to 
fall  back  to  a  new  position  on  the  French  side  of  the 
frontier,  covering  the  Troupe  de  Charmes — the  gap  in 
the  eastern  fortress  barrier — with  the  entrenched  camp 
of  Toul  on  its  left  and  that  of  Epinal  on  its  right.  On 
this  side,  Dubail  with  the  First  Army  would  co-operate 
in  the  next  battle.  Nancy  and  the  Grand  Couronnd 
would  be  held  against  the  enemy. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  TROUEE  DE  CHARMES 

On  August  21st — tlie  morrow  of  the  Battle  of  Morhange 
— a  welcome  reinforcement  reached  the  Second  Army. 
It  was  made  up  of  three  infantry  brigades  and  several 
batteries  of  artillery  belonging  to  the  Ninth  Army 
Corps,  which  had  mobilized  at  Tours. 

The  Ninth  Corps  had  been  originally  destined  for  De 
Castelnau's  army;  but,  just  before  the  offensive  was 
ordered,  the  troops  belonging  to  it,  which  had  already 
reached  eastern  France,  had  been  sent  away  to 
strengthen  the  Third  Army  under  De  Ruffey.  A  delay 
in  the  mobilization  of  the  three  brigades  led  to  their 
being  sent  to  the  original  destination  of  the  whole  corps, 
when  the  news  arrived  of  the  serious  resistance  met 
with  by  the  Second  Army  on  August  19th.  De  Castel- 
nau  placed  them  under  the  command  of  General  Leon 
Durand,  and  sent  them  to  reinforce  the  Reserve  Divi- 
sions holding  the  entrenchments  of  the  Grand  Couronn^. 
This  set  free  the  troops  of  the  Twentieth  Army  Corps 
which  Foch  had  already  assigned  to  this  position,  and 
thus  enabled  him  to  have  his  whole  corps  at  his  dis- 
posal for  the  important  task  which  De  Castelnau  now 
entrusted  to  him.  The  Twentieth  Army  Corps  was  to 
act  as  the  rear  guard  of  the  whole  army,  and  cover  its 
retirement  across  the  Meurthe  to  the  new  battle  posi- 
tions. 

The  retreat  across  the  frontier — begun  on  August 

146 


BATTLE  OF  TROUEE  DE  CHARMES       147 

21st — was  announced  in  the  French  official  communique 
of  the  22nd,  which  while  still  avoiding  any  admission 
as  to  the  lost  battle,  stated  that  "  the  importance  of  the 
enemy's  forces  engaged  in  Lorraine  did  not  allow  of 
the  retention  of  the  ground  that  had  been  won,  except 
at  too  great  a  cost."  As  a  set-off  to  this  disappointing 
news,  it  was  announced  that  General  Pau  had  occupied 
Mulhouse  and  captured  twenty-four  guns  and  several 
thousand  prisoners. 

On  August  21st,  Foch  re-crossed  the  river  Seille ;  and 
during  this  and  the  following  day  there  was  some 
fighting,  as  his  corps  covered  the  retirement  to  the  new 
line.  He  protected  the  crossings  of  the  Meurthe  by  hold- 
ing a  position  from  the  southern  slopes  of  the  Grand 
Couronne  to  the  line  of  high  ground  along  the  south 
side  of  the  Marne  and  Rhine  Canal  and  the  little  river 
Sanon.  His  front  formed  a  re-entrant  angle,  so  as  to 
bring  a  cross  fire  of  artillery  on  the  approaches  to  the 
bridges.  During  the  21st,  though  there  was  some  firing, 
the  enemy  made  no  serious  attack ;  but  on  the  22nd  the 
pursuit  was  hotly  pressed,  and  there  was  hard  fighting. 

Foch  held  that  day  the  heights  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Meurthe  above  and  below  St.  Nicolas,  covering  the 
river  crossings  with  his  artillery  fire.  The  4th  Chasseurs 
defended  the  bridge  of  St.  Nicolas.  On  the  right  bank, 
a  brigade  of  the  11th  Division  with  several  batteries 
held  the  heights  about  Flainval  against  repeated  attacks, 
and  only  withdrew  across  the  river  after  dark,  blow,ing 
up  the  bridges.  By  nightfall,  the  retreat  across  the 
Meurthe  had  been  successfully  completed.  The  only 
French  troops  left  on  the  right  bank  were  those  that 
held  the  Grand  Couronne. 

It  .was  while  he  was  preparing  for  battle  that  Foch 


148  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

heard  the  news  of  a  double  personal  loss.  On  August 
22nd  in  the  battle  of  the  Ardennes,  his  only  son,  Lieu- 
tenant Germain  Foch  had  been  killed  in  action,  and 
also  his  son-in-law.  Captain  B^court. 

On  Sunday,  August  23rd,  the  Second  Army  was  in 
position  on  its  chosen  battle  ground  for  the  defence  of 
the  Charmes  Gap.  Before  following  further  the  course 
of  events  on  this  front,  let  us  see  what  was  happening 
elsewhere  on  the  long  line.  Without  taking  note  of 
these  events,  the  full  importance  of  the  battle  for  the 
Gap  cannot  be  understood. 

While  the  Second  Army  was  retiring  across  the 
Meurthe,  the  French  offensive  had  developed  along  the 
northern  frontier.  On  Friday,  August  21st,  the  Third 
and  Fourth  armies  under  De  Ruffey  and  De  Langle  had 
advanced  into  the  wooded  Ardennes.  On  the  22nd,  they 
were  defeated  by  the  Crown  Prince  and  the  Duke  of 
Wurtemburg.  Want  of  cohesion  between  the  columns 
advancing  through  the  difficult  forest  and  hill  country, 
inferior  numbers,  weakness  in  heavy  artillery  and 
machine  guns,  and  finally  a  deficiency  of  aircraft 
accounted  for  the  failure.  The  French  fell  back  across 
the  frontier  to  make  a  stand  on  the  line  of  the  Meuse. 

On  the  same  Saturday,  De  Lanrezac's  army  on  the 
Sambre  was  attacked  and  defeated  by  Von  Btilow.  On 
Sunday,  the  23rd,  while  De  Castelnau's  army  was  taking 
up  its  positions  to  hold  Nancy  and  the  Charmes  Gap, 
the  Britisli  Exj)editionary  Force  was  fighting  its  first 
battle  at  Mons,  and  late  that  evening  its  retreat  began. 
Namur  liad  fallen.  De  Lanrezac  was  already  in  full 
retreat,  and  the  Tliird  and  l\)urth  armies  had  soon  to 
abandon  tlieir  positions  on  the  Meuse.  The  whole  line 
along  the  northern  frontier  was  falling  back. 


BATTLE  OF  TROUEE  DE  CHARMES      149 

So  on  the  mommg  of  Monday,  August  24th,  when  the 
battle  of  the  Trouee  de  Charmes  began,  De  Castelnau 
knew  that  there  had  been  a  series  of  defeats  in  the 
North,  and  the  German  invasion  was  pouring  into 
France  like  a  flood  that  has  swept  away  a  river  bank. 

In  front  of  the  Second  Army  the  Germans  had 
occupied  Lun^ville  and  thrown  a  number  of  bridges 
across  the  Meurthe.  As  the  result  of  the  lost  battle, 
Dubail  had  abandoned  the  Donon  heights  and  the 
neighbouring  line  of  the  Vosges.  Pau  was  withdrawing 
from  Mulhouse  and  the  Alsatian  plain  to  hold  the 
mountain  frontier.  Official  accounts  of  the  operations 
that  followed  say  that  Dubail  with  the  First  Army  was 
ordered  by  General  Joffre  and  the  headquarters  staff 
to  combine  with  De  Castelnau's  army  in  the  fight  for 
the  Charmes  Gap.  But  before  receiving  the  order,  he 
had  already  decided  to  take  this  course,  and  was  help- 
ing his  colleague  most  effectively. 

The  Troupe  de  Charmes  is  geographically  the  opening 
between  the  southern  end  of  the  Meuse  heights  (Cotes 
de  la  Meuse)  which  extend  from  Verdun  to  Toul,  and 
the  long  spur  of  the  Vosges  that  forms  the  heights  of  the 
right  bank  of  the  upper  Moselle.  Both  these  lines  of 
heights  are  fortified.  As  already  noted,  ^6v6  de 
Rivieres,  when  he  planned  the  new  defences  of  France, 
left  the  Gap  open.  German  critics  wrote  of  it  as  the 
"  erwunschte  Durchbruckstellung,"  the  "  desired  break- 
ing-through point "  for  an  invasion,  a  trap  set  for  the 
German  invader  where  he  would  have  to  fight  with 
fortresses  on  his  flanks  or  rear  and  a  French  army 
holding  the  hills  of  the  Faucilles  country  in  front. 

Perhaps  this  was  De  Rivieres'  idea — an  attempt  to 
canalize  the  invasion.    Behind  the  Gap,  the  little  town 


150  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

of  Neufcliateau,  a  place  of  no  importance  before  the 
war  of  1870,  was  made  the  meeting  point  of  no  less  than 
six  railways,  and  protected  by  a  fort.  It  looked  like  an 
Intended  centre  of  concentration.  In  1895,  when  the 
French  army,  after  the  signature  of  the  treaty  of  alliance 
with  Russia,  executed  manceuvres  on  a  huge  scale  in 
the  presence  of  a  Russian  military  mission  of  eighty 
officers  under  General  Dragomiroff.  The  idea  of  the 
manoeuvre  campaign  was  that  an  "  eastern  army  "  had 
penetrated  into  the  Faucilles  through  the  Gap  of 
Charmes.  It  was  attacked  and  driven  back  by  the 
"  western  army."  Naturally,  everyone  interpreted  the 
manoeuvres  as  a  rehearsal  of  a  fight  with  a  German 
invader  coming  through  the  Gap.  But  if  the  trap  scheme 
ever  existed,  it  had  been  long  abandoned  before  the 
Great  War  of  1914.  The  idea  of  tlie  battle  which  began 
on  August  24th  was  to  deny  the  Gap  to  the  invader  by 
meeting  him,  not  behind  it,  but  in  front  of  it,  with  De 
Castelnau's  Second  Army  based  on  Toul  and  Nancy, 
and  Dubail's  First  Army  based  on  Epinal. 

The  fortresses  had  still  their  use,  and  if  the  battle 
were  lost  the  Gap  would  afford  a  safe  line  of  retreat 
to  other  good  positions  in  the  Faucilles.  The  Gap 
itself  would  have  afforded  an  excellent  line  on  which  to 
fight  the  battle.  It  is  not  much  more  than  twenty  miles 
wide,  if  we  exclude  on  either  flank  the  ground  actually 
swept  by  the  guns  mounted  in  the  forts  of  Toul  and 
Epinal.  But  to  make  a  stand  on  this  shorter  line 
would  have  entailed  the  sacrifice  of  Nancy.  That  the 
French  leaders  chose  to  fight  in  advance  of  such  a 
tempting  position  sliows  how  confident  they  were  in 
their  men,  despite  tfie  failure  before  the  Morhange 
entrenchments. 


BATTLE  OF  TROUEE  DE  CHARMES       151 

But,  as  the  map  shows,  their  plan  enabled  a  trap  of 
another  kind  to  be  laid  for  Rupert  of  Bavaria.  De 
Castelnau's  battle  line,  with  its  left  on  the  heights  of 
the  Grand  Couronnd,  and  running  southwards  by 
Saffais  towards  Essey,  formed  almost  a  right-angle  with 
Dubail's  line,  which  ran  from  Essey  by  Baccarat  to  the 
Vosges.  The  German  advance  must  either  be  frontul 
against  one  army,  exposing  a  flank  to  the  other,  or  must 
form  a  sharp  salient  enveloped  by  the  French  from  the 
outset. 

On  Sunday,  August  23rd  (the  day  of  Mons),  the 
Germans  had  occupied  Lun^ville  and  were  advancing 
towards  the  Gap.  Next  day  the  great  battle  began  on 
a  front  of  about  forty-five  miles. 

We  cannot  give  any  exact  estimate  of  the  force  which 
Prince  Rupert  brought  into  action ;  but  it  appears  that, 
besides  the  Saxon  and  Bavarian  troops,  which  had 
fought  in  the  first  battle,  he  had  the  support  of  a  con- 
siderable part  of  Von  Heeringen's  army  on  his  left. 

Prince  Rupert's  plan  for  the  battle  was  to  break  the 
French  right — Dubail's  army.  He  made  an  attempt  to 
turn  the  flank  by  forcing  the  Pass  of  St.  Marie  in  the 
Vosges  with  a  corps  of  Von  Heeringen's  army.  Here, 
during  the  24:th,  the  Fourteenth  French  Army  Corps, 
reinforced  by  troops  from  the  garrison  of  Epinal, 
steadily  repulsed  repeated  attacks  on  the  Pass  and  the 
heights  on  both  sides  of  it.  Meanwhile  the  Bavarians 
had  pushed  along  by  the  Meurthe  valley,  and  at  Celles 
and  Baccarat  the  Twenty-first  Corps  had  to  hold  its  own 
all  day  against  superior  numbers.  But  De  Castelnau's 
front  was  also  attacked.  Advancing  across  the  Mor- 
tagne  valley  on  both  sides  of  Gerb^viller,  the  Germans 
flung   themselves  in   dense   masses  against  the  high 


152  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

ground  from  Saffais  to  Rozelieure,  where  the  position 
was  held  by  the  Fifteenth  and  Sixteenth  Corps.  The 
Fifteenth — the  men  of  Provence — amply  redeemed  their 
failure  of  a  few  days  before,  by  their  steady  resistance. 
On  the  right  of  De  Castelnau's  line,  about  Essey,  Con- 
neau's  cavalry  fought  dismounted,  supported  by  a  divi- 
sion of  the  Eighth  Corps.  Here  the  attack  was  pressed 
furiously  for  hours.  "  The  enemy's  columns  were  every- 
where," wrote  one  of  Conneau's  officers.  "  They  were 
coming  up  in  all  directions  from  the  river  (the  Mor- 
tagne),  uniting  on  each  side  of  the  Lundville-Bayon 
road,  which  ran  through  our  position.  At  the  same 
time  the  bombardment  began.  Shells  and  shrapnel 
rained  on  the  Plateau." 

As  soon  as  the  first  German  attacks  had  been  repulsed 
and  it  was  evident  that  the  line  was  holding  on  firmly 
to  the  positions,  De  Castelnau  organized  a  counter- 
attack. The  enemy  had  not  ventured  to  assail  the 
entrenched  heights  of  the  Grand  Couronn^,  and  De 
Castelnau  was  able  to  detach  from  its  garrison  the 
70th  Reserve  Division  and  two  of  Durand's  brigades 
of  the  Ninth  Corps — the  Thirty-fourth  and  Thirty- 
fifth.  These  were  placed  at  General  Foch's  dis- 
posal, in  addition  to  his  own  Army  Corps.  The 
Twentieth  Corps  crossed  the  Meurthe  by  bridges,  under 
the  cover  of  the  guns  of  the  Grand  Couronn^;  and 
Foch  led  it  against  the  heights  beyond  the  Sanon, 
north  of  Lun^ville,  while  the  otlier  detachments  were 
pushed  forward  towards  the  Luneville-Chtiteau  Salins 
road,  north  of  the  Marne  and  Rhine  Canal.  It  was  a 
turning  movement  against  the  German  right  flank  and 
rear,  threatening  to  cut  their  communications,  and 
endangering  their  whole  position.     It  is  evident  that 


BATTLE  OF  TROUEE  DE  CHARMES       153 

the  capture  of  the  heights  above  the  Sanon  would  be 
fatal  to  the  whole  German  advance.  The  Germans  saw 
the  danger,  and  hurried  up  troops  to  meet  the  counter- 
attack; but  their  main  masses  were  already  committed 
to  the  attack  far  to  the  south  and  west.  By  nightfall, 
General  FayoUe  with  the  French  70th  Division  was 
within  two  and  a  half  miles  of  Serres  on  the  Chateau 
Salins  road,  while  Foch  had  reached  the  heights  beyond 
the  Sanon  and  stormed  Flainval  and  the  neighbouring 
villages,  and  cleared  the  wood  of  Crevic  of  the  enemy. 

On  Tuesday,  the  25th,  Rupert  still  persisted  in  his 
attacks,  from  Saffais  to  beyond  Baccarat,  while  counter- 
attacking to  regain  the  ground  so  perilously  lost,  to 
the  northward.  Fayolle  could  make  no  further  progress. 
Foch  found  that  all  he  could  do  was  stubbornly  to  main- 
tain himself  on  the  heights  he  had  won  the  day  before. 
Attacked  again  and  again,  he  held  on  to  what  he  held 
to  be  the  decisive  point  of  the  battlefield.  But  to  feed 
these  attacks  on  the  heights  and  to  hold  the  Cha,teau 
Salins  road.  Prince  Rupert  had  to  withdraw  consider- 
able forces  from  his  main  battle  line.  His  reserves  were 
becoming  exhausted;  and  early  in  the  afternoon  it  was 
evident  that  the  German  attacks  were  everywhere  losing 
their  vigour.  At  3  p.m.  De  Castelnau  realized  from 
the  reports  he  received  at  his  headquarters  near  the 
outer  forts  of  Toul,  that  the  time  was  come  for  a  final 
effort.  He  telegraphed  the  order :  '^  En  avant  partout 
et  a  fond" — " Forward  everywhere  and  drive  it  home." 

The  French  now  assumed  the  offensive;  and  Rupert 
of  Bavaria  with  his  army  in  the  midst  of  a  huge  arc 
of  converging  fire,  and  attacked  from  north,  west  and 
south,  speedily  realized  that  to  prolong  the  unsuccess- 
ful battle  might  be  to  court  disaster.     The  German 


154'  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

retreat  began.  But  the  Bavarians  and  Saxons  though 
defeated  were  not  routed.  Not  a  gun  was  lost.  The 
grey  masses  streamed  back,  fighting  as  they  went, 
through  the  wide  gap  between  the  Chateau  Salins  road 
and  the  Vosges.  They  retired  during  the  following 
days  towards  their  own  frontier,  but  they  fought  a 
series  of  steady  rearguard  actions,  and  finally  halted 
on  the  border  waiting  to  renew  the  attempt.  They 
had  lost  heavily  in  their  reckless  and  persistent  massed 
attacks  on  the  Trouee  de  Charmes  positions.  It  was 
a  serious  defeat,  and  for  awhile  no  effort  was  spared  to 
conceal  it  from  the  German  people  and  the  other  Ger- 
man armies.  It  was  a  severe  disappointment  to  the 
German  High  Command,  coming  as  it  did  in  the  midst 
of  a  series  of  successes  on  the  other  fronts.  It  was 
utterly  unexpected;  for  after  his  victory  at  Morhange, 
Prince  Rupert  thought  that  it  would  be  no  diflcult 
matter  to  crush  the  armies  of  De  Castelnau  and 
Dubail. 

General  Joffre  made  it  the  subject  of  a  stirring  order 
of  the  day,  addressed  to  the  other  armies,  in  which  he 
held  up  to  them  the  success  of  the  eastern  armies  as 
an  encouragement  and  an  example.  It  was  the  first 
great  victory  won  for  France,  and  one  may  say  that  it 
made  the  victorious  stand  on  the  Marne  possible.  Had 
the  Prince  forced  the  Troupe  de  Charmes,  a  new  tide  of 
invasion  would  have  poured  through  the  gap  in  the 
eastern  barrier,  coming  out  in  the  rear  of  the  long 
French  line,  probably  isolating  Verdun  from  the  upper 
Marne  region,  and  preventing  the  stand  that  was  made 
a  few  days  later  by  the  Allied  armies,  with  the  right 
on  the  barrier,  the  left  on  Paris.  The  Allies  would  have 
been  forced  to  full  back  at  least  as  far  as  the  line  of 


BATTLE  OF  TROUEE  DE  CHARMES       155 

the  Seine,  and  the  whole  aspect  of  the  campaign  would 
have  been  altered  for  the  worse. 

Foch  had  taken  a  decisive  part  in  this  all-important 
success.  He  had  proved  himself  a  trusty  leader,  alike 
in  defeat  at  Morhange  and  in  victory  at  the  Trouee  de 
Charmes.  His  merit  was  to  be  promptly  recognized  by 
giving  him  a  still  more  important  command  and  the 
opportunity  of  rendering  even  more  striking  services 
to  his  country  and  to  the  Allied  cause. 


CHAPTER  XI 

TELE   NINTH    ARMY   IN   THE   BATTLE  OF  THE   MARNB 

Early  on  Saturday,  August  29th,  while  he  was  watch- 
ing one  of  the  regiments  driving  in  a  German  outpost 
on  the  frontier  line,  Foch  received  a  telegram,  ordering 
him  to  hand  over  the  command  of  the  Twentieth  Army 
Corps  to  General  Balfourier  and  come  to  Chalons  to 
see  General  Joffre,  and  take  a  more  important  post. 

Ninety  miles  of  good  road  are  soon  covered,  when 
one  has  a  staff  car  at  one's  disposal.  Foch  was  at 
Chalons  in  the  forenoon  of  the  same  day,  and  found 
Joffre  at  his  headquarters  there.  The  Commander-in- 
Chief  congratulated  him  on  the  splendid  work  he  had 
done  at  Nancy,  and  told  him  to  take  command — not  of 
another  Army  Corps,  but  of  a  group  of  corps — the 
Ninth  Army. 

The  general  situation  was  rapidly  discussed.  All  the 
northern  armies  were  in  retreat  since  the  beginning  of 
the  week,  and  for  the  moment  there  was  no  immediate 
prospect  of  the  retreat  being  stopped.  The  very  city, 
in  which  the  two  generals  were  meeting,  would  soon 
have  to  be  abandoned  to  the  enemy.  But  Joffre  meant 
to  make  a  stand  as  soon  as  the  German  pursuit  showed 
signs  of  exhaustion  and  tlio  armies  could  be  brought  into 
line  on  a  favourable  position.  It  might  be  on  the  Marne, 
but  it  might  be  necessary  to  fall  back  to  the  Seine. 
Paris  might  be  attacked.  The  Government  had  been 
removed  to  Bordeaux. 

166 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MAKNE  157 

Where  was  the  Ninth  Army,  which  Foch  was  to  com- 
mand? It  had  yet  to  be  got  together.  In  fact  his  first 
task  was  to  be  its  assembly  and  organization.  It  was 
to  be  made  up  of  the  following  bodies  of  troops : — 

Eleventh  Army  Corps — General  Eydoiix. 
Thirty-fourth  and  Thirty-fifth  Brigades  of  the  Ninth 

Army  Corps — General  Dubois. 
42nd  Division — General  Grosetti. 
52nd  Reserve  Division — General  Battesti. 
60th  Reserve  Division — General  Joppe. 
Morocco  Division — General  Humbert. 
9th  Cavalry  Division — General  de  I'Esp^e. 

In  many  popular  histories  of  the  Great  War,  the  Ninth 
Army  is  described  as  a  reinforcement  to  the  French 
battle  line  provided  by  troops  that  had  become  avail- 
able after  the  first  mobilization.  But  every  unit  in  it 
was  already  somewhere  in  line,  either  in  the  eastern 
armies  or  in  those  that  were  retiring  from  the  northern 
frontier.  The  only  fresh  troops  were  drafts  from  the 
depots  arriving  to  make  up  for  some  of  the  losses 
already  incurred.  The  formation  of  the  new  army  did 
not  add  a  single  battalion,  battery  or  squadron,  to  the 
total  available  French  fighting  force.  There  was,  it 
is  true,  some  reinforcement  of  the  fighting  line  to  the 
west  of  the  fortress  barrier,  by  the  withdrawal  of  part 
of  the  new  organization  from  the  eastern  front.  But 
the  main  fact  was  that  Joffre  had  decided  that  Foch 
should  be  in  a  position  to  render  more  serious  services 
to  France  than  those  of  a  corps  commander,  by  being 
put  in  command  of  an  army  at  the  head  of  which  he 
would  have  freer  scope  for  his  remarkable  knowledge 
of  war  and  powers  of  leadership.  No  higher  tribute 
was  ever  paid  by  one  great  general  to  another.    It  was 


158  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

an  honour  to  Foch ;  but  it  was  also  honourable  to  Joffre, 
for  one  of  the  highest  qualities  of  a  commander-in-chief 
in  war  is  the  capacity  for  selecting  his  subordinate  com- 
manders. 

The  only  troops  withdrawn  from  the  eastern  frontier 
region  were  the  two  brigades  of  the  Ninth  Army  Corps. 
These  were  part  of  the  reinforcement  sent  to  Nancy 
after  the  battle  of  Morhange,  and  had  been  engaged 
with  Foch's  Army  Corps  in  the  great  counter-attack  that 
decided  the  victory  of  the  Troupe  de  Charmes.  They  did 
not  join  the  Ninth  Army  till  September  4th,  on  the  eve 
of  the  battle  of  the  Marne. 

The  rest  of  the  new  army  came  from  the  armies  that 
had  already  been  engaged  on  the  Belgian  frontier,  and 
were  now  in  retreat  southwards.  The  only  unit  actually 
available,  when  Foch  met  Joffre  at  Chalons,  was  General 
Joppe's  60th  Division.  It  had  fought  under  General 
de  Langle  in  the  Fourth  Army,  and  had  taken  part  in 
the  battle  of  the  Ardennes  on  the  river  S^mois,  and  in 
the  subsequent  attempt  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Meuse 
against  the  German  advance.  It  had  been  engaged  in 
the  battle  at  Donch^ry,  *  close  to  the  old  battlefield  of 
Sedan. 

General  Eydoux's  Eleventh  Army  Corps,  the  only 
complete  corps  to  be  handed  over  to  Foch,  had  its  peace 
headquarters  at  Nantes.  It  was  made  up  of  the  soldiers 
of  Brittany  and  La  Vendue,  good  fighting  material  and 
men  for  whom  Foch  had  a  special  bond  of  sympathy. 
They  were  "his  Bretons,"  men  of  his  new  homeland, 
who  like  himself  were   inspired  by   the  old  faith   of 

*  Donchr-ry  was  the  point,  wliere  on  the  night  before  the  battle  of 
Sedan,  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince  (afterwards  the  Emperor  Frederic) 
crosBpd  the  Meuse  to  interpose  between  MacMahon  and  the  line  of 
retreat  on  Mezifirea. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  159 

France.  They  had  been  with  De  Langle  in  the  march 
into  the  Ardennes.  D'Espee's  Cavalry  Division  had  been 
with  them  in  the  same  fighting.  The  42nd  and  52nd 
Divisions  had  been  in  the  Third  Army  under  Ruffey, 
and  had  taken  part  in  the  advance  against  the  Crown 
Prince's  army  on  the  Luxemburg  border.  The  Third 
Army,  now  transferred  to  the  command  of  General 
Sarrail  was  concentrated  about  Verdun.  The  Morocco 
Division — Zouaves  and  Marine  from  North  Africa — had 
reached  the  northern  front  on  August  22nd,  but  had 
not  yet  been  seriously  engaged.  It  was  to  be  com- 
manded by  General  Humbert  who  had  taken  part  in 
the  battle  of  the  Charmes  Gap  with  the  detachments  of 
the  Ninth  Army  Corps. 

Within  a  week  the  new  army  was  concentrated  and 
organized.  It  was  a  difficult  piece  of  work.  A  staff 
had  to  be  improvised.  Only  one  division  was  near  at 
hand ;  the  rest  were  mostly  on  the  move  from  the  north. 
Foch  had  to  get  in  touch  with  them  by  telephone,  tele- 
graph or  messenger,  arrange  for  their  future  movements 
that  would  bring  his  whole  force  together  in  one  mass, 
organize  supply  arrangements  and  reserves  of  ammuni- 
tion— and  all  this  in  the  midst  of  the  ceaseless  strain 
of  the  retreat.  Looking  back  on  this  strenuous  week, 
Foch  said  later,  of  the  beginnings  of  the  Ninth  Army, — 
"  We  were  like  a  poor  household.  There  was  a  staff 
of  five  or  six  officers  hastily  got  together  to  start  with, 
little  or  no  working  material,  only  our  note-books  and 
a  few  maps."  One  of  these  first  staff  officers.  Com- 
mandant R^quin,  tells  how  on  the  first  night  the  new 
staff  found  it  difficult  even  to  obtain  quarters,  and  he 
himself  slept  in  the  guard-room  of  a  village  among  the 
soldiers,  in  order  to  make  sure  of  being  able  to  rejoin 


160  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

his  General  and  the  rest  of  the  staff  in  the  morning. 
"  One  must  imagine,"  he  adds,  "  the  difficulties  of 
organization  and  command  of  an  army  formed  in  the 
course  of  the  falling-back  movements  which  prepared 
the  victory  of  the  Marne,  among  the  crowds  of  the 
population  fleeing  before  the  horrors  of  invasion  and 
encumbering  the  roads,  without  the  possibility  of  stop- 
ping for  a  single  day." 

On  September  4th,  Foch  had  his  headquarters  at 
Tours-sur-Marne  a  few  miles  to  the  east  of  Epernay. 
It  was  a  convenient  position  for  collecting  his  divisions 
and  brigades  from  the  two  armies  of  D'Esperey  and  De 
Langle.  It  was  between  their  general  lines  of  retire- 
ment; and  his  army  was  to  take  its  place  between  them 
when  the  battle  line  was  formed.  Here  on  the  4th  the 
concentration  w^as  joined  by  the  two  brigades  from 
Nancy  and  the  Ninth  Army  was  practically  complete, 
six  days  after  its  formation  had  begun. 

Next  day  he  moved  his  headquarters  some  miles 
further  south  to  the  village  of  Bergferes-en-Vertus,  at  an 
important  road-junction  near  the  town  of  Vertus  and 
on  the  road  southwards  to  Ffere  Champenoise  and  Arcis- 
sur-Aube.  He  was  now  in  the  country  which  was  soon 
to  be  the  scene  of  the  great  battle.  But  the  retreat  was 
still  in  progress,  and  the  tide  of  invasion  flowed  steadily 
onwards.  That  day  the  famous  French  aviator  of  peace 
days,  Brindejonc  de  Moulinais,  descended  near  his 
headquarters  to  report  the  results  of  a  reconnoitring 
flight  over  the  enemy's  front.  He  told  how  he  had  seen 
masses  of  the  enemy  about  Rheims  and  four  army  corps 
marching  across  the  plain  of  Chillons — "  a  magnificent 
spectacle."  It  was  Von  Bulow's  army  that  was  about 
Rheims,  and  the  columns  crossing  the  plain  of  Chalons 


THE  BATTLE  OP  THE  MARNE  161 

were  the  Saxon  army  under  Von  Hansen.  These  were 
the  enemies  that  Foch  would  soon  have  to  oppose. 

Next  day  (September  5th)  the  Germans  had  a  divi- 
sion in  Vertus,  and  the  headquarters  of  the  Ninth  Army 
were  moved  further  south,  and  Foch  had  his  force 
concentrated  on  the  line  Sezanne-Fere  Champenoise. 
There  was  to  be  no  further  retreat.  This  was  the  day 
on  which  General  Joffre  met  Sir  John  French  to  com- 
municate to  him  the  plans  for  the  coming  offensive,  and 
drafted  the  stirring  order  of  the  day  which  was  read 
next  morning  to  every  regiment  in  the  French  army : — 

"  At  a  moment  when  a  battle  on  which  the  welfare  of 
the  country  depends  is  about  to  begin,  I  feel  it  my  duty 
to  remind  you  that  it  is  no  longer  the  time  to  look 
behind.  We  have  but  one  business  in  hand — to  attack 
and  repulse  the  enemy.  Any  of  the  armies  which  can 
no  longer  advance,  will  at  all  costs  hold  the  ground  it 
has  won,  and  allow  itself  to  be  killed  where  it  stands 
rather  than  give  way.  This  is  no  time  for  faltering, 
and  it  will  not  be  tolerated." 

On  that  Sunday  morning,  September  6th,  the  battle  of 
the  Marne  began — a  battle  that  was  to  last  for  five 
days  on  a  front  of  over  a  hundred-and-twenty  miles, 
between  Paris  and  Verdun.  We  have  only  to  deal 
here  with  the  part  played  in  it  by  General  Foch  and  the 
Ninth  Army,  which  was  placed  in  the  centre  of  the  long 
line  at  one  of  the  points  that  proved  to  be  of  decisive 
importance  in  the  struggle. 

First,  a  word  as  to  the  ground  on  which  the  Ninth 
Army  was  to  give  battle  against  the  left  of  Von  Billow's 
army  and  the  right  of  Von  Hansen's.  The  district  of 
Suzanne  and  F^re  Champenoise  is  south  of  the  great 


162  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

northward  curve  of  the  Marne,  between  it  and  "  hungry 
Champagne,"  the  poorer  lands  of  the  province  where  the 
cultivated  ground  is  interspersed  with  wide  stretches 
of  half-barren  moorland  and  chalk  downs,  affording  a 
scanty  pasturage.  It  is  a  country  of  low  round-topped 
ridges  and  hills,  through  which  many  deep  narrow  water- 
courses spanned  by  numerous  old  stone  bridges  make 
their  way  to  the  Marne.  Westward,  by  Suzanne,  begins 
the  higher  plateau  that  takes  its  name  from  the  town, 
an  upland  with  woods  and  vineyards  clothing  its  slopes. 
The  lower  ground,  the  plain  that  extends  eastward,  has 
many  stretches  of  woodland,  mostly  beech  and  fir  plan- 
tations. Across  it  run  the  railway  and  the  old  highway 
road  from  Paris  by  Vitry  on  the  Marne  to  Toul  and 
Nancy.  There  are  plenty  of  good  roads  running  north 
and  south  through  the  district;  but  a  few  miles  north 
of  the  S^zanne-F^re  Champenoise  front,  there  is  a  long 
hollow  in  the  chalk  hills  that  forms  a  green  level  ex- 
panse. It  was  a  lake  in  early  times.  Long  after,  as 
it  partly  dried  up,  it  was  an  impassable  morass,  the 
source  on  which  the  Petit  Morin  started  on  its  course 
to  the  Marne.  Much  of  it  has  now  been  reclaimed  and 
turned  into  pasture;  and  two  good  roads  and  four 
unmetalled  country  lanes  cross  it.  But  there  are  still 
wide  reaches  of  marsh,  with  shallow  pools,  and  beds 
and  thickets  of  brown  rushes  that  grow  six  feet  high 
by  September.  For  the  heavy  traffic  of  an  army  only 
the  two  roads  are  practicable  ways  across  this  natural 
barrier,  and  in  wet  weather  they  become  defiles  through 
ground  where  a  wheel  would  sink  to  the  axle.  The 
mediaeval  abbey  of  St.  Gond,  ruined  at  the  Revolution, 
gives  its  name  to  this  marsh  region.  First-class  roads 
pass  it  on  the  east  and  west,  from  Epernay  to  Suzanne 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  163 

crossing  the  Petit  Morin  by  the  bridge  of  St.  Prix,  and 
from  Vertus  to  Fere  Champenoise. 

Foch  knew  the  district  well.  Among  the  exercises  of 
the  Ecole  de  Guerre  were  "  staff  rides."  These  exercises 
are  among  the  most  useful  methods  of  training  in  all 
European  armies.  They  are  manoeuvres  of  officers. 
There  are  no  troops  on  the  ground,  but  an  episode  in 
an  imaginary  campaign  is  worked  out  as  if  they  were 
present.  Orders  were  written  out,  and  situations  dis- 
cussed, as  if  an  actual  war  were  in  progress.  The  di- 
rector of  the  operations  introduces  sudden  variations  in 
the  course  of  the  supposed  events,  so  as  to  test  the 
capacity  of  his  pupils  for  dealing  with  emergencies.  Tt 
is  a  war  game  on  the  actual  ground,  often  lasting  for 
many  days.  While  he  was  director  of  the  Ecole,  Foch 
had  conducted  several  of  these  staff  rides  on  the  ground 
on  which  he  was  to  command  in  a  great  battle.  This 
is  one  more  instance  of  the  remarkable  way  in  which  his 
work  in  the  years  of  peace  prepared  him  for  his  task 
in  the  war. 

On  Saturday,  September  5th,  a  day  that  was  cloudy 
in  the  morning,  clear  and  intensely  hot  in  the  afternoon, 
the  Ninth  Army  was  retiring  across  its  destined  battle 
ground.  No  orders  had  arrived  as  yet  to  stop  the  re- 
treat, and  Foch  had  directed  for  that  day  a  movement 
southward  towards  the  river  Aube,  in  fact  some  of  the 
troops  were  to  cross  that  river.  The  Germans  of  Von 
Billow's  left  were  over  the  Petit  Morin,  occupying  the 
northern  villages  of  the  plateau  of  Suzanne.  There  was 
some  skirmishing  between  them  and  French  rear  guards 
and  patrols.  At  the  other  end  of  the  marshes.  Von 
Hausen's  Saxons  were  advancing  from  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Vertus  in  the  direction  of  Fere  Champenoise. 


164  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

But  the  German  march  was  strangely  slow.  By  a  more 
rapid  push  they  could  have  peacefully  occupied  posi- 
tions that  they  soon  had  to  fight  hard  for.  Perhaps  the 
fatigue  of  the  hurried  pursuit  from  the  north  was  tell- 
ing upon  them.  Certain  it  is  that,  on  this  part 
of  their  front,  great  masses  were  halted  for  hours  this 
day. 

On  the  French  side,  the  4th  Division  was  marching 
furthest  to  the  westward,  passing  through  Suzanne; 
next  came  the  Morocco  Division ;  then  the  Ninth  Corps, 
marching  by  Fere  Champenoise.  The  Eleventh  Corps 
(the  Bretons)  was  moving  on  Sommesous.  The  52nd 
and  60th  Reserve  Divisions  were  well  forward  towards 
the  Aube.  De  I'Esp^e's  cavalry  were  partly  supplying 
detachments  to  cover  the  retreat,  partly  moving  south 
beyond  the  line  of  march  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  in 
order  to  form  a  line  with  De  Langle's  army  further 
east. 

About  midday,  there  was  a  sudden  halt  in  column 
after  column,  as  a  new  order  from  General  Foch  reached 
the  commanding  officers.  They  were  to  stand  fast,  or 
in  some  cases  to  turn  and  retrace  their  steps  for  a  cer- 
tain distance.  Foch  had  just  had  a  message  from  Joffre, 
giving  him  the  first  intimation  that  the  retreat  was  to 
end  and  the  offensive  to  be  resumed  next  morning. 
Later  in  the  day,  he  received  the  order  from  Joffre  for 
the  operations  of  the  morrow.  It  briefly  described  the 
task  assigned  to  each  army,  leaving  it  to  the  army  com- 
manders to  work  out  the  details  each  for  his  own  front. 
The  part  assigned  to  the  Ninth  Army  was  thus  indi- 
cated : — 

"  The  Ninth  Army  will  cover  the  right  of  the  Fifth 
Army,  holding  the  debouches  to  the  south  of  the  marshes 


THE  BATTLE  OP  THE  MARNE  165 

of  St.  Gond  and  posting  a  part  of  the  forces  on  the 
plateau  to  the  north  of  Suzanne." 

But  Foch  had  not  waited  for  the  final  order  to  act. 
As  soon  as  he  received  the  first  intimation  that  the 
offensive  was  to  be  assumed  next  day,  he  had  taken 
prompt  steps  to  prepare  the  way  for  it  not  only  by 
halting  his  army  and  putting  it  into  line  for  the  ad- 
vance, but  by  advancing  to  attack  the  German  outposts 
on  his  left  flank  in  order  to  regain  some  of  the  useful 
ground  that  had  been  abandoned,  according  to  earlier 
orders,  in  the  morning.  The  battle  of  the  Marne  began, 
officially,  on  Sunday,  September  6th.  But  Foch's  left 
was  in  action  betw'een  3  and  4  p.m.  on  the  Saturday 
afternoon. 

He  had  again  and  again  in  his  teaching  laid  it  down 
that  merely  to  hold  positions  is  to  court  disaster,  that 
attack  is  the  best  form  of  defence,  and  the  more  anxious 
is  the  situation  the  more  boldly  and  persistently  should 
one  attack.  Now  the  offensive  had  been  ordered,  and  he 
at  once  chose  his  objective.  Instead  of  simply  holding 
on,  south  of  the  green  hollow  of  the  marshes — which 
would  have  fulfilled  the  letter  of  his  instructions  and 
might  have  satisfied  a  less  enterprising  leader,  he  de- 
cided on  an  attempt  to  seize  the  high  ground  to  the 
north  of  them  with  his  centre,  while  pushing  his  left 
forward  to  drive  Von  Biilow  from  the  Suzanne  plateau 
with  the  help  of  the  troops  of  D'Esperey's  army  on  this 
flank  of  his  line. 

In  the  morning  the  villagers  on  the  border  of  the 
marshes  had  seen  the  French  troops  marching  away 
to  the  southward.  In  the  afternoon  they  returned. 
Batteries  dragged  up  the  slopes  of  Mont  Aotit  and  the 
spur  of  Allemant,  and  moved  by  the  Suzanne  road  to 


166  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

the  high  ground  near  the  village  of  Mondement  and  its 
old  chateau.  Other  guns  were  placed  in  position  on 
the  crest  that  forms  the  southern  wall  of  the  marsh 
hollow.  The  42nd  Division,  with  Grosetti  at  its  head — 
stout  alike  in  body  and  in  spirit — moved  from  Suzanne 
to  the  northeastern  heights  of  the  plateau  near  the  same 
point.  Then  the  Morocco  division,  eager  for  a  fight, 
appeared  in  the  villages  of  Broussy  le  Grand  and  Le 
Petit,  marching  for  the  roads  across  the  hollow.  The 
brigades  of  the  Ninth  Corps  came  up  through  Bannes. 
Towards  four  o'clock  the  French  guns  opened  fire,  and 
the  German  artillery  replied  from  the  heights  of  Congy 
and  along  the  plateau  towards  Charleville  and  the  Gault 
woods.  Grosetti  pressed  on,  and  seized  the  crossing  of 
the  Petit  Morin  at  the  bridge  of  St.  Prix,  almost  with- 
out resistance,  for  the  sudden  return  of  the  French  and 
their  swift  advance  had  taken  the  enemy  by  surprise. 
The  Morocco  Division  crossed  the  marshes  and  cleared 
a  small  German  detachment  out  of  Joches  and  Coizard. 
A  battalion  of  the  Ninth  Corps  seized  the  wooded  hill  of 
Toulon-la-Montagne  and  got  three  batteries  of  75's  up 
to  the  crest.  To  the  west  of  the  hill,  a  German  outpost 
was  driven  from  Vert-la-Gravelle,  Auluay  and  Morains- 
le-Petit,  at  the  east  end  of  the  marshes,  were  occupied 
without  opposition  by  detachments  of  the  Ninth  Corps. 
Their  patrols,  sent  out  to  the  front,  came  in  contact  with 
the  enemy's  outpost  line  about  Coligny  and  Pierre 
Morains,  towards  Vertus. 

The  fighting  on  the  left  died  down  in  the  twilight. 
On  the  right  the  Breton  Corps  (the  Eleventh)  was  tak- 
ing  its   positions   along   the   course   of   the    Somme,* 

•  The  Somme  of  Foch's  baltlefit-ld  is,  of  course,  not  the  river  that 
flows  hy  Ppronnc  Alhort  and  Amions,  but  a  small  deep  stream  of  the 
Bame  name,  that  IIowh  into  the  upper  Marne.  It  ia  sometimes  called 
the  tSummo-CbamDeuoiiiu. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  167 

marked  by  the  line  of  villages  from  Ecurie-le-Repos  to 
Sommesous.  Here  there  were  no  enemies  immediately 
in  front;  but  the  aviators  and  De  I'Esp^e's  cavalry 
scouts  had  ascertained  that  the  Saxon  troops  of  Von 
Hansen's  army  were  not  far  off.  They  were  along  the 
upper  Marne,  where  they  had  occupied  Vitry-le-Fran- 
gois.  Their  outposts  were  among  the  woods  along  the 
course  of  the  river  Sonde,  which  runs  parallel  to  the 
Somme  for  a  few  miles  to  the  eastward  and  joins  it 
lower  down. 

In  the  night,  the  enemy  attacked  the  Morocco  men 
in  Joches  and  Coizard,  and  regained  the  two  villages. 

On  the  Sunday  morning,  when  the  great  battle 
began  all  along  the  line  from  the  banks  of  the  Ourcq 
and  the  Grand  Morin  to  the  advanced  works  of  Verdun, 
there  was  for  more  than  an  hour  after  sunrise  a  strange 
silence  along  the  front  of  the  Ninth  Army.  It  seemed 
as  if  the  enemy  was  hesitating  to  advance,  and  Foch 
was  completing  his  preparations  and  putting  together 
the  latest  information  obtained  by  his  reconnaissances. 
On  his  left  the  42nd  Division  held  the  northeastern 
heights  of  the  Suzanne  plateau  in  touch  with  the  Tenth 
French  Army  Corps,  which  formed  the  right  of  the  Fifth 
Army  under  D'Esperey.  Next  came  the  Morocco  Di- 
vision, holding  the  south  edge  of  the  marsh  hollow,  with 
some  detachments  north  of  it ;  and  then  the  two  brigades 
of  the  Ninth  Corps  (17th  Division),  partly  north  of  the 
marshes  about  Toulon  la  Montagne  partly  holding  the 
ground  at  their  eastern  end  about  Morains  le  Petit. 
The  Eleventh  Corps  then  carried  on  the  line  at  an  angle, 
running  southeast  along  the  course  of  the  Somme  to 
Sommesous. 

Here  there  was  a  gap  of  some  ten  miles  between  the 


168  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

right  of  Foch's  Ninth  Army  and  the  left  of  the  Fourth 
Army  (De  Langle  de  Gary),  south  of  Vitry  le  Frangois. 
This  gap  was  for  the  present  watched,  rather  than  held 
in  any  force,  by  De  I'Esp^e  with  the  9th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion (17th  Hussars,  10th  Chasseurs-a-cheval,  1st,  3rd 
and  24th  Dragoons  and  25th  Cyclists,  with  a  group  of 
horse  artillery  batteries).  It  was  a  small  force,  twenty- 
four  squadrons  and  twelve  guns;  and  all  that  De  FEsp^e 
could  do  was  to  keep  strong  patrols  out  in  front  as  far 
as  Vatry  in  the  early  morning,  and  hold  his  main  body 
ready  for  action  in  the  open  ground  near  Mailly.  He 
was  at  the  inner  curve  of  a  deep  re-entrant  of  the 
French  line;  and  if  the  Germans  pushed  towards  the 
gap,  there  would  be  ample  time  for  a  converging  coun- 
ter-attack upon  them  by  the  right  of  the  Ninth  and  the 
left  of  the  Fourth  Army. 

For  a  reserve,  Foch  had  the  52nd  Division  near  the 
Mont  Aout  and  the  60th  between  F^re  Champenoise  and 
Sommesous,  south  of  the  road.  He  had  massed  a  con- 
siderable part  of  his  artillery  on  the  heights  near  his 
left  and  centre  to  support  the  attack  in  this  direction. 
For  his  post  of  command,  or  battle  headquarters,  he 
had  selected  a  country-house  near  the  village  of  Pleurs, 
well  to  the  rear  of  his  centre.  In  the  great  battles  of 
to-day,  extending  over  a  front  of  many  miles,  the  gen- 
eral in  command  can  no  longer  as  of  old  take  his  place 
close  up  to  the  fighting  line,  mounted,  and  surrounded 
by  his  staff.  He  may  visit  the  fighting  line  for  awhile ; 
but  for  most  of  the  time  he  is  most  likely  seated  at  a 
table  with  maps  before  him,  in  a  house  that  has  been 
linked  up  with  the  field  telegraphs  and  the  permanent 
telegraph  and  telephone  lines  of  the  district.  Assisted 
by  his  staff,  he  watches  the  course  of  the  battle  on  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  169 

map  marked  as  the  messages  come  in,  and  sends  off  his 
orders  from  time  to  time.  It  is  a  more  prosaic  business 
than  that  of  a  Napoleon  or  a  Wellington  watching  the 
fighting  at  close  quarters.  But  war  has  become  an 
immense  machine,  and  for  the  chief  leaders  a  prosaic 
business  of  map-reading,  collation  of  information,  cal- 
culations as  to  time  and  space,  available  forces,  and  the 
supplies  and  reliefs  for  them.  For  hours  the  great 
leader  of  to-day  has  to  see  the  battle  only  on  his  maps, 
as  he  sits  in  the  centre  of  his  system  of  telegraph  wires, 
and  listens  to  the  cannon  thunder  miles  away.  At 
times,  when  there  is  a  lull  in  the  fighting,  he  may  be 
able  with  the  help  of  a  swift  car  to  inspect  his  line; 
or,  when  a  great  movement  has  been  ordered,  he  may 
leave  his  right-hand  man  at  headquarters  and  go  him- 
self to  watch  the  progress  of  his  troops.  But  usually, 
the  higher  is  the  command  the  general  holds,  the  less  he 
sees  at  close  quarters  of  the  fighting. 

Foch  was  opposite  the  point  where  the  flanks  of  two 
armies  met  in  the  great  German  line.  Opposed  to  his 
left  and  left  centre  were  two  of  Von  Billow's  corps. 
On  the  left  and  near  the  Suzanne  plateau  was  the  10th 
Army  Corps,  Hanoverians,  some  of  the  regiments  bear- 
ing on  their  colours  battle  honours  from  Minden  and 
Waterloo,  won  in  the  days  when  Britain  and  Hanover 
were  under  the  same  sovereign.  Opposite  the  left 
centre,  with  headquarters  at  Vertus,  was  a  corps  of 
the  Prussian  Guard,  in  which  one  of  the  Kaiser's  sons. 
Prince  Eitel,  was  serving.  Opposed  to  the  French  right 
were  two  Saxon  army  corps,  the  12th  and  the  12th  Re- 
serve Corps.  Foch  had  the  equivalent  of  eight  infantry 
divisions  in  line,  and  would  be  slightly  outnumbered 
even  if  the  German  corps  had  only  their  normal  peace 


170  MAESHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

establishment  of  two  divisions.  But  there  is  reason  to 
believe  that  some  if  not  all  of  them  had  received  a  third 
(reserve)  division  on  mobilization,  so  that  the  French 
were  seriously  outnumbered.  But  the  Germans  had  a 
further  advantage  in  the  possession  of  a  considerable 
number  of  batteries  of  heavy  guns  and  howitzers.  The 
hills  on  their  right,  opposite  Foch's  left,  fairly  bristled 
with  this  powerful  long-ranging  artillery.  The  enemy 
was  also  far  better  supplied  with  machine  guns. 

Between  seven  and  eight  o'clock  the  guns  came  into 
action,  first  of  the  French  left,  and  then  all  along  the 
line.  On  the  Sezanne  plateau,  the  French  attacked 
furiously  from  the  Petit  Morin  southwards  Charleville ; 
and  at  first  the  42nd  Division  gained  ground  steadily. 
Beyond  the  marshes  the  Morocco  troops  again  attacked 
Joches  and  Coizard.  Foch's  order  for  this  part  of  the 
field  was  that  the  division  was  to  push  forward  through 
Courjeonnet  to  support  the  attack  made  by  the  men  of 
the  Ninth  Corps  on  the  Congy  heights,  with  the  help  of 
the  covering  fire  from  the  Toulon-la-Montagne  crest  and 
the  hills  south  of  the  marshes.  Here  there  was  hard 
fighting  during  the  morning.  Attack  after  attack  was 
launched  against  the  German  positions;  but  the  Han- 
overians held  their  ground.  And  as  the  morning  went 
on,  the  artillery  fire  from  the  curve  of  the  heights,  from 
the  south  of  Congy  to  the  north  of  Vertus,  became  more 
intense.  The  enemy  had  a  formidable  concentration  of 
heavy  guns  on  these  positions.  Their  converging  fire 
was  especially  directed  on  the  Toulon-la-Montagne 
height.  Towards  noon  the  village,  the  hill  top,  the 
woods,  were  wrapped  in  a  pall  of  smoke  and  dust  from 
tlie  Inigc  sliells  that  burst  in  showers  all  over  the  ground. 
The  trees  of  the  wood  were  torn  and  shattered,  the  vil- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  171 

lage  set  on  fire.  In  vain  the  light  French  quick-firers 
tried  to  beat  down  the  heavy  artillery  to  which  they  were 
opposed.  The  position  became  untenable,  and  had  to 
be  evacuated. 

The  retirement  from  the  height  was  the  signal  for  a 
fierce  attack  by  the  Hanoverians  and  the  Prussian 
Guard,  heralded  and  supported  by  a  storm  of  artillery 
fire  beating  down  from  the  heights  on  the  villages  of  the 
lower  ground.  The  Morocco  men  were  driven  back  to 
the  crossings  of  the  marshes,  and  forced  to  retire  along 
the  narrow  causeways,  suffering  heavily  from  a  deadly 
fire  of  shrapnel  and  high  explosives.  North  of  the  east 
end  of  the  marsh,  a  regiment  of  the  Ninth  Corps  held 
on  steadily  to  Aulnay  and  the  neighbouring  ground; 
and  a  brigade  of  the  same  corps  stopped  the  rush  of  the 
guardsmen  at  Morains  le  Petit  on  the  Fere  Cham- 
penoise  road.  At  the  other  end  of  the  marshes,  the 
Hanoverians  retook  the  bridge  of  St.  Prix,  and  captured 
the  bold  hill  up  which  the  road  zigzags  beyond  it — the 
Signal  du  Poirier.  Most  of  the  ground  gained  in  the 
morning  towards  Charleville  had  to  be  abandoned. 
Grosetti  held  on,  however,  along  the  Suzanne  road,  with- 
out losing  touch  with  D'Esperey's  Tenth  Corps  on  his 
flank. 

In  the  afternoon,  the  Germans  gained  a  footing  south 
of  the  marshes.  Their  artillery  had  crowned  the  height 
of  Toulon-la-Montagne ;  their  infantry  pushed  forward 
from  Coizard  and  Aunizeux,  after  the  retiring  Morocco 
troops.  With  the  converging  attack  from  these  two  di- 
rections, they  fought  their  way  into  Bannes;  but  the 
French  clung  to  the  southern  exits  of  the  village.  To 
the  west  of  it,  they  held  on  to  the  villages  of  Broussy- 
le-Grand  and  Broussy-le-Petit,  supported  by  the  bat- 


172  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

teries  in  position  on  Mont  Aout  and  the  Allement  spur 
of  the  Suzanne  plateau. 

On  the  right  the  situation  was  unchanged  during 
the  day.  Here  Foch's  orders  were  to  hold  the  line  of 
the  little  Somme.  His  plan  was  defensive  on  the  right, 
offensive  on  the  left.  ATid  his  line  on  the  right  had  to 
be  somewhat  thinly  held.  Eydoux's  Eleventh  Corps  had 
to  defend  a  ten-mile  front  with  a  little  over  thirty  thou- 
sand men,  an  average  of  about  three  thousand  men  to 
the  mile ;  and  beyond  his  right  there  was  only  the  screen 
of  De  I'Esp^e's  cavalry  division.  But  during  the  Sun- 
day there  was  no  serious  attack  on  this  side. 

The  ground  in  front  of  the  line  was  chalky  moorland, 
with  some  cultivation  near  the  villages,  and  beyond  a 
wide  expanse  of  stunted  fir  and  beech  woods,  amidst 
which,  here  and  there,  were  open  stretches  of  poor  pas- 
ture land  for  sheep.  It  was  a  typical  landscape  of 
"  hungry  Champagne."  During  the  day,  the  Germans 
pushed  forward  to  the  edge  of  the  woods  and  the  artil- 
lery was  in  action  all  along  the  line,  but  there  was  no 
close  infantry  fighting — only  the  threat  of  an  attack. 
On  the  flank,  De  I'Esp^e  dealt  with  an  attempt  of  the 
German  cavalry  to  press  forward,  and  drove  them  back 
so  promptly,  that  they  had  no  idea  that  the  position  in 
their  front,  the  broad  plain  of  Mailly,  was  almost  with- 
out defence. 

On  the  Monday,  the  7th,  the  fighting  began  at  the 
first  light  of  dawn.  On  the  left,  the  nearest  unit  of  the 
Fifth  Army,  the  Tenth  French  Corps  gave  useful  sup- 
I)ort  to  Foch's  hard-pressed  line  by  clearing  the  Gault 
woods  of  the  enemy  and  joining  with  Grosetti's  left  in 
the  counter-attacks  towards  Cliarleville,  but  on  the 
northeastern  heights  of  the  plateau  and  along  its  slopes 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  173 

towards  the  marshes,  things  were  not  going  so  well. 
All  day  there  was  a  succession  of  attack  and  counter- 
attack; ground  was  lost  and  regained,  and  lost  again. 
The  Morocco  Division  lent  useful  support  to  the  42nd 
in  this  prolonged  struggle.  General  Humbert,  who  com- 
manded these  fine  troops,  himself  came  up  to  the 
plateau,  and  established  his  headquarters  at  the  chateau 
of  Mondement,  which  was  gradually  becoming  the  centre 
of  the  conflict  on  this  side. 

Mondement  village  stands  on  a  bold  spur  of  the 
Suzanne  plateau,  looking  out  northwards  over  the 
wooded  slopes  that  sink  down  to  the  marshes  of  St. 
Gond.  The  chateau  is  a  massively  built  quadrangle, 
with  pepper-box  turrets  at  the  angles,  and  within,  and 
sheltered  by  these  mediaeval  defences,  a  modern  mansion. 
Its  dominant  position  on  the  crest  of  the  spur  made  it 
a  rallying  point  for  the  French  defence,  a  magnet  for 
the  German  attack.  French  popular  writers  at  the 
time,  in  their  narratives  of  the  battle,  described  the 
chateau  of  Mondement  as  "  the  key  of  the  whole  marsh 
region  " ;  but  it  had  a  mere  local  and  almost  accidental 
importance. 

In  the  afternoon  the  enemy  heavily  reinforced  his 
attack,  and  gained  possession  of  the  villages  on  the 
margin  of  the  marsh,  north  of  the  Mondement  spur. 
The  position  was  now  a  sharp  salient,  projecting  into 
the  enemy's  lines,  and  under  fire  from  three  sides.  Field 
batteries  on  the  Signal  du  Poirier  sent  plunging  fire 
over  the  woods.  Other  guns  were  in  action  along  the 
plateau  and  across  the  marshes.  But  the  French  clung 
steadily  to  the  narrowed  ground. 

In  the  centre,  Aulnay  had  to  be  abandoned.  Morains- 
le-Petit,  crushed  by  a  concentrated  howitzer  fire,  was  in 


174  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

flames  and  no  longer  tenable.  The  Prussian  Guard 
pressed  forward  on  both  sides  of  the  place,  and  by  night- 
fall held  the  firm  ground  at  the  eastern  end  of  the 
marshes. 

Along  the  right  front,  the  Saxons  were  attacking  the 
villages  on  the  Somme.  Here  too  the  German  artillery 
was  asserting  its  superiority.  "  We  felt  we  were  out- 
gunned," wrote  a  French  officer,  who  told  of  the  cease- 
less storm  of  shells  that  came  from  the  enemy's  bat- 
teries hidden  in  the  woods  beyond  the  Somme.  But  Ger- 
man narratives  show  that,  on  the  side  of  the  attack, 
there  was  during  this  day  a  sense  of  failure  before  a 
firm  line  strongly  and  bravely  held.  The  villages,  and 
the  deep  hollow  of  the  river  course  concealed  here  and 
there  in  clumps  of  bush,  formed  a  serious  obstacle ;  and 
the  Bretons  fought  well,  met  every  attack  with  a  sweep- 
ing fire  of  rifles  and  machine  guns,  and  repeatedly 
charged  with  the  bayonet  to  check  the  rushes  of  the 
Saxons.     By  nightfall  the  line  was  still  intact. 

The  Germans  had  not  gained  much  ground;  but,  on 
the  French  centre  and  left,  they  had  made  progress. 
On  the  left,  the  Tenth  Corps  of  D'Esperey's  army  had 
been  able  to  keep  touch  with  Foch's  flank  on  the  plateau. 
The  loss  of  Morains-le-Petit  in  the  centre  might  prove 
to  be  a  serious  matter.  Here  the  Prussian  Guard  had 
got  so  far  forward,  that  a  further  advance  would  en- 
danger the  left  of  the  Breton  corps  about  Ecury-le- 
Repos.  Foch  had  sent  in  his  reserves,  Battesti's  52nd 
Division,  to  reinforce  the  left,  Joppe's  60th  Division  to 
support  Eydoux  and  the  Eleventh  Corps.  He  took  an 
optimistic  view  of  the  situation.  According  to  his  own 
theory  of  war,  determination  to  hold  on  and  win  was 
the  first  condition  of  success  j  and  his  orders  of  the  day 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  175 

sought  to  inspire  his  officers  and  men  with  his  own 
hopeful  courage.  In  the  order  of  September  7th,  he 
had  told  them  that  he  counted  on  their  displaying  "  the 
greatest  activity  and  the  most  untiring  energy,"  to  im- 
prove their  successes  against  "  an  experienced  and  dar- 
ing enemy."  In  the  order  sent  out  in  the  early  hours 
of  the  8th,  he  described  the  situation  as  excellent,  and 
directed  that  "  the  offensive  should  be  vigorously  main- 
tained." 

But  before  this  order  was  communicated  to  the  troops, 
there  was  a  change  in  the  situation  that  might  well  have 
broken  the  confidence  of  a  less  determined  leader.  At 
3  A.M.  on  Tuesday,  September  8th,  in  the  darkness  of 
the  night,  the  two  Saxon  corps  suddenly  attacked  all 
along  the  line  of  the  Somme.  At  Normee,  the  outposts 
were  swept  away  in  a  rush  of  grey-coated  infantry,  that 
poured  out  of  the  darkness  of  the  woods ;  and  the  village 
was  attacked,  while  its  garrison  were  standing  to  their 
arms.  It  was  stormed  after  a  hard  fight  among  the 
burning  houses,  and  the  French  fell  back  to  the  rail- 
way line  beyond  the  river.  Ecury-le-Repos  was  almost 
cut  off,  and  could  not  hold  out  long.  At  Lenhar^e — 
which,  though  in  Champagne  sounds  like  one  of  the  old 
Celtic  names  of  Brittany — two  companies  fought  for  an 
hour  against  a  heavy  column  of  attack.  Every  officer 
was  killed  or  wounded.  When  at  last,  about  4  a.m.,  the 
place  was  captured,  a  Saxon  officer,  marching  through 
with  his  men,  seeing  the  wounded  French  officers  with 
a  group  of  their  disarmed  soldiers,  brought  his  own 
troops  to  the  parade  step  with  shouldered  rifles,  and 
gave  the  order  :  "  Salute  our  opponents — they  are  brave 
men ! " 

On  the  right  of  the  line,  Vaussimont,  Haussimont  and 


176  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

Sommesous  held  out  till  some  hours  after  daylight.  It 
was  not  till  9  a.m.  that  Sommesous  was  stormed,  and 
then  there  was  a  prolonged  struggle  at  the  railway  tri- 
angle to  the  south  of  the  village.  De  FEsp^e  brought 
up  some  of  his  squadrons  and  his  horse  batteries  to 
prevent  the  flank  of  the  broken  line  from  being  turned. 

The  situation  was  serious.  Foch  came  up  from 
Pleurs  to  assist  in  restoring  it.  Beyond  the  river,  num- 
bers of  prisoners  had  been  taken  by  the  enemy,  groups 
of  men  cut  off  from  the  bridges  by  the  successful  rush 
upon  the  villages.  On  the  French  side  of  the  stream, 
the  Breton  corps  was  retiring  in  some  confusion.  There 
is  disorder  even  after  a  successful  attack;  and,  after  a 
repulse  like  this  there  must  be  disorder  that  might  easily 
degenerate  into  rout.  Guns  and  wagons  were  galloping 
back,  regiments  were  mingled  together,  and  amid  the 
retiring  troops  there  was  a  wild  flight  of  the  villagers. 
But  the  Breton  is  a  good  fighting  man ;  a  rally  was  made 
along  the  railway  line.  The  guns'  reopening  told  that 
the  Eleventh  Corps  was  again  in  action. 

Foch  was  undismayed  by  the  peril  of  his  right. 
"  Bah !  "  he  said  to  his  staff  officers,  "  if  they  are  attack- 
ing us  so  furiously  here,  it  must  be  because  things  are 
going  badly  with  them  elsewhere,  and  they  are  trying 
to  get  some  compensation." 

He  rode  up  to  a  Breton  regiment  as  it  rallied,  and 
pointing  towards  the  Saxon  line  said,  "  My  boys,  you 
must  kill  tliose  fellows  to  hold  them  back."  "  We  will, 
mon  G(^n(^ral,"  came  a  cheery  reply  from  the  ranks. 

But  the  retirement  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  had  further 
unfortunate  consequences.  The  rush  of  broken  men  and 
fugitive  peasantry  from  Ecury  and  Nomine  had  come 
pouring  into  the  artillery  positions  of  the  Ninth  Corps, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  177 

and  temporarily  put  several  of  General  de  Moussy's  bat- 
teries out  of  action.  At  the  same  time  the  Prussian 
Guard  attacked  in  front.  The  line  fell  back  to  form 
again  for  battle  in  the  scattered  woods  from  Mont  Aout 
to  the  village  of  Puits  west  of  Fere  Champenoise.  The 
left  of  the  Breton  line  had  to  be  swung  back  to  conform 
to  this  retirement.  In  the  forenoon  the  French  front 
ran  from  near  Mailly,  on  a  line  south  of  the  Sommesous 
-Fere  Champenoise  road,  with  the  centre  beyond  the 
town  in  the  woods ;  and  the  line  was  continued  by  Mont 
Aout  and  the  Allemant  spur,  with  the  sharp  salient 
about  Mondement  still  holding  good  and  linking  up  on 
the  plateau  with  the  Fourth  Army. 

F^re  Champenoise  lies  in  a  hollow.  Its  defence  de- 
pends on  the  holding  of  the  higher  ground  to  the  north 
and  east  of  it.  The  Prussian  Guard  advanced  into  the 
place  between  10  and  11  o'clock,  joining  hands  with  the 
Saxon  right.  Some  of  the  tall  grenadiers  of  Prussia 
came  in  at  the  parade  step,  with  fife  and  drum  playing 
a  lively  march.  They  evidently  thought  the  battle  was 
won — not  only  the  centre  of  Foch's  army  broken 
through  but  the  whole  Ninth  Army,  which  was  itself 
the  centre  of  Joffre's  great  battle  line  on  the  point  of 
collapse.  But  Foch  did  not  mean  to  be  defeated.  A 
story  went  round  the  French  press,  that  he  telegraphed 
to  Joffre :  "  Situation  excellent.  My  centre  is  broken 
and  my  right  has  given  way,  but  I  am  attacking."  The 
message  does  not  seem  a  likely  one.  Foch  would  hardly 
send  scant  tidings  that  seemed  to  indicate  disaster ;  but 
if  not  authentic,  the  message  expressed  the  spirit  of  the 
man,  who  would  not  hear  of  failure  and  was  determined 
to  snatch  victory  even  from  the  jaws  of  impending 
defeat. 


178  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

For  the  moment  his  object  was  to  hold  the  German 
advance,  not  by  mere  passive  resistance,  but  by  a  series 
of  counter-attacks :  to  steady  his  own  men  by  the  sense 
of  local  successes :  to  wear  down  the  energy  of  the  Saxon 
onset:  to  keep  the  Guards  busy  about  Fere  Cham- 
penoise:  and  meanwhile  to  prepare  a  counter-stroke 
that  would  restore  the  battle. 

At  1  P.M.,  sixty  guns,  posted  from  the  slopes  of  Mont 
Aout  to  the  farm  of  St.  Sophie  on  the  margin  of  the 
woods,  opened  on  the  ground  about  Fere  Champenoise ; 
and  supported  by  their  fire  the  52nd  Division  (Battesti) , 
withdrawn  during  the  morning  from  the  left  centre,  at- 
tacked the  Prussian  Guard  and  prevented  them  from 
gaining  ground  beyond  the  low  ridge  west  of  the  town. 
Later  in  the  afternoon,  an  attack  was  made  from  the 
Mont  Aout  woods  across  the  Bannes-Fere  Champenoise 
road  towards  the  railway.  It  was  stopped  dead  by  a 
huge  array  of  German  machine  guns  strung  out  on  a 
front  of  a  mile  beyond  the  road.  On  the  other  side 
of  the  road,  Eydoux's  Bretons  attacked  towards  Con- 
nantry,  and  gained  ground  for  awhile,  but  towards 
nightfall  had  to  fall  back;  and  the  Eleventh  Corps  by 
evening  was  south  of  the  little  Maurienne  brook,  by 
Corroy  and  Gourgan^*on,  with  the  11th  Division  about 
Semoine,  and  De  I'Esp^e's  troopers,  cyclists  and  horse 
batteries  still  holding  the  flank  about  Mailly. 

On  the  left,  things  were  going  better.  D'Esperey's 
army  had  made  good  progress  at  the  Suzanne  plateau. 
His  centre  was  up  to  the  Petit  Morin,  and  his  most  ad- 
vanced troops  had  got  into  Montmirail,  though  his  right 
had  made  mucli  less  progress.  Grosetti's  42nd  Division 
had  scored  heavily  in  a  number  of  local  counter-attacks, 
and  was  keeping  touch  with  the  advance  of  the  Fifth 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  179 

Army.  Humbert's  Zouaves  and  Marines  were  clinging 
to  the  ground  about  Mondement,  but  they  were  fiercely 
attacked  by  the  Hanoverians  in  front  and  from  the 
right ;  a  huge  concentration  of  artillery  was  raining  its 
shells  on  the  contested  ground,  and  as  the  darkness 
came  on  it  seemed  that  the  old  castle  of  Mondement  was 
ablaze.  At  other  points  of  the  battlefield,  burning  vil- 
lages reddened  the  sky.  The  whole  front  was  wrapped 
in  clouds  of  drifting  smoke  and  dust. 

All  of  Foch's  reserves  were  in  line  and  much  ground 
had  been  lost.  Weary  men,  lying  down  in  their  fight- 
ing positions  to  snatch  a  brief  sleep,  felt  anxious  enough 
as  to  what  the  morrow  would  bring.  It  seemed  not 
unlikely  that  the  French  centre  would  be  broken 
through,  with  disastrous  consequences  to  the  whole  of 
Joffre's  line. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  VICTORIOUS   MAN(EUVBB 

In  that  night  of  September  8th,  after  a  day  of  over- 
whelming anxieties,  Foch  drew  up  the  orders  that  were 
to  make  the  9th  a  day  of  victory. 

In  examining  his  teaching  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre, 
we  have  seen  how  he  insisted  on  the  supreme  importance 
of  the  commander's  "  will  to  conquer,"  of  his  determina- 
tion, of  his  calm  combination  of  all  the  means  in  hand 
to  attack  and  to  give  the  decisive  direction  to  the  blow. 
"  The  army  is  for  its  chief,"  he  said,  "  what  the  sword- is 
for  the  soldier.  It  tells  only  through  the  impulse,  the 
direction  of  the  energy  that  he  gives  to  it." 

Napoleon  had  said :  "  It  was  not  the  Roman  legions 
that  conquered  Gaul;  it  was  Caesar.  It  was  not  the 
Carthaginian  soldiers,  but  Hannibal,  that  made  Rome 
tremble.  It  was  not  the  Macedonian  phalanx,  but  Alex- 
ander, that  penetrated  into  India.  It  was  not  the 
French  army  but  Turenne  that  made  a  way  to  the  Weser 
and  the  Inn.  It  was  not  the  Prussian  soldiers  who 
defended  Prussia  for  seven  years  against  the  three  most 
formidable  Powers  in  Europe;  it  was  Frederick  the 
Great." 

As  a  teacher,  he  made  the  great  master's  words  his 
own.  The  chief,  the  man,  not  the  mere  crowd  of  armed 
men,  was  the  winner  of  victory.  He  was  now  to  prove 
the  fact  by  liis  own  actions  in  command. 

And  how  was  the  blow — the  ideal  victory-compelling 

180 


THE  VICTORIOUS  MANCEUVRE  181 

blow — to  be  directed?  There  must,  if  possible,  be  an 
element  of  surprise  in  it,  not  the  surprise  of  the  am- 
buscade and  the  like  in  the  operations  of  little  wars, 
but  the  tactical  surprise,  "  the  sudden  intervention  of 
unexpected  force "  striking  hard  and  effectively  and 
bringing  to  the  opponent  the  sense  of  his  inability  to 
parry  the  blow,  "  the  conviction  that  he  cannot  conquer, 
which  is  the  same  thing  as  saying  that  he  is  conquered." 
His  will  must  be  broken  by  this  "  unexpected  blow  of 
supreme  vigour," 

The  point  of  attack  must  be  well  chosen.  The  enemy's 
line  may  seem  to  be  standing  fast  like  a  breakwater 
against  a  rising  tide,  but,  if  the  leader  can  see  "  a  fis- 
sure in  the  edifice,  a  point  of  insufficient  resistance,  or 
if  by  a  special  combination  he  can  add  to  the  regular 
methodical  action  of  the  tide  an  effect  like  that  of  the 
blow  of  a  battering  ram  capable  of  shattering  the  struc- 
ture at  one  point,  the  equilibrium  is  broken  down,  and 
through  the  breach  thus  produced  the  mass  at  once 
pushes  forward,  bearing  down  every  obstacle.  We  must 
seek  for  this  fissure,  this  point  of  insufficient  resistance, 
or  make  it  by  organizing  for  this  purpose  our  battering- 
ram  blow  on  one  point  of  the  enemy's  line,  so  as  to 
arrive  at  the  same  result.  This  is  the  manoeuvre 
battle."  * 

Here  was  the  theory  of  the  manoeuvre  that  was  to 
save  the  Ninth  Army  and  break  the  centre  of  the  Ger- 
man battle  line — a  theory  elaborated  fourteen  years 
earlier  than  the  day  when  Foch  made  himself  famous 
by  its  execution. 

Normally  for  such  a  blow  there  should  be  a  reserve  in 
hand.    But  all  Foch's  reserves  had  been  thrown  into  the 

*  Principes  de  la  Ousrre,  p.  280. 


182  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

fight  during  the  anxious  hours  of  September  8th.  He 
must  improvise  a  reserve  and  he  could  do  this  only 
by  temporarily  withdrawing  it  from  his  fighting  line. 
What  troops  was  he  to  take?  Where  was  he  to  risk 
the  weakening  of  his  hard-pressed  front?  He  made  a 
bold  decision,  but  one  that  at  the  same  time  showed 
how  closely  he  had  followed  the  developments  of  the 
long  struggle  and  how^  well  he  could  judge  which  leader, 
which  division,  was  best  fitted  for  the  daring  manoeuvre 
he  was  planning. 

Of  all  the  troops  engaged,  Grosetti's  division  had 
shown  most  persistent  enterprise  in  its  repeated  coun- 
ter-attacks on  the  Hanoverian  front  near  Mondement. 
It  was  to  be  withdrawn.  A  message  was  sent  to 
D'Esperey,  asking  him  to  give  what  help  he  could  to  the 
left  of  the  Ninth  Army.  And  at  5  a.m.  on  September 
10th,  Grosetti  received  his  orders  for  the  day. 

Humbert  and  the  Morocco  division  were  to  hold  on 
upon  the  left.  Grosetti  was  to  disengage  his  battalions 
and  batteries  from  the  fighting  line.  As  soon  as 
D'Esperey's  men  came  up  to  relieve  them,  he  was  to  get 
them  together  and  march  to  a  new  front  between  Linthes 
and  Pleurs,  which  he  was  to  reach  by  midday.  Arrived 
there,  he  was  to  push  forward  between  the  Ninth  and 
Eleventh  Corps,  and  fall  upon  the  flank  of  the  Saxons. 

The  actual  wording  of  this  important  order  ( dated  on 
the  evening  of  the  8th)  is  interesting.  "  The  42nd  Divi- 
sion, as  soon  as  it  is  relieved  by  the  Tenth  Army  Corps, 
will  march  by  Broyes  and  St.  Loup,  to  form  a  reserve 
for  the  army  on  the  line  Linthes-Pleurs.  The  point  of 
to-morrow's  manoeuvre  is  to  debouch  by  F^re  Champe- 
noise.  Reports  to  be  sent  on  all  available  forces  and  all 
activity  in  this  direction.  .    .    .  Whatever  the  situation 


a: 

-XT 

0> 


THE  VICTORIOUS  MANCEUVRE  183 

of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  we  count  upon  resuming  the 
offensive  against  the  front  Connantre-Corroy,  an  offen- 
sive in  which  the  Ninth  Army  Corps  will  co-operate  on 
the  line  Morains-F6re  Champenoise." 

Foch  believed  he  had  found  the  "  fissure  " — the  weak 
point  in  the  enemy's  front  against  which  the  battering 
ram  was  to  be  swung.  Why  had  he  chosen  it?  The 
Prussian  Guard  was  being  held  about  F^re  Champe- 
noise.  Von  Hansen's  Saxons  were  pressing  back  the 
Breton  corps,  and  by  the  evening  of  the  8th  had  gained 
more  ground  than  the  Guard,  with  the  result  that  the 
Saxon  right  towards  Corroy  and  Gourgangon  was  well 
south  of  the  left  of  the  Guard  on  the  ridges  near  Fere 
Champenoise.  There  was  not  an  actual  opening  in  the 
enemy's  line ;  but  the  meeting  point  of  two  separate  com- 
mands, tending  to  move  forward  in  even  slightly  diver- 
gent directions,  is  likely  to  be  weak.  Foch  did  not  trust 
to  probabilities.  He  had  in  his  teaching  again  and 
again  shown  the  danger  of  depending  on  theories  as  to 
what  must  he  the  enemy's  position,  instead  of  definitely 
ascertaining  it.  Reports  from  the  fighting  line  showed 
that  there  was  no  strong  body  of  the  enemy  holding  the 
ground  between  the  Guard  and  the  Saxons,  Here  the 
battering  ram  could  be  driven  home,  the  blow  being 
aimed  against  Von  Hansen's  flank.  Foch's  note,  that 
"  whatever  the  situation  of  the  Eleventh  Corps "  the 
offensive  w^ould  take  place  in  this  direction,  shows  how 
well  he  judged  the  situation.  He  foresaw  the  prob- 
ability of  Eydoux's  line  being  pushed  further  to  the 
southwards,  but  he  also  judged  that  the  Saxon  advance 
in  pursuit  would  if  anything  tend  to  weaken  the  enemy's 
line  at  the  point  he  had  selected  for  his  stroke. 

Of  course  a  risk  was  being  run ;  but  there  are  seldom 


184  MAESHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

certainties  in  war  even  as  to  the  events  of  a  few  hours 
hence.  "  Ca  pouvait  reussir,  ga  pouvait  rater/' — "  It 
might  succeed,  it  might  miss  fire,"  said  Foch,  talking  of 
his  plan,  some  months  later.  But  it  was  to  succeed. 
And  it  had  the  element  of  the  unexpected  for  the  enemy. 
The  Germans  might  well  believe  that  Foch  was  at  the 
end  of  his  reserves,  and  could  hardly  imagine  that  he 
would  be  able  to  detach  a  whole  division  from  his  hard- 
pressed  left,  to  bring  it  to  the  aid  of  his  right.  It  was 
not  the  kind  of  manoeuvre  that  the  old-fashioned  writers 
on  tactics  would  have  approved.  But  the  element  of 
surprise  was  supremely  useful.  A  French  writer  has 
not  inaptly  compared  it  to  the  move  of  castling  at  chess, 
that  suddenly  at  a  critical  moment  brings  a  powerful 
piece  unexpectedly  into  play.  Foch  was  castling  with 
Grosetti's  division. 

After  issuing  his  orders  to  his  generals,  Foch  wrote 
an  order  of  the  day  to  be  read  to  every  unit  of  his  corps 
in  the  morning,  so  as  to  convey  to  officers  and  men  his 
own  confidence  and  determination.  What  he  said  at  the 
outset  of  this  proclamation,  about  the  condition  of  the 
enemy,  was  his  own  deliberate  judgment  of  the  situa- 
tion and  no  mere  fiction  for  the  encouragement  of  his 
men.  He  had  noted  the  strange  slowness  of  the  Ger- 
mans to  follow  up  and  enlarge  the  successes  they  had 
won.  Their  driving  force  must  be  nearly  exhausted. 
Messages  from  Joffre  told  him  they  were  giving  way  on 
other  parts  of  the  long  battle  line.  Foch  felt  that  a 
success  against  their  centre  would  be  decisive,  and  he 
meant  to  secure  that  success,  and  boldly  predicted  vic- 
tory as  the  result  of  dogged  resistance  coupled  with  the 
blow  he  had  planned.  So  he  told  his  officers  and  men  in 
his  order  of  the  day : 


^ 


CO 

St 

0 

^4 


2 


THE  VICTORIOUS  MANCEUVRE  185 

"  The  German  army  is  in  the  last  stage  of  exhaustion ; 
the  units  and  the  orders  are  hopelessly  entangled;  the 
command  has  lost  its  bearings.  The  vigorous  offensive 
of  our  troops  has  taken  the  enemy  by  surprise;  he 
counted  on  our  offering  no  further  resistance.  It  is  of 
the  last  importance  to  take  advantage  of  this  state  of 
affairs.  At  this  decisive  hour,  when  the  honour  and. 
the  existence  of  France  are  at  stake,  officers  must  draw 
from  the  energy  of  our  race  the  strength  to  hold  out  till 
the  moment  when  the  enemy  shall  retire  exhausted.  The 
disorder  in  the  German  ranks  is  the  sign  of  our  coming 
victory ;  our  army  has  only  to  throw  all  its  energy  into 
the  continuance  of  this  struggle,  to  stop  the  enemy's 
advance  and  hurl  him  out  of  our  country.  But  every 
one  must  be  convinced  that  success  is  to  those  who  hold 
out  the  longest." 

Having  thus  done  what  he  could  to  "  organize  vic- 
tory," he  confidently  awaited  the  result.  There  must  be 
many  anxious  hours  before  the  decisive  moment.  What 
was  to  happen  in  the  meantime? 

Grosetti's  men  were  not  particularly  pleased  at  the 
order  to  break  off  the  fight  on  the  plateau  and  march 
to  a  new  position  behind  the  battle  line.  "  We  are  scor- 
ing here.  Why  do  they  take  us  away?  "  was  what  they 
asked.  It  took  some  time  to  get  them  all  out  of  action. 
They  were  replaced  partly  by  Humbert's  Moroccans, 
partly  by  troops  from  the  Tenth  Corps  of  D'Esperey's 
army ;  but  these  last  did  not  arrive  till  some  hours  had 
passed.  Meanwhile  a  whole  Hanoverian  brigade  had 
been  flung  against  Mondement,  and  drove  the  French 
out  of  the  village,  and  stormed  the  castle.  But  the 
enemy  gained  no  further  ground.  Humbert  first  stopped 
their  attempts  to  debouch  from  Mondement,  and  then 
counter-attacked  with  his  troops.  He  had  sent  to 
Dubois  of  the  Ninth  Corps  for  help,  and  a  regiment 


186  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

hurried  to  reinforce  him.  Grosetti  brought  three  of  his 
batteries  into  action  in  support,  leaving  them  to  rejoin 
his  line  of  march  later  on.  The  Germans  showed  an  un- 
expected lack  of  enterprise  on  this  side.  They  seemed 
content  to  hold  what  they  had  won,  and  for  hours 
merely  stood  on  the  defensive  against  Humbert's  series 
of  attacks. 

On  the  centre  and  right  they  were  pressing  the  attack. 
The  Saxons,  making  the  most  of  their  advantage  of  more 
powerful  artillery  and  superior  numbers — two  corps 
against  one  and  a  half — were  steadily  forcing  Eydoux's 
Eleventh  Corps  back  from  the  line  of  the  Maurienne. 
Fighting  doggedly,  the  Bretons  and  the  60th  Division 
had  to  abandon  Corroy,  Gourgangon  and  Semoine.  De 
I'Espee  had  to  retire  from  Mailly,  in  order  to  conform 
to  the  movement  of  the  infantry.  Midday  came,  but 
Grosetti  had  not  arrived.  He  had  not  been  able  to 
assemble  his  division  for  hours  after  he  received  that 
order,  and  it  was  after  eleven  when  he  began  the  march 
from  the  plateau. 

Early  in  the  afternoon,  the  Ninth  Corps  had  to  give 
ground.  The  Prussian  Guard  had  penetrated  as  far  as 
Conantre.  The  position  on  Mont  Aoiit,  and  in  the 
woods  on  the  plain  below  it,  was  in  danger.  Before  an 
attack  by  the  Guard,  covered  by  a  tremendous  artillery 
fire,  these  positions  were  abandoned.  For  awhile  there 
was  dangerous  confusion.  A  spectator  of  the  scene  tells 
how  he  saw  the  French  coming  out  of  the  woods,  first  by 
twos  and  threes,  then  in  crowds — then  a  rush  of  cavalry, 
artillery  wagons  and  guns,  galloping  back,  under  a  hail 
of  shrapnel  and  a  burst  of  rifle  fire  from  the  margin  of 
the  woods.  The  line  was  re-established  from  Mont 
Chalmont  across  the  railway  in  front  of  Linthes  and 


THE  VICTORIOUS  MANOEUVRE  187 

Pleurs,  to  keep  touch  with  the  retiring  Eleventh  Corps, 
whose  left  was  now  near  Fresnay. 

The  line  was  dangerously  weak  on  the  plain  by  the 
railway.  "  The  weaker  one  is,  the  more  one  should  at- 
tack," Foch  had  said ;  and  local  counter-attacks  held  the 
enemy,  who  seemed  exhausted  by  his  efforts.  And  the 
progress  southward  of  the  Saxon  advance  had,  if  any- 
thing, made  the  "  fissure  "  between  Von  Hansen's  right 
and  the  left  of  the  Guard  more  vulnerable.  And  at  last 
Grosetti  was  near  at  hand. 

Forming  betw^een  the  villages  of  Linthes  and  Lin- 
thelles,  he  led  his  division  forward  about  four  o'clock 
in  the  direction  of  CEuvy,  the  left  towards  the  railway, 
the  right  towards  the  hollow  of  the  Maurienne  brook. 
This  was  the  battering-ram  blow  striking  in  towards  the 
flank  and  rear  of  the  Saxons.  But  it  was  no  isolated 
effort.  The  order  had  been  sent  along  the  lines  by  Foch 
to  attack  everywhere.  The  Eleventh  Corps  found  the 
Saxons  already  retiring,  and  cleared  the  woods  south  of 
Gourgangon  with  little  resistance.  Grosetti  captured 
Conantre  and  Corroy,  and  got  into  touch  with  the  left 
of  Eydoux's  advance.  The  Ninth  Corps  regained  a 
footing  in  the  Mont  Aot.t  woods.  One  of  Grosetti's 
regiments  went  still  forward  after  nightfall,  halted  well 
to  the  front  of  the  woods,  and  in  the  dawn  of  the  fol- 
lowing day  was  into  F^re  Champenoise,  which  the 
enemy  had  evacuated  in  the  night. 

On  the  other  flank,  Humbert  had  been  attacking  about 
Mondement  all  through  the  day.  The  attack  on  the  old 
chateau  in  particular  was  renewed  again  and  again  with 
reckless  daring.  It  had  become  a  point  of  honour  to 
recapture  it.  It  was  like  the  desperate  fighting  that 
takes  place  to  secure  a  standard  or  a  gun.    Mondement 


188  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

had  become  something  like  a  trophy  of  success  or  failure. 
Late  in  the  evening,  the  French  flag  flew  again  from 
one  of  the  turrets.  Colonel  Letoquoi  had  run  three  guns 
up  close  to  the  wall,  breached  it  and  stormed  the  gap 
thus  made,  not  without  the  loss  of  many  brave  men. 

On  this  side  the  Tenth  Corps — men  of  northern  Brit- 
tany and  the  Cherbourg  peninsula,  soldiers  from 
Rennes,  St.  Brieuc  and  St.  Malo — sent  to  Foch's  help 
by  D'Esperey,  had  advanced  across  the  Petit  Morin  as 
far  as  Fromenti^res  and  were  pressing  towards  Baye 
on  the  road  from  St.  Prix  northwards  to  Epernay. 
Thus  the  direct  line  of  retreat  for  the  Germans  about 
Mondement  was  soon  to  be  cut,  and  they  had  to  retire 
by  the  roads  across  the  marshes. 

That  evening  Foch  knew  that  he  had  won  a  great  vic- 
tory. Next  day  would  show  its  full  extent,  and  he  must 
make  the  most  of  it.  His  orders,  issued  late  on  the 
Wednesday  evening  for  the  operations  of  Thursday,  Sep- 
tember 10th,  directed  that  the  offensive  was  to  be  re- 
sumed at  5  A.M. — just  before  sunrise.  The  Tenth  Corps, 
now  transferred  to  his  command  by  D'Esperey,  was  to 
attack  north  of  the  marshes  of  St.  Gond,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Berg^res-lez-Vertus,  against  the  enemy's  north- 
ern line  of  retreat.  The  Ninth  Army  Corps  was  to  ad- 
vance between  the  east  end  of  the  marshes  and  the 
F^re  Champenoise-Vitry  railway,  its  objectives  being 
Morains-le-Petit,  Ecury-le-Repos  and  Norm(?e.  The 
42nd  Division  was  to  advance  through  F^re  Champe- 
noise.  The  Eleventh  Corps  was  to  push  forward 
through  OEuvy  towards  Lenhar^e.  D'Esp^e's  cavalry 
division  was  to  protect  the  right  of  the  advance  and 
keep  touch  by  patrols  with  the  left  of  the  Third  Army, 
which  was  moving  on  Vitry-le-Frangois. 


THE  VICTORIOUS  MANCEUVRE  189 

Many  of  the  popular  narratives  of  the  battle,  pub- 
lished in  the  press  soon  after  the  event,  stated  that  on 
September  9th  Foch  had  been  informed  by  his  aviators 
that  there  was  a  gap  between  the  left  of  Von  Billow's 
army  and  the  right  of  Von  Hansen's,  and  that  his  vic- 
torious manoeuvre  was  a  sudden  thrust  into  this  open- 
ing. But  we  have  seen  that  the  manoeuvre  which  de- 
cided the  victory  was  a  much  more  difficult  and  delicate 
operation.  Foch  had  divined  the  weak  spot  of  the  Ger- 
man front,  and  improvised  a  reserve,  and  used  it  to 
make  the  breach,  which  only  came  into  existence  next 
day,  as  the  Guards  corps  on  Von  Btilow's  left,  and  the 
Saxon  corps  on  Von  Hansen's  right  were  forced  on  to 
divergent  lines  of  retreat,  with  Foch's  victorious  army 
pushing  in  between  them.  It  was  not  on  September 
9th,  but  on  the  10th,  that  the  aviator  Brindejonc  de 
Moulinais  reported  a  gap  in  the  German  line  with  only 
some  cavalry  watching  it. 

The  enemy  had  begun  his  retreat  in  the  night;  and 
the  French  advance  on  the  left  and  centre  met  with 
opposition  only  from  rearguards,  that  nowhere  during 
the  morning  of  the  10th  made  any  prolonged  or  deter- 
mined stand.  At  5  a.m.,  the  hour  named  for  the  ad- 
vance to  be  resumed,  a  regiment  of  the  42nd  Division, 
which  had  halted  far  to  the  front  the  night  before,  was 
marching  into  Fere  Champenoise,  where  it  found  many 
wounded  and  stragglers  of  the  Prussian  Guard.  The 
Guard  had  marched  towards  Vertus  in  the  night,  mostly 
by  the  good  road  from  F^re  Champenoise  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Rheims.  The  detachments  of  the  corps,  which 
retired  from  Bannes,  crossed  the  marsh  road  to 
Anizeux,  a  narrow  metalled  causeway,  but  a  good  hard 
track,  even  though  some  heavy  rain  fell  in  the  night — 


190  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

the  first  rain  after  long  days  of  clear  skies  and  torrid 
heat.  Some  stragglers  may  have  been  lost  in  the 
swamps  and  deep  pools  of  the  marshes  of  St.  Gond ;  but 
there  was  no  foundation  for  the  legend,  which,  first 
spread  through  the  French  and  Allied  newspapers,  was 
then  repeated  in  more  than  one  serious  history  of  the 
war.  It  was  a  story  of  the  Prussian  Guard  being  driven 
into  the  desolate  swamp,  amid  a  deluge  of  rain  that 
made  the  meadowlands  impassable — of  whole  companies 
of  men  drowned  in  mud  and  water,  and  whole  batteries 
of  guns  and  convoys  of  wagons  sunk  to  the  axles  and 
left  to  be  collected  by  the  victorious  French.  All  wars 
have  been  fruitful  in  picturesque  legends; — this  was 
one  of  them.* 

Towards  midday  the  resistance  of  the  German  rear- 
guards became  more  serious.  Dubois  had  reoccupied 
Morains-le-Petit  but  north  of  it  his  advance  was  held. 
At  St.  Prix,  at  the  other  end  of  the  marshes,  the  advance 
of  the  Tenth  Corps  found  only  an  abandoned  barricade 
at  the  bridge.  North  of  the  marshes  there  was  a  good 
deal  of  fighting,  with  rearguards  steadily  falling  back 
towards  Vertus  and  outflanked  more  than  once  by  Hum- 
bert's Moroccans,  when  towards  midday  they  crossed 
the  roads  of  the  marsh. 

Grosetti,  with  the  42nd  Division,  was  in  action  about 
5.30  A.M.  marching  towards  Lenhar^e.  The  Eleventh 
Corps  was  pressing  forward  on  its  right,  and  De  I'Esp^e 


*  M.  Charloa  le  Goflfic',  in  his  work  Les  Marais  de  St.  Gond,  trans- 
lated into  EnprliHli  undor  the  title  of  "General  Foch  at  the  Marne," 
deals  vi'ry  fully  with  the  story,  and  shows  how  unfoimded  it  was;  and 
he  juatly  remarks,  "That  which  was  swallowed  up  in  the  marshes,  that 
which  foundered  desperat'ly  in  their  {jreen  depths,  was  more  than  a 
few  crack  battalions — it  was  the  prestige  of  the  German  army  and  of 
its  pretended  invincibility  ...  On  this  occasion,  at  least,  the  reality 
ig  finer  than  the  legend." 


THE  VICTORIOUS  MANCEUVRE  191 

reoccupied  Mailly.  The  Saxons  made  a  determined 
stand  for  some  hours  along  the  line  of  the  Somme.  At 
Sommesous,  where  Joppe's  60th  Division  was  attacking, 
they  held  their  ground  all  through  the  day.  Further  to 
the  north,  their  batteries,  massed  along  the  margin  of 
the  woods  beyond  the  river,  put  up  a  regular  barrage 
along  the  railway  line  on  the  west  bank.  It  was  not  till 
the  afternoon  that  the  French  occupied  Ecury,  Norm^e 
and  Lenharee.  They  were  now  on  the  ground  where  the 
Eleventh  Corps  had  fought  in  the  first  stage  of  the  bat- 
tle. The  narratives  of  French  officers,  who  took  part  in 
the  advance,  tell  of  the  awful  aspect  of  the  battlefield. 
Round  the  villages,  along  the  roads  and  the  river  banks 
and  in  the  woods,  lay  thousands  of  dead,  decomposing  in 
the  hot  sun,  where  they  had  lain  for  days.  It  was  as  one 
soldier  writes,  "a  Dantesque  spectacle";  and  more 
than  one  confesses  that  he  felt  ill  in  the  sickly  atmos- 
phere amid  those  scenes  of  death  in  its  most  repulsive 
form. 

On  the  left  of  the  Somme  line,  about  Sommesous,  and 
to  the  east  of  it,  the  Saxons  held  their  ground  all  day. 
They  were  making  a  desperate  stand  to  cover  the  retire- 
ment of  the  rest  of  Von  Hansen's  army,  which  was  now 
in  a  deep  salient  pointing  south,  with  Foch  on  the  one 
side,  and  De  Langle  de  Cary's  army  on  the  other,  threat- 
ening it  with  envelopment.  At  Vitry,  De  Langle's  ad- 
vance was  held  before  formidable  entrenchments,  where 
a  strong  rearguard  made  a  stand  that  secured  the 
retreat. 

Foch  had  established  his  headquarters  at  F^re  Cham- 
penoise  about  midday.  On  the  report  that  the  line  of 
the  Somme  had  been  won,  he  issued  an  order  to  press 
on  towards  the  Sonde;  but  the  Saxon  resistance  in  the 


192  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

woods  beyond  the  river  prevented  much  progress  being 
made,  and  towards  evening  Grosetti  ordered  a  halt  till 
daylight  next  morning.  The  order  failed  to  reach  Col- 
onel Deville  and  the  162nd  Regiment,  in  the  woods  in 
front  of  Lenharee.  They  moved  forward  under  the  im- 
pression that  they  still  had  other  columns  advancing  on 
their  left  and  right.  By  a  curious  chance,  they  had  in 
front  of  them  a  gap  in  the  enemy's  line ;  and  they  passed 
through  it  without  seeing  anything  of  the  Saxons.  As 
darkness  was  coming  on,  they  issued  from  the  woods  in 
the  wide  clearing  near  Villeseneux,  only  to  come  under 
a  heavy  fire  from  a  mass  of  troops  halted  about  the  vil- 
lage and  from  machine  guns  on  the  church  tower.  They 
fell  back  towards  Lenharde  and  bivouacked  in  the  woods. 
When  they  advanced  again  next  day,  they  found  that 
Villeseneux  had  been  abandoned  by  the  enemy. 

All  along  the  line,  the  Saxon  corps  had  withdrawn 
under  cover  of  the  darkness.  Sommesous  was  occupied 
by  the  60th  Division  at  dawn  on  the  11th.  A  column 
of  De  I'Esp^e's  troops  was  sent  sweeping  forward,  seized 
two  bridges  on  the  Marne  and  in  the  course  of  the  day 
occupied  Chalons.  Foch  established  his  headquarters 
there  that  evening.  His  army  had  moved  up  to  the  river- 
line,  and  was  crossing  it  at  various  points.  The  Tenth 
Corps  was  retransferred  to  D'Esperey's  command. 

The  battle  of  the  Marne  was  won.  On  the  Allied 
right,  the  British  were  across  the  Ourcq,  and  the  enemy 
was  falling  back  to  the  Aisne.  D'Esperey  was  close  up 
to  Rhoims,  Foch  at  Chalons,  De  Langle  north  of  Vitry, 
Sarrail  holding  his  own  about  Verdun.  Beyond  the 
eastern  barrier  line,  De  Castelnau  on  the  7th  and  8th 
had  defeated  another  advance  of  Prince  Rupert's  Bava- 
rians, towards  Nancy.    The  tide  of  invasion  had  been 


THE  VICTORIOUS  MANCEUVRE  193 

turned  back,  and  the  long  war  of  entrenched  positions 
was  about  to  begin. 

Foch  had  captured  a  considerable  number  of  pris- 
oners and  much  miscellaneous  debris  of  the  enemy's 
retreat,  including  guns  shattered  by  shell  fire  and  left 
on  the  field.  The  enemy  had  lost  heavily,  but  had  made 
a  good  retreat.  The  Ninth  Army,  too,  had  suffered 
seriously,  and  paid  dearly  for  its  victory.  There  were 
regiments  commanded  by  captains,  companies  under  ser- 
geants, so  serious  had  been  the  loss  among  the  officers. 
And  when  at  last  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  was  sus- 
pended, along  the  Marne,  about  Chalons,  officers  and 
men  alike  were  near  the  end  of  their  strength.  The  long 
days  of  battle,  without  any  reserves  available  to  relieve 
the  fighting  line  in  its  struggle  with  a  heavier  artillery 
and  superior  numbers,  had  been  a  terrible  strain  on  all. 
"  The  men  were  nearly  dead  beat,  but  they  marched  all 
the  same,"  said  Foch,  speaking  of  his  army  in  the  last 
phase  of  fight.  The  victory  of  September  9th  had  given 
them  new  energy,  at  the  moment  when,  but  for  that 
stroke  of  genius  of  their  chief,  they  might  well  have 
found  themselves  on  the  verge  of  disastrous  collapse. 

It  was  that  day  which  made  the  name  of  Foch  famous 
throughout  the  world.  It  has  been  indeed  suggested 
that  when  he  flung  Grosetti's  division  against  the  weak 
point,  the  "  fissure  "  he  had  marked  in  the  enemy's  line, 
the  Germans  were  preparing  to  retreat,  if  the  retreat 
had  not  already  begun.  Years  hence,  when  the  staff  his- 
tories of  both  sides  have  been  issued  and  made  the  neces- 
sary documents  available,  it  will  be  possible  to  say  when 
the  German  orders  for  retreat  were  given,  when  they 
reached  corps,  divisions  and  brigades,  and  when  the 
movement  actually  began  in  front  of  the  Ninth  Army. 


194  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

This  much  we  do  know — that  in  the  morning  of  Septem- 
ber 9th,  French  aviators  flying  high  over  the  ground 
in  the  German  rear,  between  Chalons-sur-Marne  and 
Vertus,  thought  they  saw  the  convoys  of  baggage  wagons 
on  the  roads  being  rearranged,  and  their  teams  and 
motor-tractors  turned  so  as  to  face  northward — a  sign 
that  the  staff  was  contemplating  the  necessity  or  the 
probability  of  an  early  retirement.  But  it  is  also  fairly 
clear  that  hours  later  in  the  afternoon,  the  Guard  was 
still  attacking  to  the  north  of  Fere  Champenoise,  and 
succeeded  in  driving  the  French  from  the  woods  near 
Mont  Aout,  and  Von  Hansen's  Saxons  were  pressing 
slowly  but  steadily  forward,  driving  back  Eydoux's 
Bretons  south  of  the  Gourgangon-Vitry  road,  and  he  had 
dug  himself  in  about  Vitry  as  if  to  secure  a  pivot  for  his 
advance.  It  would  seem  then  that  the  hope  of  breaking 
down  the  resistance  of  Foch  and  piercing  the  French 
centre  had  not  yet  been  abandoned,  and  it  was  the  at- 
tack at  the  weak  junction  of  the  line  between  Von  Btilow 
and  Von  Hansen  that  finally  determined  the  retreat, 
while  the  same  movement  rendered  the  retreat,  when  it 
began,  a  perilous  operation. 

One  may  take  it  that  both  sides  were  in  the  position 
that  frequently  develops  in  the  course  of  prolonged 
battle.  Losses  had  been  heavy,  and  the  strain  on  the 
endurance  of  all  was  becoming  each  hour  more  severe. 
Both  were  nearing  the  breaking  point.  In  such  a  situa- 
tion the  victory  is  for  the  side  that  can  make  one  more 
determined  effort.  Foch's  energy  and  insight  produced 
this  supreme  effort  at  the  critical  moment  and  in  the 
most  decisive  direction,  and  victory  was  the  result.  He 
deserves  all  the  credit  given  to  him  for  it,  even  if  at  the 
moment  when  his  "  battering  ram  "  was  driven  into  the 


THE  VICTORIOUS  MANCEUVRE  195 

German  line,  the  enemy's  leaders  were  already  losing 
heart,  and  preparing  to  abandon  the  hard- fought  field. 
The  French  Government  therefore  aptly  characterized 
the  service  he  had  rendered  to  the  Allied  cause,  when 
in  bestowing  upon  him  the  Grand  Cross  of  the  Legion 
of  Honour  in  recognition  of  his  leadership  in  the  battle 
of  the  Marne,  it  summed  up  his  exploits  by  saying : 

"  For  several  days  he  held  back  the  violent  attacks 
-directed  against  our  centre,  and  finally  drove  back  the 
enemy  to  the  northwards  by  a  vigorous  offensive,  giving 
proof  of  calm  determination  and  remarkable  skill  in 
manoeuvre,  sustained  by  energy  and  tenacity  that  rose 
superior  to  every  difficulty." 


CHAPTER  XIII 

FOCH  AT  YPRES 

FoCH  had  his  headquarters  at  Ch^lons-sur-Marne  on 
the  evening  of  September  11th.  He  remained  there  for 
a  little  more  than  three  weeks. 

His  first  care  was  to  reorganize  the  sorely  tried  Ninth 
Army,  with  the  help  of  drafts  sent  from  the  depots  to 
replace  its  losses.  For  the  time  being,  it  was  in  reserve 
in  the  second  line  of  the  fighting  front  in  Champagne — 
on  which  there  was  now  little  activity  on  either  side.  '  It 
was  formed  by  the  Fourth  Army  (De  Langle  de  Gary) 
facing  the  Argonne,  and  the  Fifth  (D'Esperey)  about 
Rheims. 

The  battle  of  the  Aisne  had  begun  on  September  13th, 
and  at  first  seemed  to  promise  a  new  success  for  the 
Allies.  But  now  the  second  phase  of  the  war  began  to 
develop.  The  enemy  had  dug  himself  in  solidly  on  the 
Aisne  heights,  where  he  was  supported  by  masses  of 
heavy  artillery;  and  it  was  soon  realized  that  frontal 
attacks  against  this  improvised  fortress  could  only  end 
in  costly  failure. 

Joffre  now  decided  on  turning  the  position  by  an  ad- 
vance up  the  Oise  valley  towards  Noyon,  so  as  to  strike 
in  behind  the  German  flank.  It  was  an  obvious  expe- 
dient, and  the  enemy  was  ready  for  it.  De  Cnstelnau 
was  broiiglit  from  the  east  of  France,  and  with  the 
Second  Army  came  into  action  prolonging  the  line  of 

196 


FOCH  AT  YPRES  197 

Maunoury's  Sixth  Army,  which  formed  the  Allied  left. 
He  found  at  once  strong  German  forces  barring  his  way. 
Then  another  army — the  Tenth  under  General  Maud'- 
huy — was  brought  into  line,  prolonging  the  French  front 
northwards  across  the  Somme  to  the  east  of  Amiens. 
Once  more  a  German  army  was  placed  in  position  to  bar 
the  flank  attack.  As  the  French  line  lengthened  north- 
wards, the  German  extension  kept  pace  with  it.  What 
the  French  official  bulletin  called  the  "  course  a  la  Mer  " 
— the  "  race  to  the  sea  " — had  begun. 

Towards  the  end  of  September,  it  was  clear  that 
another  dangerous  crisis  of  the  war  was  rapidly  develop- 
ing. German  cavalry,  supported  by  armed  motor-cars 
and  infantry  detachments,  were  appearing  on  the 
Franco-Belgian  border  between  Lille  and  Dunkirk; 
news  through  Holland  told  of  continual  transport  of 
troops  from  east  to  west  through  Belgium;  a  German 
army  was  closing  in  upon  Antwerp.  It  was  evident  that 
the  enemy  was  preparing  to  besiege  the  famous  fortress, 
clear  his  northern  flank  of  the  menace  based  upon  it, 
and  then  pour  a  new  tide  of  invasion  into  northern 
France,  turning  the  extended  battle  line  of  the  Allies 
before  it  could  rest  securely  upon  the  sea. 

An  ambitious  plan  was  formed  by  Joffre  and  the 
British  command  to  save  Antwerp  by  a  counter-stroke 
against  the  German  right.  The  danger  to  the  fortress 
and  the  Belgian  army  was  now  imminent.  On  Sunday, 
September  27th,  General  Von  Beseler,  who  had  been 
given  command  of  the  operations  against  Antwerp,  at- 
tacked along  the  Scheldt  about  Termonde,  the  beginning 
of  an  unsuccessful  effort  to  cut  the  Belgian  line  of 
retreat.  Next  day,  his  siege  guns,  reinforced  by  heavy 
Skoda  howitzers  manned  by  Austrian  gunners,  opened 


198  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

fire  on  the  southern  forts  of  Antwerp  at  a  range  of  seven 
miles. 

A  movement  of  the  British  army — carefully  and  suc- 
cessfully concealed — was  begun  in  order  to  transfer  it 
from  the  Aisne  front  to  Abbeville  by  rail.  Thence  it 
was  to  advance  into  Belgium,  clearing  the  French  border 
district  of  the  enemy,  saving  Lille  from  a  threatened 
hostile  occupation,  and  then  pushing  forward  to  relieve 
Antwerp,  with  the  co-operation  of  French  troops. 

Up  to  the  closing  period  of  the  battle  for  the  Aisne 
heights,  the  main  Allied  front  had  run  from  west  to  east 
along  the  Aisne,  and  across  southern  Champagne  to 
Verdun.  A  secondary  front  ran  from  Verdun  along  the 
eastern  fortress  barrier  to  the  Swiss  border  near  Bel- 
fort.  A  third  front  at  right  angles  to  the  Aisne  line 
was  now  coming  into  existence,  stretching  from  south 
to  north,  from  Compiegne  to  the  Belgian  frontier,  and 
soon  to  be  prolonged  to  the  sea.  Here  French,  British 
and  Belgian  troops  would  be  in  position  on  various 
points  of  this  new  line  of  over  a  hundred  miles  of 
frontage.  Joffre  decided  that  the  operations  on  this 
important  front  should  be  placed  under  one  general 
control. 

It  was  a  wise  decision.  Co-operation  had  to  be 
secured  between  three  different  national  armies.  Plans 
of  action,  arranged  to  meet  the  new  developments  of 
the  German  attack,  and  necessarily  varied  as  occasion 
arose,  would  be  handicapped  in  the  important  element 
of  time  if  they  were  to  be  the  subject  of  correspondence, 
even  by  telegraph,  between  the  headquarters  of  the 
French  armies  on  the  front,  the  French  General  Head- 
quarters, the  British  headquarters  and  King  Albert's 
staff.     There  must  be  one  man  with  the  power  to  decide 


FOCH  AT  YPRES  199 

and  advise  on  the  spot — a  man  who  could  keep  in  close 
touch  with  the  local  headquarters  of  the  armies,  study 
the  situation  on  the  spot  and  watch  at  close  quarters  its 
varying  phases.  It  would  be  a  delicate  task,  for  there 
could  as  yet  be  no  question  of  a  single  command.  The 
soldier  sent  to  the  new  front  could  act  as  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  French  armies  there  and  issue  orders  to 
them ;  but  he  could  only  offer  advice  to  King  Albert  and 
Sir  John  French,  advice  to  be  given  tactfully,  and  per- 
haps to  be  the  subject  of  negotiation.  Difficult  problems 
would  have  to  b6  rapidly  solved ;  and  the  situation  was 
a  dangerous  one.  The  post  would  have  to  be  offered  to 
a  soldier  who  could  face  with  calm  resolution  and  re- 
sourceful expedients  even  the  menace  of  disaster. 

Once  more  Joffre  showed  his  capacity  for  making  a 
wise  choice  of  his  subordinate  commanders.  The  first 
days  of  October  had  brought  the  news,  that  the  southern 
forts  of  Antwerp  were  being  crushed  by  the  Austro- 
German  artillery.  On  Saturday,  the  3rd,  the  movement 
of  the  British  army  from  the  Aisne  front  had  just  begun. 
In  the  north  of  France,  German  cavalry  patrols  were 
about  Cassel  and  Hazebrouck.  The  crisis  was  develop- 
ing with  dangerous  rapidity.  The  Belgian  staff  had 
actually  decided  to  abandon  the  defence  of  Antwerp. 
The  Government  was  already  being  transferred  from  the 
city  to  Havre. 

On  Sunday,  October  4th,  Mr.  Winston  Churchill  ar- 
rived at  Antwerp  with  a  promise  that  British  succour 
was  on  the  way;  and  King  Albert  was  persuaded  to 
prolong  the  defence.  The  same  afternoon,  General  Foch 
at  Ch^lons-sur-Mame  received  a  telegram  from  Joffre 
telling  him  to  hand  over  the  command  of  what  was  left 
of  the  Ninth  Army  to  his  next  in  seniority,  and  start 


200  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

immediately  for  the  north  of  France,  where  he  was  to 
take  over  the  command  of  the  French  troops  already 
holding  the  new  line  or  moving  towards  it.  These  were 
the  armies  of  De  Castelnau  and  Maud'huy,  a  group  of 
Territorial  Divisions  under  General  Brugere,  and  the 
Cavalry  Divisions  of  Generals  De  Mitry  and  Conneau. 
His  official  title  was  to  be  "  adjoint  au  general  com- 
mandant en  chef  " — "  assistant  to  the  commander-in- 
chief." 

The  Ninth  Army  was  already  being  broken  up,  a  sign 
that  Foch  would  be  employed  elsewhere  before  long.  A 
few  days  before  he  received  Joffre's  message,  the 
Eleventh  Army  Corps  (Eydoux)  had  been  sent  away  to 
reinforce  De  Castelnau.  The  rest  of  the  army  was  soon 
to  be  dispersed,  some  of  its  divisions  being  transferred 
to  Foch's  new  sphere  of  command.  It  was  late  when  he 
received  the  telegram,  but  it  did  not  take  long  to  hand 
over  the  headquarters  business  of  Chalons  to  a  tempo- 
rary successor.  In  the  evening  he  had  started  on  his 
journey,  travelling  westward  in  a  motor-car,  and  taking 
with  him  his  chief  of  the  staff  in  the  Ninth  Army, 
Colonel  (now  General)  Weygand,  who  has  since  been 
his  right-hand  man  in  successive  commands. 

The  route  of  the  car  was  across  the  bend  of  the  Marne, 
over  the  northern  margin  of  the  battlefield  of  Septem- 
ber, and  over  Napoleon's  battlefields  of  Champaubert 
and  Montmirail,  then  across  the  Marne  at  Meaux  by  the 
bridge  hastily  repaired  after  being  blown  up  in  the 
great  retreat:  then  northwestward  through  the  dark- 
ness through  the  woods  by  Senlis,  with  the  thud  of 
heavy  gun  fire  sounding  miles  away,  from  the  Aisne 
heights  on  the  right.  Over  the  Oise  at  Creil  went  the 
car,  and  then  northwards  through  Clermont  and  into 


oitu-abton.    on.   bl)g.    Nprbbe-i^i^  P'on.b"  vjl^cn.    Pp^l^   too/<^    cjamn.-anA. 


FOCH  AT  YPRES  201 

the  main  street  of  the  little  town  of  Breteuil.  It  was 
4  A.M.  on  a  moonless  autumn  night. 

General  de  Castelnau  did  not  expect  his  early  visitor, 
and  was  in  bed,  fast  asleep.  He  rose  and  dressed,  coffee 
was  made,  and  the  two  soldier  friends  discussed  the  sit- 
uation. Foch  had  come,  to  learn  from  the  men  on  the 
spot  how  matters  stood,  and  what  troops  were  available, 
and  where.  A  few  weeks  ago,  Foch  had  been  under  De 
Castelnau's  command.  Now  the  positions  were  re^ 
versed.  But  neither  of  them  could  have  any  personal 
feeling  of  the  change.  They  were  working  together, 
each  giving  his  best. 

The  conference  lasted  nearly  two  hours.  At  six 
o'clock,  while  it  was  still  dark,  Foch  was  in  his  car 
again.  Further  northwards  he  went,  through  Amiens 
in  the  early  twilight;  then,  at  the  great  junction  of 
roads  at  Doullens,  there  was  a  turn  to  the  northeast- 
ward, and  at  nine  o'clock  the  General  was  at  the  village 
of  Aubigny  near  Arras,  the  headquarters  of  Maud'huy's 
Tenth  Army.  Here  there  was  another  prolonged  confer- 
ence. Foch  received  from  Maud'huy  detailed  reports  of 
the  German  movements  further  north,  and  of  their  in- 
creasing activity  in  front  of  Arras  which  now  was  near 
the  extreme  left  of  the  growing  French  line.  De  Mitry 
and  Conneau's  cavalry  were  guarding  the  flank.  Bru- 
gere's  territorial  troops  were  covering  Arras.  Further 
south,  Maud'huy's  line  was  held  by  Foch's  old  army 
corps,  the  20th,  lately  brought  from  the  Eastern  Front ; 
and  here  again,  as  at  Morhange  and  the  Troupe  de 
Charmes,  the  Bavarian  army  was  opposed  to  them. 

Having  collected  all  the  information  he  required,  and 
got  into  personal  touch  wdth  the  army  commanders, 
Foch  established  his  headquarters  at  Doullens,  a  place 


202  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

that  had  good  railway  communications  and  stood  at  the 
centre  of  a  radiating  junction  of  roads.  Here  three 
days  later,  on  October  8th,  Sir  John  French,  on  his  way 
from  the  Aisne  front  to  the  north,  came  to  confer  with 
him. 

The  situation  had  not  improved.  The  outer  forts  on 
the  southern  front  of  Antwerp  had  fallen ;  the  line  of  de- 
fence on  the  Nethe  had  been  lost.  The  German  shrapnel 
was  bursting  over  the  city,  while  the  Belgian  army  was 
beginning  its  retreat  across  the  floating  bridge  on  the 
Scheldt,  and  the  inhabitants  were  in  flight  by  the  roads 
into  Holland,  and  in  crowded  craft  of  all  kinds  on  the 
river.  The  German  advanced  troops  were  on  a  wide 
front  in  French  Flanders;  and  reinforcements,  soon  to 
be  augmented  by  the  besiegers  of  Antwerp,  were  moving 
forward  to  convert  the  raid  into  an  invasion.  A  British 
division  under  Rawlinson,  and  a  cavalry  force  had  been 
landed  at  Ostend  and  Zeebrugge.  The  Second  Corps  of 
the  British  Expeditionary  Force,  transferred  from  the 
Aisne,  had  begun  detraining  at  Abbeville  and  marching 
towards  the  frontier.  The  Third  Corps  had  not  yet  ar- 
rived; it  was  to  retrain  at  St.  Omer.  The  First  Corps 
would  arrive  still  later.  The  Belgian  army  would  now 
be  in  retreat  along  the  coast.  Would  the  British  army 
be  in  time  to  close  the  gap  between  it  and  the  French 
line  and  stop  the  German  inroad? 

Foch  and  French  had  become  friends  two  years  before, 
during  the  British  army  manoeuvres  near  Cambridge, 
and  had  met  on  two  or  three  occasions  since  then.  There 
would  be  no  difficulty  about  a  free  exchange  of  views 
between  them;  and  Foch  gave  ready  approval  to  the 
British  commander's  plans,  and  promised  hearty  co- 
operation on  the  part  of  his  own  troops. 


FOCH  AT  YPRES  203 

Sir  JohD  (in  his  despatch  of  November  20th,  1914) 
sets  forth  in  detail  the  plan  that  was  adopted.  It  may 
be  thus  summarized.  The  British  Second  Corps  (Smith- 
Dorrien)  would  be  on  the  front  Aire-Bethune  by  Oc- 
tober 11th.  It  was  to  connect  with  the  right  of  Maud'- 
huy's  Tenth  Army,  now  extending  north  of  Arras,  and 
endeavour  to  act  against  the  left  of  the  German  force 
opposed  to  it.  The  Third  and  First  corps  would  come 
into  action  in  succession,  in  the  same  way,  on  the  left 
of  the  second.  Sir  Henry  Rawlinson's  force  in  Belgium 
would  assist  the  retirement  of  the  Antwerp  garrison, 
and  co-operate  as  soon  as  possible  with  the  general 
British  and  French  advance.  French  was  hopeful  of 
great  results,  for  his  memorandum  on  the  plan  ends 
thus: 

"  In  the  event  of  those  movements  so  far  overcoming 
the  resistance  of  the  enemy  as  to  enable  a  forward  move- 
ment to  be  made,  all  the  Allies  to  march  in  an  easterly 
direction.  The  road  running  from  Bethune  to  Lille 
was  to  be  the  dividing  line  between  the  British  and 
French  forces,  the  right  of  the  British  being  directed 
on  Lille." 

But  the  force  that  the  enemy  was  concentrating  in 
Belgium  was  underrated,  and  the  time  available  over- 
estimated. Antwerp  was  in  the  enemy's  hands  on 
October  9th.  The  British  advance  towards  Lille  began 
only  on  the  12th.  Next  day  that  city  was  captured  by 
the  enemy.  All  that  could  be  accomplished — and  under 
the  circumstances  it  was  a  most  valuable  result — was 
to  push  back  the  German  advanced  troops  from  the 
French  border,  follow  them  up  towards  the  Yser  and 
occupy  Ypres  and  the  Yser  and  the  Lys  lines,  closing  the 
gap  between  the  Belgian  army  and  the  French  left. 


204  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

Focli  assisted,  by  pushiDg  in  to  the  help  of  the  Belgians 
a  force  under  General  D'Urbal,  which  gradually  grew 
into  the  French  Eighth  Army.  On  October  20th,  the 
line  was  complete  from  the  sea  to  the  Oise,  though  on 
the  Yser  front  it  was  very  thinly  held.  And  the  German 
forces  in  front  were  increasing  day  by  day.  On  the 
21st  the  first  battle  of  Ypres,  known  in  France  as  the 
battle  of  the  Yser,  began. 

The  battle  lasted  till  the  middle  of  November.  The 
weak  Allied  line — at  one  time  held  for  miles  only  by  a 
small  force  of  dismounted  cavalry — stood  firm  against 
repeated  assaults  of  superior  numbers,  assaults  driven 
home  with  a  reckless  courage  that  was  only  surpassed 
by  the  stubborn  valour  of  the  defence.  Here  and  there 
the  line  was  forced  back ;  at  times  it  seemed  on  the 
point  of  breaking,  but  it  held,  though  at  a  terrible 
cost. 

In  England  at  the  time  it  was  not  unnaturally  spoken 
of  as  a  "  British  "  victory.  Every  nation  concentrates 
its  attention  and  its  anxieties  on  its  own  men.  But  it 
was  a  victory  of  the  Allies.  On  the  left,  near  the  sea, 
the  Belgians  held  fast,  aided  by  two  naval  supports,  the 
British  ships  on  the  seaward  flank  bringing  tlieir  guns 
to  bear  on  the  German  right,  the  French  naval  division 
of  Breton  and  Norman  sailors  under  Admiral  Ron- arch 
helping  to  hold  the  Dixmude  front.  Next  in  the  line 
came  D'Urbal's  Eiglith  Army.  The  rest  of  the  front, 
held  at  first  by  British  troops  who  were  soon  reinforced 
by  the  Indian  corps,  was  finally  made  good  by  the  help 
of  Frencli  contingents.  Here  for  the  first  time  in  tlie  war 
French  and  British  fought,  not  as  allied  armies  side  by 
side,  but  mingled  together  in  closer  comradeship,  bri- 
gades and  divisi(ms  forming  at  last  a  parti-coloured  line 


FOCH  AT  YPRES  205 

of  khaki  and  blue,  and  the  men  of  the  two  nations  often 
fighting  side  by  side,  shoulder  to  shoulder,  in  the  same 
shallow  trench. 

It  was  Foch  who  supplied  this  invaluable  support  to 
the  hard-pressed  British  line.  The  battle  had  hardly 
begun,  when,  on  October  24th,  he  transferred  his  head- 
quarters from  Doullens  to  Cassel,  the  little  perch  on 
an  isolated  hill  top  that  looks  out  over  the  Flanders  Hats 
like  a  watch  tower,  commanding  on  fine  days  a  view 
from  the  sea  to  the  Yser. 

The  headquarters  offices  were  at  the  old  Town  Hall. 
The  general  lived  close  by,  at  the  house  of  a  local  notary. 
When  he  was  not  at  the  fighting  front,  he  spent  most  of 
the  day  in  his  room  at  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  the  map 
before  him,  the  telef)houe  beside  him.  It  was  often  long 
after  midnight  when  he  returned  to  the  notary's  house 
for  a  few  hours'  sleep.  A  short  ride  or  a  walk  gave  him 
exercise.  No  soldier  in  his  high  command  ever  lived 
with  less  of  ceremony  surrounding  his  headquarters. 
The  motor-car  was  used  only  for  rapid  rushes  to  the 
front.  He  walked  about  the  little  town  of  Cassel,  un- 
attended even  by  an  orderly.  The  war  correspondent 
of  a  London  paper  one  day  gave  a  characteristic  glimpse 
of  the  general's  ways.  He  had  followed  him  on  the 
chance  of  having  a  few  words  with  him  at  headquarters. 
Foch  turned  aside  to  enter  a  church.  The  journalist 
went  in,  and  saw  the  general  kneeling  on  the  pavement 
with  clasped  hands  and  down-bent  head. 

Another  well-known  war  correspondent,  Mr.  G.  H. 
Perris,  tells  of  a  visit  with  some  of  his  colleagues  of  the 
press  to  the  headquarters  of  General  Foch,  towards  the 
end  of  the  Ypres  battle.  It  is  worth  reproducing,  as  an 
impression   of  the  commander  and  his  surroundings. 


206  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

The  "  curious  little  town,"  which  could  not  be  named 
when  Mr.  Ferris  wrote,  was  of  course  Cassel. 

"  In  a  certain  curious  little  town,  which  must  not  be 
named,  we  suddenly  learned  by  the  fact  that  he  invited 
us  to  meet  him,  that  we  were  in  the  midst  of  the  Etat 
Major  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  four  northern 
armies,  General  Foch.  The  general  of  to-day  does  not 
go  about  the  battlefields  on  a  prancing  charger.  He  sits 
still  in  an  obscure  house,  working  out  the  plans  of  the 
war,  as  though  it  were  a  particularly  long,  hard  and 
momentous  game  of  chess.  There  was  no  sign  what- 
ever to  mark  this  house  out  from  its  terrace  neighbours ; 
and  within  there  was  no  sign  of  pomp  or  comfort.  A 
short  quick-moving  clear-glanced  man  stepped  out  of 
an  inner  room — the  engineer's  office  of  the  northern 
campaign — and  stood  for  three  or  four  minutes  in  our 
midst.  After  greetings,  he  uttered  a  sharp  speech  of 
about  a  hundred  words,  noting  the  critical  character  of 
the  twenty-days'  battle,  the  endurance  and  gallantry 
of  the  men  and  the  greatness  of  the  issue.  I  had  been 
reading  S^gur,  and  could  not  but  contrast  the  new 
method  with  the  theatrical  comings  and  goings  of  the 
greatest  of  soldiers.  General  Foch  is  responsible  for 
a  host  greater  than  any  Napoleon  led,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  the  disastrous  Russian  expedition.  But  no 
Napoleonic  legend  will  gather  round  his  person  or  mem- 
ory; and  to  say  this  is  not  to  shadow  a  distinguished 
name,  but  simply  to  record  our  passage  into  a  new 
phase  in  the  development  of  the  world."  * 

With  the  last  days  of  October  there  came  a  dangerous 
crisis  on  the  Ypres  front.  On  October  29th,  the  thin 
line  that  held  the  salient  was  hard  pressed.  Ground 
was  lost,  and  won  back  again  by  costly  counter-attacks, 
the  German   artillery  fire  was  heavier  from  hour  to 

*  The  Campaiyn  of  191ft  in  France  and  Belgium,  by  G.  H.  Perris,  p. 
359. 


FOCH  AT  YPRES  207 

hour,  and  fresh  divisions  were  massing  to  reinforce  the 
attack. 

Foch  had  spent  the  day  at  Cassel.  As  the  reports  of 
the  situation  about  Ypres  arrived  in  the  evening,  he 
remained  late  at  the  Town  Hall.  He  realized  that  the 
position  must  be  even  more  serious  next  day.  He  col- 
lected all  the  necessary  information  as  to  what  French 
units  he  could  dispose  of  from  other  parts  of  his  long 
line,  and  sent  off  orders  for  their  immediate  movement 
northwards.  Then,  just  after  midnight,  he  sent  for  his 
motor-car,  and  taking  with  him  one  of  his  staff  officers, 
Captain  Meunier  Surcouf,  he  started  for  St.  Omer,  the 
headquarters  of  Sir  John  French. 

The  fifteen  miles  to  St.  Omer  were  soon  covered.  All 
the  while  the  thunder  of  the  German  guns  to  the  east- 
ward gave  warning  of  serious  work  next  day.  At  1  a.m. 
Foch  was  with  the  British  commander-in-chief.  Both 
agreed  that  the  British  line  at  Ypres  was  being  strained 
dangerously  near  to  the  breaking  point.  Foch  asked 
Sir  John  what  reserve  he  had  available,  and  the  reply 
was  that  practically  everything  had  been  put  into  line. 

"  Well,"  said  Foch,  "  I  can  give  you  some  of  mine. 
General  Joffre  is  sending  me  eight  battalions  of  the 
32nd  Division.     Take  them,  and  en  avant!" 

Meunier  Surcouf,  who  was  present,  tells  how  Sir  John 
French  rose  and  grasped  Foch's  hand,  as  he  said 
"  Thanks ! — you  are  giving  me  splendid  help." 

Then  the  two  commanders  set  to  work  together  to 
arrange  the  details  of  this  welcome  reinforcement.  By 
2  A.M.,  the  order  had  been  wired  to  all  concerned;  and 
Foch  returned  to  Cassel.  Before  daylight,  the  first  of 
the  eight  battalions  were  detraining  behind  the  Ypres 
line  and  marching  to  the  front. 


208  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

That  day,  Saturday,  October  31st,  brought  the  crisis 
of  the  battle.  There  was  a  fierce  drive  of  the  attack 
against  the  salient  of  the  Ypres  line.  Gheluvelt  village 
was  taken.  North  of  the  place,  the  line  was  driven  in, 
the  1st  Coldstream  Guards  being  badly  cut  up.  South 
of  Gheluvelt,  the  7th  Division,  with  its  flank  exposed, 
had  to  fall  back.  Here  the  Scots  Fusiliers  were  cut  off 
and  all  but  annihilated.  Of  the  battalion  only  an  of- 
ficer and  seventy  men  were  left.  Hooge,  where  the  head- 
quarters of  the  First  Corps  was  established,  came  under 
a  storm  of  shell  fire;  two  generals  and  several  of  the 
staff  were  hit.  North  of  the  Menin-Ypres  road,  the  situa- 
tion was  temporarily  saved  by  a  counter-attack,  directed 
by  General  FitzClarence.  South  of  Hooge,  the  line  was 
steadied  and  a  dangerous  gap  filled  by  De  Moussy  bring- 
ing up  some  of  the  battalions  of  reserve  supplied  by 
Foch.  Here  it  was  that  a  break  in  the  front  was  closed 
and  the  German  rush  stopped  by  a  charge  led  by  De 
Moussy  in  person  at  the  head  of  a  scratch  force  made  up 
of  his  escort,  some  men  of  the  British  Army  Service 
Corps,  and  a  number  of  stragglers,  servants,  cooks,  every 
man  that  could  be  hastily  collected,  some  of  them  with- 
out weapons. 

Further  to  the  right,  on  the  long  rise  of  ground  known 
as  the  Messines  Ridge,  the  enemy  took  Wytschaete,  and 
was  pressing  into  the  burning  streets  of  Messines,  threat- 
ening to  turn  the  whole  main  position  before  Ypres. 

Sir  John  French,  in  his  despatch,  notes  that  the  hour 
from  two  to  three  in  the  afternoon  w^as  the  most  critical 
moment  of  the  prolonged  battle  for  Ypres.  He  was 
then,  with  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  under  shell  fire,  in  Hooge 
village.  As  soon  as  the  enemy's  pressure  showed  some 
sign  of  slackening,  and  the  Germans  were  being  pressed 


FOCH  AT  YPRES  209 

back  towards  Ghelnvelt,  French  left  Hooge  and  drove 
back  through  Ypres.  Then  by  a  happy  chance  he  met 
Foch  again.  Foch  had  come  over  from  Cassel  in  the 
morning,  to  see  for  himself  how  the  battle  was  going. 
In  the  afternoon  he  had  a  consultation  with  General 
D'Urbal,  the  commander  of  the  Eighth  Army,  at  Vlamer- 
tinghe  near  Ypres.  While  the  two  generals  were  to- 
gether, Major  Jamet  of  the  French  staff,  who  was  at  the 
door  of  the  house,  saw  Sir  John  French's  car  coming 
down  the  village  street,  and  called  out  to  him  to  stop. 
French  was  pleased  to  hear  that  Foch  was  there,  and 
came  in  to  talk  with  him.  There  was  a  brief  exchange 
of  views.  The  situation  was  a  serious  one.  It  must 
have  reminded  Foch  of  the  anxious  days  before  the  tide 
of  war  turned,  during  his  own  fight  by  the  marshes  of 
St.  Gond.  But  now,  as  then,  there  could  be  no  question 
of  giving  way.  Foch  promised  further  help  to  the  hard- 
pressed  British  line.  The  Belgian  front,  now  protected 
to  a  great  extent  by  inundations,  was  strong  enough  for 
some  of  the  French  troops  to  be  spared  from  that 
part  of  the  line.  Foch  had  ordered  the  withdrawal  of 
Grosetti's  42nd  Division — his  battering  ram  on  the  crit- 
ical day  of  the  Marne — and  it  would  be  available  next 
day  on  the  Ypres  front.  It  would  relieve  Allenby's  thin 
line  of  dismounted  cavalry  on  the  right  of  the  position. 
The  two  commanders  drafted  their  joint  orders  for  the 
next  day.  One  of  Foch's  orders  required  some  move- 
ment of  British  troops  for  its  execution.  He  showed  it 
to  French,  who  simply  added  the  words,  "  Carry  out  the 
orders  of  General  Foch,"  and  signed  it.  There  was  not 
yet  for  a  long  time  to  be  unity  of  command;  but  there 
was  the  most  perfect  comradeship,  mutual  understand- 
ing, and  hearty  co-operation. 


210  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

On  November  1st,  the  line  was  re-established,  and  the 
German  onset  slackened.  Then  for  some  days  there  was 
little  more  than  a  cannonade  along  the  opposing  fronts. 
On  November  10th,  the  battle  blazed  up  again,  and  the 
Prussian  Guard  attacked  the  British  front,  only  to  fail 
disastrously.  In  the  following  week,  the  fighting  be- 
came less  serious  day  by  day.  The  first  battle  of  Ypres 
was  coming  to  an  end.  By  the  17th  it  was  over.  The 
German  effort  to  break  the  line,  turn  the  Allied  front 
and  push  on  to  the  Channel  ports,  had  failed,  and  failed 
thanks  to  the  stubborn  resistance  of  Sir  John  French's 
army  and  the  loyal  comradeship  and  well-directed  co- 
operation of  Greneral  Foch. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 

During  the  winter  of  1914-15,  Foch  kept  his  head- 
quarters at  Cassel — his  hill  top  lookout  over  the  Flem- 
ish flats.  A  great  crisis  of  the  war  had  passed,  a  time 
of  exceeding  peril  for  the  Allied  cause;  and  Foch  had 
borne  a  leading  part  in  averting  disaster.  How  great 
was  the  peril  was  only  realized  at  the  time  by  those  who 
had  to  grapple  with  it.  As  one  of  the  historians  of 
the  war  has  well  said,  the  people  both  in  France  and 
England  knew  little  of  it.  "  The  French  official  com- 
muniques gave  the  barest  information,  and  the  Paris 
papers  could  not  supplement.  The  English  press  con- 
tinued to  publish  reassuring  articles  and  victorious 
headlines ;  indeed,  we  were  oflflcially  told  that  our  front 
had  everywhere  advanced  on  a  day  when  it  had  every- 
where fallen  back.  Hence  since  the  duration  of  the 
crisis  had  caused  little  anxiety,  its  end  brought  no  spe- 
cial relief  or  rejoicing  to  the  ordinary  man.  Soldiers, 
returning  on  leave,  solemnized  by  their  desperate  experi- 
ence, were  amazed  at  the  perfect  calmness  of  the  British 
public,  until  they  discovered  that  it  was  caused  by  a 
perfect  ignorance."  * 

One  result  of  this  official  reticence,  and  the  conse- 
quent lack  of  public  knowledge  of  what  was  happening 
during  the  crisis  at  Ypres,  was  that  the  immense  service 
Foch  had  rendered  to  the  Allied  cause  was  almost  un- 

*  History  of  the  War,  by  Colonel  John  Buchan,  vol.  V.,  p.  10. 

211 


212  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

known  and  certainly  was  not  properly  appreciated. 
There  was  in  England  a  general  knowledge  of  the  fact 
that  the  French  troops  had  given  timely  help,  but  few 
heard  of  the  man  whose  keen  intellect  had  directed  that 
co-operation  and  given  again  wise  counsel  and  welcome 
encouragement  to  his  British  comrades  in  command. 
Nor  was  it  known  till  months  later  that  these  services 
did  not  end  with  the  November  day,  when  the  last  fierce 
German  attack  broke  on  the  lines  at  Ypres,  and  fell 
back  in  defeat.  The  British  divisions  were  so  exhausted 
with  the  long  struggle,  so  thinned  with  losses  that  ran 
up  to  tens  of  thousands,  that  it  was  essential  that  most 
of  the  troops  should  be  withdrawn  to  rest  the  men  and 
reorganize  the  various  units.  By  the  end  of  November, 
1914,  only  the  Third  British  Army  Corps,  the  new  8th 
Division,  some  of  the  cavalry  and  the  Indian  corps  were 
in  the  front  line.  From  the  Lys  flats  to  the  sea  the 
ground  was  mostly  held  by  Foch's  French  troops. 

Along  this  northern  front  the  wintry  weather  came 
early.  It  was  not — so  far  as  temperature  went — a  par- 
ticularly hard  winter.  If  it  had  been,  the  conditions 
might  have  been  more  easily  endured,  and  active  opera- 
tions might  have  been  more  possible.  Hard  dry  cold, 
without  exceptionally  heavy  snow,  makes  every  bit  of 
open  ground  as  good  as  a  road,  keeps  the  roads  them- 
selves in  excellent  order,  and  is  not  unhealthy  weather 
for  well-clad  and  well-fed  troops.  But  this  winter  of 
1914-15  was  a  time  of  cold  rain  in  abundance,  that 
tnmod  the  Flemish  flats  into  a  swamp.  There  was 
some  snow,  and  for  weeks  there  was  frost  every  night, 
generally  followed  by  a  thaw  in  the  day-time.  The 
I^s  was  in  places  more  than  half  a  mile  wide.  In  the 
trenches  there  was  a  continual  struggle  to  prevent  whole 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES    213 

fronts  being  flooded  out.  Men  passed  weary  nights  up 
to  their  knees  in  half-frozen  water.  All  but  the  great 
main  roads  became  quagmires.  Though  fighting  on  any 
large  scale  gradually  became  impossible  and  there  was 
a  lull  in  the  main  operations,  that  Flanders  winter  was 
a  most  trying  time  for  both  sides. 

The  opposing  armies  were  now  chiefly  engaged  in  dig- 
ging themselves  in,  and  improving  their  positions.  The 
trenches  hastily  dug  in  the  autumn  were  developing 
into  elaborate  fortified  systems,  which  were  to  be  held 
for  years  with  little  change  in  the  fronts.  There  was 
much  strange  talk  of  a  new  "  war  of  attrition."  The 
German  enemy  was  to  be  besieged  and  forced  to  sur- 
render by  a  process  of  exhaustion.  Optimists  predicted 
the  date  of  collapse  as  not  many  months  off.  It  was  one 
of  the  many  delusions  of  the  war.  Foch,  with  his  theory 
that  wars  are  decided  by  the  shock  of  battle,  the  decisive 
blow,  was  not  likely  to  share  it;  and  with  his  bed-rock 
principle  that  attack  is  the  best  form  of  defence,  he 
organized  active  operations  against  the  German  lines 
as  soon  as  he  had  reorganized  his  own  long  front. 

Though  there  was  a  lull  in  the  fighting  (so  far  as 
great  battles  were  involved)  during  the  bad  weather, 
it  blazed  up,  now  here  now  there,  in  the  worst  of  the 
winter  months.  In  the  last  days  of  November,  there 
was  hard  fighting  on  the  front  held  by  the  Indian 
troops,  which  was  suddenly  attacked  by  the  enemy. 
Further  north,  at  the  beginning  of  December,  the  French 
improved  their  position  on  the  Yser  by  a  vigorous 
counter-attack.  Foch  had  by  this  time  information  that 
the  enemy  were  transferring  large  bodies  of  troops  from 
the  Western  Front,  to  strengthen  Hindenburg's  armies 
in  the  East.    It  was  important  to  check  this  eastward 


214  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

flow  of  reinforcements  by  a  show  of  activity  on  the 
Western  Front ;  and  Foch  chose  as  the  scene  of  renewed 
operations  one  of  the  critical  points  of  the  enemy's 
line.  This  minor  operation  of  December,  1914,  had  a 
marked  influence  on  much  that  followed.  The  attack 
thus  opened  was  renewed  and  enlarged  in  its  scope  from 
time  to  time;  so  that  it  proved  to  be  the  prelude  to 
important  events  of  a  later  stage  in  the  campaign. 

A  line  of  high  ground — known  to  French  geographers 
as  the  "  Hills  of  Artois  " — begins  at  Cape  Gris  Nez, 
near  Calais,  and  runs  southeastward,  forming  the  water- 
shed between  the  rivers  and  streams  that  flow  to  the  flats 
of  Flanders  and  those  of  the  Seine  basin  in  France. 
The  hills  are  nowhere  of  any  considerable  height ;  often 
they  are  long  slopes  like  those  of  the  English  chalk 
downs,  with  flat  rounded  tops.  Their  greatest  heights 
seem  important  only  by  contrast  with  the  wide  stretches 
of  flat  country  they  overlook,  to  the  northward.  North 
of  Arras  this  line  of  high  ground  forms  the  dominant 
Vimy  Ridge  (famous  in  the  record  of  the  Canadian 
army),  and  close  by  is  the  narrow  ridge  of  Notre  Dame 
de  Lorette.  On  the  slopes  that  descend  northward  from 
these  heights,  and  among  the  flat-topped  low  spurs  that 
run  out  from  them,  stands  Lens,  the  great  colliery 
centre  of  northern  France,  with  its  pitheads,  shale  heaps, 
and  a  network  of  railway  lines.  Outlying  colliery 
centres  are  about  Loos,  Grenay,  and  other  mining 
villages.  The  Germans  held  Lens  and  the  whole  of  its 
colliery  region,  and  had  converted  the  place  into  an  im- 
provised fortress.  They  held  also  the  Vimy  and  Loretto 
ridges  in  dangerous  proximity  to  Arras  and  had  con- 
structed a  netAvork  of  entrenchments  north  of  Arras, 
among  tlie  .southern  spurs  of  the  ridges  and  covering  the 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES    215 

gap  where  the  little  Souchez  brook  runs  down  to  Lens 
between  the  Vimy  and  Lorette  heights.  The  whole  of 
these  strong  positions  formed  a  salient  in  the  German 
front,  a  menacing  salient  not  only  for  Arras  but  for  the 
country  towards  Bethune.  It  had  almost  a  defensive 
value  for  the  enemy.  It  not  only  secured  their  posses- 
sion of  the  coal-field  and  of  the  useful  railway  system 
that  centred  on  Lens,  but  it  also  formed  a  barrier 
against  attempt  of  the  Allies  to  advance  into  the  low 
lands  of  the  upper  Scarpe  and  Scheldt. 

Later  on,  Foch  was  to  plan  a  formidable  offensive 
against  these  positions;  but  the  time  was  not  ripe,  nor 
were  the  forces  available  for  anything  like  an  effort  to 
break  through  the  German  line.  But  Foch  had  already 
marked  this  region  as  the  possible  objective  of  serious 
operations  in  the  future,  and  he  made  the  minor  opera- 
tion he  now  directed  a  preparation  for  such  an  under- 
taking. 

As  his  immediate  objective  he  chose  a  strong  point  in 
the  enemy's  front — one  of  his  advanced  posts.  This  was 
the  Chateau  of  Vermelles  and  the  entrenched  ground 
about  it.  The  chateau  was  stormed  by  Maud'huy's 
troops  in  the  first  days  of  December  after  a  hard  fight. 
They  held  it  against  a  counter-attack,  and  pushing  on, 
captured  and  entrenched  themselves  in  the  village  of 
Rutoire.  In  itself  it  was  a  small  gain ;  but  the  seizure 
of  Vermelles  deprived  the  enemy  of  the  use  of  a  railway- 
line  directly  linking  up  their  positions  about  La  Bass^e 
with  those  on  the  Lorette  spur.  And  there  was  the 
further  gain  that  this  success  was  inspiriting  to  the 
whole  army  on  the  northern  front.  They  had  shown 
they  could  hold  the  German  attacks.  But  they  had 
now  taken  the  offensive  against  the  enemy's  entrenched 


216  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

lines,  and  won  a  position  from  him  by  sheer  hard 
fighting,  hand  to  hand.  It  was  a  presage  of  greater 
things. 

Later  in  the  month  a  combined  operation  of  British 
and  French  troops  was  arranged  to  recapture  part  of  the 
Ridge  of  Messines,  south  of  Ypres.  Some  ground  was 
won,  but  the  German  resistance  here  proved  more  serious 
than  had  been  anticipated.  Then  there  was  a  prolonged 
pause  in  the  fighting  on  the  northern  front;  but  as  the 
weather  improved  in  the  New  Year,  Foch  resumed  his 
activity  against  the  German  front  toward  Lens.  Prep- 
arations were  made  for  aggressive  trench  warfare, 
based  on  siege  work  lines,  against  the  German  positions 
along  the  Souchez  brook,  and  the  network  of  trenches, 
"  machine-gun  nests,"  and  other  improvised  fortifica- 
tions,- that  extended  along  the  Arras  road,  with  their 
citadel  in  the  huge  knot  of  entrenchments  known  to  the 
French  as  "  the  Labyrinth." 

While  these  preparations  were  in  progress,  during  the 
month  of  April,  heavy  fighting  had  begun  on  the  Ypres 
front.  On  April  22nd,  a  new  horror  was  introduced  into 
war  by  the  German  gas  attack  on  the  north-east  of  the 
Y^pres  salient.  The  line  on  the  left,  held  by  the  French, 
had  to  give  way,  and  the  Germans  crossed  the  canal, 
north  of  Ypres.  A  wide  breach,  thinly  held,  had  been 
opened  in  the  Allied  line.  On  the  morning  of  the  23rd, 
Focli  met  Sir  John  French.  In  his  despatch,  the  British 
commander  tells  how  he  pointed  out  that  it  might  be 
necessary  to  abandon  a  good  deal  of  ground  in  order 
to  shorten  the  British  line,  the  left  flank  of  which  was 
so  dangerously  exposed.  Foch  asked  him  to  hold  out 
for  awhile,  saying  he  hoped  to  regain  the  ground  lost 
on  the  left,  and  re-establish  the  position,  and  that  he 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES    217 

was  bringing  up  large  French  reinforcements,  some  of 
which  had  already  arrived. 

"  I  fully  concurred,"  writes  Sir  John  French,  "  in  the 
wisdom  of  the  General's  wish  to  re-establish  our  old  line, 
and  agreed  to  co-operate  in  the  way  he  desired,  stipu- 
lating however,  that  if  the  position  was  not  re-established 
within  a  limited  time,  I  could  not  allow  the  British 
troops  to  remain  in  so  exposed  a  situation,  as  that  which 
the  action  of  the  previous  twenty-four  hours  had  com- 
pelled them  to  occupy." 

Foch  succeeded  in  driving  the  Germans  back  across 
the  Yser  Canal,  but  was  unable  to  regain  much  of  the 
ground  beyond  it.  The  Allies  were  handicapped  by  hav- 
ing to  fight  exposed  to  the  horrible  gas  attack,  in  those 
first  days,  when  they  had  not  yet  learned  to  guard 
against  it.  It  was  no  fault  of  the  French  that  they 
failed  to  regain  the  lost  front;  and  in  a  few  days  Foch 
agreed  that  it  was  necessary  to  draw  the  whole  line 
of  the  salient  closer  in  to  Ypres.  In  the  first  days  of 
May,  the  position  was  again  secure,  and  he  felt  himself 
free  to  devote  his  attention  to  the  offensive  he  had 
organized. 

He  now  left  Cassel,  and  moved  his  headquarters  to 
the  village  of  Frevent,  north  of  Doullens,  and  on  the 
railway  and  road  from  Arras  to  Etaples.  Here  he  was 
within  easy  reach  of  the  front  to  be  attacked. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  by  this  time  General 
Joffre  had  grouped  the  French  armies  into  three  com- 
mands; and  these  three  groups  of  armies  had  for  their 
commanders  the  three  generals  who  had  played  the 
leading  part  in  the  operations  in  the  east  of  France  in 
August,  1914,  that  culminated  in  the  victory  of  the 
Troupe    de    Charmes.      The    '"northern    front"    from 


218  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

Compiegne  to  the  sea  was  commanded  by  Foch:  the 
central  front,  from  Compiegne  to  Verdun  by  De 
Castelnau:  and  the  eastern  front,  from  Verdun  to  the 
Belfort  Gap  and  the  Swiss  frontier,  by  Dubail. 

Foch  had  brought  up,  in  all,  eleven  hundred  guns  to 
the  front  he  was  about  to  attack.  The  artillery  prep- 
aration was  to  be  on  a  greater  scale  than  anything  yet 
attempted  by  the  Allies.  For  once,  the  Germans  were 
out-gunned,  and  Foch  had  made  a  local  concentration 
of  infantry  that  probably  also  secured  that  they  were 
out-numbered.  Their  only  local  advantage  was  the 
exceeding  strength  of  their  positions. 

We  have  followed  in  detail  the  earlier  operations  of 
the  war — the  Battles  of  Morhange  and  the  Troupe  de 
Charmes,  and  the  fighting  in  the  French  centre  at  the 
great  Battle  of  the  Marne.  This  has  been  done  to  show 
how  Foch  won  his  way  to  high  command,  and  how  he 
applied  in  the  field  the  principles  he  had  taught  at  the 
Ecole  de  Guerre  and  in  his  writings.  His  co-operation 
with  the  British  command  in  the  arduous  days  of  the 
first  Battle  of  Ypres  has  also  been  described  in  detail. 
There  he  laid  the  foundation  for  his  future  close 
cameraderie  with  the  British  generals,  and  establish 
those  relations  of  mutual  friendship  and  trust,  that  made 
his  final  appointment  to  the  command-in-chief  of  the 
Allied  armies  as  welcome  to  British,  Irish,  and  Oversea 
soldiers  of  the  Dominions,  as  it  was  to  the  French  them- 
selves. Henceforth  we  need  only  touch  upon  the  salient 
points  of  the  operations  he  directed. 

On  Sunday,  May  9th,  Foch  opened  fire  from  his 
thousand  guns.  More  than  300,000  shells  were  fired 
that  day,  more  than  half  of  them  in  the  early  hours  of 
the  morning.    The  bombardment  simply  swept  the  first 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES    219 

German  line  of  works  out  of  existence.  At  ten,  tlie 
infantry  attack  began.  By  noon,  on  the  right  the 
French  were  across  the  Arras  road  and  fighting  their 
way  into  the  villa  of  Neuville  St.  Vaast.  In  the  centre — 
the  point  of  the  German  salient — the  line  of  chalk- 
cut  trenches,  known  as  the  "  White  Works,"  was 
stormed,  and  the  attack  pushed  on  for  over  two  miles. 
On  the  left  of  this  line  the  Germans  were  clinging  to 
Carency  and  the  broken  ground  around  it,  fighting  from 
house  to  house  in  the  village.  By  nightfall,  Foch  had 
three  thousand  prisoners  and  ten  captured  guns  as 
trophies  of  success.  Then  the  fighting  went  on  day  by 
day,  and  the  French  steadily  won  more  and  more  ground. 
On  the  12th,  the  commanding  ridge  of  Notre  Dame  de 
Lorette  was  stormed. 

Despite  desperate  resistance,  the  attack  pushed  for- 
ward, clearing  village  after  village,  fighting  its  way  into 
the  formidable  works  of  "  the  Labyrinth."  By  the  end 
of  May,  the  German  salient  had  been  flattened  in,  the 
menace  to  Arras  from  the  north  had  been  destroyed, 
and,  although  the  enemy  still  held  the  Vimy  Ridge,  the 
capture  of  the  hill  of  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette  had 
deprived  the  Germans  of  a  dominating  position  and 
opened  the  way  for  a  further  advance.  Best  of  all, 
the  hard-won  success  had  increased  the  confidence  of 
the  French  soldier  in  himself  and  his  chiefs.  It  was  no 
longer  defensive  war,  but  the  attack;  and  the  result 
had  shown  that,  with  adequate  artillery  preparation, 
the  strongest  entrenched  line  could  be  broken  into.  The 
Allies  were  successfully  adapting  themselves  to  the  new 
conditions  of  trench  warfare,  and  developing  the  tacti- 
cal methods  it  required. 

Fighting  went  on  through  the  summer  on  the  new 


220  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

front  won  in  May — siege  warfare  in  trenches  cut  through 
Souchez  village,  in  houses  levelled  nearly  to  the  ground 
but  with  their  ruins  and  their  cellars  turned  into 
improvised  forts.  But  no  operations  on  a  large  scale 
were  attempted  until  September. 

The  Allied  man  power  was  growing,  but  there  was 
still  a  deficiency  of  heavy  artillery;  and  the  supply  of 
munitions,  large  as  it  was  in  comparison  with  anything 
that  had  been  required  in  earlier  wars,  had  not  yet 
risen  to  the  enormous  amount  needed  for  a  continuous 
bombardment  on  the  scale  of  that  which  had  heralded 
Foch's  attack  near  Arras.  The  Allied  chiefs  had  decided 
upon  a  combined  offensive  towards  the  end  of  the  sum- 
mer. To  accumulate  munitions  for  it,  and  add  largely 
to  the  available  gun  power,  was  the  work  of  the  summer. 
The  great  offensive,  for  which  a  decisive  result  was 
hoped,  was  fixed  for  September,  1915. 

The  main  attack  was  to  be  delivered  by  De  Castelnau's 
group  of  armies  on  the  Champagne  front.  Foch  was  to 
play  an  important  but  still  a  subsidiary  part  in  the 
plan  of  the  offensive.  To  keep  the  German  armies  on 
the  northern  front  occupied,  besides  minor  attacks  at 
other  points  there  was  to  be  an  attack  in  force  on  the 
part  of  their  line  covering  Lens.  Apart  from  the  diver- 
sion that  would  be  thus  made  in  favour  of  the  main 
attack  in  Champagne,  this  secondary  attack  in  Artois 
might  give  very  important  results. 

By  this  time  the  British  Territorial  army,  and  the 
new  Kitchener  armies,  had  sent  several  divisions  to 
France;  and  Foch  had  been  able  to  arrange  for  an 
extension  of  the  front  held  by  Sir  John  French's  troops. 
Tlie  British  line  Avas  extended  southward  as  far  as 
(Irenay,  on   the  edge  of  the  Lens  coal-field  and  just 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES    221 

north  of  the  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette  Ridge.  The  attack 
from  the  northern  front  was  to  be  made  where  the 
British  and  French  lines  joined.  Two  of  the  British 
armies  would  attack  towards  Loos,  while  D'Urbal's 
Tenth  French  Army  would  push  forward  against  the 
Souchez  Gap  and  the  German  front  as  far  as  the  Vimy 
Ridge.    The  battle  was  to  begin  on  September  25th. 

Every  precaution  was  taken  to  keep  the  secret  of  .the 
Allied  plans.  But  nevertheless  the  Germans  had  a  very 
sufficient  warning  of  what  was  coming.  Foch  had  laid 
it  down  in  his  lectures  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre,  that 
surprise  should  if  possible  be  an  element  in  any  decisive 
attack,  and  had  suggested  that  on  this  account  the  burst 
of  artillery  fire  that  prepared  the  way  for  the  attack  on 
the  battlefield  should  not  last  long.  When  he  launched 
his  own  attack,  in  May,  1915,  he  had  kept  his  thousand 
guns  in  action  for  a  few  hours  only,  before  his  infantry 
"  went  over  the  top  ".  But  the  September  offensive  was 
preluded  and  prepared  by  a  gigantic  bombardment  from 
a  huge  concentration  of  artillery  in  both  Champagne 
and  Artois,  that  went  on  for  a  fortnight.  It  was  heard 
far  to  the  German  rear,  away  on  the  Belgian  frontier. 
Day  and  night,  often  at  this  distance  there  was  in  the 
air  a  continuous  sound  like  the  rumbling  of  a  distant 
thunder  storm.  The  enemy  set  to  work  to  strengthen 
his  second  and  third  lines ;  and  when  at  last  the  attack 
was  launched,  on  September  25th,  though  the  first  line 
had  mostly  been  destroyed,  all  was  ready  further  back 
for  a  well-organized  resistance. 

In  severe  fighting  prolonged  over  several  days,  the 
Allies  gained  some  ground,  but  the  general  result  was 
disappointing.  On  the  front  which  Foch  had  attacked 
with  the  Tenth  Army,  there  could  be  no  question  of  sur- 


222  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

prise,  for  liere  fighting  had  been  going  on  ever  since 
May ;  there  would  be  a  lull  for  some  days,  and  then  it 
would  blaze  up  again  into  a  fierce  struggle  at  close 
quarters.  The  fronts  were,  in  places,  only  a  few  yards 
apart.  In  Souchez  village  ruined  houses  and  street 
corners  were  lost  and  won,  and  lost  again. 

But  on  September  25th,  new  forces  were  thrown  into 
the  attack,  Souchez  was  stormed,  and  in  the  days  that 
followed  the  whole  line  was  pushed  forward  a  little,  and 
a  footing  gained  on  the  western  end  of  the  Vimy  Ridge. 
Then  the  advance  came  to  a  standstill,  for  behind  these 
first  positions  the  enemy  had  dug  himself  in,  and  formed 
a  new  labyrinth  of  deeply-entrenched  works,  that  had 
been  untouched  by  the  bombardment.  Desultory  fight- 
ing followed  for  a  time;  and  then  with  the  hard  winter 
weather,  the  fronts  settled  down  into  a  deadlock,  and 
it  seemed  to  many  that  it  was  likely  to  be  almost  per- 
manent. So  far  all  attacks  on  either  side  had  had 
much  the  same  result.  It  was  evident  now  that  by  a 
concentration  of  artillery  fire  for  the  preparation, 
followed  up  by  an  infantry  attack,  some  ground  could 
always  be  won  in  the  enemy's  advanced  positions;  but 
the  problem  of  breaking  the  line  was  still  unsolved. 
This  much  was  clear,  that  the  way  to  its  solution  lay 
in  the  accumulation  of  munitions,  guns  and  reserves  of 
men,  so  as  to  be  able  to  push  forward  after  the  first 
onset  had  exhausted  its  force;  then  to  renew  the  artil- 
lery preparation  against  the  positions  that  had  been 
reached,  and  make  a  second  advance.  The  next  great 
effort  would  be,  not  a  single  offensive,  but  a  continuous 
Reries,  lasting  week  after  week,  month  after  month. 
This  was  to  be  prepared  for  the  summer  of  1916. 


CHAPTER  XV 

BATTLE   OF   THE    SOMME 

On  the  Western  Front  the  campaign  of  1916  opened 
with  the  German  offensive  against  Verdun.  The  attack 
began  towards  the  end  of  February.  By  the  middle  of 
March  the  pressure  of  the  fortress  was  severe,  and 
General  Joffre  had  no  easy  task  to  find  fresh  troops 
to  hold  the  lines  of  the  long  battle  front  on  both  banks 
of  the  Meuse.  Foch  therefore  withdrew  the  Tenth  Army 
from  the  ground  on  which  it  had  fought  so  long  to  the 
north  of  Arras;  and  British  troops  took  over  that  part 
of  the  front.  A  little  later  the  British  line  was  extended 
still  further  south  to  the  Somme  near  Albert.  Sir 
Douglas  Haig,  who  now  commanded  the  British  Expedi- 
tionary Force,  was  thus  able  to  contribute  to  the  sav- 
ing of  Verdun  by  setting  free  considerable  reinforce- 
ments from  the  part  of  the  northern  front  that  had 
been  so  long  held  by  Foch's  troops. 

In  the  spring,  Foch  himself  had  a  narrow  escape  from 
death  or  permanent  disablement.  It  was  not  among 
the  perils  of  battle  that  the  moment  of  danger  came, 
but  during  a  motor  drive  on  a  good  road  where  every- 
thing seemed  safe.  He  had  attended  a  conference  at 
the  headquarters  of  the  central  armies,  and  was  driv- 
ing back  from  it  by  the  main  road  on  the  north  bank 
of  the  Marne,  near  Meaux.  Suddenly  a  woman  with  a 
child  in  her  arms,  not  noticing  the  near  approach  of 
the  car,  stepped  out  to  cross  the  road  in  front  of  it. 


224  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

The  chauffeur,  to  avoid  running  over  lier,  put  on  the 
brake  sharply,  and  pushed  round  the  steering  wheel. 
The  car  skidded  and  crashed  into  one  of  the  roadside 
trees.  Foch  was  hurt  about  the  head,  happily  not  very 
seriously,  but  seriously  enough  to  have  to  be  taken  to 
the  hospital  at  Meaux,  where  he  was  under  the  anxious 
care  of  the  doctors  for  some  days.  He  was  visited  there 
by  President  Poincar^,  the  Prime  Minister,  M.  Briand 
and  General  Joffre.  It  is  a  tribute  to  the  position  he 
held  in  the  eyes  of  the  army  and  the  French  people, 
that  it  was  considered  advisable  to  suppress  all  news 
of  his  accident.  The  danger  of  such  a  chief  being  lost 
to  the  French  armies  would  have  caused  widespread 
depression  and  anxiety,  if  it  had  been  knowTi.* 

Foch  made  a  rapid  recovery,  and  before  the  middle  of 
June  he  was  working  with  Sir  Douglas  Haig  at  the 
final  arrangements  for  the  coming  offensive  on  the 
Somme,  the  most  important  operation  yet  undertaken 
by  the  Allies  on  the  Western  Front.  Both  in  France 
and  England,  writers  of  some  authority  on  the  Battle 
of  the  Somme  have  described  Foch  as  being  in  command 
of  the  whole  operation  of  the  Allied  Armies.    This  was 

*  It  would  not  have  been  mentioned  here,  only  that  there  is  evidence 
that  the  veto  of  the  censorship  has  been  removed.  The  incident  is  re- 
ferred to  in  a  recently  published  work  by  a  writer  of  well-deserved 
reputation,  Miss  Mildred  Aldrieh.  In  her  book,  On  the  Edge  of  the 
War  Zone  (p.  179)  writing  on  May  23rd  at  Huiry  near  Meaux,  she 
says:  "There  is  nothing  new  here  except  that  General  Foch  is  in  the 
ambulance  at  Meaux.  No  one  knows  it;  not  a  word  has  appeared  in 
the  newspapers.  It  was  the  result  of  a  stupid  but  unavoidable  auto- 
mobile accident.  .  .  .  Luckily  he  was  not  seriously  hurt,  though  his 
head  pot  damaged.  On  Thursday,  Poincar^'  passes  over  our  hill,  with 
Uriand,  en  mute  to  meet  Joffre  at  the  General's  bedside.  I  did  not  see 
them,  but  some  of  the  people  at  Quincy  did.  It  was  a  lucky  escape  for 
Foch.  lie  would  have  hated  to  die  during  this  war  of  a  simple,  \m- 
military  automobile  accident,  and  the  army  could  ill  afford,  just  now 
to  losi-  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  war.  Carefully  as  the  fact  has  been 
concealed,  we  knew  it  through  our  ambulance,  which  is  a  branch  of  that 
at  Meaux  where  he  is  being  nursed." 


BATTLE  OF  THE  SOMME  225 

not  so.  Unity  of  command  was  still  nearly  two  years 
away  in  the  future.  Foch  and  Haig  co-operated,  as 
Eugene  and  Marlborough  worked  together  in  the 
campaign  of  Blenheim,  and  Wellington  and  Bliicher  in 
that  of  Waterloo.  Foch's  position  was  that  of  com- 
mander of  the  French  troops  on  "  the  northern  front," 
with  the  mission  also  to  keep  in  the  closest  touch  with 
the  British  Headquarters  and  do  all  that  was  necessarj^ 
to  co-ordinate  the  operations  of  the  two  armies.  His 
knowledge  of  war,  his  record  and  his  character,  gave 
him  a  special  authority,  not  of  the  mere  official  type, 
with  the  British  commanders.  With  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
he  was  always  in  the  most  friendly  relations.  How  far 
the  general  plan  of  the  battle  was  due  to  Foch's  initia- 
tive cannot  yet  be  determined,  but  the  whole  scheme  was 
the  result  of  consultation  between  the  French  and  Brit- 
ish staffs. 

The  attack  was  to  be  made  on  a  front  of  twenty-five 
miles,  the  British  on  the  left  (north),  the  French  on 
the  right  (south).  The  point  where  the  two  armies 
were  in  touch  was  near  the  village  of  Maricourt,  north 
of  the  bend  of  the  Somme.  The  French  left  here  was 
separated  from  the  rest  of  Foch's  line  by  the  wide 
swampy  hollow  through  which  the  Somme  flows  east 
and  west.  This  long  reach  of  marsh  and  stream  ends 
eastward  at  the  sharp  bend,  where  Peronne,  with  its 
mediaeval  castle  and  its  old  rampart  line,  stands  amid 
an  expanse  of  swamps  and  backwaters.  North  of  the 
river,  Foch  had  placed  the  men  he  had  commanded  at 
Nancy,  his  Twentieth  Corps.  Since  he  had  commanded 
them  at  Morhange  and  the  Troupe  de  Charmes,  they  had 
served  under  him  on  the  northern  front,  and  for  awhile 
had  been  sent  away  to  help  Nivelle  and  P^tain  to  turn 


226  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

the  tide  of  battle  at  Verdun.  They  were  now  again 
under  their  old  commander,  and  they  were  given  the 
post  of  honour  in  the  line,  where  they  were  to  keep 
touch  with  the  British  advance  and  hold  the  separate 
flank  of  the  French  front  with  old  P^ronne  for  their 
objective,  once  the  ground  along  the  Somme  could  be 
cleared. 

Foch's  line  was  made  up  of  the  two  armies  of  Generals 
Fayolle  and  Guillaumat,  the  former  on  the  left,  the 
latter  on  the  right.  From  Maricourt,  north  of  the 
Somme,  the  line  extended  southward  to  near  Estr^es 
on  the  great  highway  from  St.  Quentin  to  Amiens. 

At  the  outset,  the  French  advance  made  rapid  prog- 
ress. On  July  the  first,  the  line  was  everywhere 
pushed  a  mile  forward,  and  in  some  places  gained  even 
more  ground.  Next  day  the  progress  was  somewhat 
slower,  but  still  there  were  gains  everywhere.  By  the 
middle  of  the  month  the  French  had  cleared  all  the 
ground  in  the  bend  of  the  Somme,  and  were  looking 
down  on  P^ronne  from  the  high  ground  of  the  south 
bank,  but  the  barrier  of  swamps  barred  their  way  to 
the  old  fortress.  On  the  north  of  the  river  line,  the 
Twentieth  Corps  was  meeting  with  dogged  resistance, 
and  fighting  its  way  against  strong  positions,  covered 
with  wide  barbed-wire  entanglements  and  bristling  with 
machine  guns.  Everywhere  along  the  northern  half  of 
the  Allied  front,  the  resistance  was  more  sustained,  the 
defences  stronger  and  the  progress  slower,  than  south 
of  the  river  bend.  Tliere  is  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
Germans  expected  the  attack  to  be  made  only  on  this 
side.  Accordingly  they  had  concentrated  their  best 
troops  to  meet  it,  and  multiplied  and  skilfully  elaborated 
their  entrenchments  and  strong  posts  on  ground  that 


BATTLE  OF  THE  SOMME  227 

lent  itself  exceptionally  well  to  a  prolonged  defence. 
So  it  was  that  for  awhile  the  British  on  the  extreme  left, 
in  spite  of  heroic  efforts,  made  no  progress  and  suffered 
severe  loss,  while  in  the  centre  of  the  line  they  won  their 
way  slowly.  It  is  no  depreciation  of  the  advance  made 
by  the  French  in  those  first  days  of  the  long  battle,  to 
say  that  they  had  an  easier  task. 

The  Battle  of  the  Somme,  begun  on  July  1st,  1916, 
became  a  vast  series  of  siege  operations,  and  lasted  on 
into  the  New  Year  of  1917,  when  the  German  retreat  to 
the  Hindenburg  line  marked  its  success,  and  gave  the 
Allies  the  first  gain  of  ground  they  had  secured  since 
the  tide  of  invasion  turned  at  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 
Foch  directed  only  the  earlier  operations  of  the  two 
armies  of  Fayolle  and  Guillaumat.  Towards  the  end 
of  the  summer  he  had  temporarily  to  resign  his  com- 
mand through  illness. 

But  he  was  not  long  inactive.  A  short  rest  restored 
his  health,  and  the  French  Government  soon  made  an 
announcement  that  proclaimed  that  his  services  would 
still  be  available  to  the  army.  His  65th  birthday  was 
approaching — the  date  that,  under  French  Army 
Regulations  places  a  general  on  the  retired  list;  but  on 
September  30th,  1916,  the  Official  Gazette  announced 
that  on  account  of  his  eminent  services  General 
Ferdinand  Foch  was  exempted  from  the  regulation,  and 
his  name  was  to  remain  "  without  limit  of  age "  on 
the  list  of  the  1st  Section  of  the  General  Staff,  the  list 
from  which  men  are  selected  for  high  command. 

He  was  soon  at  work  again,  and  engaged  on  a  task 
for  which  he  was  exceptionally  well  fitted.  The  French 
Government  decided  on  the  formation  of  a  small  com- 
mittee of  officers  of  rank,  whose  business  it  would  be 


228  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

to  make  careful  study  of  problems  that  might  arise  in 
the  coming  months  of  the  war,  and  draw  up  reports  and 
plans  of  action  for  these  contingencies.  General  Foch 
was  entrusted  with  the  formation  of  this  committee  and 
the  direction  of  the  work.  It  was  a  wise  step,  and  gave 
most  useful  results.  For  Foch  personally,  it  was  one 
of  the  most  fortunate  events  in  a  career,  in  which  each 
episode  seems  to  have  been  a  preparation  for  tasks  he 
would  later  on  be  called  upon  to  undertake.  It  was 
in  this  case  a  preparation  for  the  united  command  of 
the  Allied  forces,  though  at  the  time  no  one  could  fore- 
see, either  that  such  an  appointment  would  ever  be 
made,  or  that  Foch  would  be  given  this  eminent  position. 
Foch  selected  the  two  helpers  that  he  required,  taking 
Weygaud — who  had  been  so  long  his  chief  of  the  staff, 
and  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  General — as  his  right- 
hand  man.  The  new  organization  was  really  a  commit- 
tee of  the  General  Staff,  and  one  would  have  expected 
that  its  centre  of  work  would  have  been  at  Paris.  But 
Foch  had  no  liking  for  great  cities,  least  of  all  for  Paris, 
where  official  work  means  constant  touch  with  the 
ceremonial  side  of  public  life.  He  is  a  lover  of  the  coun- 
try, and  at  the  same  time  a  hater  of  display  of  any 
kind.  We  have  seen  how  he  invariably  chose  for  his 
headquarters,  when  in  command  of  a  large  "  group  of 
armies,"  not  a  great  city,  but  a  little  country  town  or 
village,  where  he  could  do  his  work  free  from  the  cere- 
monial state  that  so  often  gathers  round  a  centre  of 
high  command.  Ho  now  chose  for  his  centre  of  work 
the  little  catliedral  city  of  Senlis,  about  thirty  miles 
from  Paris.  Its  twelfth  century  cathedral  gives  it  the 
nominal  dignity  of  a  city,  but  it  is  really  only  a  little 
country   town,   almost  surrounded   by   the   forests   of 


BATTLE  OF  THE  SOMME  g29 

Chantilly,  Halatte  and  Ermonville.  It  is  just  far 
enough  from  Paris  to  be  a  quiet  restful  place,  and  yet 
near  enough  to  make  communication  with  the  capital 
easy  and  rapid  if  need  be. 

Foch  made  occasional  visits  to  Paris  to  confer  with 
Joffre  and  the  Government.  But  he  and  General  Wey- 
gaud  also  made  longer  journeys.  For  awhile,  Foch  and 
most  of  his  staff  of  helpers  were  in  the  east  of  France, 
studying  on  the  spot  the  means  to  be  taken  to  deal 
with  a  possible  new  offensive  of  the  Germans  through 
the  Belfort  Gap,  which  might  also  be  combined  with  a 
violation  of  Swiss  neutrality,  in  order  to  turn  the 
French  defence  works  of  the  Jura.  There  was  a  moment 
when  German  concentrations  in  Alsace  and  the  Black 
Forest  region  pointed  to  such  a  possibility,  and  rumour 
told  of  an  intended  reinforcement  of  the  attack  by 
Austro-Hungarian  troops,  brought  up  by  the  railways 
of  South  Germany.  It  did  not  happen,  but  it  was  a 
possibility,  and  Foch's  business  was  to  prepare  plans 
for  any  possible  new  development,  so  that  if  it  arose,  the 
means  of  meeting  it  would  not  have  to  be  improvised 
at  the  last  moment. 

Another  eventuality,  which  actually  arose  and  had 
to  be  dealt  with  later  on,  was  the  possibility  of  an 
Austrian  or  combined  Austro-German  advance  into  Italy 
with  forces  so  great  that  it  might  be  necessary  to  send 
French  and  British  help  to  the  Italian  army  across  the 
Alps  from  the  Western  Front.  So  far  things  had  gone 
well  for  the  Allied  cause  in  Italy,  though  events  had  not 
justified  the  sanguine  forecasts  of  the  press,  that  raised 
the  hopes  of  the  Allied  peoples  so  high,  when  Italy 
declared  war  against  Austria,  in  1915.  In  those  days, 
there  was  talk  of  the  occupation  of  Trieste  and  Trent 


230  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

being  among  the  early  events  of  the  Austro-Italian 
campaign.  But  the  difficulties  of  the  Italian  operations 
had  been  strangely  underrated  by  those  who  indulged  in 
these  optimistic  predictions.  For  months  the  mountain 
ramparts  of  the  Austro-Italian  frontier  defied  attack. 
Reckless  valour,  directed  with  consummate  skill  of  com- 
mand, and  aided  by  every  resource  of  the  artillerist  and 
the  engineer,  failed  to  make  much  impression  on  the 
dogged  resistance  with  which  the  enemy  held  his  posi- 
tion among  the  limestone  ridges  of  the  Carso  and  the 
glaciers  of  the  Alps,  and  in  the  mountain-walled  valleys 
of  the  Dolomites  and  the  Trentino.  After  a  year  of  war, 
the  Italians  were  nowhere  as  much  as  fifteen  miles 
beyond  their  frontier.  They  were  still  fighting  upon 
it,  along  the  great  Carnic  mountain  wall.  In  the  sum- 
mer of  1916,  they  repelled  a  dangerous  counter-attack 
from  the  Trentino.  In  August,  they  took  Gorizia,  but 
the  Austrian  guns  still  menaced  the  battered  city  from 
precipitous  heights  not  two  miles  away.  To  the  north 
of  it,  the  mountains  that  look  down  on  the  Isonzo  were 
firmly  held.  To  the  south,  all  progress  was  barred 
among  the  rocks  of  the  Carso.  Italy  was  feeling  severely 
the  strain  of  the  long-drawn  battle,  that  had  given  such 
scanty  results.  Foch,  looking  to  the  chances  of  the 
future,  felt  that  it  was  well  to  study  on  the  spot  and  in 
touch  with  the  Italian  staff,  the  double  question  of 
whether  the  Allies  could  give  direct  help  to  carry  the 
attack  on  the  Austrian  positions  forward,  and  the 
problem  of  how  effective  help  could  be  given  to  the 
Italian  army,  in  case  of  a  renewed  counter-attack  by 
the  enemy  on  a  greater  scale  than  that  of  the  offensive 
that  had  been  repulsed  in  the  summer  of  1916. 

Having  completed  his  study  of  the  defences  of  the 


BATTLE  OF  THE  SOMME  231 

Belfort  and  Jura  region,  Focli  now  took  up  the  question 
of  the  Italian  front.  In  the  winter  of  1916-17,  during 
the  pause  in  the  operations  enforced  by  frost  and  snow 
on  the  Alpine  frontier,  he  made  more  than  one  visit  to 
Italy.  He  had  conferences  with  Cadorna  and  the 
Italian  staff,  and  visited  the  fronts  held  by  the  army. 
Then  he  proceeded  to  draw  up  detailed  schemes  for  the 
rapid  transport  of  French  and  British  troops  to  northern 
Italy,  in  case  their  services  should  be  needed.  His  long 
study  of  Napoleon's  campaigns  had  made  him  familiar 
with  all  the  problems  of  the  defence  of  the  plain  of 
northern  Italy  against  an  Austrian  invasion. 

The  result  of  these  studies  was,  that,  when  the 
emergency  arose  before  another  year  had  gone  by,  noth- 
ing had  to  be  improvised.  The  plans  for  sending  speedy 
help  to  Italy  and  saving  the  situation  at  a  moment  of 
the  direst  peril  were  all  ready. 

Of  course,  at  the  time  and  for  long  after,  nothing 
could  be  heard  of  all  this  most  valuable  activity  and  its 
results.  The  name  of  Foch  had  for  months  been  unmen- 
tioned  in  the  public  press.  He  seemed  to  have  dis- 
appeared from  the  scene  of  the  war. 

By  the  end  of  1916,  there  had  been  important  changes 
in  the  French  higher  command.  Joffre  had  resigned 
the  position  of  generalissimo  of  the  French  armies,  and 
had  been  succeeded  by  General  Nivelle.  In  the  first 
stage  of  the  war,  Nivelle  had  held  the  rank  of  Colonel 
of  Artillery.  He  had  been  promoted  to  the  rank  of 
General  after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  He  had  risen 
to  fame  as  the  defender  of  Verdun  with  P^tain,  and  had 
increased  his  reputation  by  his  counter-attacks  on  the 
German  lines  before  the  fortress,  in  which  attacks  he 
had  won  back  much  of  the  gi'ound  lost  in  the  first  onset 


232  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

of  the  enemy.  His  appointment  to  the  post  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief was  very  popular.  In  England  some 
of  the  newspapers  began  an  agitation  for  a  further 
enlargement  of  his  command,  suggesting  that  he  should 
be  given  full  control  of  both  the  French  and  the  British 
armies  in  France  and  Flanders,  and  urging  amongst 
other  arguments  that  he  was  specially  fitted  for  such 
an  international  command,  because  on  his  mother's  side 
he  was  of  English  descent.  It  was  the  first  time  that 
the  appointment  of  a  single  Commander-in-Chief  for  the 
Western  Front  had  been  suggested.  But  the  proposal 
led  to  nothing. 

Other  changes  had  taken  place  in  the  command  of 
the  three  groups  of  French  armies.  De  Castelnau,  after 
having  helped  to  reorganize  the  defence  of  Verdun  in 
the  first  days  of  danger,  was  given  the  command  of  the 
eastern  group  from  Verdun  to  the  Swiss  frontier.  He 
held  this  post,  when  Foch  visited  the  Belfort-Jura 
region  to  study  its  defence.  P^tain  was  in  command 
of  the  central  group;  and  D'Esperey  had  taken  over 
Foch's  former  command  of  the  northern  front. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

CHIEF  OF  THE  FRENCH  GENERAL  STAFF 

At  the  beginning  of  the  New  Year  of  1917,  Foch  was 
still  engaged  in  the  staff  work  that  was  to  occupy  him 
for  some  time  to  come.  The  first  weeks  of  the  year 
saw  the  beginning  of  a  wide-reaching  change  in  the 
situation  on  the  Western  Front.  On  the  Somme  battle 
ground,  which  had  been  for  six  months  the  scene  of 
continuous  fighting,  the  Germans  had  gradually  been 
forced  back  to  a  line  which  ran  from  the  high  ground 
about  the  gorge  of  the  little  river  Ancre,  along  the 
strongly-entrenched  Bapaume  ridge,  and  then  by  the 
heights  north  of  Peronne  to  the  old  fortress,  secure  for 
awhile  in  its  girdle  of  marsh  and  river.  The  line  then 
followed  for  a  few  miles  the  east  bank  of  the  Somme, 
and  then  crossed  it,  and  pushed  out  into  a  broad  salient, 
south  of  the  Amiens-St.  Quentin  road. 

But  even  the  hard  wintry  weather  did  not  put  an  end 
to  the  Somme  battle.  In  January  and  the  first  days  of 
February,  Haig  by  a  series  of  masterly  operations 
forced  the  strong  positions  on  the  Ancre  heights,  break- 
ing into  the  German  line  at  a  critical  point,  and 
threatening  the  flank  of  the  Bapaume  ridge  defences. 
This  was  the  decisive  climax  of  the  long  battle.  In  the 
last  days  of  February,  the  Germans  gave  way  before 
the  menace  to  their  flank,  and  their  retreat  began  all 
along  the  Somme  front. 

All  through  the  month  of  March,  the  British  and  the 

233 


234  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

French  were  gaining  ground  day  by  day.  Every  des- 
patch sent  news  of  the  re-occupation  of  towns  and 
villages  long  held  by  the  invader.  Optimists  indulged 
in  predictions  of  the  early  collapse  of  the  enemy's  power. 
But,  as  yet,  though  the  Germans  were  defeated,  there 
was  no  collapse.  Their  retreat  was  well  conducted,  and 
they  were  falling  back  on  carefully  prepared  positions. 
Hindenburg — a  name  popular  in  Germany  since  the 
victory  of  Tannenberg — was  given  general  command  of 
the  western  operations.  His  name  was  popularly  asso- 
ciated with  the  new  line,  on  which  the  Germans  at  last 
made  a  stand.  The  Hindenburg  line  became  a  current 
term,  sometimes  applied  to  one  strong  line  of  trenches 
that  formed  a  feature  of  the  new  front,  but  in  its  wider 
sense  denoting  the  whole  system  of  positions  in  front  of 
the  line — Douai-Cambrai-St.  Quentin-Laon.  The  right 
flank  linked  up  with  the  salient  formed  by  the  defences 
of  Lens  and  the  Vimy  Ridge,  whence  the  German  front 
extended  by  the  positions  covering  Lille  to  the  lines  be- 
fore Ypres,  and  so  to  the  sea.  The  left  rested  on  the 
wooded  hills  that  protected  Laon,  and  the  inundations 
of  the  Oise  about  the  advanced  post,  La  Fere. 

To  understand  the  course  of  events  that  brought  Foch 
the  supreme  command  of  the  Allied  Armies  in  the 
West,  we  must  touch  upon  the  chief  events  of  this 
critical  year,  1917. 

While  the  Germans  were  retiring  to  the  Hindenburg 
lino,  there  came  the  sudden  thunderclap  of  the  Russian 
Revolution.  The  optimist  spirit  of  the  press,  and  of 
public  and  official  opinion  in  France  and  England,  led 
to  the  most  sanguine  hopes  being  based  upon  every 
change  in  tlie  situation.  A  mistaken  view  was  generally 
taken  of  the  Russian  Revolution.     It  was  represented 


CHIEF  OF  FRENCH  GENERAL  STAFF  235 

for  some  time  as  a  movement  that  would  marshal  all 
the  strength  of  Russia  against  the  Austro-German 
invaders,  as  the  Revolution  called  forth  the  fighting 
power  of  France  against  the  Allied  Sovereigns  of  old 
Europe.  Disillusion  came  slowly,  and  was  reluctantly 
accepted.  Event  after  event,  culminating  in  the  collapse 
of  the  Russian  army  in  the  last  effort  at  an  offensive, 
showed  that  Russia  had  for  the  time  being  ceased  to  be 
a  power,  and  had  become  a  chaos. 

The  hopeful  mood  was  still  in  the  ascendant  in  the 
spring  of  1917,  and  it  was  not  yet  realized  that  before 
many  months  Germany  would  be  able  to  move  huge 
armies  from  the  East,  and  throw  them  into  the  scales  of 
battle  on  the  Western  Front.  The  danger  was  foreseen 
by  few.  It  was  believed  that  the  Germans  in  the  West 
would  be  forced  to  further  retreat.  Haig  was  anxious 
to  carry  out  a  plan  he  had  prepared  for  a  new  offensive, 
that  might  drive  them  from  the  Belgian  coast;  but  he 
accepted  a  plan  proposed  by  the  new  French  general- 
issimo, Nivelle.  The  British  were  to  attack  from  Arras, 
against  the  left  centre  of  the  German  line  towards 
Cambrai  and  St.  Quentin.  The  French  were  to  storm 
the  heights  covering  Laon,  and  thus  make  a  converging 
attack  on  the  German  flank.  Haig  attacked  on  a  wide 
front,  in  April  and  May.  The  Vimy  Ridge  was  stormed ; 
the  advance  was  pushed  close  to  the  suburbs  of  Lens. 
The  Germans  were  forced  back  on  a  front  of  nearly 
sixteen  miles  to  a  depth  of  from  two  to  four.  Round  St. 
Quentin,  where  the  British  and  French  lines  met, 
ground  was  won,  that  half  enclosed  the  German  posi- 
tions about  the  city.  Nivelle,  attacking  on  a  long  front 
that  extended  to  the  east  of  Rheims,  captured  some  of 
the  enemy's  positions,  won  a  footing  on  the  eastern  end 


236  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

of  the  Aisne  heights,  but  failed  in  what  should  have 
been  the  decisive  thrust  towards  Laon.  The  great 
battle  died  down  before  the  strong  positions  on  which 
the  Germans  had  retired  in  the  Cambrai  region;  and 
their  line  facing  the  French  was  almost  intact.  It  was 
a  disappointing  result,  and  Nivelle  was  superseded  in 
the  chief  command  of  the  French  armies,  being  replaced 
by  General  P^tain,  on  May  15th.  Foch  was  on  the  same 
day  given  the  appointment  of  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff  of  the  French  army. 

This  appointment  made  Paris  his  usual  place  of 
residence.  His  work  was  at  the  Headquarters  of  the 
General  Staff,  and  he  had  to  keep  in  close  touch  with  the 
Government.  P^tain  was  not  carrying  out  any  opera- 
tions of  wide  scope  on  the  French  front.  After  the  close 
of  the  offensive  in  the  early  summer,  he  was  devoting 
himself  to  local  improvements  in  the  line,  the  chief  of 
which  was  the  further  thrusting  back  of  the  Germans 
from  the  Verdun  front.  The  main  operation  of  the 
second  half  of  1917  was  in  the  hands  of  Haig  and  the 
British,  with  some  co-operation  from  the  French  troops 
north  of  Ypres.  Haig  was  acting  on  his  plan  for  forc- 
ing the  enemy  from  the  Belgian  coast  districts,  and,  as 
a  first  step,  was  gradually  clearing  the  ridges  east  and 
north-east  of  Ypres — a  task  not  unlike  that  of  the 
patient  conquest  of  the  German  positions  on  the  Somme 
battlefield  the  year  before.  In  the  autumn,  cold  rainy 
weather,  that  made  even  the  slopes  into  greasy  quag- 
mires, added  to  the  difficulties  of  the  advance — which 
finally  reached  the  village  of  Passchendaele  in  No- 
vember. 

By  tliis  time  northern  Italy  had  become  the  most 
important  centre  of  the  war  in  the  West.     In  October 


CHIEF  OF  FRENCH  GENERAL  STAFF  237 

an  Austro-German  offensive  was  launched  against  the 
Italian  front  on  the  Isonzo.  It  broke  through  the  line 
at  Caporetto,  and  the  whole  defence  gave  way  from  that 
point  to  the  sea.  The  invaders  poured  into  Venetia, 
making  enormous  captures  of  prisoners,  guns,  war 
materiel  and  stores  of  all  kinds;  and  the  Italian  army 
was  forced  back  across  the  Tagliamento  and  the  Livenza, 
making  at  last  a  halt  behind  the  Piave  line,  while  a  new 
offensive  developed  on  its  flank  from  the  Trentino. 

The  state  of  affairs  had  arisen,  which  Foch  had  studied 
months  before  as  a  possible  contingency  of  the  war. 
The  Italian  Government  was  appealing  for  help,  with  its 
army  compelled  to  abandon  hundreds  of  miles  of  moun- 
tain frontier  and  fall  back  into  the  northern  plain.  Foch 
was  rightly  judged  to  be  the  man  to  arrange  that  this 
help  should  be  promptly  and  effectively  given.  He  was 
sent  to  Italy  as  the  chief  of  a  military  mission.  British 
and  French  reinforcements  were  already  moving  south 
and  crossing  the  Alps.  The  plans  he  had  drawn  up  for 
the  event  were  being  executed.  His  business  was  to 
confer  with  the  Italian  staff,  and  see  that  all  necessary 
arrangements  were  made  for  the  new  reinforcements 
coming  quickly  into  line. 

During  this  visit  to  Italy,  Foch  met  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
at  the  conference  held  at  Rapallo  on  the  Riviera,  in 
which  representatives  of  Britain,  France  and  Italy,  took 
part,  both  the  civilian  and  military  leaders  being 
represented. 

At  the  Rapallo  conference  a  very  important  decision 
was  arrived  at — namely,  the  formation  of  a  central 
council  which  was  to  secure,  if  not  unity  of  command,  at 
least  a  general  unity  of  direction  for  the  Allied  Armies 
on  the  Western  Front.    And  this  front  was  now  under- 


238  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

stood  to  include  the  Italian  lines  on  the  Piave  and  the 
Trentino  border.  It  was  a  front  extending  from  the 
North  Sea  to  the  Mediterranean,  with  one  interruption, 
where  Switzerland  still  maintained  its  neutrality,  an 
island  of  peace  in  the  midst  of  the  deluge  of  European 
war. 

It  was  a  first  step  in  the  new  evolution  by  which 
before  long  General  Foch  was  to  become  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Allied  Armies  in  the  West.  Before  fol- 
lowing further  the  story  of  the  new  agreement  between 
Britain,  France  and  Italy,  that  was  settled  at  Rapallo, 
it  will  be  well  to  give  the  terms  of  this  important  docu- 
ment as  it  was  later  communicated  to  the  House  of 
Commons  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George: 


1.  With  a  view  to  the  better  co-ordination  of  military 
action  on  the  Western  front,  a  Supreme  War  Council  is 
created,  composed  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  a  member 
of  the  Government  of  each  of  the  Great  Powers  whose 
armies  are  fighting  on  that  front.  The  extension  of 
the  scope  of  the  Council  to  other  fronts  is  reserved  for 
discussion  with  the  other  Great  Powers. 

2.  The  Supreme  War  Council  has  for  its  mission  to 
watch  over  the  general  conduct  of  the  war.  It  prepares 
recommendations  for  the  decision  of  the  Governments, 
and  keeps  itself  informed  of  their  execution,  and  reports 
thereon  to  the  respective  governments. 

3.  The  General  Staff  and  military  commands  of  the 
Armies  of  each  Power,  charged  with  the  conduct  of 
military  operations  remain  responsible  to  their  respec- 
tive governments. 

4.  The  general  war  plans  drawn  up  by  the  competent 
military  authorities  are  submitted  to  the  Supreme  War 
('ouncil,  which,  uuder  the  high  authority  of  the  govern- 
ments, ensures  their  concordance,  and  submits,  if  need 
be,  any  necessary  changes. 


CHIEF  OF  FRENCH  GENERAL  STAFF     239 

5.  Each  Power  delegates  to  the  Supreme  War  Council 
one  permanent  military  representative,  whose  exclu- 
sive function  is  to  act  as  technical  adviser  to  the  Council. 

6.  The  military  representatives  receive  from  the 
Government  and  the  competent  military  authority  of 
their  country  all  the  proposals,  information  and  docu- 
ments, relating  to  the  conduct  of  the  war. 

7.  The  military  representatives  watch  day  by  day 
the  situation  of  the  forces,  and  the  means  of  all  kinds 
of  which  the  Allied  Armies  and  the  enemy  armies 
dispose. 

8.  The  Supreme  War  Council  meets  ordinarily  at 
Versailles,  where  the  permanent  military  representatives 
and  their  staffs  are  established.  They  may  meet  at 
other  places,  as  may  be  agreed  upon,  according  to  the 
circumstances.  The  meetings  of  the  Supreme  War 
Council  will  take  place  at  least  once  a  month. 

It  appears  that  before  Mr.  Lloyd  George  left  London, 
on  November  4th,  for  Italy,  the  suggested  had  been 
drafted  by  the  War  Cabinet.  He  was  in  Paris  on  his 
way  home  a  week  later,  and  reached  London  on  the 
evening  of  the  13th;  so  this  important  step  had  been 
very  quickly  decided  upon.  In  Paris,  at  a  luncheon 
presided  over  by  the  French  Prime  Minister,  M. 
Painlev^,  he  made  a  remarkable  speech.  He  explained 
afterwards  that  he  put  things  with  brutal  frankness  in 
order  to  arouse  public  opinion  to  the  serious  position 
of  affairs  and  enforce  the  necessity  of  the  new  depart- 
ure. Perhaps  in  his  anxiety  to  influence  opinion,  he 
indulged  in  exaggeration.  He  dwelt  on  various  alleged 
mistakes  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  by  the  Allied  Powers, 
on  lost  opportunities  and  disasters  that  might  have  been 
averted.  There  had  been  conferences  and  consultations, 
he  said,  and  after  each  it  was  proclaimed  that  the  unity 
of  the  Allies  was  complete ;  but  "  that  unity,  in  so  far 


240  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

as  strategy  went,  was  pure  make-believe;  and  make- 
believe  may  live  through  a  generation  of  peace — it  can- 
not survive  a  week  of  war."  It  was  necessary  to  oppose 
united  action  by  the  Allies  to  the  united  command  of 
the  Central  Powers,  and  the  means  had  now  been  found 
to  secure  this.  The  Italian  disaster  might  yet  save  the 
Allies  by  enforcing  this  co-ordination  of  plans.  The 
new  Supreme  War  Council  would  give  a  unity  which 
would  be  "  not  a  fraud,  but  a  fact." 

Next  day  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  in  London,  and  on 
the  14th  he  explained  to  the  House  of  Commons  the 
constitution  and  objects  of  the  new  Council.  Shortly 
after  it  was  announced  that  the  military  representa- 
tives of  the  three  Powers  would  be  Sir  Henry  Wilson  for 
England,  General  Cadorna  for  Italy,  and  General  Foch 
for  France. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George's  Paris  speech  had  naturally  pro- 
voked a  good  deal  of  criticism.  The  new  Council  was 
also  the  subject  of  much  controversy.  Everyone  was 
agreed  that  co-ordination  of  the  Allied  plans  and  unity 
of  strategic  direction  were  all  important.  But  many 
questioned  whether  the  Council  was  the  best  means  of 
securing  these  ends,  and  indeed  whether  it  would  prove 
to  be  a  good  working  organization.  Soldiers,  as  a  rule 
do  not  trust  the  control  of  warlike  operations  by  a 
committee.  They  like  better  the  guidance  of  a  single 
mind.  The  French  newspapers  began  at  once  to  suggest 
that  the  best  use  that  could  be  made  of  the  Supreme 
War  Council  would  be  to  make  it  a  stepping-stone  to 
the  appointment  of  a  supreme  Commander-in-Chief. 
The  idea  was  not  at  first  welcomed  in  England,  though 
it  found  some  supporters.  But  English  criticism  ran 
chiefly  on  the  line,  that  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  new 


CHIEF  OF  FRENCH  GENERAL  STAFF  241 

Council  were  very  vaguely  defined ;  that  it  was  not  clear 
whether  it  was  to  be  merely  advisory  or  executive ;  and 
that  it  would  not  be  an  easy  matter  to  combine  its 
action  with  the  existing  system  under  which  in  each 
country  the  Government  was  responsible  for  the  con- 
duct of  the  war,  acting  on  information  and  advice 
received  from  the  General  Staff,  while  the  commanders 
in  the  field  carried  out  the  policy  thus  outlined  for  them. 

There  is  no  need  here  to  discuss  the  controversy 
further.  The  creation  of  the  new  Council  is  of  interest 
in  connection  with  the  career  of  General  Foch,  chiefly 
because  it  actually  proved  to  be  the  first  step  to  his 
advancement  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Allied 
Armies.  In  November,  1917,  the  time  was  not  yet  ripe 
for  such  an  appointment  to  be  made.  There  is  proof  of 
this,  so  far  as  English  opinion  is  concerned  in  the  fact 
that,  when  the  policy  of  the  Supreme  War  Council  was 
formally  debated  in  the  House  of  Commons,  on  Novem- 
ber 19th,  both  Mr.  Asquith,  who  opened  the  debate,  and 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  who  replied  to  his  questions  and 
criticisms,  joined  in  deprecating  the  idea  of  a  "  gen- 
eralissimo "  of  the  armies  on  the  Western  Front  being 
appointed. 

"  In  France,"  said  Mr.  Asquith,  "  I  observe  that  the 
formation  of  the  Council  has  been  hailed  in  some  quar- 
ters, and  very  authoritative  quarters,  as  the  first,  and 
only  the  first,  step  to  a  much  more  drastic  change. 
Unity  of  control  in  their  view  is  soon  to  develop  into 
unity  of  command.  I  desire  to  read  into  it  no  such 
ulterior  purpose.  If  I  were  compelled  to  do  so,  I 
should  be  able,  I  believe,  to  submit  to  the  House  over- 
whelming arguments  against  it." 

Mr.   Lloyd  George  spoke   even   more   strongly.     In 


242  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

dealing  with  possible  alternatives  to  the  Council  as  a 
means  of  securing  unity  of  control,  he  referred  to  the 
fact  that  the  idea  had  been  put  forward  "  in  very  respon- 
sible quarters  "  of  the  appointment  of  a  generalissimo 
of  the  Allied  forces.  And  he  went  on  to  say,  "  Per- 
sonally, I  am  utterly  opposed  to  that  suggestion,  for 
reasons  which  it  would  not  be  desirable  to  enter  into 
now.  It  would  not  work.  It  would  produce  real  fric- 
tion, and  might  really  produce  it  not  merely  between 
the  armies,  but  between  the  nations  and  the  govern- 
ments as  well." 

Thus,  in  November,  1917,  the  responsible  leaders  of 
English  opinion  were  agreed  that  the  idea  of  placing 
the  various  national  armies  on  the  Western  Front  under 
a  single  commander  and  fusing  them  into  one  inter- 
national army  was  so  far  outside  the  range  of  practical 
politics,  that  there  was  no  need  even  to  discuss  it  as  a 
possibility.  But  the  "  drastic  change  "  was  not  far  off. 
And  it  may  safely  be  said  that  while  the  course  of 
events  suggested  it,  it  was  the  personal  character  of 
General  Foch,  and  the  solid  confidence  he  inspired  in 
all  the  armies,  that  made  the  change  possible. 

Until  at  some  future  day  the  full  official  record  of  the 
war  is  available,  nothing  can  be  said  of  the  inner  work- 
ing of  the  new  Council  and  the  results  it  obtained  dur- 
ing this  first  brief  stage  of  its  existence.  The  political 
members,  the  ministers  of  the  Allied  Governments,  met 
from  time  to  time  at  Versailles.  The  military  members 
worked  day  by  day.  They  were  soon  joined  by  a  new 
colleague,  the  American  General  Bliss.  Foch,  with  his 
experience  as  a  commander  in  the  field,  and  later  as  the 
director  of  the  committee  that  used  to  meet  at  Senlis 
to  study  war  problems,  and  with  his  actual  position  as 


CHIEF  OF  FRENCH  GENERAL  STAFF  243 

Cliief-of-the-Stafif  of  the  French  army,  had  a  special  com- 
petence for  his  task  as  the  French  representative,  and 
was  able  to  give  most  efficient  help  to  the  Council. 

The  military  situation  was  still  anxious.  The  Italian 
front  strengthened  by  British  and  French  reinforce- 
ments, had  held  firm  on  the  Piave,  until  the  wintry 
weather  put  a  stop  to  active  operations  on  the  dangerous 
Alpine  flank  of  the  line.  In  France  the  dash  of  Byng's 
army  towards  Cambrai,  which  at  first  seemed  to  promise 
great  results,  was  followed  by  a  counter-attack,  that 
gave  back  to  the  enemy  most  of  what  he  had  lost,  while 
the  element  of  successful  surprise  in  the  counterstroke, 
produced  an  unpleasant  impression.  But  most  serious 
of  all  was  the  change  in  the  general  conditions  of  the 
war,  produced  by  the  collapse  of  Russia.  It  was  cer- 
tain that  during  the  winter  the  enemy  would  be  able 
to  transfer  thousands  of  guns,  and  a  huge  army  of  more 
than  a  million  men,  from  east  to  west;  and  it  was 
predicted  that  early  in  the  New  Year  the  German  Staff 
would  make  an  attempt  on  a  gigantic  scale  to  over- 
whelm the  Allies  in  France  and  Flanders  before  the  new 
armies  that  the  United  States  were  raising  and  train- 
ing would  be  ready  in  any  large  numbers  for  active 
service  on  the  Western  Front. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

"  CO-ORDINATOR  "  OF  THE  ALLIED  OPERATIONS 

In  the  first  weeks  of  1918,  along  the  Western  Front 
there  was  more  activity  in  the  air  than  on  the  ground. 
British  and  French  airmen  were  asserting  that  mastery, 
which  was  to  prove  a  most  important  factor  in  the 
operations  of  the  coming  summer.  For  awhile  little  was 
heard  of  the  military  action  of  the  Versailles  Council. 
But  after  the  meeting  held  at  the  beginning  of  February 
it  was  announced  officially  that  "  The  functions  of  the 
Council  itself  were  enlarged,  and  the  principles  of  unity 
of  policy  and  action  initiated  at  Rapallo  in  November 
received  still  further  concrete  and  practical  develop- 
ment." This  announcement  was  coupled  with  a  state- 
ment in  reply  to  suggestions  for  negotiations  thrown  out 
by  the  German  Chancellor  and  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  These  declarations  of 
policy  would  of  course  originate  with  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments represented  at  the  meeting  by  their  Premiers  and 
Foreign  Secretaries.  But  important  military  decisions 
in  connection  with  the  impending  German  offensive 
must  have  been  taken  at  the  same  time,  for  the  military 
element  was  strongly  represented  at  the  meeting,  which 
lasted  for  four  days,  from  Wednesday,  January  30th,  to 
Saturday,  February  2nd.  The  official  communique,  in 
mentioning  those  who  were  present,  indicated  a  change 
in  the  constitution  of  the  Council  on  its  military  side. 

244 


COORDINATOR  OP  ALLIED  OPERATIONS    245 

It  was  stated  that  among  those  who  took  part  in  the 
proceedings  were  "  the  military  representatives  of  the 
Supreme  War  Council  (General  Weygaud,  General  Sir 
H.  W.  Wilson,  General  Cadorna  and  General  Bliss). 
There  were  also  present,  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
purely  military  discussion,  the  French  and  British 
Chiefs  of  the  General  Staff  (General  Foch  and  General 
Sir  W.  Robertson),  the  Italian  Minister  of  War 
(General  Alfieri)  and  the  Commanders-in-Chief  on  the 
Western  Front  (General  P^tain,  Field  Marshal  Sir 
Douglas  Haig  and  General  Pershing). 

When  the  Council  was  formed,  in  November,  1917, 
General  Foch,  while  still  retaining  his  position  as  Chief 
of  the  French  General  Staff,  had  been  appointed  to 
represent  France  at  Versailles.  But  evidently  he  had 
by  this  time  found  that  the  double  duty  was  too  heavy 
a  burden,  even  for  his  indefatigable  industry,  and  had 
secured  the  appointment  of  his  right-hand  man.  General 
Weygaud,  as  his  substitute.  By  this  arrangement  he 
would  have  more  time  for  his  Staff  work,  while  still 
being  able  to  influence  the  decisions  of  the  Council  on 
military  policy. 

In  the  House  of  Commons,  the  Government  was  ques- 
tioned as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  "  enlargement 
of  the  Council's  functions,"  but  refused  to  give  any 
specific  information.  In  reply  to  a  question  as  to 
whether  "  unity  of  command  had  been  attained  "  Mr. 
Bonar  Law  said : — "  If  the  honourable  gentleman  means 
*■  Has  a  Generalissimo  been  appointed?'  the  answer  is 
'  No '." 

M.  Clemenceau,  to  whom  Foch  had  owed  his  appoint- 
ment as  Director  of  the  Ecole  de  Guerre,  was  now  Prime 
Minister  of  France.    Writers  in  the  Paris  press,  who 


246  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

were  known  to  be  in  close  touch  with  Clemenceau  and 
whose  articles  were  sometimes  used  as  the  means  of 
giving  publicity  to  official  views  without  directly  involv- 
ing the  authority  of  the  Government — announced  that 
the  Supreme  War  Council  had  fully  considered  the 
possibilities  of  the  threatened  German  offensive,  which 
was  now  regarded  as  imminent,  and  had  taken  effective 
measures  not  only  to  deal  with  it,  but  also  for  "  subse- 
quent retaliation."  In  England,  Ministers  spoke  hope- 
fully of  the  outlook.  While  recognizing  that  a  time  of 
trial  was  approaching,  they  declared  that  the  army  in 
France  was  never  stronger  or  in  a  better  position  to 
meet  an  attack  on  a  grand  scale. 

There  was  fine  weather,  and  all  through  February 
the  great  offensive  was  expected  from  day  to  day.  Some 
of  the  Berlin  papers  predicted  that  February,  1918 
would  be  a  glorious  date  in  the  annals  of  the  German 
army.  But  throughout  the  month  there  was  a  strange 
lull  along  the  German  lines  in  the  West.  The  war 
correspondents  on  the  British  front  told  of  the  enemy's 
almost  "  ostentatious  idleness."  In  many  places,  even 
the  ordinary  routine  of  trench  warfare  seemed  to  have 
been  abandoned  for  awhile.  Snipers  were  no  longer 
busy.  The  artillery  loosed  off  perhaps  half-a-dozen 
shells  in  the  day  here  and  there.  Occasionally  a  trench 
mortar  got  to  work  for  a  few  minutes.  British  raids 
produced  no  attempt  at  retaliation.  But  British  and 
French  airmen  brought  reports  that  far  behind  the 
inactive  front  lines  there  was  a  ceaseless  activity. 
Troops  and  convoys  were  moving  westward  by  rail  and 
road;  and  at  large  instruction  camps  well  to  the  rear, 
bodies  of  troops  wore  carrying  out  field-day  manoeuvres, 
the  chief  feature  of  which  was  the  attack  in  masses 


COORDINATOR  OF  ALLIED   OPERATIONS    247 

against  prepared  positions  representing  the  Allied 
entrenchments. 

At  times,  the  lull  on  the  front  was  interrupted  by 
local  operations,  but  these  were  mostly  initiated  by  the 
Allies.  In  Italy,  an  attack  over  ice  and  snow  won  back 
some  of  the  ground  lost  in  the  early  winter  on  the 
Asiago  plateau.  A  German  thrust  in  the  woods  north 
of  Verdun  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss  to  the  assailants. 
The  Canadians  raided  the  outskirts  of  Lens.  The 
French  made  local  attacks  in  the  Argonne  and  on  the 
Lorraine  front.  At  the  end  of  the  month,  the  artillery 
became  again  busy  on  both  sides. 

But  February  passed  by  without  the  offensive  develop- 
ing. In  the  press,  at  home  in  England,  there  were 
suggestions  thrown  out  that  perhaps  after  all  it  was 
a  gigantic  "  bluff,"  meant  to  divert  attention  from  some 
new  enterprise  in  the  East  or  a  renewed  attack  upon 
Italy.  But  the  chiefs  of  the  Allied  Armies  on  the 
Western  Front  had  no  such  illusions.  They  knew  that 
the  critical  moment  could  not  now  be  far  off. 

The  despatches  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  given  to  the 
public  on  October  21st,  1918,  though  they  leave  cer- 
tain points  still  unexplained,  open  up  much  interesting 
information  as  to  the  general  situation  before  the 
German  offensive  began.  Incidentally  they  tell 
something  of  the  arrangements  to  meet  it  that  had 
been  concerted  with  General  Foch  and  the  French 
Staff. 

For  the  time  being,  the  Allies  had  had  to  adopt  a 
defensive  policy.  By  the  end  of  January,  1918,  the 
British  lines  had  been  further  extended  southwards, 
Haig  taking  over  from  the  French  about  twenty-eight 
miles  of  new  front  on  his  right,  and  thus  carrying  the 


248  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

British  line  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Oise.  The  whole 
front  held  by  Haig's  armies  was  now  125  miles. 

On  all  the  southern  part  of  the  front,  the  British 
had  for  more  than  a  year  been  acting  on  the  offensive, 
and  their  entrenchments  now  represented  positions 
which  had  not  been  long  held,  and  which  were  therefore 
not  very  elaborately  fortified.  Much  work  would  have 
to  be  done  to  prepare  them  for  a  serious  and  prolonged 
defence,  and  to  improve  the  railway  and  road  communi- 
cations in  their  rear,  where  a  wide  zone  of  the  ground 
had  been  reduced  to  a  chaotic  condition  during  the 
months  of  the  Somme  battle.  Haig  explains  that  his 
men  were  so  continually  occupied  with  this  work,  that 
little  time  could  be  found  to  give  them  special  training 
for  defensive  operations.  It  was  on  the  line  south  of 
Arras,  including  the  twenty-eight  miles  of  front  taken 
over  from  the  French,  that  the  heaviest  work  had  to  be 
done.  Haig  believed  that  it  was  the  most  likely  point 
for  the  German  attack ;  but,  after  providing  for  the  rest 
of  the  line,  there  was  only  a  limited  force  available  for 
its  immediate  defence.  It  was  held  by  the  Fifth  Army 
under  General  Gough,  who  had  the  French  on  his  right 
beyond  the  Oise,  and  the  Third  Army  under  General 
Byng  on  his  left  about  Arras. 

Sir  Douglas  Haig  refers  in  his  despatch  to  the  fact 
that  arrangements  liad  been  made  for  French  co-opera- 
tion, adding  that  "  among  the  many  problems  studied 
by  the  Allied  Staffs,  those  involved  by  a  hostile  offensive 
on  the  line  of  the  Somme  River,  and  the  passage  of  that 
river  by  the  enemy,  had  been  worked  out."  This  shows 
that,  in  its  study  of  the  question  of  defence  against  the 
German  offensive,  the  Versailles  Council  had  faced  the 
possibility  tliat  there  would  have  to  be  a  retirement  be- 


COORDINATOR  OF  ALLIED  OPERATIONS     249 

fore  the  weight  that  the  enemy  could  put  into  his  first 
onset. 

In  the  second  week  of  March,  the  German  artillery 
became  more  active  along  the  front.  Here  and  there  at 
times  its  fire  rose  to  the  intensity  of  a  heavy  bombard- 
ment, such  as  might  be  the  prelude  of  an  attack.  Local 
attacks  were  actually  made  on  a  considerable  scale. 
Some  heavy  firing  resulted  in  Flanders,  on  the  Cambrai 
front,  in  Champagne  and  north  of  Verdun.  But  none 
of  these  attacks  lasted  for  more  than  a  few  hours ;  they 
were  evidently  feints  meant  to  divert  attention  from  the 
real  danger  point.  But  the  British  airmen  had  ob- 
tained abundant  evidence  of  a  concentration  before  our 
front,  between  Arras  and  the  Oise;  and  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  reports  in  his  despatch,  that  on  Tuesday,  March 
19th,  he  had  information  that  the  German  preparations 
were  complete  and  he  expected  the  attack  within  the 
next  two  days. 

Though  it  was  thus  anticipated,  when  the  great  of- 
fensive began  in  the  early  morning  of  Thursday,  March 
21st,  it  was  something  of  a  surprise.  It  was  a  fine  day, 
without  any  wind,  and  there  was  a  dense  fog  hanging 
low  on  the  ground,  limiting  the  range  of  vision  in  most 
places  to  about  fifty  yards.  Before  dawn,  thousands  of 
German  guns  had  been  heavily  shelling  the  front.  Guns 
of  longer  range  began  firing  over  the  lines,  bursting  their 
heavy  shells  miles  to  the  rear,  along  the  lines  by  which 
support  could  be  sent  up  to  the  front.  This  went  on 
during  the  morning  hours.  About  10  a.m.^  spreading 
gas  clouds  began  to  mingle  with  the  fog,  and  in  the  semi- 
darkness  more  than  half  a  million  of  the  enemy  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack,  on  a  front  of  nearly  fifty  miles. 
Behind  the  advance,  at  least  an  equal  force  was  being 


250  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

hurried  up  by  road  and  rail  to  support  it.  When  the 
fog  cleared  later  in  the  day,  our  airmen,  flying  over  the 
German  lines,  reported  that  for  miles  to  the  rear  of  the 
enemy,  the  roads  were  packed  with  marching  columns. 

The  marvel  is,  not  that  the  British  line  was  forced 
back,  but  that  for  awhile  it  made  only  a  slow  retirement. 
By  evening  the  extent  of  this  retirement  was  nowhere  as 
much  as  two  miles.  All  available  reserves  were  hurried 
up;  but  the  enemy's  attack  was  also  being  reinforced, 
and  on  the  Friday  more  ground  was  lost.  In  the  next 
three  days,  the  enemy  was  pushing  forward  rapidly.  On 
the  left,  it  is  true,  the  positions  covering  Arras  were 
held ;  but  further  south  the  whole  British  line  was  being 
forced  back.  On  the  battlefields  of  the  Somme,  ridges 
and  ruined  villages,  that  had  cost  weeks  to  capture,  were 
lost  in  a  few  hours.  The  enemy  was  in  Peronne,  and 
the  line  of  the  Somme  to  the  south  of  it  had  been  aban- 
doned. By  Tuesday,  the  26th,  he  was  close  up  to  Albert, 
and  the  Ancre  heights  had  been  captured;  and  on  the 
other  flank  the  enemy  was  near  Roye,  and  was  forcing 
the  French  out  of  Noyon.  The  front  of  the  German 
advance  formed  a  huge  blunted  salient  north  and  south 
of  the  St.  Quentin-Amiens  road,  with  the  point  danger- 
ously near  the  latter  city.  German  reports  claimed  the 
capture  of  more  than  a  thousand  guns  and  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  prisoners. 

On  this  day  an  important  conference  met  at  Doullens, 
north  of  Amiens,  where  Foch  had  had  his  headquarters 
in  1014.  It  was  now  within  hearing  of  the  cannon 
thunder  from  the  battlefield.  The  Allied  Governments 
were  represented  by  M.  Clemenceau  for  France  and 
Lord  Milner  for  England.  Sir  Douglas  Haig  was  there 
with  more  than  one  of  his  army  commanders;  and  sev- 


COORDINATOR  OF  ALLIED  OPERATIONS     251 

eral  of  the  French  generals  were  present,  amongst  them 
General  Foch. 

All  present  realized  how  serious  was  the  situation, 
and  the  momentous  decision  taken  in  order  to  deal  with 
it  was  the  placing  of  the  Allied  operations  under  the 
resourceful  control  of  Foch.  It  is  said  that  the  pro- 
posal came  from  Clemenceau.  But  whoever  originated 
it,  it  was  at  once  unanimously  adopted. 

The  position  thus  assigned  to  the  great  soldier  was 
practically,  but  as  yet  not  nominally,  that  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. In  England  the  impression  given  by 
official  utterances  gave  the  impression  that  he  was  to  be 
the  supreme  adviser  of  the  defence  measures  to  be  taken 
by  the  Allied  armies.  If  he  could  not  issue  formal 
orders,  his  plans  and  dispositions  were  certain  to  be 
accepted  without  cavil  or  hesitation.  Although  he  at 
once  took  charge  of  the  operations,  it  was  not  until 
March  30th  that  his  appointment  was  publicly  an- 
nounced. On  that  day,  too,  he  received  a  welcome  offer 
of  support  from  General  Pershing.  The  American  army 
in  France  was  still  in  the  stage  of  organizing  and  train- 
ing, but  Pershing  had  available  many  units  that  he  con- 
sidered to  be  available  for  the  battle  line.  He  went  to 
Foch's  headquarters,  and  personally  offered  the  services 
of  his  officers  and  men. 

"  I  have  come,"  he  said,  "  to  tell  you  that  the  Ameri- 
can people  would  consider  it  a  great  honour  to  have 
our  troops  engaged  in  the  present  battle.  I  ask  for  this 
in  its  name  and  in  my  own.  Just  now,  the  only  ques- 
tion is  fighting.  Our  infantry,  artillery,  flying  men — 
all  that  we  have  is  at  your  disposal.  More  are  coming 
— as  many  as  may  be  required.  I  have  come  expressly 
to  tell  you  that  the  American  people  will  be  proud  to 


252  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

have  their  troops  engaged  in  the  greatest  and  finest 
battle  in  history." 

The  offer  was  at  once  accepted,  and  it  was  arranged 
that  American  battalions  should  be  temporarily  bri- 
gaded with  British  troops. 

The  official  announcement  issued  on  this  day  to  the 
English  press  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  stated  that  for  the 
first  few  days  after  the  German  offensive  was  launched, 
the  situation  had  been  "  extremely  critical,"  The  posi- 
tion had  improved,  but  the  struggle  was  still  only  in  its 
"  opening  stage,"  and  no  prediction  of  the  future  could 
yet  be  made.  The  governments  of  Great  Britain,  France 
and  America  were  taking  combined  measures  to  deal 
with  the  emergency.  Then  the  communication  went  on 
to  announce  General  Foch's  appointment,  in  these 
words : 

"  The  enemy  has  had  the  incalculable  advantage  of 
fighting  as  one  army.  To  meet  this,  the  Allies  have, 
since  the  battle  began,  taken  a  most  important  decision. 
With  the  cordial  co-operation  of  the  British  and  French 
Commanders-in-Chief,  General  Foch  has  been  charged 
by  the  British,  French  and  American  governments,  to 
co-ordinate  the  action  of  the  Allied  armies  on  the 
Western  Front." 

"  Co-ordination  "  was  the  word  which  had  been  used 
to  describe  the  object  of  the  Versailles  Council.  It  had 
the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  a  certain  vague- 
ness, and  its  use  left  Foch's  position  anything  but 
clearly  defined.  The  Times  in  its  leading  article  re- 
ferred to  what  it  called  "  bygone  discussions  of  the 
generalissimo  ideal,"  and  suggested  that  "  the  public 
would  be  well  advised  to  accept  the  official  statement 
as  meaning  precisely  what  it  says."     The  drawback  was, 


COORDINATOR  OF   ALLIED  OPERATIONS     253 

that  the  meaning  was  anything  but  precise.  The  Times 
writer  went  on  to  say :  "  General  Foch,  as  we  under- 
stand the  position,  neither  possesses  nor  desires  the 
title  of  Generalissimo.  His  function  is  properly  de- 
scribed by  the  Government  as  that  of  co-ordinating  the 
action  of  the  Allied  armies.  The  distinction  may  seem 
to  be  more  verbal  than  real,  but  it  is  sufficiently  plain 
to  those  who  have  followed  the  events  of  the  last  few 
months  and  the  selection  of  General  Foch  is  itself  a 
guarantee  that  the  work  of  these  months — in  spite  of 
all  its  interruptions  and  slowness — has  nevertheless 
been  broadly  continuous." 

The  progress  was  to  continue  to  its  logical  conclusion, 
and  that  before  many  days  had  gone  by.  Meanwhile, 
we  may  be  quite  certain  that  Foch  cared  very  little  for 
verbal  distinctions  about  his  appointment,  so  long  as  he 
had  the  power  to  carry  out  the  plans  he  had  rapidly 
formed.  He  knew  he  could  rely  upon  the  most  ready 
and  loyal  co-operation  on  the  part  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
and  the  British  generals.  Haig  evidently  took  a  more 
matter-of-fact  view  of  the  situation  than  that  adopted 
either  by  the  politicians  or  the  leader-writers.  In  his 
despatch  he  frankly  stated  that  "  on  this  day,  March 
26th,  the  governments  of  France  and  Great  Britain  de- 
cided to  place  the  supreme  control  of  the  operations  of 
the  French  and  British  armies  in  France  and  Belgium 
in  the  hands  of  General  Foch,  who  accordingly  assumed 
control." 

Thus  on  the  very  day  of  the  meeting  at  Doullens,  he 
began  to  issue  his  directions  for  the  operations  that 
were  to  avert  the  danger  to  Amiens  and  the  Allied  line. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  OF  THE  ALLIES 

When  Foch  took  control  of  the  operations,  on  March 
26th,  the  German  advance  had  made  such  progress,  that 
the  enemy's  immediate  objects  were  clearly  revealed. 
The  German  staff  was  aiming  at  breaking  through  the 
Allied  line  on  a  wide  front,  and  separating  the  French 
from  the  British  army.  There  was  a  direct  push  for 
Amiens,  the  great  junction  of  roads  and  railways  which 
is  the  working  centre  of  communication  between  Paris 
and  the  north  of  France ;  and  linked  up  with  this  there 
was  a  secondary  push  down  the  Oise  valley,  to  break 
through  at  the  actual  point  where  the  two  armies  joined 
hands. 

Foch's  first  efforts  were  directed  to  holding  up  the 
advance  on  Amiens,  and  at  the  same  time  hurrying  up 
reinforcements  to  block  the  enemy's  advance  along  the 
Oise  from  Noyon,  and  strengthen  this  vital  point  of  the 
Allied  line. 

It  was  all-important  to  relieve  with  fresh  troops  the 
hard-tried  brigades  and  divisions  that  had  been  fighting 
for  nearly  a  week.  Even  with  their  superior  forces,  the 
Germans  had  found  it  difficult  to  disengage  the  troops 
in  the  front  line  and  bring  fresh  units  into  it.  On  both 
sides  there  were  signs  of  exhaustion.  One  of  the  narra- 
tives of  the  battle  tells  how  on  the  sixth  day  of  the 
fighting  the  firing  died  away  at  points  even  where  Brit- 
ish and  Germans  were  in  close  contact,  and  what  were 

254 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  OF  THE  ALLIES     255 

described  as  counter-attacks  really  meant  that  a  few 
hundred  haggard  men  were  got  together,  and  went  for- 
ward for  a  short  distance,  while  the  equally  weary 
enemy  fell  back  before  them,  and  presently  the  effort  to 
get  forward  ended,  and  both  sides  lay  down  again. 
Amid  this  growing  exhaustion,  it  was  only  the  arrival 
of  fresh  troops  on  both  sides  that  could  keep  the  battle 
going.  Haig  had  drawn  some  new  divisions  from  the 
Flanders  front,  where  they  could  ill  be  spared;  and  these 
had  been  sent  into  the  battle,  as  they  arrived.  Foch  was 
bringing  troops  from  the  Champagne  front  and  from  the 
east  of  France,  improvising  a  local  reserve  even  at  the 
risk  of  weakening  the  line  elsewhere.  At  first,  nothing 
could  be  kept  in  hand  to  form  a  striking  force  for  a  spe- 
cial effort.  The  troops,  as  they  arrived,  were  pushed 
into  the  line  between  the  Amiens-Paris  railway  and  the 
Oise,  where  the  French  front,  forced  back  by  the  Ger- 
man advance  had  been  lengthened  by  many  miles  and 
was  in  danger  of  breaking.  The  French  were  barring 
the  enemy's  advance  on  this  side.  Haig  was  holding  the 
direct  road  to  Amiens,  and  opposing  the  German  effort 
to  break  through  above  Arras  and  from  the  Ancre 
heights  in  order  to  envelop  Amiens  from  the  northern 
side.  The  Germans  were  still  making  progress  at  some 
points.  They  occupied  Albert  on  the  night  of  the  26th- 
27th,  and  on  the  28th  they  took  Montdidier,  thus  cut- 
ting a  useful  railway-line  connecting  Amiens  with  the 
French  right.  But  the  great  rush  had  been  stopped. 
Fresh  troops  were  arriving  every  hour  and  reinforce- 
ments for  Haig  had  begun  to  cross  the  Channel  from 
England  at  a  rate  which  rose  to  thirty  thousand  in  a 
day.  On  the  evening  of  the  28th,  Foch  felt  so  well  sat- 
isfied with  the  situation,  that  he  ordered  that  hence- 


256  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

forth  troops  on  arriving  should  not  be  sent  immediately 
into  the  line,  but  given  a  rest  after  their  long  journey 
in  the  troop  trains. 

We  learn  from  a  few  words,  which  he  said  to  a  party 
of  English,  French  and  American  journalists,  to  whom 
he  gave  an  interview  at  his  headquarters  a  few  days 
later,  that  he  regarded  March  27th  as  the  turning-point 
of  the  battle.  Perhaps  it  is  an  exaggeration  to  describe 
the  meeting  as  an  interview;  for  Foch  is  one  of  the 
very  few  public  men  of  our  time  who  have  never  been 
interviewed  in  the  strict  journalistic  sense  of  the  word. 
The  correspondents  had  asked  to  see  him,  and  were  in- 
vited to  meet  him  at  his  headquarters  near  Amiens.  One 
of  them  tells  how  they  were  struck  by  the  fact  that  the 
room  in  which  he  met  them,  and  where  he  evidently  did 
his  work,  was  almost  bare.  The  chief  piece  of  furniture 
was  a  table  covered  with  green  baize,  on  which  there  was 
nothing  but  a  telephone  and  a  pad  of  paper.  On  the 
wall  close  by  was  a  large  map  of  the  battle  region, 
marked  with  coloured  chalks.  A  staff  officer  rapidly 
introduced  the  journalists  in  succession  by  name,  and 
Foch  made  the  briefest  of  speeches,  speaking,  says  one 
of  them,  "  in  a  low,  measured  voice,  with  his  eyes  some- 
times half-closed." 

"  Well,  gentlemen,"  he  said,  "  as  you  know,  our  af- 
fairs are  not  going  badly.  The  enemy  is  blocked  in 
since  the  27th  of  March.  You  can  see  it  on  that  map. 
The  wave  has  broken  on  the  beach ;  that  means,  it  has 
come  up  against  a  serious  obstacle.  We  have  stopped 
it.  And  now  we  are  going  to  try  to  do  still  better.  I 
don't  know  if  I  can  say  any  more  to  you." 

He  paused  for  a  moment.  A  heavy  shower  of  rain 
was  beating  against  the  windows.     "  It  is  wretched 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  OF  THE  ALLIES     257 

weather,"  he  said ;  "  but  we  must  take  it  as  it  comes. 
I  wish  you  better  weather  and  good  news.  It  is  a  time 
when  we  all  have  to  work  hard.  You  will  work  with 
your  pens,  and  we  with  our  arms." 

With  this  the  interview  ended.  The  General  had  not 
told  the  journalists  much,  but  he  had  given  them  the 
impression  that  he  was  well  satisfied  with  the  situation 
on  the  fighting  front. 

In  the  first  week  of  April  the  situation  steadily  im- 
proved. The  Allied  defence  was  becoming  more  and 
more  solid.  If  here  and  there  the  enemy  won  a  little 
ground,  it  was  almost  invariably  regained  by  a  counter- 
attack within  a  few  hours.  There  were  signs  that  the 
Germans  were  seeking  rather  to  keep  the  British  and 
French  troops  in  their  front  occupied  than  to  make  any 
serious  attempt  to  press  the  attack.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  they  were  suspending  the  push  towards  Amiens 
until  they  could  improve  their  communications  over  the 
ground  they  had  won,  and  meanwhile  they  were  pre- 
paring for  a  new  enterprise  in  another  direction. 

On  April  9th,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  introduced  his  proposals  for  a  further  extension 
of  the  Military  Service  Acts,  and  gave  an  account  of  the 
situation  in  France  since  March  21st.  General  Foch's 
appointment  was  now  described  as  something  more  than 
that  of  a  mere  "  co-ordinator  "  of  the  military  opera- 
tions. The  Prime  Minister  at  last  ventured  to  say  that 
he  was  in  supreme  command,  and  described  the  duties 
entrusted  to  him. 

"  A  few  days  after  the  battle  commenced,  not  merely 
the  Government,  but  the  commanders  in  the  field — we 
had  not  merely  the  Field  Marshal  but  all  the  com- 
manders present — were  so   convinced — and  the   same 


258  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

thing  applies  to  the  French  army,  they  were  so  con- 
vinced— of  the  necessity  of  a  more  complete  strategic 
unity,  that  they  agreed  to  the  appointment  of  General 
Foch  to  the  supreme  direction  of  the  strategy  of  all  the 
Allied  armies  on  the  Western  Front. 

"  May  I  just  say  one  word  about  General  Foch?  It  is 
not  merely  that  he  is  one  of  the  most  brilliant  soldiers 
in  Europe.  He  is  a  man  who,  when  we  were  attacked 
and  were  in  a  similar  plight  at  the  first  battle  of  Ypres, 
rushed  the  French  army  there  by  every  conceivable 
expedient — omnibuses,  cabs,  lorries,  anything  he  could 
lay  his  hands  upon — he  crowded  French  divisions 
through,  and  undoubtedly  helped  to  win  that  great 
battle.  There  is  no  doubt  about  the  loyalty  and  com- 
radeship of  General  Foch. 

"  I  have  no  doubt  that  this  arrangement  will  be  car- 
ried out  not  only  in  the  letter  but  in  the  spirit.  It  is 
the  most  important  decision  that  has  been  taken  in  refer- 
ence to  the  coming  battle.  This  strategic  unity  is,  I 
submit  it  to  the  House,  a  fundamental  condition  of  vic- 
tory. It  can  only  be  maintained  by  complete  co-opera- 
tion between  the  governments  and  the  generals,  and  by 
something  more  than  that — unmistakable  public  opinion 
behind  it.  Why  do  I  say  that?  For  this  reason.  A 
Generalissimo  in  the  ordinary  and  full  sense  of  the  term 
may  be  impracticable.  There  are  three  functions  which 
a  Generalissimo  wields — the  strategical,  the  tactical  and 
the  administrative.  What  does  the  administrative 
mean?  It  means  the  control  of  the  organization,  the 
appointment  and  dismissal  of  officers  and  generals,  and 
that  is  a  power  which  it  is  almost  impossible  to  give  to 
a  general  of  another  country  with  a  national  army. 
Therefore,  in  spite  of  all  the  arrangements  made,  unless 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  OF  THE  ALLIES     259 

there  be  not  merely  good  will  but  the  knowledge  that 
the  public,  in  France,  Great  Britain  and  America  will 
assist  in  co-ordination  and  in  supporting  the  authori- 
ties in  the  supreme  strategical  plans  chosen  by  the  gov- 
ernments, and  in  any  action  they  may  take  to  assert 
their  authority,  any  arrangements  made  will  be  futile 
and  mischievous. 

"  I  make  no  apology  for  dwelling  at  some  length  upon 
this  point.  I  have  always  felt  that  we  are  losing  value 
and  efficiency  in  the  Allied  armies  through  lack  of  co- 
ordination and  concentration.  We  have  sustained  many 
disasters  already  through  that,  and  we  shall  encounter 
more  unless  this  defect  in  our  machinery  is  put  right. 
Hitherto,  I  regret  to  say,  every  effort  at  amendment  has 
led  to  rather  prolonged  and  very  bitter  controversy,  and 
these  difficulties,  these  great  inherent  difficulties,  were 
themselves  accentuated  and  aggravated.  There  were 
difficulties  of  carrying  out  plans,  and  other  obstacles, 
and  what  is  worse,  valuable  time  is  lost.  I  entreat  the 
nation  as  a  whole  to  stand  united  for  a  united  control 
of  the  strategical  operations  of  our  armies  at  the  front. 
We  know  how  much  depends  upon  unity  of  concentra- 
tion. We  are  fighting  a  very  powerful  foe,  who  in  so 
far  as  he  has  triumphed,  has  triumphed  mainly  because 
of  the  superior  unity  and  concentration  of  his  strategic 
plans." 

On  the  same  day  in  the  House  of  Lords,  Lord  Curzon, 
speaking  for  the  Government,  announced  that  so  far  as 
the  operations  were  concerned  General  Foch  was  in 
complete  control,  adding  that  he  was  not  a  Generalis- 
simo is  the  sense  of  taking  charge  of  the  administration 
as  well  as  the  operations  of  the  armies.  "  The  stra- 
tegical control,"  he  said,  "  ought  to  be  invested  in  single 


260  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

hands,  or — should  he  say — in  a  single  brain?  We  have 
suffered  grievously  from  the  want  of  this  in  the 
past.  In  these  circumstances,  if  by  common  consent 
a  single  direction  was  required,  it  could  only  be 
by  a  Frenchman;  and  if  a  Frenchman — by  General 
Foch." 

Lord  Crewe,  speaking  for  the  opposition,  welcomed 
the  appointment,  saying  that,  "  So  far  as  a  single  com- 
mand was  concerned,  there  was  no  ofiflcer  of  the  French 
army  more  admired  or  more  trusted  by  the  British 
troops  than  General  Foch." 

Utterances  like  these  gave  voice  to  the  public  feeling 
of  confidence  in  the  new  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Allied  armies.  The  British  generals  in  the  field  had  wel- 
comed his  appointment ;  and  Lord  French  not  long  after 
spoke  of  him  as  the  greatest  leader  the  war  had  pro- 
duced. But  still  more  remarkable  was  the  feeling  of 
confidence  that  the  nomination  of  Foch  to  the  supreme 
command  called  forth  in  the  rank  and  file  of  the  British 
army  at  the  front.  The  soldiers — many  of  them  still  in 
civil  life  at  that  time^ — had  heard  of  him  as  one  of  the 
foremost  among  the  victors  of  the  Marne,  even  though 
they  knew  nothing  of  his  masterly  handling  of  the  battle 
in  the  French  centre.  Then  they  knew  something  of  the 
fact  that  he  had  given  loyal  and  ready  help  to  the  hard- 
pressed  British  line  in  the  two  long  battles  at  Ypres. 
When  the  news  came  that  he  was  in  command,  there  ran 
through  the  ranks  the  feeling,  that  now  the  French  and 
British  armies  were  at  last  fused  into  one  great  fighting 
force  under  a  master  of  war.  It  was  a  private  in  a  line 
regiment,  who  said,  "  We  all  felt  happier  for  it."  Num- 
bers of  the  officers  had  been  brought  into  personal  rela- 
tion with  Foch,  or  had  learned  in  one  way  or  another 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  OF  THE  ALLIES     2G1 

to  appreciate  his  characteristic  qualities  for  command. 
By  all,  from  Sir  Douglas  Haig  downwards,  he  was  re- 
garded as  the  trusted  friend  of  the  British  army.  There 
was  no  fear  that  his  view  of  the  situation  would  be 
narrowed  by  any  national  feeling,  or  blurred  by  such 
ideas  as  the  protection  of  Paris  being  the  supreme  ob- 
ject. He  had  already  in  the  days  of  the  Ypres  battles 
spoken  of  the  absolute  importance  of  holding  at  all  costs 
the  positions  covering  the  Channel  ports,  in  order  to 
secure  this  rapid  line  of  communication  with  England. 
When  first  it  had  been  suggested  that  a  single  com- 
mander should  control  the  operations,  there  had  been 
talk  of  the  jealousies  and  anxieties  such  an  appointment 
might  produce.  But  in  the  case  of  Foch,  no  one  thought 
for  a  moment  of  any  such  difficulties  arising.  His  char- 
acter and  his  whole  record  in  the  war  made  him  the  one 
man  who  was  peculiarly  fitted  for  the  task  that  was  now 
entrusted  to  him. 

As  the  fighting  before  Amiens  died  down  into  a  desul- 
tory conflict  between  opposing  lines,  that  hardly  moved 
from  day  to  day,  he  had  to  devote  his  attention  to  an- 
other offensive,  this  time  directed  against  the  northern 
front,  where  he  had  first  co-operated  with  the  British 
commanders.  On  April  7th,  the  enemy  began  a  heavy 
bombardment  of  the  Flanders  front,  from  the  south  of 
Ypres  to  La  Bassee.  Early  on  the  9th — once  more  cov- 
ered by  a  fog — an  attack  in  overwhelming  force  was 
launched  against  the  Allied  lines  on  a  wide  front.  The 
enemy  had  to  advance  across  the  flat  lands  by  the  river 
Lys,  which  in  an  ordinary  season  would  have  been  im- 
passable at  this  time  of  the  year.  But  the  late  months 
of  the  winter  had  been  exceptionally  dry.  There  was 
plenty  of  firm  ground,  and  the  Lys  itself  was  low.    The 


262  MAUSOAL  FERDINAND  FOC^II 

river  was  crossed,  and  ArInenti^^ea  captured  in  the  first 
rush.  The  troops  who  held  this  part  of  the  line  were 
the  Portu<j;ues(' divisiou  jiud  l^ritisli  divisions,  several  of 
wliich  had  been  engaj»ed  in  the  iij^htiuj;'  further  south 
and  were  sent  to  rest  and  reorj^anize  and  till  up  with 
new  drafts  from  Enjijlaiul.  The  (lernians  pressed  the 
attack  day  after  day  with  forces  that  everywhere  out- 
numbered the  defence.  The  line  was  uubrokeu,  but  it 
lost  ground  for  some  days.  Tlai^;,  in  urdov  to  shorten 
his  front  and  economize  his  force,  evacuated  the 
Pascliendaele  ridge  and  all  tlu»  ground  won  to  the  east 
of  Ypres  in  the  hard  iiglitiug  of  the  previous  year.  The 
Messines  ridge  was  lost.  The  enemy  was  pushing 
towards  Ilazebrouck  junction  and  attacking  the  Kem- 
mel  heights.  It  was  a  more  [)()werful  and  more  dan- 
gerous drive  towards  the  Channel  ports  than  even  the 
great  offensives  against  Ypres  in  1914  and  1915.  "  We 
are  figliting  with  our  backs  to  the  wall,"  said  Flaig,  in  a 
stirring  appeal  to  his  men  to  stand  fast.  Foch  once 
more  provided  ready  help.  French  troops  were  moved 
up  from  the  south,  and  gradually  took  over  a  consider- 
able section  of  the  front.  The  two  armies,  fighting  side 
by  side,  at  last  held  llie  (lerman  attack. 

But,  as  it  was  checked  at  one  |)art  of  the  front,  it  was 
])ressed  at  another.  The  eneuiy  had  tlie  great  advan- 
tage of  having  his  reserves  massed  in  the  inner  curve  of 
a  huge  salient,  in  a  country  well  i)rovided  with  railways 
and  first-class  roads,  and  he  was  thus  able  to  reinforce 
now  one  ]>art  of  the  front,  now  another,  more  rai)idly 
than  the  Allies,  who  hnd  to  nu)ve  on  longer  lines  outside 
the  curving  front  held  by  the  invaders.  As  the  fighting 
on  the  Flanders  front  became  less  fui'ious,  a  new  ad- 
vance was  attem])ted  against  Amiens.     There  was  a  dan- 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  OF  THE  ALLIES     2G3 

gerous  moment,  on  April  25th,  when  the  enemy  captured 
Villers  Bretonneux,  on  the  spur  between  the  Somme  and 
Avre  rivers,  east  of  the  city.  It  is  high  ground  within 
easy  artillery  range  of  Amiens.  The  place  was  retaken 
by  a  brilliant  night  attack  of  Australian  troops  within 
twenty-four  hours  of  its  loss.  The  French  held  a  series 
of  attempts  to  advance  from  Montdidier  against  the 
line  of  the  Clermont-Paris  railway.  The  renewed 
offensive  against  Amiens  gave  the  enemy  no  gain  of 
importance. 

The  Germans  had  now  pushed  two  salients  into  the 
Allied  front,  the  larger  towards  Amiens,  the  smaller  on 
the  Flanders  border.  There  was  a  threat  to  the  Channel 
ports,  a  threat  against  Amiens,  and  a  threat  against 
Paris,  this  last  accentuated  by  the  long  guns  hidden 
somewhere  in  the  St.  Gobain  woods,  that  sent  shells  at 
regular  intervals,  with  a  range  hitherto  unheard  of,  to 
burst  in  the  city.  Along  the  fronts  of  the  two  salients 
fighting  went  on,  but  the  defence  was  stubbornly  hold- 
ing its  own.  It  was  known  that  the  enemy  had  still 
large  reserves  in  hand,  and  the  fighting  in  the  salients 
might  at  any  moment  develop  into  a  new  drive,  or  a 
fresh  offensive  might  be  started  somewhere  else  on  the 
line  of  the  front. 

Foch  was  so  far  acting  strictly  on  the  defensive. 
There  were  local  counter-attacks,  but  as  yet  no  attempt 
at  any  great  counterstroke.  The  time  had  not  arrived 
for  it.  If  we  regard  the  whole  fight  on  the  long  front 
as  a  great  battle,  it  was  still,  for  Foch,  in  what  he  would 
describe  as  the  preparatory  stage.  He  was  holding  the 
enemy  fast,  making  him  exhaust  his  surplus  reserves, 
and  beginning  to  accumulate  his  own.  The  Germans 
left  entirely  out  of  their  calculations  two  facts.    Eng- 


264  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

land  had  rushed  across  to  France  a  large  reinforcement, 
by  sending  across  the  Channel  a  great  part  of  the  army 
that  had  hitherto  been  kept  at  home  as  a  safeguard — 
many  believed  an  unnecessary  safeguard  against  the 
remote  chance  of  a  German  invasion.  And  American 
troops  were  arriving  in  large  numbers.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  year,  the  Allies  had  counted  on  the  American 
army  being  in  great  force  in  France  at  the  earliest  in 
the  autumn  of  1918.  But  the  despatch  of  this  new  army 
had  been  accelerated.  The  moment  was  near  at  hand 
when,  instea^d  of  being  brigaded  with  British  troops,  in 
small  numbers,  the  American  soldiers  would  be  ready 
to  take  the  field  in  divisions,  and  even  to  form  an  army 
acting  as  one  of  the  great  units  in  the  battle  line.  These 
new  resources  would  soon  enable  Foch  to  use  as  striking 
forces  veteran  French  and  British  armies,  and  to 
organize  an  effective  counterstroke  on  a  large  scale. 
But  the  time  was  not  yet  come. 

In  the  last  week  of  May,  the  enemy  began  another 
formidable  thrust.  While  the  battle  became  fiercer  in 
Flanders,  and  desultory  fighting  continued  on  the 
Amiens  salient,  another  great  offensive  began  on  the 
27th,  on  a  front  of  some  forty  miles,  extending  from  the 
wooded  heights  southwest  of  Laon  to  the  neighbourhood 
of  Rheims.  In  the  first  rush  the  Germans  scored  heav- 
ily. By  the  evening  of  the  28th,  they  were  over  the 
long  ridge  of  the  Aisne  heights — the  natural  rampart 
that  had  been  the  scene  of  war  since  1914 — and  were 
down  to  the  river,  and  at  one  point  across  it.  Next  day 
they  were  over  the  hills  south  of  the  Aisne,  and  their 
advance  had  reached  the  Vesle  and  in  the  centre  was 
over  the  river  line.  Soissons  had  to  be  abandoned  by  the 
French,  but  they  held  on  for  awhile  to  the  ground  com- 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  OF  THE  ALLIES     265 

manding  the  western  exits  from  the  place.  By  May 
31st,  the  point  of  the  new  German  salient  had  reached 
Dormans  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Marne. 

In  the  first  week  of  June,  the  enemy  extended  his  hold 
on  the  river  bank  beyond  Chateau-Thierry.  On  the 
other  side  of  the  wedge  he  had  driven  into  the  Allied 
front,  he  was  striving  to  push  in  to  the  south  of  Rheims. 
But  on  both  flanks  he  was  now  stubbornly  opposed ;  and, 
after  the  occupation  of  Chateau-Thierry,  he  failed  to 
enlarge  the  wedge-like  salient.  He  now  sought  to  gain 
ground  west  of  Soissons.  Between  the  salient  driven 
towards  the  Marne  and  the  south  side  of  the  Amiens 
salient,  there  was  a  long  re-entrant  curve  in  his  line 
from  the  Aisne  heights  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Mont- 
didier.  He  tried  hard  to  improve  his  front  here,  by 
pressing  forward  on  both  sides  of  the  Oise.  Near  Mont- 
didier,  he  gained  some  ground.  Elsewhere  he  was  held. 
From  the  forest  region  about  Compiegne  Foch  made  a 
local  counter-attack,  on  a  wide  front,  on  June  11th,  and 
regained  some  ground.  Further  to  the  right,  General 
Pershing  came  into  action,  with  the  First  American 
Divisions  that  were  ready  to  take  the  field  as  an  inde- 
pendent unit.  By  a  series  of  splendid  attacks,  he  pre- 
vented the  enemy  from  issuing  westward  along  the 
Marne  from  Chateau-Thierry;  and  the  little  town 
gives  its  name  to  the  first  victory  won  by  the 
troops  of  the  United  States  in  the  Great  War  in 
France. 

All  through  the  month  of  June  the  fighting  went  on. 
The  Allies  were  now  able  to  report  many  local  gains  on 
all  the  three  battle  fronts — in  Flanders,  on  the  Amiens 
front,  and  towards  the  Marne.  French,  British  and 
Americans  all  contributed  their  share.    The  gains  were 


266  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

nowhere  very  great,  but  they  went  to  show  that  the 
enemy,  instead  of  being  able  to  press  forward,  was  just 
able  to  hold  to  the  new  line  that  he  had  taken  up.  In 
July  came  the  final  crisis  of  the  tremendous  battle  and 
the  turning-point  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  DECISIVE  COUNTER-ATTACK 

During  the  hard  fighting  in  June,  Foch  is  reported  to 
have  said,  in  reply  to  a  question  as  to  what  he  thought 
of  the  situation,  that  even  if  the  battle  were  a  mere  game 
with  no  national  interests  at  stake,  he  would  "  prefer 
his  own  hand  to  Ludendorfif's."  On  one  of  the  critical 
days,  the  reassuring  statement  given  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment in  reply  to  a  question  in  the  House  of  Commons 
took  the  form  of  an  announcement  that  "  General  Foch 
was  perfectly  satisfied  with  the  position  and  the  out- 
look." 

In  the  anxious  days  of  the  first  battle  of  the  Marne, 
he  had  watched  unmoved  the  forced  retirement  of  his 
divisions  before  the  attack  of  superior  numbers,  and 
waited  patiently  for  the  opportunity  to  strike  the  de- 
cisive blow.  In  this  gigantic  battle,  that  extended  from 
Ypres  to  Champagne  and  went  on  for  months,  he  was 
once  more  waiting  with  resolute  patience  for  the  day 
when  he  could  organize  and  launch  his  decisive  attack. 
The  "  preparatory  stage  "  was  still  in  progress. 

The  German  leaders  had  studied  Foch's  teaching,  and 
knew  well  his  persistent  emphasis  on  the  idea  that  de- 
fence could  never  give  decisive  victory,  that  attack  was 
the  only  way  to  a  decision.  It  was  the  fourth  month  of 
the  battle.  So  far,  Foch  had  made  only  local  and  lim- 
ited counter-attacks.  He  had  not  even  attempted  the 
great  counter-attack,  that  he  had  described  in  his  writ- 

267 


268  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

ings  as  the  essential  stroke  for  success.  Why  was  this? 
The  inspired  articles  give  some  clue  to  the  theory 
adopted  as  an  explanation  by  the  German  staff.  Thus, 
on  July  4th,  the  Deutsche  Tageszeitung  wrote : 

"  We  know,  from  all  that  has  so  far  happened,  how 
Foch  has  put  in  one  reserve  after  another ;  his  army  of 
manoeuvre,  which  was  formerly  so  strong — about  sixty 
divisions — is  now  used  up.  On  the  initiative  of  Von 
Hindenburg  and  our  incomparable  army  depends  the  de- 
cision, and  they  will  bring  it  about  despite  the  much- 
advertised  American  help." 

This  theory,  that  Foch  had  used  up  his  reserves  in 
barring  the  repeated  offensives  of  the  German  army, 
seemed  to  solve  the  riddle.  It  was  proclaimed  that  Foch 
could  not  counter-attack  in  force  because  his  reserves 
had  disappeared,  swallowed  up  in  the  long  effort  to 
keep  his  line  unbroken  against  the  onset  of  the  German 
millions.  It  was  a  reassuring  theory,  and  it  seemed  to 
point  to  a  certainty  of  success.  If  Foch's  reserves  were 
gone,  not  only  was  there  no  danger  of  a  counter-attack 
in  force,  but  he  would  find  it  difficult  to  supply  the 
reinforcements  required  to  hold  his  own,  in  case  further 
pressure  were  exerted  against  new  points  in  his  line. 
There  was  the  fixed  idea,  that  no  American  help  on  a 
large  scale  could  yet  be  available  for  the  Allies.  The 
German  staff  could  therefore  develop  its  plans  at  leisure 
and  even  take  some  risks  with  impunity.  It  was  a 
dangerous  state  of  mind.  It  is  always  rash  to  under- 
rate an  enemy's  resources. 

The  great  offensive  had  been  described  in  Germany 
as  "  the  Kaiserschlacht," — "  the  Emperor's  Battle  " ; 
and  "  the  Friedensturm,"  the  peace  offensive  that  was 
to  give  victory  and  a  dictated  peace.     Judging  from  the 


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THE  DECISIVE  COUNTER-ATTACK        269 

course  of  the  successive  offensives,  the  general  plan  of 
the  battle  is  clear  enough.  The  French  and  British 
armies  were  to  be  separated  by  the  push  towards 
Amiens,  and  the  British  line  itself  broken  by  the  drive 
towards  the  Channel  ports.  If  these  first  operations 
succeeded,  the  British  army  would  be  partly  forced  back 
across  the  lower  Seine,  partly  pushed  back  with  the  Bel- 
gians to  the  sea,  and  obliged  to  seek  safety  in  a  difficult 
re-embarkation,  after  which  the  Channel  coast  as  far  as 
Calais  would  be  added  to  the  coast  fortress  of  the 
Ostend-Zeebrugge  sea-front.  Paris  would  be  attacked  / 
and  taken,  and  the  French  and  British  armies  beaten 
in  detail.  It  was  a  well-devised  scheme,  foiled  by  the 
stubborn  defence  of  the  Allies. 

After  the  first  check,  a  variation  of  the  plan  was  elab- 
orated in  May,  and  its  execution  on  the  Aisne  heights 
and  the  drive  towards  the  Marne  in  the  last  days  of  that 
month.  The  rapid  initial  success  of  this  attack  gave  the 
Germans  a  new  front  of  about  sixty  miles  in  length, 
from  Montdidier  to  Chateau-Thierry.  It  faced  south- 
west towards  Paris,  and  was  about  forty  miles  from  the 
forts  covering  the  French  capital. 

During  the  month  of  June  and  the  first  days  of  July, 
Foch  was  able  to  prevent  any  further  gain  of  ground  on 
this  front,  except  a  slight  advance  on  the  German  right. 
Then,  in  July,  came  the  manoeuvre  on  the  enemy's  side, 
on  which  he  obviously  counted  for  a  decisive  result,  for 
the  Crown  Prince's  army  was  now  thrown  into  the 
battle. 

On  July  15th,  the  Germans  attacked  on  a  front  of 
about  fifty-five  miles,  from  Chateau-Thierry  eastward 
along  the  Marne  and  beyond  Rheims,  almost  up  to  the 
western  margin  of  the  Argonne  forest.     If  this  new 


270  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

push  had  begun  with  a  success  like  that  achieved  at  the 
outset  of  the  earlier  attacks,  the  results  would  have  been 
serious  for  the  Allies.  The  Germans  got  across  the 
Marne  at  several  points.  They  tried  to  push  in  on  both 
sides  of  Rheims  and  isolate  the  city.  They  made  furi- 
ous attacks  on  the  front  held  by  General  Gouraud's 
army  in  Champagne.  The  Marne  crossing  had,  no 
doubt,  the  ultimate  object  of  extending  the  front 
towards  Paris,  but  its  primary  aim  was  to  cut  off  the 
communications  of  General  Gouraud's  army  with  the 
west.  If  he  had  given  way  before  the  fierce  attack 
launched  against  him  by  the  Crown  Prince,  not  only 
would  Rheims  have  been  isolated,  but  Verdun  too  would 
have  been  cut  off,  as  the  German  advance  gained  touch 
with  the  salient  the  enemy  had  held  at  St.  Mihiel,  since 
1914.  It  was  a  supreme  effort  of  the  German  command 
to  break  the  French  line,  isolate  Rheims  and  Verdun 
which  could  then  make  no  long  resistance,  and  thus 
prepare  for  a  great  advance  on  Paris,  by  the  Marne 
valley  and  from  the  Montdidier-Oise  line. 

But  in  this  last  great  push,  the  enemy  gained  only 
trifling  ground  at  the  outset.  Foch  used  Pershing's 
troops,  not  only  to  hold  the  western  outlets  from 
Chateau-Thierry,  but  also  to  deal  with  and  force  back 
the  German  detachments  that  had  crossed  the  Marne; 
and  the  Americans  fully  answered  his  expectations. 
Further  east,  Rheims,  although  encircled  by  the  enemy, 
still  kept  one  line  open,  and  held  out  against  hostile 
attempts  to  fight  a  way  into  its  suburbs.  Gouraud  held 
his  advanced  positions  very  lightly,  only  delaying  the 
enemy's  advance  at  first.  But  after  a  slight  gain,  the 
Germans,  now  beyond  the  immediate  help  of  their  heavy 
artillery,  were  brought  to  a  dead  stop  before  a  well- 


/ 


THE  DECISIVE  COUNTER-ATTACK        271 

prepared  and  strongly  held  line  of  defences.  The 
enemy's  rush  was  checked,  and  now  at  last  Foch  struck 
his  blow. 

The  Germans  have  themselves  admitted  that  it  was 
quite  unexpected.  There  had  indeed  been  some  idea 
that  Foch  might  make  a  local  attack  on  a  rather  larger 
scale  than  usual,  on  the  American  Independence  Day, 
July  4th,  or  on  the  French  National  Fete,  the  14th. 
When  both  anniversaries  passed  without  any  serious 
operation  on  the  Allied  side,  the  enemy  were  more  than 
ever  confirmed  in  their  theory,  that  Foch — anxious 
though  he  might  be  to  act  up  to  his  own  theory  and 
repel  attack  by  attack — had  only  the  reserves  left  that 
were  necessary  to  keep  his  line  intact.  So  on  the  mor- 
row of  the  15th,  the  Crown  Prince  had  moved  his  armies 
to  the  new  offensive,  without  any  anxieties  about  having 
to  parry  a  vigorous  counter-stroke. 

But  Foch  was  by  this  time  nearly  ready  to  act.  He 
had — as  we  have  seen  when  examining  his  teaching — 
shown  how  the  place  for  the  decisive  effort  might  be 
determined,  amongst  other  things  by  the  discovery  of  a 
weak  point  in  the  enemy's  front,  and  by  the  choice  of 
ground  offering  good  communications  for  the  concen- 
tration and  cover  by  which  the  preparations  could  be 
concealed.  In  modern  war,  forests  have  acquired  a  new 
importance,  for  they  afford  good  cover  from  the  prying 
eyes  of  the  airmen,  and  thus  troops  can  be  securely 
moved  and  massed  under  their  leafy  screen.  It  was 
quite  true  that  by  this  time  the  Allied  flying  corps  had 
obtained  something  approaching  a  mastery  of  the  air; 
but  no  absolute  dominion  over  those  vast  spaces  is  pos- 
sible; and  even  if  daring  flyers  from  the  German  side 
did  not  penetrate  far  over  the  French  front,  they  could 


272  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

obtain,  in  the  clear  summer  weather,  wide-reaching 
views  to  the  rear  of  it  by  high  ascents  near  their  own 
front.  Forest  cover  would  therefore  be  useful  for  the 
French  concentration. 

Now,  between  the  lower  Oise  and  the  western  face  of 
the  salient  which  the  Germans  had  pushed  towards  the 
Marne,  is  a  well-wooded  district.  Along  the  east  bank 
of  the  Oise,  the  forests  of  Compiegne,  Halatte  and  Chan- 
tilly,  form  a  wide  zone  of  woodlands.  From  the  north 
and  south  of  this  range  of  forests  smaller  woods  stretch 
out  in  straggling  lines,  and  link  the  Oise  forest  zone  with 
the  far-spreading  forest  of  Villers  Cotterets,  the  hilly 
eastern  margins  of  which  are  within  five  miles  of  the 
Soissons-Chateau-Thierry  line. 

This  wooded  region  is  well  provided  with  good  roads, 
and  has  railway  connections  that  might  have  been  pur- 
posely designed  for  the  concentration  of  an  army  on  its 
eastern  front.  A  main  line  from  Paris  follows  the  Oise 
valley;  and  from  junctions  on  the  river  at  Compiegne, 
Rivecourt  and  Creil,  three  railways  run  eastward  to  a 
crossline  that  traverses  the  forest  region  about  its 
centre.  The  Compiegne  and  Rivecourt  lines  run  into  a 
junction  at  Villers  Cotterets,  whence  a  northern  line 
runs  towards  Soissons  and  a  southern  follows  the  Ourcq 
valley,  parallel  to  the  front,  and  throws  off  a  branch 
towards  Chateau-Thierry,  finally  joining  up  with  the 
main  line  that  follows  the  north  bank  of  the  Marne. 
This  system  of  railways  made  it  easy  to  arrange  for  the 
concentration,  reinforcement  and  supply,  of  a  large 
army. 

Foch  had  gradually  assembled  a  considerable  force  in 
this  forest  region.  He  made  it  the  centre  of  his  opera- 
tions to  liold  back  a  German  advance  towards  Paris, 


THE  DECISIVE  COUNTER-ATTACK        273 

first  from  the  salient  pushed  towards  Amiens,  and  later 
from  the  curving  front  of  the  enemy's  line  from  Mont- 
didier  by  Soissons  to  Chateau-Thierry.  He  had  suc- 
cessfully repelled  the  enemy's  efforts  to  penetrate  into 
the  forest  margins  of  the  Compiegne  and  Villers  Cot- 
terets  woodlands.  He  now  began  to  crowd  the  eastern 
woods  with  troops,  as  he  assembled  his  striking  force. 
The  enemy  had  no  idea  that  they  had  anything  more 
than  a  defence  force  in  their  front,  in  the  Viller  Cot- 
terets  forests.  It  was  thus  easy  to  conceal  the  concen- 
tration, and  secure  the  great  element  of  surprise  for  the 
decisive  attack. 

The  force  thus  assembled  in  secret  for  the  "  coup  de 
heller  " — the  "  battering-ram  blow  " — was  made  up  of 
the  two  armies  of  General  Mangin  and  General 
Degoutte.  Mangin,  on  the  left,  had  with  him  not 
only  French  troops  but  two  British  divisions  selected 
for  their  excellent  fighting  record.  Degoutte,  on  the 
right,  had  besides  his  French  divisions  a  strong  Ameri- 
can contingent. 

The  weak  point  on  the  enemy's  front,  where  the  blow 
was  meant  to  produce  a  "  fissure  "  followed  by  a  wide- 
spread collapse,  was  the  Soissons-Chateau-Thierry  line. 
In  their  efforts  to  widen  the  salient  the  Germans  had 
pushed  towards  the  Marne,  to  force  a  crossing  over  the 
river,  and  to  break  down  the  resistance  of  Rheims — they 
had  accumulated  a  very  large  force  in  the  salient.  And 
they  had  only  one  good  line  of  supply — the  railway  and 
road  from  Soissons  to  Chateau-Thierry.  It  was  badly 
placed  and  dangerously  exposed.  It  was  not  in  the 
centre,  but  on  the  western  edge  of  the  salient;  and  the 
Germans  had  only  been  able  to  advance  a  few  miles 
beyond  it  to  the  westward.      A  short  advance  of  the 


274  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

Allies  would  bring  it  under  gun-fire.  Another  step  for- 
ward would  cut  the  communications  of  the  huge  force, 
that  was  crowding  towards  the  Marne  crossings. 

The  attack  was  made  at  daybreak,  on  July  18th. 
There  was  to  be  no  long  preparatory  bombardment,  so 
as  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  surprise.  "  Not  a  sound 
was  to  be  heard  from  the  forest,"  ^\Tites  a  Times  cor- 
respondent, "  though  it  was  teeming  with  men  and  guns. 
And  then  suddenly,  at  the  appointed  moment,  as  day 
broke,  there  was  one  roar  from  all  the  guns,  and  the 
whole  front  broke  into  activity,  as  men  and  tanks  dashed 
forward  to  the  attack." 

At  the  first  rush  there  was  a  considerable  gain  of 
ground.  In  one  place  the  line  was  carried  forward  for 
five  miles.  Twenty  villages  were  cleared  of  the  enemy, 
and  forty-eight  guns  and  sixteen  thousand  prisoners 
taken.  Next  day,  Friday,  the  19th,  further  progress 
was  gained  by  Mangin's  army.  The  high  ground 
towards  Soissons  was  reached,  and  the  French  artillery 
was  able  to  open  fire  on  the  railway.  Then  the  German 
resistance  stiffened,  and  progress  was  slower  for  awhile. 
On  Sunday,  the  21st,  the  French  and  Americans  were  in 
ChAteau-Thierry. 

Rheims  was  now  out  of  danger,  and  General  Barthe- 
lot  was  able  to  begin  a  series  of  attacks  on  the  other 
flank  of  the  German  salient.  Besides  his  French  divi- 
sions, he  had  with  him  British  and  Italian  troops.  The 
enemy  was  withdrawing  from  the  Marne.  Covering  his 
retirement  by  furious  counter-attacks,  he  was  making 
a  slow  retreat  in  the  whole  of  the  salient.  On  August 
2nd,  he  had  to  abandon  Soissons.  There  was  a  stand 
for  a  few  days  along  the  line  of  the  Vesle,  and  the  Ger- 
mans then  fell  back  across  the  Aisne. 


THE  DECISIVE  COUNTER-ATTACK        275 

But  this  was  only  the  beginning  of  their  retirement. 
The  counter-attack  of  July  18th  proved  to  be  the  turn- 
ing-point of  the  war.  The  German  staff  were  now  in  the 
position,  which  they  had  mistakenly  attributed  to  Foch 
in  the  early  days  of  July.  In  feeding  their  successive 
offensives  since  March  21st,  maintaining  the  long  lines 
of  the  new  salients,  making  the  last  push  in  July  and 
endeavouring  to  parry  Foch's  counter-stroke,  they  had 
used  up  their  reserves.  And  they  now  realized  that  the 
American  reinforcements  were  pouring  across  the  At- 
lantic. The  initiative  had  passed  to  the  Allies.  The 
Germans  would  have  to  act  on  the  defensive. 

To  economize  his  forces  by  holding  a  shorter  line, 
Ludendorff  decided  on  the  abandonment  of  the  ground 
gained  since  March.  Preparations  were  made  for  a 
withdrawal  from  the  two  remaining  salients.  The  army 
of  invasion  was  to  fall  back  on  the  Hindenburg  line,  and 
hold  the  old  line  in  the  centre  from  the  Aisne  heights 
to  the  Argonne. 

But  Foch  did  not  for  even  a  day  relax  his  pressure  on 
their  fronts.  Hitherto,  throughout  the  war,  on  both 
sides  every  offensive  thrust  had  been  followed  by  a  long 
pause,  while  another  effort  was  being  organized.  But 
Foch  was  faithful  to  his  own  teaching,  that  the  fruits 
of  success  must  be  reaped  by  relentless  pursuit.  The 
pursuit  here  took  the  form  of  blow  after  blow  launched 
against  the  German  lines,  now  here  now  there,  not  at 
haphazard  but  with  the  continuous  connection  of  pur- 
pose that  gave  them  the  character  of  a  ceaseless  organ- 
ized attack  on  a  gigantic  scale. 

In  the  second  week  of  August,  as  the  Germans  fell 
back  to  the  Aisne  heights,  Haig  attacked,  and  flattened 
in  the  point  of  the  Amiens  salient,  the  advance  of  his 


276  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

infantry  being  accompanied  by  the  onset  of  a  thousand 
tanks.  After  this  came  the  double  pressure  of  the  Brit- 
ish against  the  Hindenburg  line  front,  and  of  the  French 
and  Americans  in  Champagne  and  the  Argonne.  The 
Aisne  and  Laon  positions  became  the  menaced  point  of 
another  salient,  hard  pressed  on  both  flanks,  and  threat- 
ening a  Sedan  on  a  vast  scale  if  the  German  armies 
could  not  be  extricated  from  the  angle.  Under  this 
pressure  the  Laon  region  was  abandoned,  Haig  broke 
through  the  Hindenburg  line,  and  the  Franco-American 
armies  pushed  northwards  towards  the  Belgian  frontier, 
menacing  one  of  the  enemy's  main  lines  of  communica- 
tion with  Germany. 

In  the  first  days  of  August,  when  the  German  retreat 
had  only  begun,  but  when  it  was  already  evident  that 
July  18th  had  been  the  decisive  day,  the  French  Gov- 
ernment decided  on  giving  the  highest  honours  it  could 
award  to  the  organizer  of  the  victory.  The  title  of 
Marshal  of  France  had  originated  under  the  old  Mon- 
archy, and  was  abolished  by  the  first  Republic.  Na- 
poleon revived  it,  when  he  assumed  the  imperial  crown ; 
and  he  bestowed  the  marshal's  baton  on  several  of  his 
best  generals.  The  title  was  again  revived  by  Napoleon 
III,  to  be  once  more  abolished  by  the  Republic  that  came 
into  existence  after  his  downfall.  It  had  once  more 
been  restored  by  the  new  Republic  and  given  to  General 
JofPre  as  a  recognition  of  his  services  on  his  retirement 
from  the  chief  command  of  the  French  armies.  On 
August  7th,  the  Journal  Officiel  published  a  decree  of 
the  President,  promoting  General  Foch  to  the  Mar- 
shalate.  It  was  accompanied  by  the  report  of  M.  Clem- 
enrenu  to  M.  Poincar^,  on  which  the  decree  was  based. 

This  official  testimony  to  the  services  of  the  great  sol- 


THE  DECISIVE  COUNTER-ATTACK        277 

dier  ran  as  follows :  "  The  decree  of  December  24th, 
1916,  revived  for  the  first  time  the  dignity  of  Marshal. 
I  have  the  honour  to  submit  for  your  signature,  in  the 
name  of  the  Government  (and  I  may  assert,  in  the  name 
of  the  whole  of  France)  a  decree  conferring  upon  Gen- 
eral Foch  this  high  national  recompense.  At  the  hour 
when  the  enemy,  by  a  formidable  offensive  on  a  front  of 
one  hundred  kilometres,  counted  upon  snatching  a  de- 
cision and  imposing  a  German  peace  which  would  mark 
the  enslavement  of  the  world.  General  Foch  and  his  ad- 
mirable troops  vanquished  him.  Paris  liberated :  Sois- 
sons  and  Chateau-Thierry  reconquered:  over  two  hun- 
dred villages  delivered:  thirty-five  thousand  prisoners 
and  seven  hundred  guns  captured :  the  hopes  loudly  pro- 
claimed by  the  enemy  crumbled  into  dust:  the  glorious 
Allied  armies  pushed  forward  in  one  victorious  bound 
from  the  borders  of  the  Marne  to  the  banks  of  the  Aisne 
— such  are  the  results  of  a  manoeuvre,  as  admirably 
conceived  by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  as  it  was  su- 
perbly executed  by  incomparable  commanders.  The 
confidence  reposed  by  the  Republic  and  all  its  Allies 
in  the  victor  of  the  marshes  of  St.  Gond,  in  the  illus- 
trious leader  of  the  Yser  and  the  Somme,  has  been  fully 
justified.  The  dignity  of  Marshal  conferred  upon  Gen- 
eral Foch  will  not  be  merely  a  recompense  for  past  serv- 
ices; it  will  consecrate  still  better  in  the  future  the 
authority  of  the  great  soldier  who  is  called  to  lead  the 
armies  of  the  Entente  to  final  victory." 


CHAPTER  XX 

PERSONAL  CHARACTERISTICS 

We  have  followed  the  career  of  Marshal  Foch  up  to 
the  days  when,  by  a  brilliant  stroke  he  turned  the  tide 
of  war,  and  France  recognized  his  supreme  services  to 
the  Allied  cause  by  bestowing  exceptional  honours  upon 
him.  The  judgment  of  the  world  ratified  the  action  of 
the  French  Government.  Even  those  against  whom  he 
fought  spoke  of  him  as  one  of  the  greatest  masters  of 
war.  Since  then  he  has  done  further  service  to'  his 
country  and  the  Allies  of  France;  and  his  successes  on 
the  Western  Front  have  had  momentous  effects  even  in 
distant  theatres  of  the  war.  For  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  defection  of  Germany's  allies  was  largely  due 
to  the  discouragement  produced  by  the  defeat  of  her 
armies  in  France  and  the  failure  of  what  had  been  pro- 
claimed to  be  her  final  effort  to  obtain  a  decision  in  the 
field,  that  would  have  enabled  her  to  dictate  peace. 

On  October  4th  the  German  Government  asked  for 
an  armistice  and  sued  for  peace.  On  November  11th  the 
armistice  was  signed  and  Foch  issued  that  evening  his 
final  war  bulletin : — 

"  In  the  r)2nd  month  of  a  war  without  precedent  in 
history,  the  French  army,  with  the  aid  of  its  Allies,  has 
consummated  the  defeat  of  the  enemy.  Our  troops, 
animated  by  the  highest  spirit  of  sacrifice,  have  fur- 
nished during  four  years  of  uninterrupted  fighting,  an 

278 


PERSONAL  CHAKACTEllISTICS  270 

example  of  sublime  endurance  and  daily  heroism.  Our 
troops  have  accomplished  the  task  which  was  confided 
to  them  by  the  Motherland,  now  supporting  with  an 
indomitable  energy  the  assaults  of  the  euemy,  now 
themselves  attacking  and  forcing  the  victory.  They 
have,  after  a  decisive  offensive  of  four  months,  driven 
back,  beaten  and  thrown  out  of  France  the  powerful 
German  army  and  compelled  it  to  sue  for  peace. 

"  All  the  conditions  demanded  for  the  suspension  of 
hostilities  having  been  accepted  by  the  enemy,  the 
armistice  came  into  operation  to-day  at  11  o'clock." 

On  November  25th  he  rode  into  Strasburg  at  the 
head  of  the  French  army  which  had  marched  through 
Alsace  to  the  Rhine. 

In  France,  there  has  always  been  a  certain  suspicion 
of  a  successful  soldier,  and  a  lurking  fear  that  he  might 
use  his  military  prestige  and  his  influence  with  the  army 
for  personal  and  political  ends.  Napoleon's  coup  d'etat 
of  Brumaire,  that  made  him  first  the  master  of  France 
and  then  its  emperor,  and  his  nephew's  seizure  of  power 
with  the  aid  of  St.  Arnaud  and  the  army,  are  remem- 
bered as  warnings  of  what  might  occur  again.  But  in 
the  case  of  Marshal  Foch,  there  has  never  been  even  a 
shadow  of  such  doubts.  All  through  his  life  he  has 
stood  apart  from  politics  and  parties.  Even  the  fiercest 
of  "  anti-Clericals,"  with  all  his  hostility  to  the  Church, 
had  not  the  remotest  idea  that  this  earnest  Catholic 
soldier  will  ever  lend  himself  to  the  intrigues  of  either 
an  Orleanist  or  a  Bonapartist  faction.  So  far  as  Mar- 
shal Foch  has  any  political  standpoint,  it  is  assuredly 
that  which  Leo  XIII  so  wisely  recommended  to  the 
Catholics  of  France — namely  a  rally  to  the  loyal  sup- 
port of  the  Republic,  the  abandonment  of  all  dreams  of 
seeking  advantage  for  their  cause  from  either  a  Royalist 


280  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

or  an  Imperialist  restoration,  and  the  effort  to  secure 
their  rights  under  Republican  institutions  by  insisting 
on  the  practical  application  of  the  principles  of  equality 
and  libertj'^  to  every  class  of  citizens. 

Foch  has  never  been  a  politician,  and  has  never 
trimmed  his  sails  to  the  political  policy  that  happened 
to  be  in  the  ascendant.  He  has  simply  done  his  duty 
as  a  soldier,  and  waited  patiently  for  the  promotion  that 
would  give  him  the  opportunity  of  fulfilling  the  task, 
for  which  his  life  had  been  a  long  studious  prepara- 
tion. 

He  had  always  insisted  on  the  two  facts  of  knowledge 
and  character  as  the  essentials  in  the  formation  of  the 
leader  of  men  in  war.  His  owti  career  gives  a  high 
example  of  the  results  obtained  by  the  faithful  practice 
of  what  he  taught. 

A  lifelong  student,  a  teacher  of  exceptional  genius,  it 
has  been  said  of  him  that  if  he  were  not  in  uniform  he 
might  be  taken  for  a  college  professor  rather  than  a 
soldier.  His  face  has  the  characteristic  features  of  the 
man  of  mind.  The  high  forehead,  the  calm  blue-grey 
eyes  under  their  heavy  eyebrows,  tell  of  thought  and 
intellect.  But  it  is  the  face  of  a  strong  man,  and  of 
one  strong  not  only  on  the  intellectual  side.  The  slight 
figure  is  athletic  and  full  of  energy.  The  whole  type 
combines  thought  with  action. 

There  is,  however,  no  trace  of  jtose  about  him.  To 
use  familiar  expressions,  there  is  neither  "  swagger " 
nor  "  side."  He  hates  display  and  useless  ceremonial. 
Ho  is  above  all  things  a  matter-of-fact  worker.  Calm 
and  self-controlled,  ho  only  shows  impatience  in  the 
prosonco  of  cnrolossnoss  and  lack  of  thought.  One  of 
Ills  officers,  M.  Puaux,  who  has  written  a  brilliant  sketch 


PERSONAL  CHAIIACTEIUSTICS  281 

of  his  career,  marks  as  one  of  his  characteristics  "  une 
horreur  de  Vd-peu-prh,''  which  one  may  translate  by  "  a 
horror  of  careless  inexactitude  in  talk."  M.  Puaux  de- 
scribes his  questioning  a  staff  officer,  and  suddenly  stop- 
ping the  conversation  with :  "  Evidently  you  don't  know. 
Go  and  find  out."  When  practical  matters  have  to  be 
discussed,  he  speaks  with  a  straight  frankness  that 
wastes  no  time  in  softening  his  own  adverse  criticisms 
with  smooth  words.  At  the  back  of  all  this  is  his  fixed 
principle,  that  guess-work  and  vague  information  are 
worse  than  useless,  and  that  hard  facts  clearly  grasped 
are  the  only  guide  to  action. 

He  is  an  indefatigable  worker,  and  makes  up  his  mind 
rapidly  in  the  midst  of  action ;  but  he  has  the  power  of 
seeking  rest  from  the  stress  of  his  daily  work  by  turn- 
ing his  mind  to  other  things  even  at  anxious  times. 
Thus,  M.  Puaux  tells  us,  that  on  September  9th,  1914, 
in  the  crisis  of  the  battle  of  the  Marne,  when  the  Breton 
corps  was  still  retiring,  the  centre  of  the  Ninth  Army 
was  in  danger  and  Grosetti's  arrival  to  its  help  was 
strangely  delayed,  Foch  walked  up  and  down  with  one 
of  his  staff,  talking  not  of  the  war  but  of  a  scientific 
question  that  had  no  reference  whatever  to  it.  He  had 
given  his  orders  and  set  Grosetti's  division  on  the  march, 
and  he  awaited  the  result  of  his  manoeuvre  without  giv- 
ing way  to  anxiety. 

Besides  this  power  of  detaching  himself  for  the  time 
being  from  the  strain  of  war,  Foch  has  always  been  able 
to  economize  his  own  energy  by  the  studious  care  with 
which  he  restricts  his  activity  to  the  special  functions 
of  the  high  command  he  holds.  He  deals  with  the  di- 
rection and  combination  of  operations  in  their  broad 
essential  lines,  leaving  all  matters  of  detail  to  the  com- 


282  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

manders  of  the  fighting  fronts.  This  principle  of  com- 
mand is  an  elementary  one;  but  it  is  a  point  in  which 
some  of  the  greatest  commanders  have  nevertheless 
failed.  Even  Napoleon,  in  his  later  years,  made  the 
mistake  of  trying  to  supervise  everything;  and  we  find 
him,  during  the  campaign  of  1814,  when  it  was  essential 
that  Paris  should  be  put  in  a  state  of  defence,  paralysing 
the  local  authority  and  causing  loss  of  valuable  time  by 
insisting  that  no  work  should  anywhere  be  done  until 
the  plans  had  been  submitted  to  him  at  his  headquarters 
in  the  field.  Foch  knew  how  to  trust  Haig,  Petain  and 
their  generals  in  all  matters  of  the  execution  of  his 
plans.  At  his  headquarters,  consequently,  even  in  the 
busiest  times,  there  is  no  elaborate  office  machinery  re- 
quired. Half-a-dozen  officers  work  with  him.  Three 
rooms  are  enough  for  all  their  requirements.  Thus  it 
is  that  he  is  able  to  direct  vast  operations  from  a  head- 
quarters established,  not  in  the  midst  of  some  large  city, 
but  in  a  little  house  in  some  small  country  town  or 
village. 

This  fits  in  with  the  simple  life  he  has  always  lived, 
his  modest  ways,  his  dislike  of  mere  parade  and  show. 
Usually  he  has  no  escort.  Perhaps  one  of  his  staff  is 
with  him ;  as  often  he  is  alone,  when  he  goes  about.  He 
is  a  worker,  and  all  his  ways  are  of  the  simplest.  In 
an  age  of  advertisement,  he  shuns  publicity.  He  has 
never  been  interviewed,  and  we  have  seen  that  his  rela- 
tions with  the  press  during  the  war  have  been  limited 
to  a  few  courteous  receptions,  here  and  there,  of  a  group 
of  correspondents,  to  whom  he  addressed  the  briefest  of 
speeches.  This  is  why  there  is  in  his  case  a  lack  of 
personal  anecdotes,  such  as  are  connected  with  the 
names  of  most  public  men  in  all  countries.     One  writer 


PERSONAL  CHARACTERISTICS  283 

of  a  sketch  of  his  life  in  a  London  paper  could  find 
nothing  better  to  mention  as  a  personal  trait  than  that 
he  was  for  years  a  great  cigar  smoker,  but  had  lately 
taken  to  a  pipe,  perhaps  because  the  war  made  it  diffi- 
cult to  get  his  favourite  cigars.  For  any  other  man  of 
note,  the  journalist  would  have  found  it  easy  to  collect 
a  store  of  personal  detail. 

In  the  years  before  the  war  he  used  to  spend  his 
periods  of  leave  at  his  Breton  home,  and  arrange,  if 
possible,  to  have  his  soldier  son-in-law  with  him  there. 
The  war  has  made  sad  inroads  into  the  little  circle  that 
used  to  assemble  at  Trefeunteuniou.  His  only  son, 
Lieutenant  Germain  Foch,  has  been  killed  in  action, 
and  one  of  his  daughters  has  been  widowed. 

In  his  writings  Foch  dwells  upon  duty  and  discipline 
as  the  guiding  ideals  of  a  soldier's  character.  They  have 
been  the  guides  of  his  own  career;  but  no  true  impres- 
sion of  the  man  can  be  formed,  unless  we  bear  in  mind 
that  with  Ferdinand  Foch  himself  the  idea  of  duty  and 
discipline  has  a  higher  sanction  than  military  tradition. 
From  his  boyhood  the  religion  that  he  was  taught  in 
his  Pyrenean  home,  and  later  in  the  Jesuit  colleges,  has 
been  something  not  merely  to  be  professed  but  to  be 
practiced.  It  has  been  a  real  force  in  the  shaping  of  his 
great  career. 

The  faith  which  was  that  of  united  Christendom  for 
more  than  a  thousand  years  before  the  Revolution  of  the 
sixteenth  century,  and  which  in  our  day  has  more  ad- 
herents than  any  other  form  of  Christian  belief,  is  as- 
suredly, even  if  no  higher  claim  is  made  for  it,  one  that 
gives  to  men  a  clear  chart  by  which  to  set  their  course 
in  the  voyage  of  life.  It  gives  to  those  who  accept  its 
guidance  a  clearly  defined  rule  of  conduct,  and  plain 


284  MARSHAL  FERDINAND  FOCH 

answers  to  the  problems  of  time  and  eternity.  Our  sol- 
diers in  France  and  Flanders  have  learned  something 
of  its  practical  bearing  upon  the  lives  of  men.  For  not 
a  few  of  them,  the  crucifixes  standing  untouched  in 
ruined  villages  or  by  the  roadside,  amid  shell-torn  trees, 
have  come  to  be  strangely  impressive  symbols  of  the 
faith  that  stands  unbroken  amid  the  storms  of  life. 
They  have  seen,  too,  peasants  and  townsfolk  in  the 
churches  not  only  for  a  once-a-week  service  but  at  all 
hours  of  the  day,  and  soldiers  gathered  round  the  im- 
provised altars,  on  the  fighting  fronts,  and  even  in  the 
trenches  themselves. 

In  the  campaign  of  Lorraine  and  in  the  days  of  the 
Marne,  when  Foch  was  not  at  headquarters  behind  the 
war-front,  but  among  the  soldiers  in  the  actual  battle- 
front,  he  was  more  than  once  seen  kneeling  among  his 
officers  and  men  at  those  Masses  celebrated  under  the 
open  sky.  At  Doullens,  Cassel  and  Frevent,  day  after 
day,  he  found  time  for  the  morning  Mass,  and  in  some 
leisure  moments  of  the  day  went  again  to  pray  before 
the  altar.  On  the  morning  of  the  most  critical  day  of 
the  fight  by  the  marshes  of  St.  Gond,  he  appealed  to 
the  chaplains  for  their  prayers.  On  the  eve  of  his  last 
great  effort,  in  the  critical  summer  of  1918,  he  asked  for 
the  prayers  of  the  children  of  France.  The  editor  of  a 
Catholic  paper,  the  London  Universe,  passed  on  his  ap- 
peal to  the  Catholic  children  of  England,  and  was  able 
to  write  to  Marshal  Foch  that  thousands  of  them  were 
offering  their  communions  for  him.  Amid  the  pressure 
of  his  work,  the  Marshal  wrote  a  letter  of  thanks  for 
what  he  described  as  "  this  great  act  of  Faith." 

On  the  authority  of  one  who  was  with  him  at  his 
headquarters  we  know  that  on  the  evening  of  July  17th» 


PERSONAL  CHARACTERISTICS  285 

when  he  had  issued  his  final  orders  for  the  great  effort 
of  next  day,  he  laid  all  work  aside  to  find  time  for 
prayer.  He  had  told  his  staff  that  he  wished,  if  pos- 
sible, to  be  left  undisturbed  for  an  hour  or  so.  They 
naturally  thought  that  he  felt  he  needed  a  brief  rest. 
But  how  he  was  spending  the  hour  was  revealed  by  a 
mere  chance.  A  telegram  arrived  that  required  his  im- 
mediate attention.  He  was  sought  for  and  found  alone 
in  a  little  chapel  kneeling  in  prayer  before  the  Blessed 
Sacrament. 

In  the  minds  of  many  men,  the  idea  of  a  commander 
in  the  field,  who  brings  religion  into  his  daily  life,  is 
perhaps  obscured  by  the  thought  of  a  grim  Puritan 
soldier  such  as  Cromwell,  likening  himself  to  the  war- 
riors of  the  Old  Testament,  and  speaking  of  his  op- 
ponents as  the  Amalekite  and  the  Philistine,  to  be 
smitten  with  "  the  sword  of  the  Lord  and  of  Gideon." 
Or  perhaps  there  comes  the  memory  of  a  soldier  like 
Chinese  Gordon,  with  his  erratic  mysticism  and  his 
ideas  of  an  almost  personal  inspiration.  But  for  a 
Catholic  soldier  like  Foch,  his  religion  has  not  the  grim 
fanaticism  of  the  Cromwellian,  nor  does  its  clear  teach- 
ing lend  itself  to  visionary  self-delusion.  There  is  no 
temptation  for  the  general  in  command  to  imagine  him- 
self a  Heaven-guided  leader  of  men.  It  is  enough  for 
him  that  he  finds  help  in  prayer,  and  that  in  times  of 
danger  the  Sacraments  of  the  Church  are,  for  him  as 
well  as  for  the  simple  soldier  in  the  ranks,  the  well- 
known  way  of  preparation  to  face  death  as  the  begin- 
ning of  a  new  life. 

Napoleon  said  of  his  great  opponent,  the  Archduke 
Charles  of  Austria :  "  He  is  a  good  man — a  man  of 
irreproachable  conduct.     His  soul  belongs  to  the  heroic 


286  MARSHAL  TERDINAND  FOCH 

age;  his  heart  to  that  of  gold."  Ferdinand  Foch  de- 
serves the  same  testimony.  Or  we  may  compare  him 
to  one  of  the  chivalrous  types  of  an  earlier  day,  and 
describe  him,  like  Pierre  Bayard,  as  "  the  good  knight, 
without  fear  and  without  reproach." 


THE  END 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


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